Himachal Pradesh High Court
State Of H.P. & Another vs Tej Singh on 7 April, 2026
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
RSA No.194 of 2025
Decided on: 07.04.2026
.
State of H.P. & another ....Appellants
Versus
Tej Singh ...Respondent
Coram
of
Hon'ble Mr. Justice Romesh Verma, Judge
Whether approved for reporting?
For the appellants:
rt Mr. Manish Thakur, Deputy Advocate
General.
For the respondent: Mr. Amit Dhumal and Ms. Parul Negi,
Advocates.
Romesh Verma, Judge(oral)
The present appeal arises out of judgment and
decree, as passed by learned Additional District Judge, Sarkghat,
District Mandi, H.P., dated 31.05.2022, whereby judgment and
decree, as passed by learned Civil Judge (Jr. Division), Court
No.2, Sarkaghat, District Mandi, H.P. dated 20.05.2019 has been
affirmed.
2. Brief facts of the case are that the plaintiff/respondent
filed a suit for declaration and in alternative for permanent
prohibitory and mandatory injunction under Sections 37, 38 and
39 of Specific Relief Act. It was averred in the plaint that the land
comprised in Khata-Khatauni No.3/4 min bearing Khasra No.264
was recorded in the ownership and possession of the plaintiff as
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per jamabandi for the year 2008-2009. The defendants acquired
Khasra No.264/1, measuring 00-01-86 hectares, Khasra
.
No.264/2, measuring 00-00-78 hectares and Khasra No.264/3,
measuring 00-00-37 hectares, vide mutation No.109, dated
05.11.2009, Khasra No.264/4/1 vide mutation No.118 dated
25.07.2012. The defendants started construction of super
of
highway. During this process, the defendants encroached upon
the land of the plaintiff over Khasra No.264/4/2/1 land measuring
rt
00-01-16 hectares. Though, the plaintiff objected to the cutting of
the land by the defendants, however, the officials of the
defendants promised the plaintiff to pay the compensation if the
land of the plaintiff is cut down. During the construction of the
road, heavy machinery was deployed by the defendants to cut the
land of the plaintiff.
3. As per plaintiff he was constrained to approach the
Assistant Collector 2nd Grade for giving demarcation and to issue
the spot map on 08.11.2013. The demarcation was provided on
09.12.2013. After that, it transpired that the defendants have
encroached over Khasra No.264/4/2/1, thereby causing damage
to the cow shed as well as land of the plaintiff and made the land
unfit for cultivation and for construction of cow shed or any
construction as there were cultivating fields on the spot and the
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land has been made unfit for any cultivation. Therefore, the suit
was filed by the plaintiff with the prayer that the suit be decreed in
.
favour of the plaintiff, restraining the defendants causing any
interference over the suit land comprising Khasra No.264/4/2 land
measuring 00-01-16 hectares and mandatory injunction was also
sought against the defendants restoring the suit land into its
of
original position and in alternative a consequential relief for
possession was also sought from the learned trial Court.
4.
rt
The suit, as filed by the present respondent/plaintiff,
was contested by the appellants/defendants by filing written
statement. Preliminary objections with respect to maintainability,
estoppel, suppression, jurisdiction etc. were raised. On merits, it
was admitted that the road/super highway by name Jahu Kalkhar
road was constructed and the cutting was done during the
construction of the said road. It was submitted that the defendants
had acquired the land of the plaintiff and due compensation has
also been paid to the plaintiff. Further, it was submitted that in
addition to the land acquired of the plaintiff, if more land has been
acquired for the construction of the road then the plaintiff can
approach the competent authority for grant of compensation. The
defendants did not deny the encroachment over the suit land
while answering para-5 of the plaint on merits. It was not denied
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that the encroachment has been made by the defendants over
the suit land bearing Khasra No.264/4/2/1. Therefore, it was
.
prayed that the suit filed by the plaintiff be ordered to be
dismissed.
5. The plaintiff did not file the replication to the written
statement.
of
6. Learned trial Court framed the following issues on
11.04.2016:
1.
rt Whether plaintiff is entitled for injunction, as prayed
for? OPP
2. Whether the suit of the plaintiff is not maintainable in
the present form, as alleged? OPD.
3. Whether plaintiff has no cause of action to file the
present suit, as alleged? OPD
4. Whether plaintiff is estopped from filing the present
suit, by his own acts & conduct? OPD
5. Whether this Court has no jurisdiction to try the
present suit, as alleged? OPD
6. Whether plaintiff has suppressed the material facts
from this Court, as alleged? OPD
7. Relief.
7. Learned trial Court directed the respective parties to
adduce evidence in support their contentions and finally vide its
judgment and decree dated 20.05.2019, decreed the suit filed by
the plaintiff for mandatory injunction directing the defendants to
acquire the part of the suit land i.e. Khasra No.264/4/2/1 and to
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5pay compensation accordingly after conducting demarcation on
the spot.
.
8. Feeling dissatisfied, the present appellants preferred
an appeal in the Court of learned Additional District Judge,
Sarkghat, District Mandi, H.P., on 02.08.2021. In the said appeal,
the present respondent/plaintiff had also preferred the cross-
of
objections. Learned First Appellate Court vide its judgment and
decree dated 31.05.2022 dismissed the appeal, as preferred by
rt
the present appellants and the cross-objections filed by the
respondent/plaintiff were also ordered to be dismissed.
Consequently, the findings, as returned by learned trial Court,
were affirmed
9. Still feeling aggrieved, the State has approached this
Court by filing present regular second appeal.
10. It is contended by Mr. Manish Thakur, learned Deputy
Advocate General, that the judgments and decrees as passed by
learned Courts below are erroneous and liable to be quashed and
set aside. He submits that the respondent/plaintiff has given
implied and expressed consent for the construction of the road
and the suit, as filed by the plaintiff, was hopelessly time barred.
11. On the other hand, Mr. Amit Dhumal, learned counsel
for the respondent/plaintiff, has defended the judgments and
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decrees as passed by learned Courts below and submitted that
as per mandate of Hon’ble Apex Court, no person can be
.
deprived of his property without adopting due process of law. He
further submitted that, in view of concurrent findings of fact, no
interference is warranted in the present appeal.
12. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and
of
have also scanned the case file.
13. With the consent of learned counsel for the parties,
rt
the appeal is finally heard at the admission stage.
14. Admittedly, in the present case, the land owned by
the present respondent/plaintiff has been utilized for the
construction of the road/super highway. In order to prove the case
in hand, the plaintiff has placed on record a copy of demarcation
report Ext PW-4/A. A perusal of the report reveals that the State
has utilized the suit land. The said document has not been
rebutted by the State in any manner. The demarcation report
clearly reveals that the land of the plaintiff/respondent has been
encroached/utilized for the construction of the road. Therefore,
the submission, as made by learned counsel for the State that no
encroachment has been made by the State over the suit land, is
found to be incorrect.
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15. In order to substantiate his case, the plaintiff has
examined himself as PW-1. While deposing, he has categorically
.
stated that he is the owner of the suit land and not only the road
has been constructed even the remaining land has been
destroyed by the State. Though, in the cross-examination, he has
admitted that in pursuance to the construction of the road, certain
of
land of the plaintiff was acquired, however, the acquisition was
not carried out qua the entire utilized land.
16.
rt
PW-2 Tek Chand, in his deposition, has stated that
he is the former President of Gram Panchayat. He stated that
over the suit land, the State has raised the construction of Super
Highway and adjoining to the same the land of the plaintiff is
situated. During the construction of the road, the remaining
portion of the land of the plaintiff was destroyed. Although, the
plaintiff stopped the officials of the State Government not to raise
the construction, however, they did not pay heed to his request.
17. PW-3, Rattan Chand, Senior Assistant in the office of
Tehsildar, Baldwara, District Mandi, H.P. has brought the record.
18. PW-4. is the statement Som Dutt, who has stated in
his deposition that, on 9th December, 2013, on the application of
the plaintiff, the Local Commissioner demarcated the suit land.
Tatima has been prepared by him and is duly singed by him.
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19. In order to rebut the case of the plaintiff, the
defendant has examined DW-1 Arvind Bhardwaj. He stated that
.
he is working as SDO in the Public Works Department. He further
stated that prior to the construction of the road, the land had been
acquired and the appropriate compensation was paid to the
landholders. The State/defendant never raised any encroachment
of
over the suit land. He further stated that cow shed and the
remaining land of the plaintiff was never damaged in any manner.
rt
In the cross-examination, he has categorically admitted that qua
the utilization of the suit land, no process was started by the State
till date. He further admitted that, after the institution of the
present suit, no steps were taken by the State Government for the
acquisition of land utilized by the defendants. He further admitted
that qua the utilization of the suit land, no amount of
compensation has been paid to the plaintiff.
20. The admitted facts of the case are that the suit land
has been utilized by the State/appellants for the construction of
the road. In the present case, the suit has been filed by the
plaintiff on the basis of title and the title of the respondent has not
been disputed by the present appellants. The demarcation report
Ext. PW-4/A clearly shows that the land of the present respondent
has been utilized for the construction of the road.
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21. The Hon’ble Apex Court has in various cases held
.
that no person can be deprived of his property without adopting
due process of law. In the present case, as per clear cut
admission on the part of DW-1 that the suit land which has been
utilized by the State has neither been acquired nor amount of
of
compensation has been paid to him, clinches the entire
controversy. The submission of Mr. Manish Thakur, learned
rt
Deputy Advocate General, that the respondent has given oral
consent for the construction of the road is dehors the record. He
has failed to show any document from the record which indicates
that there is any implied or express consent for the construction of
the said road. Therefore, the said submission does not hold good.
22. As far as the submission as made by learned counsel
for the appellants that the Suit as filed by the respondent is highly
belated, it is well settled principle of law that the State cannot
claim adverse possession against its citizen. Thus the suit on the
basis of title cannot be said to be time barred, which right could
only be defeated by proof of perfection of title by way of adverse
possession by the other.
23. Admittedly, the respondent/plaintiff is the title holder
of the suit property. Being owner of the suit property, he may file a
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suit at any stage until and unless the said right is defeated by the
present appellants/ defendants by perfection of title by way of
.
adverse possession.
24. Being the owner of the suit land, the
plaintiff/respondent was well within his right to file a suit for
injunction and mandatory injunction since the suit land was
of
utilized by the State for construction of the road in question
without adopting due process of law including the payment of
rt
amount of compensation.
25. Admittedly, the defendants/appellants were not in
possession of any document to show that the plaintiffs had
consented for construction of road through the suit land.
26. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Vidya Devi vs. State of
Himachal Pradesh & others (2020) 2 SCC 569 has held that no
person can be forcibly dispossess of his property without any
legal sanction and without following the due process of law and
depriving her payment of just and fair compensation. The State
being a welfare State governed by the rule of law cannot arrogate
to itself a status beyond what is provided by the Constitution. The
Court has held as follows:
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“12. We have heard learned Counsel for the parties and
perused the record.
12.1. The Appellant was forcibly expropriated of her
.
property in 1967, when the right to property was a
fundamental right guaranteed by Article 31 in Part III of
the Constitution. Vidaya Devi vs The State Of HimachalPradesh on 8 January, 2020 Article 31 guaranteed the
right to private property 1, which could not be deprived
without due process of law and upon just and fairof
compensation.
12.2. The right to property ceased to be a fundamental
right by the Constitution (Forty Fourth Amendment) Act,
rt
1978, however, it continued to be a human right 2 in awelfare State, and a Constitutional right under Article 300
A of the Constitution. Article 300 A provides that no
person shall be deprived of his property save by authority
of law. The State cannot dispossess a citizen of hisproperty except in accordance with the procedure
established by law. The obligation to pay compensation,though not expressly included in Article 300 A, can be
inferred in that Article The State of West Bengal v.
Subodh Gopal Bose and Ors. AIR 1954 SC 92. 2
Tukaram Kana Joshi & Ors. v. M.I.D.C. & Ors. (2013) 1SCC 353.
12.3. To forcibly dispossess a person of his private
property, without following due process of law, would be
violative of a human right, as also the constitutional right
under Article 300 A of the Constitution. Reliance is placed
on the judgment in Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd.
v. Darius Shapur Chenai4, wherein this Court held that:
” 6. … Having regard to the provisions contained in
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12exercise of its power of “eminent domain” may
interfere with the right of property of a person by
acquiring the same but the same must be for a.
public purpose and reasonable compensation
therefor must be paid.” (emphasis supplied)
12.4 In N. Padmamma v. S. Ramakrishna Reddy5, thisCourt held that:
“21. If the right of property is a human right as also
a constitutional right, the same cannot be takenof
away except in accordance with law. Article 300A
of the Constitution protects such right. The
rt provisions of the Act seeking to divest such right,
keeping in view of the provisions of Article 300A ofthe Constitution of India, must be strictly
construed.” (emphasis supplied) 4 (2005) 7 SCC
627.
12.5 In Delhi Airtech Services Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. v. Stateof U.P. & Ors., this Court recognized the right to property
as a basic human right in the following words:
“30. It is accepted in every jurisprudence and by
different political thinkers that some amount ofproperty right is an indispensable safeguard
against tyranny and economic oppression of theGovernment. Jefferson was of the view that liberty
cannot long subsist without the support of property.
“Property must be secured, else liberty cannot subsist”
was the opinion of John Adams. Indeed the view that
property itself is the seed bed which must be conserved if
other constitutional values are to flourish is the
consensus among political thinkers and jurists.”
(emphasis supplied)
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12.6 In Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar v. State of Gujarat,7
this Court held as follows :
“48. …In other words, Article 300A only limits the
.
powers of the State that no person shall be
deprived of his property save by authority of law.
There has to be no deprivation without anysanction of law. Deprivation by any other mode is
not acquisition or taking possession under Article
300A. In other words, if there is no law, there is noof
deprivation.” (emphasis supplied) 10.3. In this
case, the Appellant could not have been forcibly
rt dispossessed of her property without any legal
sanction, and without following due process of law,there is no deprivation.”
12.7 In this case, the Appellant could not have been
forcibly dispossessed of her property without any legal
sanction, and without following due process of law, and
depriving her 6 (2011) 9 SCC 354. 7 (1995) Supp. 1 SCC
596. payment of just compensation, being a fundamental
right on the date of forcible dispossession in 1967.
12.8. The contention of the State that the Appellant or her
predecessors had “orally” consented to the acquisition is
completely baseless. We find complete lack of authority
and legal sanction in compulsorily divesting the Appellant
of her property by the State.
12.9. In a democratic polity governed by the rule of law,
the State could not have deprived a citizen of their
property without the sanction of law. Reliance is placed
on the judgment of this Court in Tukaram Kana Joshi &
Ors. v. M.I.D.C. & Ors. wherein it was held that the State
must comply with the procedure for acquisition,
requisition, or any other permissible statutory mode. The
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State being a welfare State governed by the rule of law
cannot arrogate to itself a status beyond what is provided
by the Constitution.
.
12.10. This Court in State of Haryana v. Mukesh Kumar
held that the right to property is now considered to be not
only a constitutional or statutory right, but also a human
right. 8 (2013) 1 SCC 353. Human rights have been
considered in the realm of individual rights such as right
to shelter, livelihood, health, employment, etc. Human
of
rights have gained a multi− faceted dimension.
12.11. We are surprised by the plea taken by the State
before the High Court, that since it has been in
rt
continuous possession of the land for over 42 years, it
would tantamount to “adverse” possession. The State
being a welfare State, cannot be permitted to take the
plea of adverse possession, which allows a trespasser
i.e. a person guilty of a tort, or even a crime, to gain legal
title over such property for over 12 years. The State
cannot be permitted to perfect its title over the land by
invoking the doctrine of adverse possession to grab the
property of its own citizens, as has been done in the
present case.
12.12. The contention advanced by the State of delay
and laches of the Appellant in moving the Court is also
liable to be rejected. Delay and laches cannot be raised
in a case of a continuing cause of action, or if the
circumstances shock the judicial conscience of the Court.
Condonation of delay is a matter of judicial discretion,
which must be exercised judiciously and reasonably in
the facts and circumstances of a case. It will depend
upon the breach of fundamental rights, and the remedy
claimed, and when and how the delay arose. There is no
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period of limitation prescribed for the courts to exercise
their constitutional jurisdiction to do substantial justice.
12.13. In a case where the demand for justice is so
.
compelling, a constitutional Court would exercise its
jurisdiction with a view to promote justice, and not defeat
it.
12.14. In Tukaram Kana Joshi & Ors. v. M.I.D.C. &
Ors.,10 this Court while dealing with a similar fact
situation, held as follows : “There are authorities which
of
state that delay and laches extinguish the right to put
forth a claim. Most of these authorities pertain to service
jurisprudence, grant of compensation for a wrong done to
rt
them decades ago, recovery of statutory dues, claim for
educational facilities and other categories of similar
cases, etc. Though, it is true that there are a few
authorities that lay down that delay and laches debar a
citizen from seeking remedy, even if his fundamental right
has been violated, under Article 9 P.S. Sadasivaswamy v.
State of T.N. (1975) 1 SCC 152. 10 (2013) 1 SCC 353. 32
or 226 of the Constitution, the case at hand deals with a
different scenario altogether. Functionaries of the State
took over possession of the land belonging to the
Appellants without any sanction of law. The Appellants
had asked repeatedly for grant of the benefit of
compensation. The State must either comply with the
procedure laid down for acquisition, or requisition, or any
other permissible statutory mode.” (emphasis supplied)
13. In the present case, the Appellant being an illiterate
person, who is a widow coming from a rural area has
been deprived of her private property by the State without
resorting to the procedure prescribed by law. The
Appellant has been divested of her right to property
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without being paid any compensation whatsoever for over
half a century. The cause of action in the present case is
a continuing one, since the Appellant was compulsorily
.
expropriated of her property in 1967 without legal
sanction or following due process of law. The present
case is one where the demand for justice is so
compelling since the State has admitted that the land was
taken over without initiating acquisition proceedings, or
any procedure known to law. We exercise our
of
extraordinary jurisdiction under Articles 136 and 142 of
the Constitution, and direct the State to pay
compensation to the appellant.
rt
27. To the similar effect, the Hon’ble Apex Court in
(2022) 7 SCC 508 titled as Sukh Dutt Ratra and another vs.
State of H.P. and others has held as under:
“14. It is the cardinal principle of the rule of law, that
nobody can be deprived of liberty or property without dueprocess, or authorization of law. The recognition of this
dates back to the 1700s to the decision of the King’sBench in Entick v. Carrington17 and by this court in Wazir
Chand v. The State of Himachal Pradesh18. Further, inseveral judgments, this court has repeatedly held that
rather than enjoying a wider bandwidth of lenience, the
State often has a higher responsibility in demonstrating
that it has acted within the confines of legality, and
therefore, not tarnished the basic principle of the rule of
law.
15. When it comes to the subject of private property, this
court has upheld the high threshold of legality that must
be met, to dispossess an individual of their property, and::: Downloaded on – 17/04/2026 20:34:57 :::CIS
17even more so when done by the State. In Bishandas v.
State of Punjab19 this court rejected the contention that
the petitioners in the case were trespassers and could be.
removed by an executive order, and instead concluded
that the executive action taken by the State and its
officers, was destructive of the basic principle of the ruleof law. This court, in another case – State of Uttar
Pradesh and Ors. v. Dharmander Prasad Singh and Ors.
20, held: “A lessor, with the best of title, has no right toof
resume possession extra-judicially by use of force, from a
lessee, even after the expiry or earlier termination of the
lease by forfeiture or otherwise. The use of the
rt
expression ‘re-entry’ in the lease-deed does not authoriseextrajudicial methods to resume possession. Under law,
the possession of a lessee, even after the expiry or its
earlier termination is juridical possession and forcible
dispossession is prohibited; a lessee cannot bedispossessed otherwise than in due course of law. In the
present case, the fact that the lessor is the State does notplace it in any higher or better position. On the contrary, it
is under an additional inhibition stemming from therequirement that all actions of Government and
Governmental authorities should have a ‘legal pedigree'”.
16. Given the important protection extended to an
individual vis-a-vis their private property (embodied
earlier in Article 31, and now as a constitutional right in
Article 300-A), and the high threshold the State must
meet while acquiring land, the question remains – can the
State, merely on the ground of delay and laches, evade
its legal responsibility towards those from whom private
property has been expropriated? In these facts and
circumstances, we find this conclusion to be
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unacceptable, and warranting intervention on the grounds
of equity and fairness.
17. When seen holistically, it is apparent that the State’s
.
actions, or lack thereof, have in fact compounded the
injustice meted out to the appellants and compelled them
to approach this court, albeit belatedly. The initiation of
acquisition proceedings initially in the 1990s occurred
only at the behest of the High Court. Even after such
judicial intervention, the State continued to only extend
of
the benefit of the court’s directions to those who
specifically approached the courts. The State’s
lackadaisical conduct is discernible from this action of
rt
initiating acquisition proceedings selectively, only in
respect to the lands of those writ petitioners who had
approached the court in earlier proceedings, and not
other land owners, pursuant to the orders dated
23.04.2007 (in CWP No. 1192/2004) and 20.12.2013 (in
CWP No. 1356/2010) respectively. In this manner, at
every stage, the State sought to shirk its responsibility of
acquiring land required for public use in the manner
prescribed by law.
18. There is a welter of precedents on delay and laches
which conclude either way – as contended by both sides
in the present dispute – however, the specific factual
matrix compels this court to weigh in favour of the
appellant-land owners. The State cannot shield itself
behind the ground of delay and laches in such a situation;
there cannot be a ‘limitation’ to doing justice. This court in
a much earlier case – Maharashtra State Road Transport
Corporation v. Balwant Regular Motor Service, held:
’11……”Now the doctrine of laches in Courts of
Equity is not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine.
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Where it would be practically unjust to give a
remedy, either because the party has, by his
conduct, done that which might fairly be regarded.
as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his
conduct and neglect he has, though perhaps not
waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in asituation in which it would not be reasonable to
place him if the remedy were afterwards to be
asserted in either of these cases, lapse of timeof
and delay are most material.
But in every case, if an argument against
relief, which otherwise would be just, is founded
rt
upon mere delay, that delay of course notamounting to a bar by any statute of limitations,
the validity of that defence must be tried upon
principles substantially equitable. Two
circumstances, always important in such cases,are, the length of the delay and the nature of the
acts done during the interval, which might affecteither party and cause a balance of justice or
injustice in taking the one course or the other, sofar as relates to the remedy.”
19. The facts of the present case reveal that the
State has, in a clandestine and arbitrary manner,
actively tried to limit disbursal of compensation as
required by law, only to those for which it was
specifically prodded by the courts, rather than to
all those who are entitled. This arbitrary action,
which is also violative of the appellants’ prevailing
Article 31 right (at the time of cause of action),
undoubtedly warranted consideration, and
intervention by the High Court, under its Article
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226 jurisdiction. This court, in Manohar (supra) – a
similar case where the name of the aggrieved had
been deleted from revenue records leading to his
.
dispossession from the land without payment of
compensation – held: 6″Having heard the learned
counsel for the appellants, we are satisfied that the
case projected before the court by the appellants
is utterly untenable and not worthy of emanating
from any State which professes the least regard to
of
being a welfare State. When we pointed out to the
learned counsel that, at this stage at least, the
State should be gracious enough to accept its
rt
mistake and promptly pay the compensation to the
respondent, the State has taken an intractable
attitude and persisted in opposing what appears to
be a just and reasonable claim of the respondent.
Ours is a constitutional democracy and the
rights available to the citizens are declared by the
Constitution. Although Article 19(1)(f) was deleted
by the Forty-fourth Amendment to the Constitution,
Article 300-A has been placed in the Constitution,
which reads as follows: “300-A. Persons not to be
deprived of property save by authority of law.–No
person shall be deprived of his property save by
authority of law.” 8.This is a case where we find
utter lack of legal authority for deprivation of the
respondent’s property by the appellants who are
State authorities. In our view, this case was an
eminently fit one for exercising the writ jurisdiction
of the High Court under Article 226 of the
Constitution…
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20. Again, in Tukaram Kana Joshi (supra) while
dealing with a similar fact situation, this court held
as follows: (SCC p. 359 para11)
.
“11”There are authorities which state that delay
and laches extinguish the right to put forth a claim.
Most of these authorities pertain to servicejurisprudence, grant of compensation for a wrong
done to them decades ago, recovery of statutory
dues, claim for educational facilities and otherof
categories of similar cases, etc. Though, it is true
that there are a few authorities that lay down that
delay and laches debar a citizen from seeking
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remedy, even if his fundamental right has beenviolated, under Article 32 or 226 of the
Constitution, the case at hand deals with a
different scenario altogether. The functionaries of
the State took over possession of the landbelonging to the appellants without any sanction of
law. The appellants had asked repeatedly for grantof the benefit of compensation. The State must
either comply with the procedure laid down foracquisition, or requisition, or any other permissible
statutory mode.”
21. Having considered the pleadings filed, this
court finds that the contentions raised by the State,
do not inspire confidence and deserve to be
rejected. The State has merely averred to the
appellants’ alleged verbal consent or the lack of
objection, but has not placed any material on
record to substantiate this plea. Further, the State
was unable to produce any evidence indicating
that the land of the appellants had been taken over
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22
or acquired in the manner known to law, or that
they had ever paid any compensation. It is
pertinent to note that this was the State’s position,
.
and subsequent findings of the High Court in 2007
as well, in the other writ proceedings.”
28. The similar position has been reiterated and relied
upon by the Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court in CWP No. 491
of
of 2022, titled as Sakuntla Devi and another vs. State of
Himachal Pradesh & another dated 20.10.2023. After relying
rt
upon the judgment of the Apex Court in Vidya Devi & Sukh Dutt
Ratra‘s case, the Court held as follows:
“7. In the aforesaid judgments, Hon’ble Apex Court has
categorically held that contention advanced by the Stateof delay and laches of the appellant in moving the Court
is liable to be rejected especially when it is not in disputethat petitioner are suffering continuous loss coupled with
the fact that they repeatedly requested the authorities toinitiate acquisition proceedings.
8. If the aforesaid judgments are read in their entirety, it
clearly emerges that land owners cannot be deprived of
their land, without following due process of law. If it is so,
ground raised by the respondents that petitioners have
made their land available with consent, is of no
consequence rather, this court, having taken note of the
fact that the land of petitioners stands utilized for the
construction of road in question, is compelled to agree
with the submission of learned counsel for the petitioners
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23utilized by respondents for construction of road in
question.
10. Admittedly, land of the petitioners stands utilized for
.
construction of road but till date, they have not been paid
any amount, which action of the respondent-State
certainly amounts to forcible dispossession of thepetitioners from their land, which is violative of provision
contained under Art. 300-A of the Constitution of India.
14. In case titled, State of Himachal Pradesh v. Umed
of
Ram Sharma (1986) 2 SCC 68, Hon’ble Apex Court has
held that entire State of Himachal Pradesh is a hilly area
and without workable roads, no communication is
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possible; every person is entitled to life as enjoined inArticle 21 of the Constitution of India; every person has
right under Article 19 (1) (b) of the Constitution of India to
move freely, throughout the territory of India; for the
residents of hilly areas, access to road is access to lifeitself. Stand taken by the respondents that there was a
policy for providing roads on demand of residents as afavour to them on conditions that they would not claim
compensation, cannot be sustained because such standis violative of Article 300A of the Constitution of India.
15. In case titled Hari Krishna Mandir Trust v. State of
Maharashtra and others, 2020 9 SCC 356, Hon’ble Apex
Court has held that though right to property is not a
fundamental right, but it is still a constitutional right under
Article 300A of the Constitution of India and also a human
right; in view of the mandate of Article 300A, no person
can be deprived of his property save by the authority of
law. No doubt, State possesses the power to take or
control the property of the owner of the land for the::: Downloaded on – 17/04/2026 20:34:57 :::CIS
24benefit of public, but at the same time, it is obliged to
compensate the injury by making just compensation.”
.
29. No other point was raised by the learned counsel for
the parties.
30. Both the Courts below have rightly appreciated the
point in controversy after considering the oral as well as
of
documentary evidence placed on record. No question of law
much less substantial question of law arises in the present case.
31.
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In view of above, the present appeal being devoid of
any merit deserves to be dismissed. Ordered accordingly.
Pending application(s), if any, also stands disposed of.
( Romesh Verma )
Judge
7th April, 2026
(vt)
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