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HomeSri.Gopalappa vs Mr.Dwarakanth on 10 April, 2026

Sri.Gopalappa vs Mr.Dwarakanth on 10 April, 2026

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Karnataka High Court

Sri.Gopalappa vs Mr.Dwarakanth on 10 April, 2026

                              -1-
                                         RFA No. 1661 of 2012


     IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU

         DATED THIS THE 10TH DAY OF APRIL, 2026

                           PRESENT
        THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE JAYANT BANERJI
                             AND
          THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE K. V. ARAVIND
      REGULAR FIRST APPEAL NO. 1661 OF 2012 (SP)
BETWEEN:

SRI.GOPALAPPA,
AGED ABOUT 61 YEARS,
S/O MUTHAPPA,
RESIDING AT NO.765/A,
15TH MAIN, 7TH CROSS,
BTM LAYOUT, MICO LAYOUT,
BANGALORE-560 076.
                                                  ...APPELLANT
(BY SRI B.R.VISHWANATH., ADVOCATE)
AND:

1.    MR.DWARAKANTH,
      AGED ABOUT 49 YEARS,
      SON OF B.VISVESWARAIAH,

2.    MRS.GAYATHRI DWARAKANATH,
      AGED ABOUT 45 YEARS,
      WIFE OF DWARAKANATH,

      BOTH ARE RESIDING AT
      NO.17/1, 4TH MODEL HOUSE STREET,
      BASAVANAGUDI,
      BANGALORE-560 004.

3.    MR.V.K.MOHAMMED ISMAIL,
      AGED ABOUT 51 YEARS,
      SON OF LATE HABIBULLAH AND K.CHOTIBI,
      RESIDING AT NO.45, ALABADAR HOUSE,
      2ND CROSS, KHBCS LAYOUT,
      BANGALORE-560 078.

4.    MR.ARUN CHAWLA,
      AGED ABOUT 27 YEARS,
                                -2-
                                          RFA No. 1661 of 2012


    SON OF MOHAN CHAWLA,
    RESIDING AT NO.79/124,
    6TH MAIN, 36TH CROSS,
    5TH BLOCK, JAYANAGAR,
    BANGALORE-560 041.
                                              ...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI.S.GANGADHAR AITHAL., ADVOCATE FOR C/R4;
    R1 AND R2 SERVED UNREPRESENTED;
    V/O DTD 07.10.2024 NOTICE TO R3 HELD SUFFICIENT)


      THIS REGULAR FIRST APPEAL IS FILED U/SEC.96 R/W ORDER
XLI RULE 1 OF CPC AGAINST THE JUDGMENT AND DECREE DATED
04.08.2012 PASSED IN O.S.NO.9153/2004 ON THE FILE OF THE V
ADDITIONAL CITY CIVIL JUDGE, BANGALORE, PARTLY DECREEING
THE SUIT FOR SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE ETC.
     THIS REGULAR FIRST APPEAL HAVING BEEN HEARD AND
RESERVED FOR JUDGMENT COMING ON FOR 'PRONOUNCEMENT OF
JUDGMENT' THIS DAY, JAYANT BANERJI J., MADE THE
FOLLOWING:

CORAM:    HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE JAYANT BANERJI
          AND
          HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE K. V. ARAVIND

                        CAV JUDGMENT

(PER: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE JAYANT BANERJI)

This is the plaintiff’s appeal seeking modification of the

SPONSORED

judgment and decree dated 04.08.2012 passed by the 5th

Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge, Bangalore, in OS No.

9153/2004 and to decree the suit filed by the plaintiff as

prayed for. The plaintiff filed a suit for specific performance in

respect of the suit schedule property, which was partly decreed

with costs. It was decreed that the 1st defendant, who is the

respondent no. 1 herein shall refund the earnest money of

Rs.5,00,000/- (Rupees Five Lakhs) to the plaintiff with costs
-3-
RFA No. 1661 of 2012

and interest at the rate of 18% per annum from the date of suit

till the date of realisation of the decreetal amount. The suit

against the defendant nos. 2 to 4 was dismissed.

2. For the sake of convenience, the parties are being

referred to as per their ranking before the trial Court.

Pleadings:

3. The suit was filed by the plaintiff on 10.12.2004

with the following prayers:-

“PRAYER

“WHEREFORE, the plaintiff prays for a Judgment
and Decree against the Defendants for Specific
Performance:

a) directing the Defendants to execute the sale deed
in favour of the plaintiff in pursuance of the
Agreement/Memorandum of Understanding dated
07.01.2004.

b) if the defendants fail to execute the sale deed in
favour of the plaintiff. This Hon’ble Court be
pleased to execute the same in favour of the
Plaintiff.

c) Restraining the Defendants their workmen, agents
or anybody claiming through them from interfering
with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the
-4-
RFA No. 1661 of 2012

suit schedule property by decree of permanent
injunction.

IN ALTERNATIVE

d) If the specific performance cannot be granted by
this Hon’ble Court to direct the Defendant to pay
Rs.5,00,000/- with interest at the rate of 24% p.a.
from the date of agreement till the date of payment
and also damages of Rupees Fifty Lakhs to the
plaintiff.”

e) for such other and further reliefs as this Hon’ble
Court deems fit to grant under the circumstances
of the case with costs in the interest of justice and
equity”

4. The plaint case in brief is that the 1st defendant

entered into a Memorandum of Understanding1 with the plaintiff

on 07.01.2004 in respect of suit schedule property, by which

the plaintiff was nominated to be the purchaser of the suit

schedule property, in which MOU, a representation was made

by the 1st defendant that he has an understanding with the 3rd

defendant for the purchase of the suit schedule property. The

price agreed for the nomination and assignment inclusive of the

sale consideration to be paid to the owner, that is, the 3rd

defendant in respect of the suit schedule property was agreed

as Rs.78,00,000/- (Rupees Seventy Eight Lakhs). As per the

terms of MOU, the plaintiff is entitled to make payment of sale

1
MOU
-5-
RFA No. 1661 of 2012

consideration to the 3rd defendant directly and get the sale

deed executed in his favour or in favour of his nominee. An

advance of a sum of Rs.5,00,000/- (Rupees Five Lakhs) was

paid by the plaintiff by means of a cheque to the 1st defendant,

which was duly acknowledged. The sale was to be completed

within 3 months from the date of the MOU or within 1 month

from the date of the owner furnishing the original documents

relating to the scheduled property after getting the discharge of

loan from Sree Charan Co-operative Bank Ltd., of which Bank

the 1st defendant was the Chairman and Managing Director.

The 1st defendant represented that he would make

arrangements for discharge of the said loan and get the sale

deed executed by the 3rd defendant. The 3rd defendant also

agreed for the said arrangement. On 10.08.2004 the 1st

defendant sent a letter to the plaintiff stating that the deal may

get delayed and requested to take back the advance. The

plaintiff caused a legal notice to be issued stating that he is

ready to perform his part of the contract and is ready and

willing to get the seal deed executed in his favour; that the 1st

defendant is not entitled to unilaterally cancel the MOU. A reply

notice was given on behalf of 1st defendant by his counsel on

02.09.2004. The 1st defendant with an ulterior motive to cause

loss to the plaintiff, surreptitiously has got the two sale deeds
-6-
RFA No. 1661 of 2012

registered in his name own and in the name of the 2nd

defendant, who is the wife of the 1st defendant. It is stated that

the defendants suppressed the actual market value of the suit

schedule property by getting the same registered for

Rs.37,50,000/-(Rupees Thirty Seven Lakhs Fifty Thousand)

against Rs.78,00,000/- (Rupees Seventy Eight Lakhs), which is

the actual value as per the MOU, and the said act of the

defendants confirmed that they have an intention to deprive

and cheat the plaintiff. The defendants were evading and

postponing the execution of the sale deed and were negotiating

with third parties to sell the property by suppressing the

transaction with the plaintiff. Since the defendants refused to

execute the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff as per the terms

of the said agreement, the suit was filed.

5. A written statement dated 30.08.2010 was filed by

the defendant nos. 1 and 2. It is stated that the 1st defendant

agreed only to be the facilitator for the sale of the suit schedule

property, of which the 3rd defendant was the owner, on terms

and conditions as per MOU. The time for completion of the

terms and conditions of the MOU is stated as three months or

one month from the date of furnishing/obtaining the original

documents and discharge of mortgage loan on the suit schedule
-7-
RFA No. 1661 of 2012

property by the 3rd defendant. Since the matter was getting

delayed for completion of the sale transaction within 3 months,

the 1st defendant by a letter dated 10.08.2004, requested the

plaintiff to receive back Rs.5,00,000/- (Rupees Five Lakh) and

cancel the MOU. However, the plaintiff demanded execution of

sale deed in respect of the suit schedule property.

5.2 Due to unforeseen and unavoidable circumstances,

the owners of the said property were not able to discharge their

obligations in time. It is stated that the MOU was entered into

for a limited purpose and it could not be treated as an

agreement of sale. The averment in the plaint that the suit

schedule property was worth Rs.78,00,000/- (Rupees Seventy

Eight Lakhs) during the year 2004 is stated to be ‘not correct’.

It is stated that only after cancellation of the MOU and

requesting the plaintiff to receive back his money, the 1st and

2nd defendants have purchased the suit schedule property after

raising loans by paying the prevailing market rate; that after

purchase of the suit schedule property, as the defendant nos. 1

and 2 were not in a position to look after their interest, they

jointly agreed to sell the suit schedule property for a sum of

Rs.50,00,000/- (Rupees Fifty Lakhs) and executed a registered
-8-
RFA No. 1661 of 2012

General Power of Attorney2 dated 24.02.2005 in favour of

Sri. Mohan Chavala. Through their registered GPA holder, the

1st and 2nd defendants sold the suit schedule property in favour

of Sri. Arjun Chavala for a total sum of Rs.50,00,000/- (Rupees

Fifty Lakhs) to discharge their debts and other family

commitments under a registered sale deed dated 24.08.2005

and delivered physical possession of the suit schedule property

to the said purchaser. It is stated that even as on date, the

defendants are ready and willing to pay back the amount of

Rs.5,00,000/- (Rupees Five Lakhs) to the plaintiff or to deposit

the said amount before the Court. It is stated that the MOU is

not an agreement of sale and not legally enforceable.

6. The 3rd defendant filed a written statement stating

that he had nothing to do with the alleged transaction between

the plaintiff and the defendant nos. 1 and 2. The plaint

averments are false and concocted. It is stated that, in

pursuance of an agreement to sell entered between the

defendant nos. 1 and 2, the defendant no. 3 and other owners,

executed a regular sale deed in favour of the defendant nos. 1

and 2. After payment of the sale consideration, possession has

been given to them.

2
GPA
-9-
RFA No. 1661 of 2012

7. Yet another written statement was filed by the

defendant no. 4. It is stated that the defendant no.4 is not a

necessary party. The defendant no. 4 purchased the suit

schedule property under a registered sale deed dated

24.08.2005 executed by Sri. Mohan Chavala, the registered

GPA holder of defendant nos. 1 and 2. There is no privity of

contract between the defendant no. 4 and the plaintiff. The

defendant no.4 is a bona fide purchaser for value without notice

of any agreement/MOU.

Issues:

8. On the basis of the submissions, the following

issues were framed:-

“i) Does the plaintiff prove that the defendants 1 & 2
assigned their interest in the schedule property in
his favour by executing a Memorandum of
Understanding on 07/01/2004?

ii) Does the plaintiff prove that he paid an amount of
Rs.5,00,000/- by way of advance to the first
defendant pursuant to MoU dated 07/01/2004?

iii) Does the plaintiff prove that he is always ready
and willing to perform his part of the contract?



     iv)    Does the 3rd defendant prove that the MoU
            dtd.7/1/2004        between     the     plaintiffs   and
            defendants 1 and 2, is not binding on him?
                                   - 10 -
                                                RFA No. 1661 of 2012


      v)      Does the 3rd defendant prove that in view of the

schedule property having been sold by him to
defendants 1 and 2, he is not under an obligation
to execute the sale deed in favour of plaintiff and
thus he is not a necessary party to the suit?

vi) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for relief of
specific performance or the alternative relief as
sought for?

vii) What decree or order?

9. Since the plaintiff had stated nothing in the plaint

about his possession over the suit schedule property, no issue

was framed by the trial Court as regards the relief of injunction.

The judgment of the trial court:

10. The plaintiff, Sri. Gopalappa, examined himself as

PW1. On behalf of the defendant, the 1st defendant examined

himself as DW1 and the defendant no.4 was examined as DW2.

On behalf of the plaintiff, Exs.P1 to P18 were marked. On

behalf of the defendants, Exs.D1 to D16 were marked.

11. The findings on the issues as recorded by the trial

Court are as follows:-

      1&2:          Affirmative
             3:     Negative
      4&5:          Affirmative
             6:     Partly in the affirmative
                                  - 11 -
                                                RFA No. 1661 of 2012


            7:       As per final order


12. After going through the terms of the MOU and the

submissions advanced on behalf of the parties as well as the

evidence, the trial Court noted that the contents of the MOU,

the conditions therein, the sale price fixed, receipt of earnest

money, etc. are those of an agreement of sale. Therefore the

Trial Court’s opinion was that the document is a sale agreement

and not an MOU as contended by defendant nos.1 and 2. The

trial Court also referred to the admissions made by the 1st

defendant in his cross-examination, on the basis of which, it

was gathered that the intention of the parties was only to enter

into a sale agreement in respect of the suit schedule property.

Accordingly, Issue Nos.1 and 2 were answered in the

affirmative.

13. As regards Issue No.3, it was held that the plaintiff

had not acted as per the MOU and did not issue any notice to

the defendants within 3 months showing his readiness and

willingness with all money ready with him. It was noted that

after lapse of 7 months, the defendant himself wrote a letter

dated 10.08.2004 requesting the plaintiff to cancel the MOU

dated 07.01.2004. It was observed that in all the transactions,

neither the 1st defendant nor the 2nd defendant was shown as

– 12 –

RFA No. 1661 of 2012

the owners of the suit property. The alleged agreement

between the 1st defendant and the 3rd defendant was not

collected by the plaintiff when he entered into the MOU (Ex.P1).

It was held that non-production of agreement between the 1st

defendant and the 3rd defendant was fatal to the case of the

plaintiff.

14. It was held that the plaintiff was not ready and

willing to perform his part of the contract. On the date of

transaction (MOU), the 1st defendant and 2nd defendant were

not the owners of the property. As per the evidence available,

the 1st defendant and the 2nd defendant purchased the suit

property on 18.11.2004 and thereafter sold the same during

pendency of the suit. The suit was filed by the plaintiff on

10.12.2004. It was held that the documents-Exs.P1 to P10 did

not disclose the plaintiff’s readiness and willingness well within

three months as per the recitals in the agreement (MOU). It

was noted that after purchasing the property, the 4th defendant

started constructions and the building was completed as per

Exs.D13 and D14; that in the cross-examination the PW1 had

admitted that under Ex.P1 (MOU), time was the essence of

contract; that he also admitted that the 1st defendant had

written a letter to him as per Ex.P2 which is a letter dated

– 13 –

RFA No. 1661 of 2012

10.08.2004 issued by the 1st defendant requesting the plaintiff

to receive back his earnest money and to cancel the MOU.

15. It is pertinent to mention here that a memo dated

20.07.2012 was filed by the plaintiff in which it was stated that

sale consideration being offered by the plaintiff as per the

terms of the MOU is Rs.78,00,000/- (Rupees Seventy Eight

Lakhs), and the plaintiff has been always ready and willing to

pay the balance sale consideration to the defendants. He also

stated that he is ready and willing to pay the cost of

improvement made on the property by the 4th defendant as

may be estimated by a competent Engineer.

16. With regard to this memo, the trial Court held that

it was not sustainable in law. It was observed that the memo

was filed to fill up the lacuna in the evidence and the

admissions made by the plaintiff. Objections were filed to this

memo by the 4th defendant. Accordingly, the memo was

rejected by the trial Court holding that the offer made by the

plaintiff could not be accepted at that stage, when the plaintiff

is entitled for alternative relief of refund of earnest money with

substantial interest. Therefore, the trial Court answered Issue

No.3, in the negative.

– 14 –

RFA No. 1661 of 2012

17. With regard to Issue Nos. 4 and 5, it was held that

the third defendant was not a party to the MOU (Ex.P1). He

was also not the attesting or consenting witness to the MOU.

Even the defendant no. 2 was not a party to the MOU. No

consent of the 3rd defendant was taken by the plaintiff before

entering into the MOU with the defendant no.1. The 3rd

defendant honestly sold the property in favour of the defendant

nos.1 and 2. The 3rd defendant was found to be not a necessary

party to the suit. The suit against him deserved to be

dismissed. It was also observed that the plaintiff had not taken

any summons to examine the 3rd defendant. Accordingly, the

Issue Nos. 4 and 5 were answered in the affirmative in favour

of the 3rd defendant.

18. As regards Issue No.6, it was held that when the

plaintiff had not proved his readiness and willingness, the

question of granting decree of specific performance did not

arise. As admitted by the plaintiff himself in the cross-

examination, the 4th defendant had constructed a four storied

building investing huge amount and some portion was already

leased to tenants for commercial purpose. It was held that

even in the entire evidence of DW2, the learned counsel for the

plaintiff had not elicited anything trustworthy to show that the

– 15 –

RFA No. 1661 of 2012

4th defendant purchased the suit property with all knowledge of

the MOU and the litigation pending before the Court in respect

of the suit schedule property. It was observed that the

defendant nos.1 and 2 purchased the suit schedule property

under two registered sale deeds dated 18.11.2004. The suit

was filed on 10.12.2004. The defendant nos.1 and 2, in turn,

sold the property in favour of the 4th defendant by registered

sale deed dated 24.08.2005. However, the 4th defendant was

impleaded in the suit after lapse of five years from the date of

sale.

19. The evidence of the 4th defendant was found to be

unimpeachable that he was a bona fide purchaser. It was

observed that, if the Court granted a decree of specific

performance, greater hardship will be caused to the 4th

defendant and it would amount to multiplicity of proceedings.

Therefore, the Court granted the decree for refund of the

earnest money with interest and cost of the suit. The

alternative prayer made by the plaintiff for damages of

Rs.50,00,000/- (Rupees Fifty Lakhs) was declined for the

reason that there is no clause in the MOU for grant of liquidated

damages on the breach of agreement by either side. The

plaintiff also had not paid any Court fee to consider such relief.

It was held that the plaintiff is entitled for refund of earnest

– 16 –

RFA No. 1661 of 2012

money with interest. Accordingly, Issue No.6 was answered by

the trial Court partly in the affirmative. Accordingly, the suit

was partly decreed as aforesaid.

Points for determination:

20. The points for determination would be:-

i) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to a decree of
specific performance of the MOU?

      ii)    Whether time      was       the   essence   of   the
             contract?

iii) Whether the plaintiff is ready and willing to
perform his point of the contract?

iv) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for damages?

Evidence:

21. Ex.P1 is the MOU dated 07.01.2004 between the

defendant no. 1, who is referred therein as the ‘1st Party’, and

the plaintiff, who is referred therein as the ‘2nd Party’.

22. In the examination-in-chief, the PW1 iterated the

contents of the plaint. Additional evidence by way of affidavit

was also furnished by him. It is stated therein that the

defendant no.1 by playing fraud against the plaintiff to deprive

him of his valuable right over the suit schedule property,

colluded with defendants and got the sale deed in the name of

the defendant nos.1 and 2. The defendant no.2 is none other

– 17 –

RFA No. 1661 of 2012

than the wife of the defendant no.1. It was stated that initially

the defendant nos. 1 and 2 did not appear. The defendant no.2

was placed ex-parte and the defendant no.1 was avoiding

service of summons, whereafter paper publication was issued

to the defendant no. 1. Thereafter also he did not appear

before the trial Court. The trial Court then issued an

attachment warrant of the property of defendant no.1, which

was duly executed. However, when the defendant no.1 did not

appear, finally the Court issued bailable warrant, which was

duly executed and thereafter the defendant no.1 was forced to

appear. It is stated that the sale deed executed by defendant

nos. 1 and defendant no.2, in favour of defendant no.4, is hit

by Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 18823 and that

sale deed is not binding on the plaintiff.

23. Exs.P1 to P9 are marked in the further

examination-in-chief held on 28.11.2005. The PW1 was cross-

examined on 08.02.2012 on behalf of Defendant No.4. On

28.02.2012, PW1 was cross-examined by advocate for

Defendant No. 1 and Defendant No. 2. In the cross-

examination on 08.02.2012, PW.1 stated that Sri. Arun Chavala

purchased the suit schedule property after filing of the case and

3
TP Act

– 18 –

RFA No. 1661 of 2012

he is the owner of the same. The allegation that PW1 filed a

suit in collusion with the defendant nos.1 and 2 was denied.

There was no agreement or MOU between the 2nd defendant

and the PW.1. The agreement in respect of the suit schedule

property was with the plaintiff. He stated that there was no

other agreement with him. He admitted that the 3rd defendant

was neither a party nor a witness, nor a consenting witness to

Ex.P1(MOU). He denied knowledge of whether the 4th

defendant had prior knowledge with regard to Ex.P1 or any

other agreement, or that whether the 4th defendant is a bona

fide purchaser for valuable consideration. He denied that he

was ready to receive back the amount from the defendant

nos.1 and 2. It was stated that the suit schedule property was

being visited by him every day and the building was under

construction. The construction was nearly complete. He did not

have any estimation as to how much money had been spent.

24. Thereafter in the cross-examination of PW1 done on

behalf of the defendant nos.1 and 2 on 28.02.2012, it is stated

that the scheduled property mentioned in Ex.P1 belongs to

Mohammed; he had not entered into any sale agreement with

Mohammed; Ex.P1 is an unregistered document entered into

between him and the 1st defendant; neither the 2nd defendant

– 19 –

RFA No. 1661 of 2012

nor the owner of the scheduled property was a party or

witnesses to Ex.P1. Under Ex.P1, time was the essence of the

contract; the first defendant had written a letter to PW1 as per

Ex.P2. That after receipt of Ex.P2, PW1 issued legal notice as

per Ex.P3. It was true that the 1st defendant replied the notice

as per Ex.P4. It was false to suggest that the 1st defendant sent

a cheque for Rs.6,01,691/- along with registered letter dated

24.02.2005; PW1 received only registered letter, but had not

received the cheque; it was false to suggest that the 1st

defendant had no intention to cheat and acted bonafidely by

sending letter to him as Ex.P2; it was false to say that there

was no cause of action to file the suit.

25. The DW1 (defendant No.1) filed his affidavit by way

of examination-in-chief dated 19.03.2012, wherein he

reiterated the contents of his written statement. He stated that

the time for completion of the terms and conditions of the said

MOU was 3 months or 1 month from the date of

furnishing/obtaining the original documents and discharge of

mortgage loan on the suit schedule property by the 3rd

defendant. It was stated that there was no mens rea or

criminal breach of trust involved by him. The MOU was entered

into for limited purposes and it could not be treated as an

– 20 –

RFA No. 1661 of 2012

agreement of sale. It was stated that after purchase of the suit

schedule property, they were not in a position to look after

their interest in the suit schedule property and pay the debts

they had incurred. Hence, they (defendant Nos. 1 and 2) jointly

agreed to sell the suit schedule property for a sum of

Rs.50,00,000/- (Rupees Fifty Lakhs) and executed a GPA dated

24.02.2005 in favour of Sri. Mohan Chavala. The GPA holder in

turn sold the suit to the 4th defendant-Sri Arun Chavala for total

sum of Rs.50,00,000/- (Rupees Fifty Lakhs) to discharge their

debts and other family commitments by a registered sale deed

dated 24.08.2005 and delivered physical possession of the suit

schedule property to the purchaser.

26. In the cross-examination of DW.1 held on

06.06.2012, he stated, inter alia, that he was also President of

Sree Charan Co-operative Bank. The total transaction of the

bank/turnover was up to 300 Crores; he was the Chairman of

the said bank since last 14 years; he had become Chairman of

the said bank when he had entered into the MOU as per Ex.P1.

He did not know the suit schedule property was pledged to the

said bank on the date of Ex.P1; he did not know to which bank

the suit schedule property was pledged on the date of Ex.P1;

he did not know in which bank the property was to be

– 21 –

RFA No. 1661 of 2012

discharged free from encumbrance. He admitted paragraph

No.4 of the MOU. He also admitted that there was a sale

agreement between him and the 3rd defendant namely V.K.

Mohammed Ismail. He did not remember on what consideration

the 3rd defendant agreed to execute the sale deed in his favour

under the agreement. He admitted that under such agreement,

the 3rd defendant agreed to execute the sale deed either to him

or his nominees; it is on the basis of agreement that he had

entered into an agreement as per Ex.P1 (MOU). He admitted

that the 2nd defendant was his wife. He and the 2nd defendant

purchased the suit schedule property for total consideration of

Rs.37,54,000/- (Rupees Thirty Seven Lakhs Fifty Four

Thousand) under Exs.P5 and P6. He admitted that he had

agreed to sell the suit schedule property for a total

consideration of Rs.78,00,000/- (Rupees Seventy Eight Lakhs)

to the plaintiff under Ex.P1. He denied the suggestion that the

plaintiff got issued legal notice dated 18.08.2004 stating that

he is ready to pay the consideration of Rs.78,00,000/- (Rupees

Seventy Eight Lakhs) and to get the sale deed in his favour. He

admitted that his advocate issued reply notice as per Ex.P4,

after receipt of Ex.P3. He admitted that the address mentioned

in the notice and the cause title belonged to him. The reply

notice dated 01.03.2005 as per Ex.P8 issued by the plaintiff

– 22 –

RFA No. 1661 of 2012

was admitted. He also admitted that he appeared before the

Court only in the year 2008 on a warrant issued by a Court. He

stated that he was not in a position to produce the agreement

entered into between him and the 3rd defendant, because such

agreement was not available. He admitted that Charan

Souhardha Bank had got legal advisers; that their bank got

simple mortgage from the 3rd defendant by receiving some title

deed. He did not remember whether the title deeds had been

taken by the bank or not, but he had not borrowed any loan

from the Charan Souhardha Co-operative Bank and purchased

the property; he did not remember where he had borrowed the

loan at that time. He stated that they had sold the property to

the 4th dependent for a total consideration of Rs.50,00,000/-

(Rupees Fifty Lakhs). He did not remember whether he had

brought to the notice of the 4th defendant regarding the

contents of Ex.P1. He denied the suggestion that in order to

deprive the right of the plaintiff and to cheat the plaintiff, he

and the 4th defendant together created all those documents and

also subsequent transaction documents. He further stated that

he did not remember whether he had agreed to get the sale

deed executed or not as per Ex.P1 (MOU). He admitted that as

per clause 7 of Ex.P1, he had agreed to execute the sale deed

in favour of the plaintiff. He denied the suggestion that in order

– 23 –

RFA No. 1661 of 2012

to frustrate the right of the plaintiff, they had executed the sale

deed in favour of the 4th defendant.

27. In further cross-examination done by the counsel

for the defendant no.4, the DW1 stated that before selling the

property, he had not intimated the matter of Ex.P1 to Arjun

Chavala. He stated that he did not remember himself and the

plaintiff had colluded.

28. DW.2 is the defendant no.4 herein. In his

examination-in-chief he got marked Exs.D1 to D.14 on

21.03.2012. In his cross-examination on 15.06.2012 he stated

that before purchase of the property, he and his father

negotiated the transaction. Before the purchase of the property

there was no contact or connection between DW.2 and DW.1.

On the advise of the 1st defendant, he opened a bank account

in Charan Co-operative Bank. He enquired from the

neighbouring persons regarding the property and thereafter

negotiated. He denied the suggestion that his father and the 1st

defendant were close prior to the transactions. At the time of

sale agreement, his father had paid a sum of Rs.50,00,000/-

(Rupees Fifty Lakhs) and thereafter he had not paid any

amount to the 1st defendant. He had taken permission to

demolish the existing building in the year 2008. Permission was

– 24 –

RFA No. 1661 of 2012

obtained from BBMP to put up a new construction in the year

2008 itself. They had started construction of the building in the

year 2008. He denied the suggestion that after filing of the

application in Court seeking directions not to put up any

construction, he had constructed the building. He then stated

that they had taken permission only in the year 2011 and

started construction. He denied the suggestion that his father

and the 1st defendant were close friends and even though they

had knowledge of the sale agreement between the plaintiff and

the 1st defendant, they had intentionally purchased the

property. He also denied the suggestion that he and his father

had got knowledge of the Court proceedings. It was admitted

that when they started construction, the plaintiff lodged a

complaint against them. He stated that in the year 2011 itself

the building was completed. They had not taken completion

report from the BBMP/BMP. It was denied that when the

plaintiff lodged a complaint, they were only digging the earth

and putting up pillars. He stated that they had not given any

notice to the 1st defendant after coming to know the Court

proceedings. He denied the suggestion that he, his father and

the first defendant had all colluded together. He admitted that,

no civil or criminal action was initiated by them against the 1st

defendant. He denied the suggestion that they and the 1st

– 25 –

RFA No. 1661 of 2012

defendant were partners in the construction of the building,

hence they had not taken action. The suggestion was denied

that the sale deed was collusive and was nominal.

29. Now to discuss the contents of the MOU which is an

unregistered document. Under the proviso to Section 49 of the

Registration Act, 1908, an unregistered document affecting

immovable property and required by the Registration Act or the

Transfer of Property Act, 1882 to be registered may be received

as evidence of a contract in a suit for specific performance

under Chapter II of the Specific Relief Act. The schedule to the

MOU is the suit schedule property.

29.1. By means of the MOU, the 1st defendant

represented to the plaintiff that, one Sri. Mohammed Ismail

(Defendant No.3 herein) had an understanding with him to sell

the scheduled property to the 1st defendant or his nominee,

which arrangement is subsisting and valid. The 1st defendant

offered to nominate the plaintiff to be the purchaser in regard

to the MOU schedule property and obtain a deed of sale

executed by the said owner in favour of the plaintiff.

Accordingly, pursuant to the recitals and in consideration of the

price agreed to be paid by the plaintiff under the MOU, the 1st

defendant nominated the plaintiff to be the purchaser of the

– 26 –

RFA No. 1661 of 2012

MOU schedule property, subject to the terms mentioned

therein. The consideration payable to the 1st defendant by the

plaintiff under the MOU for nomination and assignment was

Rs.78,00,000/- (Rupees Seventy Eight Lakhs) which was to

include the amount paid to the owner Sri. Mohammed Ismail

by the 1st defendant as advance and also sale consideration

agreed to be paid by the 1st defendant to the owner-

Mohammed Ismail. It was left open for the first defendant to

pay the amount of sale consideration directly to the owners or

to the 1st defendant and deduct the same from the payment to

be made to the 1st defendant. An advance of Rs.5,00,000/-

(Rupees Five Lakhs) was acknowledged to be paid by the

plaintiff to the 1st defendant with the balance of the price being

agreed to be paid by the plaintiff at the time of registration of

the deed of sale.

29.2. Clause 4 of the MOU provided the time for

completion. The sale in favour of the plaintiff was to be

completed within 3 months from the date of the MOU or within

1 month from the date of the owner’s furnishing and obtaining

other permission documents relating to the MOU schedule

property, getting discharge of loan from Sree Charan

Souhardha Co-operative Bank Ltd., and absolute sale deed

– 27 –

RFA No. 1661 of 2012

from the BDA, whichever date is later. The 1st defendant

assured under the MOU that the title of the owner to the MOU

schedule property is good, marketable and subsisting, and the

scheduled property would be conveyed to the 2nd party free

from all encumbrances, attachments or acquisition proceedings

or charges of any kind. It was agreed that the 1st defendant

would obtain the conveyance of the MOU schedule property by

the owners either in favour of the plaintiff and/or his

nominee(s), as required by the plaintiff. As regards the

consequences of breach of agreement, it was provided that the

aggrieved party shall be entitled to specific performance of the

MOU and also recover all losses and expenses incurred by

them/him, as a consequence of such breach from the party

committing breach. Any breach by the owners shall be

considered a breach by 1st party and the plaintiff will be entitled

to proceed against both for its remedy.

ANALYSIS:

30. On reading the MOU, we are convinced that the

MOU is actually a sale agreement and we are in full agreement

with the same finding being returned by the trial Court. This

finding also draws strength from the examination-in-chief of

the PW1, as well as the testimony of DW1. In the cross-

– 28 –

RFA No. 1661 of 2012

examination of DW1, he admits that he had agreed to sell the

suit property for a total consideration of Rs.78,00,000/-

(Rupees Seventy Eight Lakhs) to the plaintiff under Ex.P1

(MOU). So, evidently the parties are ad idem that the MOU is in

fact an agreement to sell. Though at several places in the

written statement filed by the defendant no.1 and in his

examination-in-chief he has stated that the MOU was entered

into for ‘facilitating’ the sale transaction of the property in

dispute from the 3rd defendant, however, when he was

specifically queried, he stated that he did not know the

meaning of the word facilitating. Simultaneously, he answered

that he did not remember whether he had agreed to get the

sale deed executed or not as per Ex.P1. He also admitted that

as per Clause-7 of Ex.P1 (MOU), he had agreed to execute the

sale deed in favour of the plaintiff. Clause-7 of the MOU

provides that the 1st defendant would obtain the conveyance of

the MOU schedule property by the owners either in favour of

the plaintiff and/or his nominee(s), as required by the plaintiff.

31. The trial Court has laboured on the testimony of the

PW1 during his cross-examination done on behalf of the

defendants no. 1 and 2, which was that under Ex.P1, time was

the essence of the contract. This was taken by the trial Court as

– 29 –

RFA No. 1661 of 2012

an admission by the plaintiff that he had to act as per the MOU

within 3 months. As is noted hereinabove, the MOU clearly

provides that the sale would be completed in favour of the

plaintiff within 3 months from the date of the MOU or within 1

month from the date the owners furnishing the requisite

documents and getting discharge of loan from the co-operative

bank, whichever date is later. There are no consequences or

other restrictive provisions in the MOU that may result in or

indicate termination of the agreement in case the sale is not

completed. Therefore, in the light of the judgment of the

Supreme Court in Chand Rani Vs. Kamal Rani4, in the present

case, time is not the essence of this contract. The trial Court,

therefore, has misdirected itself in holding that the plaintiff had

to act as per the MOU within 3 months, basing its finding on

the ‘admission’ of the P.W1 without adverting to the terms of

the MOU.

32. Now to consider the agreement that is referred to

in the MOU which was between the defendant no.1 and the

owner, who is the defendant no.3. A perusal of the MOU itself

leaves no room for doubt that the first defendant had

categorically represented to the plaintiff regarding the

4
(1993) 1 SCC 519

– 30 –

RFA No. 1661 of 2012

existence of the agreement with both the defendant no.3

(owner) and the defendant no.1 being bound by the same. In

the cross-examination of DW1, he has admitted that there is a

sale agreement between him and the 3rd defendant namely

Mohammed Ismail. He however, did not remember on what

consideration the 3rd defendant agreed to execute the sale deed

in his favour under the agreement. He also admitted that under

such agreement the 3rd defendant agreed to execute the sale

deed either to him or to his nominees. He categorically stated

that it was on the basis of the agreement that he had entered

into an agreement as per Ex.P1. It would also be pertinent to

refer to the written statement filed by the 3rd defendant, in

paragraph-5 of which he stated that in pursuance of the

agreement of sale entered into between him and the defendant

nos. 1 and 2, the 3rd defendant and other owners had executed

a regular sale deed in favour of the defendant nos. 1 and 2.

Therefore, the existence of the agreement to sell between the

1st defendant and the 3rd defendant is proved. Hence, it is

evident that the terms of the MOU entered into between the 1st

defendant and the plaintiff, were in terms of an agreement

between the owner and the 1st defendant. In view of these

facts, the trial Court was not right in saying that, firstly, the

plaintiff should have procured the agreement, and, secondly, to

– 31 –

RFA No. 1661 of 2012

record a finding that non-production of the agreement was fatal

to the case of the plaintiff.

33. It is pertinent to mention here that even though in

his written statement, the defendant no.3 admitted the

agreement to sell between himself and the defendant nos. 1

and 2, however, in the two sale deeds, both dated 18.11.2004,

executed by the defendant no. 3 in favour of the defendant

no.1 and defendant no.2 (Exs.P5 and P6 respectively), there is

no mention of the agreement to sell. It is noted that in the sale

deed executed by defendant no. 3 in favour of defendant no. 1,

one of the witnesses is Gayathri, who is the defendant no. 2,

and, in the sale deed executed by the defendant no. 3 in favour

of the defendant no. 2, one of the witnesses is

Sri. B.V. Dwarkanath, the defendant no.1.

34. As far as the question of readiness and willingness

of the plaintiff to perform his part of contract within the

stipulated time is concerned, the background of the matter may

be discussed. The MOU is of 07.01.2004. On 10.08.2004,

defendant no.1 wrote to the plaintiff stating that owing to

certain personal reasons, the deal may be delayed and that the

plaintiff is requested to take back his advance amount of

Rs.5,00,000/- within seven days from the date of receipt of

– 32 –

RFA No. 1661 of 2012

that letter and get the MOU cancelled. This letter is Ex.P2. A

perusal of the pleadings and the evidence reflects that this was

the first date on which the plaintiff got a hint of the intention of

defendant no. 1 to resile from his promise. There is no proof of

the date of dispatch of Ex.P2 or its receipt by the plaintiff.

However, promptly, on 18.08.2004, a legal notice was issued

by RPAD to the defendant no.1 through the advocate of the

plaintiff. In the legal notice reference was made to the MOU

and it was stated that in view of the understanding, the plaintiff

had already mobilized funds by giving up interest in certain

other properties, which were getting him more benefits. It was

stated in the notice that the plaintiff was in such an

irretrievable position and as such he is not in a position to

accept the unilateral and illegal cancellation of the MOU. It was

stated that MOU be complied with and the sale deed be

executed by the owner in favour of the plaintiff. It was stated

that the plaintiff had always been ready and willing to perform

his part of the contract. It was stated that the plaintiff is ready

with the balance sale consideration and the defendant no.1 was

asked and to inform the date and time for getting the sale deed

executed in his favour.

– 33 –

RFA No. 1661 of 2012

35. About 15 days thereafter, that is on 02.09.2004, a

reply legal notice was sent on behalf of the defendant no.1,

which is marked as Ex.P4. In this reply legal notice, it is stated

that the period of completing the MOU was 3 months from

07.01.2004 or within 1 month from the date of the owners of

the above said property furnishing the original documents after

getting due discharge of existing liability on the said property

and getting other relevant title deeds from the BDA or

whichever event occurs earlier. It is stated in the reply notice

that due to unforeseen and unavoidable circumstances, the

owners of the property were not able to discharge their

obligations in spite of the best efforts of the defendant no.1.

Therefore, the defendant no.1 was requesting the plaintiff to

take back the amount of Rs.5,00,000/- paid as deposit amount,

but the same was not being heeded by the plaintiff.

36. Thereafter, the two sale deeds dated 18.11.2004

(Exs.P5 & P6) were executed by the owner (defendant no.3) in

favour of the defendant nos.1 and 2 respectively. The suit was

then filed by the plaintiff in OS No. 9153/2004 on 10.12.2004.

37. It is clear that the trial Court has clearly not

perused the entire evidence and the chronology of

developments while recording its finding that the plaintiff has

– 34 –

RFA No. 1661 of 2012

not shown his readiness and willingness to perform the contract

within the stipulated time. It goes on to state that the

documents Exhibits P1 to P10 do not disclose the plaintiffs

readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract

well within 3 months as per the recitals in the agreement. Such

a finding cannot be sustained. It is pertinent to mention here

that, as is evident from the reply legal notice dated 02.09.2004

sent by the advocate of the defendant no.1, the defendant no.1

had falsely instructed his own counsel that the MOU’s period of

completion is 3 months from 07.01.2004 or within 1 month or

the contingencies specified in the MOU taking place, whichever

event occurs earlier, whereas, it is evident from bare perusal of

the MOU that it mentions whichever event occurs later.

38. As a matter of fact, the legal note dated

18.08.2004 sent on behalf of the plaintiff reflects the

promptitude of the reply, the shock reflected in the legal notice

of the plaintiff as well as his categorical statement regarding his

readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract.

He had already mobilised funds. That legal notice of

18.08.2004 (Ex.P3) itself calls upon the defendant no.1 to

inform the time and date for getting the sale deed executed in

favour of the plaintiff, as he is ready with the balance sale

– 35 –

RFA No. 1661 of 2012

consideration. Importantly, in his reply legal notice of

02.09.2004 (Ex.P4), there is no averment or indication that the

plaintiff is not ready and willing, nor it stated that the plaintiff

has no financial capacity. Therefore, we find that the plaintiff

was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract.

39. In view of this finding, the answer of the trial Court

on Issue No.3 is set aside.

40. It is pertinent to mention here that after filing of

the suit 10.12.2004, on 24.02.2005 a letter (Ex.P7) was

purportedly sent by the defendant no.1 to the plaintiff with

reference to the legal notice dated 18.08.2004 and the reply

notice of the defendant no.1 dated 02.09.2004 in which it was

stated that enclosed therein was a cheque dated 24.02.2005

drawn on Sree Charan Souhardha Co-operative Bank Limited,

main Branch, Bangalore for an amount of Rs.6,01,691/-, being

the amount of advance of Rs.5,00,000/- and interest at the

rate of 18% per cent from 07.01.2004, asking the plaintiff to

receive and acknowledge the same. It was also mentioned that

the matter be treated as closed amicably.

41. It appears that on 01.03.2005, a reply to Ex.P7 was

sought to be sent on behalf of the plaintiff through his advocate

– 36 –

RFA No. 1661 of 2012

(Ex.P8) seeking to inform defendant no.1 regarding filing of the

suit for specific performance of the MOU in respect of the suit

schedule property, specifying the next date of hearing along

with a copy of the plaint. It was also stated that though the

defendant no.1 is residing in the address shown in the cause

title, he has evaded service of notice issued by the Court to

circumvent the said proceedings, with a mala fide intention. It

is stated in the notice that the letter (dated 24.02.2005) was

sent without enclosing the cheque, which showed its ulterior

motive. It again called upon the defendant no.1 to execute the

sale deed with regard to the suit property, as the plaintiff was

always ready and willing to perform his part of contract.

However, this letter, though was sent by registered post

(Ex.P9) to the defendant no.1, the same was returned as ‘not

claimed’.

42. Now coming to the point whether the plaintiff is

entitled to a decree of specific performance of the MOU or

whether the plaintiff is entitled for damages.

43. It is true that the 3rd defendant is not a signatory to

the MOU. However, the agreement to sell which is indicated in

the MOU entered into by him with the defendant nos. 1 & 2 is

not denied. That agreement not being produced, no liability

– 37 –

RFA No. 1661 of 2012

under that agreement can be ascertained of the defendant

no.3. The agreement to sell with the defendant no.3 is

admitted both by the DW.1 in his cross-examination and the

defendant no.3 in his written statement. The sale deeds dated

18.11.2004 (Exs.P5 & P6) executed in favour of defendant no.1

and 2 respectively by the defendant no.3 do not disclose the

agreement to sell. Therefore, the finding of the trial Court on

Issue Nos. 4 and 5 that the 3rd defendant honestly sold the

property in favour defendant nos. 1 & 2 by receiving substantial

consideration, does not appear to be correct.

44. The 1st notice (Ex.P2) dated 10.08.2004, which was

sent to the plaintiff by the defendant no.1, which can be

connected to the sale deeds (Exs.P5 & P6), states that owing to

certain personal reasons, the deal may get delayed and the

plaintiff was asked to take back the advance amount and to get

the MOU cancelled. Even the reply notice dated 02.09.2004

(Ex.P4) sent on behalf of defendant no.1 specifically refers to

the MOU being completed within 3 months or within 1 month of

the contingencies mentioned therein whichever event occurs

‘earlier’. This indicates that there is an intention to mislead and

deceive on part of the defendant no.1.

– 38 –

RFA No. 1661 of 2012

45. In paragraph-5 of the plaint, it is mentioned, inter

alia, that sale would be made within one month from the date

of owner furnishing original documents relating to the

scheduled property after getting discharge of loan from Sree

Charan Co-operative Bank Limited5, of which the 1st defendant

is the Chairman and Managing Director. It is stated therein that

the 1st defendant represented that he will make arrangements

for discharge of the said loan and get the sale deed executed

from the 3rd defendant and the 3rd defendant also had agreed

for the said arrangement. This paragraph has not been denied

by defendant no.1 in his written statement. Moreover, the PW1

has proved these facts in his examination-in-chief. No question

was put on behalf of the defendant no.1 to the plaintiff in this

regard. Moreover, in his cross-examination, the defendant no.1

as DW1, has admitted that he is also president of Sree Charan

Co-operative Bank; that he is the Chairman of the bank since

the last 14 years, which has a total transaction/turnover of up

to 300 Crores; that he had become the Chairman of the bank

when he had entered the MOU (Ex.P1). However, DW.1 feigns

in his cross-examination that, he does not know the suit

schedule property was pledged to the bank on the date of the

5
The full name of the Co-operative bank is mentioned in the MOU as Sree
Charan Souhardha Co-operative Bank Limited.

– 39 –

RFA No. 1661 of 2012

MOU (Ex.P1). He also states that he does not know to which

bank the suit property was pledged on the date of Ex.P1. He

also does not know in which bank the property is to be

discharged free from encumbrance. In the same vein, he

admits in his cross-examination that Paragraph-4 of the MOU

mentions getting original documents after discharge of loan

from Sree Charan Souhardha Co-operative Bank Limited. He

also admits of a sale agreement between him and the

defendant.

46. There is, thus, clinching evidence of the nexus

between the defendant no.1 and the defendant no.3. The

original documents of the suit schedule property of which the

owner is admittedly the Defendant no.3 was charged/pledged

to Sree Charan Souhardha Co-operative Bank, of which the

defendant no.1 was the Chairman and Managing Director,

which reflects a pact of the defendant no.1 with the defendant

no.3. The statement in the cross-examination that the DW1

did not know that the suit schedule property was pledged to the

said bank on the date of Ex.P1 is unbelievable.

47. A perusal of the certificate of encumbrance in

Form-15 (Ex. D9) that has been proved by the 4th defendant

reflects on the 1st page that in Column-5, the name of Sree

– 40 –

RFA No. 1661 of 2012

Charan Souhardha Co-operative Bank Limited is mentioned and

in column-6 thereof the name of the 3rd defendant is

mentioned. On page 2 of Ex.D9, there are two entries in

Column-5, the name of the 3rd defendant is mentioned and in

Column-6, the names of the defendant nos. 1 and 2 are

mentioned. Defendant no.4 has proved Ex.D1, which is an

agreement to sell entered into by the defendant nos. 1 and 2,

referred to as the sellers therein, and the defendant no. 4 Arjun

Chavala, who is referred therein as the purchaser. This

agreement is made on 24.02.2005, which is registered (Ex.D1).

A perusal of Ex.D1 reflects that there is no reference made by

‘sellers’ to any dispute on litigation pending between the

defendant nos.1 and 2 and the plaintiff. As a matter of fact, on

Page-5 of Ex.D1, it is mentioned that the scheduled property is

not subject matter of any litigation or proceeding and the same

is not attached or sought to be sold in whole or in portion in

any Court, or other civil or revenue, or other proceedings and

not subject to any attachment by the proceedings etc. The

Ex.D1 also reflects that a power of attorney was executed by

the defendant nos.1 and 2 in favour of Sri. Mohan Chavala, the

father of the defendant no.4. It is noted that Ex.D1

acknowledges payment by the purchaser to the seller an

advance amount totaling Rs.50,00,000/- (Rupees Fifty Lakhs),

– 41 –

RFA No. 1661 of 2012

which amount was stated to be the total sale consideration of

the sale deed with regard to the scheduled property, which is

the suit schedule property.

48. Ex.D2 is a GPA executed by the defendants nos. 1

and 2 in favour of the father of the defendant no.4, Sri. Mohan

Chavala in respect of the suit schedule property. Ex.D3 is the

sale deed dated 24.08.2005 executed by the defendant nos.1

and 2 in favour of the defendant no.4. In this document too in

Page-5, it is stated that the scheduled property is not subject

matter of any litigation or proceeding etc. The scheduled

property of the said deed is the suit schedule property.

49. The defendant no.4 appeared as witness DW2. In

the examination-in-chief, by way of affidavit, he has stated,

inter alia, that the plaintiff was an utter stranger to him; that

he is a stranger to the alleged agreement (MOU) and he is

neither a necessary party nor a proper party. It is stated that

after purchase of the suit schedule property, he had demolished

the existing structure and put up a commercial complex

investing a huge amount.

50. DW.2 was cross-examined on 15.06.2012. He

stated that he had taken permission only in the year 2011 and

– 42 –

RFA No. 1661 of 2012

started construction. The suggestion that his father and the 1st

defendant were close friends and the suit schedule property

was intentionally purchased even though they had knowledge

of the sale agreement between the plaintiff and the 1st

defendant was denied. It is stated that in the year 2011 itself

the building was completed. He admitted that when they had

started construction, the plaintiff lodged a complaint against

them. He denied that when the plaintiff lodged complaint, they

were only digging the earth and putting up pillars. He had not

given any notice to the 1st defendant after coming to know the

court proceedings. Collusion between him, his father and the 1st

defendant was denied. It was admitted that they had not

initiated any civil or criminal action against the 1st defendant.

He denied the suggestion that they and the 1st defendant were

partners in the construction of the building. Hence, they had

not taken action. The suggestion that the sale deed is a

collusive document and nominal, was also denied.

51. The complaint lodged against defendant no.4 and

defendant no.1 by the plaintiff before the Station House Officer,

Jayanagar Police Station on 23.02.2011 is marked as Ex.P10. It

is stated in that complaint that the property was attached and

arrest warrant against the defendant no.1 was duly executed

– 43 –

RFA No. 1661 of 2012

and that the attachment of the property had not been recalled

by the Court, which is still in force. Collusion between the

defendant no.1 and the defendant no.4 was alleged that they

were trying to put up a construction over the property. A non-

cognizable report was registered by the police that was marked

as Ex.P11. Photographs purporting to be of the site are

enclosed as Exs.P12, P13, P15, P16, P17. Ex.P18 is a Compact

Disc which is damaged. The sanction plan is on record as

Ex.D10. The sanction is for stilt + ground floor + two upper

floors and the period of sanction is from 02.11.2010 upto

01.11.2012.

52. Therefore, given the admissions made by the

defendant no.4, in light of the documents/material on record, it

is evident that the complaint was filed, and it was in the full

knowledge of defendant no.4. The complaint was made on

23.02.2011 with no action by the defendant no.4 against the

plaintiff. The written statement of the defendant no.4 bears the

date 27.06.2011.

53. The amount agreed to be paid by the plaintiff to the

defendant no.1 or the owner was Rs.78,00,000/-. The

defendant no.3 executed the sale deeds (Exs.P5 and P6) in

favour of the defendant nos. 1 and 2, for a sum of

– 44 –

RFA No. 1661 of 2012

Rs.18,27,000/- (Rupees Eighteen Lakhs Twenty Seven

Thousand) and Rs.18,75,000/- (Rupees Eighteen Lakhs

Seventy Five Thousand) respectively. Despite getting those sale

deeds executed, no intimation was sent to the plaintiff by the

defendant no.1 or defendant no.2 of having acquired the

properties and they surreptitiously proceeded to execute the

agreement of sale dated 24.02.2005 (Ex.D1) in favour of the

defendant no.4.

54. It is pertinent to mention here that the suit in OS

No. 9153/2004 was filed on 10.12.2004 and defendant no.1

was served ‘as absent’ and defendant no. 2 was served in the

house ‘as refused’. On 31.03.2005, the Court noted service on

defendant no.2 ‘as sufficient’, and allowed the application under

Order V Rule 20 CPC for service on the defendant no.1 by

affixation on the house numbers and boundaries. On

27.05.2005, the defendant no.2 was placed ex-parte. On

19.07.2005, the Court recorded that the defendant no.1 served

by affixture, but he was absent. It is only thereafter that the

sale deed dated 24.08.2005 (Ex.D3) was executed by

defendant nos. 1 and defendant no.2 in favour of defendant no.

4.

– 45 –

RFA No. 1661 of 2012

55. It is clear from the aforesaid that the defendant

nos. 1 and 2 were reported as duly served with the Court

summons prior to execution of the sale deed dated 24.08.2005

(Ex.D3). Even earlier, they concealed the fact of the MOU and

the legal notices sent by the plaintiff to the defendant Nos.1 &

2. The agreement to sell (Ex.D1) which was executed on

24.02.2005 itself reflects that the entire sale consideration of a

suit of Rs.50,00,000/- (Rupees Fifty Lakhs) was paid by means

of cheques. Thus, this Court cannot but hold that the defendant

nos. 1 & 2 resorted to fraud and subterfuge against the plaintiff

for depriving him of the benefit and right under the MOU

aforesaid. Once the sale deeds dated 18.11.2004 (Exs.P5 and

P6) were executed in favour of the defendants, all

contingencies contemplated in Clause-4 of the MOU were

fulfilled and therefore the defendant nos. 1 and 2 were bound

to honour their commitment under the MOU.

56. As far as the defendant no.4 is concerned, it is his

own admission made in his cross-examination as DW2, that the

construction over the suit schedule property was commenced

and completed by him in the year 2011 itself. Moreover,

despite getting knowledge on the complaint being filed against

him, no attempt was made by him to confront the defendant

– 46 –

RFA No. 1661 of 2012

nos. 1 and 2 or to stop the constructions which were stated by

the plaintiff to be at the initial stages as per the suggestion put

to the DW.2 during his cross-examination. Under such

circumstances, the suggestion put by the counsel for the

plaintiff during the cross-examination of the defendant no.4

assumes importance that the defendant no. 4, his father and

the 1st defendant had colluded and that they and the 1st

defendant are partners to the construction of the building.

Hence they had not taken any action. The sale deed (Ex.D3)

dated 24.08.2005, as noted above, was executed on receipt of

an amount of Rs.50,00,000/- pursuant to the agreement to sell

(Ex.D2). The defendant no.1 has been acting all along in his

capacity as the Chairman and Managing Director of a Co-

operative Bank which is dealing with public money and public

trust. Under the facts and circumstances, we hold that the sale

deed (Ex.D3) of 24.08.2005 is an outcome of fraud played by

the defendant Nos.1 and 2 against the plaintiff. Further, the

defendant No.4 on getting information of the complaint filed

before police, which complaint also mentioned about the

pending litigation, chose to proceed with the constructions and

complete it. This indicates his intention to frustrate any

legitimate claim of the plaintiff.

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RFA No. 1661 of 2012

57. Evidently, the status of defendant no.4 is that of

transferee pendente lite. The Supreme Court in the case of

Thomson Press (India) Ltd. v. Nanak Builders & Investors (P)

Ltd.6, while looking into an order passed by the Division Bench

of the High Court affirming an order of the learned Single

Judge and rejecting the petition filed by the appellant therein

under Order 1 Rule 10 CPC for impleading the defendants in a

suit for specific performance of contract filed by the respondent

no.1, the plaintiff therein, considered the question as to

whether if the appellant therein who was the transferee

pendente lite having notice and knowledge about the pendency

of the suit for specific performance and the order of injunction

could be impleaded as a party under Order 1 Rule 10 CPC on

the basis of sale deeds executed in their favour by the

defendants.

58. While considering that question, the Supreme Court

in Thomson Press (India) Ltd., discussed some of the relevant

laws. It was observed as follows:-

“26. It would also be worth discussing some of the
relevant laws in order to appreciate the case on hand. Section
52
of the Transfer of Property Act speaks about the doctrine of
lis pendens. Section 52 reads as under:

6

(2013) 5 SCC 397,

– 48 –

RFA No. 1661 of 2012

“52. Transfer of property pending suit
relating thereto.–During the pendency in any
court having authority within the limits of India
excluding the State of Jammu and Kashmir or
established beyond such limits by the Central
Government of any suit or proceeding which is not
collusive and in which any right to immovable
property is directly and specifically in question, the
property cannot be transferred or otherwise dealt
with by any party to the suit or proceeding so as to
affect the rights of any other party thereto under the
decree or order which may be made therein, except
under the authority of the court and on such terms
as it may impose.

Explanation.–For the purposes of this section,
the pendency of a suit or proceeding shall be
deemed to commence from the date of the
presentation of the plaint or the institution of the
proceeding in a court of competent jurisdiction, and
to continue until the suit or proceeding has been
disposed of by a final decree or order and complete
satisfaction or discharge of such decree or order has
been obtained, or has become unobtainable by
reason of the expiration of any period of limitation
prescribed for the execution thereof by any law for
the time being in force.”

It is well settled that the doctrine of lis pendens is a
doctrine based on the ground that it is necessary for the
administration of justice that the decision of a court in a suit
should be binding not only on the litigating parties but on
those who derive title pendente lite. The provision of this
section does not indeed annul the conveyance or the transfer

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RFA No. 1661 of 2012

otherwise, but to render it subservient to the rights of the
parties to a litigation.

…………………………………………………..
………………………………………………………………..

29. The aforesaid Section 52 of the Transfer of
Property Act again came up for consideration before this Court
in Rajender Singh v. Santa Singh [(1973) 2 SCC 705 : AIR
1973 SC 2537] and Their Lordships with approval of the
principles laid down in Jayaram Mudaliar v. Ayyaswami [(1972)
2 SCC 200 : (1973) 1 SCR 139] reiterated: (Rajender Singh
case [(1973) 2 SCC 705 : AIR 1973 SC 2537] , SCC p. 711,
para 15)

“15. The doctrine of lis pendens was intended to
strike at attempts by parties to a litigation to
circumvent the jurisdiction of a court, in which a
dispute on rights or interests in immovable property
is pending, by private dealings which may remove
the subject-matter of litigation from the ambit of the
court’s power to decide a pending dispute or
frustrate its decree. Alienees acquiring any
immovable property during a litigation over it are
held to be bound, by an application of the doctrine,
by the decree passed in the suit even though they
may not have been impleaded in it. The whole object
of the doctrine of lis pendens is to subject parties to
the litigation as well as others, who seek to acquire
rights in immovable property, which are the subject-
matter of a litigation, to the power and jurisdiction of
the court so as to prevent the object of a pending
action from being defeated.”

…………………………………………………………….
…………………………………………………………….

– 50 –

RFA No. 1661 of 2012

33. At this juncture, we would also like to refer to
Section 19 of the Specific Relief Act which reads as under:

“19. Relief against parties and persons
claiming under them by subsequent title.–
Except as otherwise provided by this Chapter,
specific performance of a contract may be enforced
against–

(a) either party thereto;

(b) any other person claiming under him by a
title arising subsequently to the contract, except
a transferee for value who has paid his money in
good faith and without notice of the original
contract;

(c) any person claiming under a title which,
though prior to the contract and known to the
plaintiff, might have been displaced by the
defendant;

(d) when a company has entered into a
contract and subsequently becomes amalgamated
with another company, the new company which
arises out of the amalgamation;

(e) when the promoters of a company have,
before its incorporation entered into a contract for
the purpose of the company and such contract is
warranted by the terms of the incorporation, the
company:

Provided that the company has accepted the
contract and communicated such acceptance to
the other party to the contract.”

From the bare reading of the aforesaid provision, it is
manifest that a contract for specific performance may be

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RFA No. 1661 of 2012

enforced against the parties to the contract and the persons
mentioned in the said section. Clause (b) of Section 19 makes
it very clear that a suit for specific performance cannot be
enforced against a person who is a transferee from the vendor
for valuable consideration and without notice of the original
contract which is sought to be enforced in the suit.”

59. Learned Counsel for the appellants referred to the

following judgments of the Supreme Court:

      (i)     Guruswamy Nadar v P.Lakshmi Ammal7

      (ii)    Shyam Singh v. Daryao Singh & Ors8

(iii) Parswanath Saha v. Bandhana Modak (Das) & Anr9

60. In the judgment of Shyam Singh only legal question

involved was whether the terms of agreement of repurchase

dated 04.02.1971 contained any implied prohibition on the

original contracting parties (particularly defendant Nos.2 to 4

therein) from transferring or assigning their rights in favour of

a third party. This case is based on its own facts and is not

helpful to the case of the appellant herein in the present case.

61. In case of Guruswamy Nadar, after considering the

judgments of the Allahabad High Court, the Privy Council of the

Supreme Court, it was observed that it is apparent that the

7
(2008) 5 SCC 796
8
AIR 2004 SC 348
9
2024 INSC 1022

– 52 –

RFA No. 1661 of 2012

appellant who was the subsequent purchaser of the same

property had purchased in good faith, but the principle of lis

pendens will certainly be applicable to the present case

notwithstanding the fact that under Section 19(b) of the

Specific Relief Act, his rights could be protected.

62. The judgment of the Supreme Court in Parswanath

Saha, the issue was with regard to hardship of the defendant

after they had parted with the suit property. After considering

the provisions of Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, and

considering a catena of decisions of the High Court and the

Supreme Court, it was held that the issue of hardship would

come into play only after it is established by cogent evidence

that the person who executed the agreement of sale was

unable to foresee the hardship at the time of entering into

contract. This judgment, however, is of no benefit to the

appellant in the facts and circumstances of the instance case.

63. However, as noted aforesaid in the judgment of

Thomson Press (India) Ltd., which is a subsequent decision of

the Supreme Court, it was held that the suit for specific

performance cannot be enforced against the person who is

transferee from the vendor for valuable consideration without

– 53 –

RFA No. 1661 of 2012

notice of the original contract which is sought to be enforced in

the suit.

64. In the light of the aforesaid enunciation of law by

the Supreme Court in Thomson Press (India) Ltd., it is noted

that, though defendant No.4 chose to proceed with the

construction of the building on the suit schedule property,

despite having knowledge of the police complaint as well as

having knowledge of the litigation between defendant Nos.1

and 2 and the plaintiff, no liability for specific performance

under Section 19 of the Specific Relief Act can be imposed on

him in view of the fact that it has not been clinchingly

demonstrated that at the time of execution of the sale deed by

defendant Nos.1 and 2 in favour of defendant No.4 on

24.08.2005 (Ex.D3) defendant No.4 was anyone but a

transferee for value who has paid his money in good faith and

without notice of the original contract.

65. The case of defendant No.4 would be covered by

the exception carved out in clause (b) of Section 19 of the

Specific Relief Act since he is apparently a bona fide purchaser.

66. However, ordering specific performance of the

contract may lead to multiplicity of proceedings and may delay

– 54 –

RFA No. 1661 of 2012

the right of the plaintiff to the benefit conferred by the MOU

indefinitely. Under the circumstances, ordering specific

performance may not an appropriate relief. Therefore, we have

to consider the aspect of grant of damages to the plaintiff

which has been claimed by him as an alternate prayer.

67. In that prayer made by the plaintiff, apart from

seeking a direction to the defendants to pay Rs.5,00,000/- with

interest at the rate of 24% per annum from the date of

agreement till the date of payment, damages of Rs.50,00,000/-

has also been claimed.

68. The trial Court has already in the impugned

judgment, decreed payment of Rs.5,00,000/- with interest at

the rate of 18% per annum, which has not been challenged by

the defendants.

69. Accordingly, we direct as follows:

ORDER

i) The appeal is partly allowed and the impugned
judgment and decree dated 04.08.2012 is set
aside in part.

ii) Defendant No.1 shall pay Rs.5,00,000/- with
interest at the rate of 18% per annum from

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RFA No. 1661 of 2012

the date of filing of the suit till the date of
payment.

iii) The plaintiff is entitled to damages of
Rs.50,00,000/- that is claimed by him in the
suit which amount shall be paid by defendant
Nos.1 and 2, jointly and severally, within three
months.

iv) The plaintiff shall be entitled to costs.

v) The suit against defendant Nos.3 and 4 is
dismissed.

Sd/-

(JAYANT BANERJI)
JUDGE

Sd/-

(K.V.ARAVIND)
JUDGE

KGR/KSR



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