Sokhi Lal And Others vs State Of U.P. on 28 April, 2026

Allahabad High Court

Sokhi Lal And Others vs State Of U.P. on 28 April, 2026

Author: Vivek Kumar Singh

Bench: Vivek Kumar Singh

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
 
 


Neutral Citation No. - 2026:AHC:94725
 
 Judgment Reserved On 01.04.2026 Judgment Delivered on 28.04.2026  
 
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD 
 
CRIMINAL APPEAL No. - 3400 of 1984   
 
   Sokhi Lal And Others    
 
  .....Appellant(s)   
 
 Versus  
 
   State of U.P.    
 
  .....Respondent(s)       
 
   
 
  
 
Counsel for Appellant(s)   
 
:   
 
G.K.Pandey, Sabhajeet   
 
  
 
Counsel for Respondent(s)   
 
:   
 
A.G.A.   
 
     
 
 Court No. - 80
 
   
 
 HON'BLE VIVEK KUMAR SINGH, J.        

1. Heard Sri Sabhajeet Nishad, learned counsel for the appellants and Sri Onkar Nath Mishra, learned A.G.A. for the State.

2. The present criminal appeal has been filed by the six appellants in the year 1984, however, appellant no. 3- Chheddu, appellant no. 4 -Rajwa and appellant no. 5- Banwari, had died during pendency of present criminal appeal and the appeal against them stood abated vide order dated 09.07.2025 passed by this Court. Now only three appellants i.e. appellant no. 1- Sokhi Lal, appellant no. 2- Jagannath and appellant no. 6- Dagaruwa, are alive, therefore, the judgment is being passed in respect of appellant nos. 1, 2 and 6.

SPONSORED

3. The instant criminal appeal under Section 374 of the Cr.P.C. has been filed on behalf of the appellants mentioned hereinabove against the judgment and order dated 27.11.1984 passed by the learned 4th Additional Sessions Judge, Fatehpur, in Session Trial No. 366 of 1982 (State of U.P. vs. Sokhi Lal and others), Police Station Laloli, District Fatehpur, whereby the appellant no. 1- Sokhi Lal and appellant no. 2- Jagannath, were convicted and sentenced under Section 147 of I.P.C. for one year rigorous imprisonment and under Section 325/149 for three years of rigorous imprisonment. The appellant no. 6- Dagaruwa, was convicted and sentenced under Sections 147, 325/149 of I.P.C. for one year rigorous imprisonment and all the sentences were directed to run concurrently.

4. The prosecution case, in brief, is that an incident had taken place with the complainant Roshan Singh and injuries were caused by the accused persons. He moved an application to the police on 06.08.1981, but his report was not lodged, therefore, he filed a complaint case on 14.07.1981. His statement was recorded under Section 200 of Cr.P.C. and thereafter the accused were summoned and the case was committed to the Court of Session, where charges were framed upon the present appellant nos. 1, 2 and 6 and others, on 13.07.1983. The accused-appellant nos. 1, 2 and 6, pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.

5. In order to substantiate his case, the complainant Roshan Singh produced five witnesses. The complainant Roshan Singh was injured in the present case and he was examined as PW-1 on 05.12.1983. PW-2- Ram Singh and PW-3 Mohan Singh, were also examined as eye-witnesses on 17.01.1984. PW-4 Moinuddin Khan, a record keeper, was also examined on 04.05.1984. The last witness Dr. S.C. Srivastava (Radiologist), was examined on 31.05.1984, as PW-5, who proved the genuineness of the X-ray report.

6. Once, the prosecution evidence was over, statements of accused-appellant nos. 1, 2 and 6, under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., were recorded by the learned trial court explaining the entire evidence and other circumstances, which the appellant nos. 1, 2 and 6, denied and claimed that the entire prosecution story was wrong and concocted. No defence evidence was produced by the accused-appellant nos. 1, 2 and 6.

7. Thereafter, the learned Trial Court, after hearing learned counsel for the parties and appreciating the entire oral and documentary evidence on record, found the accused-appellant nos. 1, 2 and 6, guilty and convicted and sentenced them under Sections 147, 325/149 of I.P.C. and maximum punishment of three years was awarded to them.

8. Being aggrieved by the impugned judgment and order of conviction, the accused-appellant nos. 1, 2 and 6, have preferred the present criminal appeal.

9. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant nos. 1, 2 and 6, that he does not want to press the present appeal on merits. He submitted that the incident took place 45 years ago and there is no further criminal antecedent against the appellant nos. 1, 2 and 6. The delay in trial deprives the right of the appellant nos. 1, 2 and 6, of speedy trial and they may be given benefit of first offender as provided under the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act, 1958”). He further submitted that the appellant nos. 1, 2 and 6, were first time offenders and were not previously convicted in any case and one of the accused Chheddu, was given benefit of Section 4 of the Act, 1958, but no reason, whatsoever, has been given by the learned trial court in its judgment for not giving the benefit of the Act, 1958, to the present appellant nos. 1, 2 and 6. It is further submitted that the appeal was filed in the year 1984, i.e. 42 years ago and now all the appellant nos. 1, 2 and 6, are old and infirm persons who are suffering from several ailments related to old age. An application has also been moved by the learned counsel for the appellant nos. 1, 2 and 6, on 14.09.2025, under Section 6 of the Uttar Pradesh First Offenders Probation Act, 1938, wherein he mentioned that the appellant nos. 1, 2 and 6, are aged about between 80 and 85 years and he prayed that benefit of First Offender Act may be given to the present appellant nos. 1, 2 and 6.

10. Learned A.G.A., on the other hand, opposed the appeal and submitted that there is no material irregularity or illegality committed by the learned trial court and keeping in view the evidence on record, accused-appellant nos. 1, 2 and 6, have rightly been convicted. He further submitted that the benefit of Section 4 of the Act, 1958, should not be extended to the appellant nos. 1, 2 and 6.

11. After considering the arguments advanced by the parties and after perusal of the material available on record, this Court finds that so far as the prayer of learned counsel for the appellant nos. 1, 2 and 6 for providing benefits of Section 4 of the Act of 1958, is concerned, it is essential to discuss the legal position and law propounded by the Apex Court.

12. Sections 3 and 4 of the Act, 1958 are extracted hereunder:

“3. Power of court to release certain offenders after admonition.- “Where any person is found guilty of having committed an offence punishable under Section 379 or Section 380 or Section 381 or Section 404 or Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code, (45 of 1860) or any offence punishable with imprisonment for not more than two years, or with fine, or with both, under the Indian Penal code, or any other law, and no previous conviction is proved against him and the Court by which the person is found guilty is of opinion that, having regard to the circumstances of the case including the nature of the offence, and the character of the offender, it is expedient so to do, then, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the Court may, instead of sentencing him to any punishment or releasing him on probation of good conduct under section 4 release him after due admonition.

Explanation.-For the purposes of this Section, previous conviction against a person shall include any previous order made against him under this Section or Section 4.

4. Power of Court to release certain offenders on probation of good conduct.- (1) When any person is found guilty of having committed an offence not punishable with death or imprisonment for life and the Court by which the person is found guilty is of opinion that, having regard to the circumstances of the case including the nature of the offence and the character of the offender, it is expedient to release him on probation of good conduct, then, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the court may, instead of sentencing him at once to any punishment direct that he be released on his entering into a bond, with or without sureties, to appear and receive sentence when called upon during such period, not exceeding three years, as the Court may direct, and in the meantime to keep the peace and be of good behaviour:

Provided that the Court shall not direct such release of an offender unless it is satisfied that the offender or his surety, if any, has a fixed place of abode or regular occupation in the place over which the Court exercises jurisdiction or in which the offender is likely to live during the period for which he enters into the bond.”

13. That Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ratan Lal vs State of Punjab, AIR 1965 SC 444, while discussing the purpose and object of the Act, 1958, has observed in para no. 4, as follows:-

“4. The Act is a milestone in the progress of the modern liberal trend of reform in the field of penology. It is the result of the recognition of the doctrine that the object of criminal law is more to reform the individual offender than to punish him. Broadly stated the Act distinguishes offenders below 21 years of age and those above that age, and offenders who are guilty of having committed an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life and those who are guilty of a lesser offence. While in the case of offenders who are above the age of 21 years, absolute discretion is given to the court to release them after admonition or on probation of good conduct, subject to the condition laid down in the appropriate provision of the Act, in the case of offenders below the age of 21 years an injunction is issued to the court not to sentence them to imprisonment unless it is satisfied that having regard to the circumstances of the case, including the nature of the offence and the character of the offenders, it is not desirable to deal with them under Ss. 3 and 4 of the Act.”

14. Further the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Ved Prakash vs State of Haryana, (1981) 1 SCC 447 : AIR 1981 SC 643 while discussing on the duty of Bench and Bar regarding compliance of Section 360 Code of Criminal Procedure read with Section 4 of the Act, 1958 was pleased to observe as under:-

“The offence, for which conviction has been rendered, is one which will be attracted by S. 360 or at any rate the Probation of offenders Act, 1958. The materials before us are imperfect because the Trial Court has been perfunctory in discharging its sentencing functions. We must emphasise that sentencing an accused person is a sensitive exercise of discretion and not a routine or mechanical prescription acting on hunch. The Trial Court should have collected materials necessary to help award a just punishment in the circumstances. The social background and the personal factors of the crime-doer are very relevant although in practice Criminal Courts have hardly paid attention to the social milieu or the personal circumstances of the offender. Even if S. 360 Cr.P.C. is not attracted, it is the duty of the sentencing Court to be activist enough to collect such facts as have a bearing on punishment with a rehabilitating slant. The absence of such materials in the present case has left us with little assistance even from the counsel. Indeed members of the bar also do not pay sufficient attention to these legislative provisions which relate to dealing with an offender in such manner that he becomes a non-offender. We emphasise this because the legislation which relate to amelioration in punishment have been regarded as ‘Minor Acts’ and, therefore, of little consequence. This is a totally wrong approach and even if the Bar does not help, the Bench must fulfil the humanising mission of sentencing implicit in such enactments as the Probation of offenders Act.”

15. That it is also noteworthy that this Court in the case of Subhash Chand vs State of U.P; [2015 Law Suit (All) 1343, has emphatically laid down the need to apply the law of probation and give benefit of the beneficial legislation to accused persons in appropriate cases. This court issued following directions to all trial courts and appellate courts:-

“It appears that the aforesaid beneficial legislation has been lost sight of and even the Judges have practically forgotten this provision of law. Thus, before parting with the case, this Court feels that I will be failing in discharge of my duties, if a word of caution is not written for the trial courts and the appellante courts. The Registrar General of this Court is directed to circulate copy of this Judgment to all the District Judges of U.P., who shall in turn ensure circulation of the copy of this order amongst all the judicial officers working under him and shall ensure strict compliance of this Judgment. The District Judges in the State are also directed to call for reports every months from all the courts, i.e. trial courts and appellate courts dealing with such matters and to state as to in how many cases the benefit of the aforesaid provisions have been granted to the accused. The District Judges are also directed to monitor such cases personally in each monthly meeting. The District Judges concerned shall send monthly statement to the Registrar General as to in how many cases the trial court/appellate court has granted the benefit of the aforesaid beneficial legislation to the accused. A copy of this order be placed before the Registrar General for immediate compliance.”

16. Further the Hon’ble Apex Court in State of Maharashtra vs Jagmohan Singh Kuldip Singh Anand; (2004) 7 SCC 659 has extended the benefit of the Act, 1958 to the appellants, and observed as under:-

“The learned counsel appearing for the accused submitted that the accident is of the year 1990. The parties are educated and neighbors. The learned counsel, therefore, prayed that benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 may be granted to the accused. The prayer made on behalf of the accused seems to be reasonable. The accident is more than ten years old. The dispute was between the neighbors over a trivial issue of claiming of drainage. The accident took place in a fit of anger. All the parties educated and also distantly related. The accident is not such as to direct the accused to undergo sentence of imprisonment. In our opinion, it is a fit case in which the accused should be released on probation by directing them to execute a bond of one year for good behaviour.”

17. That coming to the point of desirability of extending the benefit of Probation Act to the accused/ appellants in Sitaram Paswan and Anr v. State of Bihar, AIR 2005 SC 3534, Supreme Court held as under:-

“For exercising the power which is discretionary, the Court has to consider circumstances of the case, the nature of the offence and the character of the offender. While considering the nature of the offence, the Court must take a realistic view of the gravity of the offence, the impact which the offence had on the victim. Thebenefit available to the accused under Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act is subject to the limitation embodied in the provisions and the word “may” clearly indicates that the discretion vests with the Court whether to release the offender in exercise of the powers under Section 3 or 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, having regard to the nature of the offence and the character of the offender and overall circumstances of the case. The powers under Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act vest with the Court when any person is found guilty of the offence committed, not punishable with death or imprisonment for life. This power can be exercised by the Courts while finding the person guilty and if the Court thinks that having regard to the circumstances of the case, including the nature of the offence and the character of the offender, benefit should be extended to the accused, the power can be exercised by the Court even at the appellate or revisional stage and also by this Court while hearing appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India.”

18. That it is also noteworthy that Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Mohd. Hashim v. State of U.P and Ors., AIR 2017 SC page 660, was pleased to observe as under:

“20-………In Rattan Lal v. State of Punjab AIR 1965 SC 444. Subba Rao, J., speaking for the majority, opined thus:-

“The Act is a milestone in the progress of the modern liberal trend of reform in the field of penology. It is the result of the recognition of the doctrine that the object of criminal law is more to reform the individual offender than to punish him. Broadly stated, the Act distinguishes offenders below 21 years of age and those above that age, and offenders who are guilty of having committed an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life and those who are guilty of a lesser offence. While in the case of offenders who are above the age of 21 years absolute discretion is given to the court to release them after admonition or on probation of good conduct, subject to the conditions laid down in the appropriate provisions of the Act, in the case of offenders below the age of 21 years an injunction is issued to the court not to sentence them to imprisonment unless it is satisfied that having regard to the circumstances of the case; including the nature of the offence and the character of the offenders, it is not desirable to deal with them under Sections 3 and 4 of the Act.”

19. That Section 4 of the Act of 1958 is applicable where a person is found guilty of committing an offence where punishment is neither life sentence nor death. The Court may release such an accused on probation of good conduct on his furnishing a bond as mentioned in the Section. The Court in applying the provisions of this Section is also required to consider the circumstances of the case, character of the offender and nature of the offence before exercising its discretion.

20. A perusal of the aforesaid provisions of the Act of 1958 thus clearly indicate that Section 4 of the Act of 1958 does not create any distinction between the category of offenders and the provision of the said Section can be made applicable in any case where the offender is found guilty for committing an offence which is not punishable with death or imprisonment for life. Incidentally certain exceptions have been indicated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court as in the case of Smt. Devki Versus State of Harayana; 1979 (3) SCC 760 where the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that benefit of Section 4 of the Act of 1958 could not be extended to a culprit who was found guilty of abducting a teenaged girl and forcing her to sexual submission with criminal motive. Similarly in the case reported in 1980 (4) SCC 669 in Re: State of Maharashtra Versus Natwar Lal Damodar Das Soni, the Hon’ble Supreme Court declined to extend the benefit of the Act of 1958 to an accused found guilty of gold smuggling.

21. That Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Jagat Pal Singh & others vs. State of Haryana, AIR 2000 SC 3622 has given the benefit of probation while upholding the conviction of accused persons under Sections 323, 452, 506 IPC and has released the accused persons on executing a bond before the Magistrate for maintaining good behaviour and peace for the period of six months.

22. Similarly this Court in case of Virendra Kumar Vs State of U.P.; 2022(120)ACrC 392 has given benefit of probation while upholding the conviction of revisionist under section 7/16 of Food Adulteration Act and had released the accused persons on executing a bond before Magistrate for maintaining good behaviour and peace for the period of six months.

23. Recently in the judgment passed in the case of Tarak Nath Keshari Vs. State of West Bengal, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 605, the Hon’ble Apex Court after considering the provisions of the Act, 1955 extended the benefit of the Act, 1958 to the accused. The relevant paragraphs of Tarak Nath Kesari (supra) are extracted hereunder:-

“9. However, still we find that a case is made out for grant of benefit of probation to the appellant for the reason that the offence was committed more than 37 years back and it was not pointed out at the time of hearing that the appellant was involved in any other offence. Before all the courts below, the appellant remained on bail. While entertaining his appeal, even this Court had granted him exemption from surrendering. Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 has a non obstante clause. The same is extracted below:

“4. Power of court to release certain offenders on probation of good conduct.-(1) When any person is found guilty of having committed an offence not punishable with death or imprisonment for life and the court by which the person is found guilty is of opinion that, having regard to the circumstances of the case including the nature of the offence and the character of the offender, it is expedient to release him on probation of good conduct, then, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the court may, instead of sentencing him at once to any punishment direct that he be released on his entering into a bond, with or without sureties, to appear and receive sentence when called upon during such period, not exceeding three years, as the court may direct, and in the meantime to keep the peace and be of good behaviour:

Provided that the court shall not direct such release of an offender unless it is satisfied that the offender or his surety, if any, has a fixed place of abode or regular occupation in the place over which the court exercises jurisdiction or in which the offender is likely to live during the period for which he enters into the bond.

(2) Before making any order under sub-section (1), the court shall take into consideration the report, if any, of the probation officer concerned in relation to the case.

(3) When an order under sub-section (1) is made, the court may, if it is of opinion that in the interests of the offender and of the public it is expedient so to do, in addition pass a supervision order directing that the offender shall remain under the supervision of a probation officer named in the order during such period, not being less than one year, as may be specified therein, and may in such supervision order impose such conditions as it deems necessary for the due supervision of the offender.

(4) The court making a supervision order under sub-section (3) shall require the offender, before he is released, to enter into a bond, with or without sureties, to observe the conditions specified in such order and such additional conditions with respect to residence, abstention from intoxicants or any other matter as the court may, having regard to the particular circumstances, consider fit to impose for preventing a repetition of the same offence or a commission of other offences by the offender.

(5) The court making a supervision order under sub-section (3) shall explain to the offender the terms and conditions of the order and shall forthwith furnish one copy of the supervision order to each of the offenders, the sureties, if any, and the probation officer concerned.”

10. Even if there is minimum sentence provided in Section 7 of the EC Act, in our opinion, the appellant is entitled to the benefit of probation, the EC Act, being of the year 1955 and the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 being later. Even if minimum sentence is provided in the EC Act, 1955 the same will not be a hurdle for invoking the applicability of provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958. Reference can be made to a judgment of this Court in Lakhvir Singh v. The State of Punjab & Ors.

11. The appeal is accordingly disposed of. The appellant is directed to be released on probation under Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 on entering into bond and two sureties each to ensure that he will maintain peace and good behaviour for the remaining part of his sentence, failing which he can be called upon to serve the sentence.”

24. After having heard the learned counsel for both the sides and going through the record, this Court finds that the learned trial court has not given any special reasons as prescribed under Section 361 of Cr.P.C. as to why the benefit of Section 4 of the Act, 1958 was not extended to the appellant nos. 1, 2 and 6, though the same benefit was extended to accused Chheddu.

25. The incident in the present matter took place way back in the year 1981. The accused-appellant nos. 1, 2 and 6, have suffered in this matter for last 45 years and there is no criminal antecedent prior or after the incident. Therefore, in view of the above discussion, this Court finds that the sentencing order passed by the learned trial court suffers from irregularity and benefit of provision of the Act, 1958, should be provided to the accused-appellant nos. 1, 2 and 6.

26. In view of the above facts and circumstances of the case and also considering the scope of Section 4 of the Act, 1958, the conviction of the appellant nos. 1, 2 and 6, is maintained but the sentence is hereby modified. Instead of sending the appellant nos. 1, 2 and 6, to jail, they are given benefit of Section 4 of the Act, 1958, and they are directed to file one surety each to the tune of Rs. 25,000/- along with their personal bond before the District Probation Officer, Fatehpur, and also an undertaking to the effect that they shall maintain peace and good behaviour during the period of one year from today. The said bonds are to be filed by the appellant nos. 1, 2 and 6, within a period of one month from the date of this judgment.

27. In case of breach of any of the above conditions, the appellant nos. 1, 2 and 6, shall be taken into custody and shall have to undergo sentence awarded to them.

28. With the above modification, the instant criminal appeal is partly allowed.

29. A certified copy of the order be also sent to the court concerned for compliance.

30. Office is directed to communicate this order to the court concerned for necessary compliance.

31. Trial court record be sent back to the district court concerned.

(Vivek Kumar Singh,J.)

April 28, 2026

A.P. Pandey