Smt. Sushmita Amishra vs State Of Chhattisgarh on 12 June, 2025

Chattisgarh High Court

Smt. Sushmita Amishra vs State Of Chhattisgarh on 12 June, 2025

                                                          1




                                                                            2025:CGHC:23636

                                                                                                NAFR


                                HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR


                                             WPS No. 3863 of 2025

               1 - Smt. Sushmita Amishra W/o Shri Sachin Mishra Aged About 46 Years
               Terminated From The Post Of Tourist Officer At Chhattisgarh Tourism
               Department Raipur District Raipur R/o H. No. A-36, P.S. City Colony New
               Changorabhata District- Raipur (C.G.)
                                                                         ... Petitioner(s)

                                                       versus

               1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Secretary, Department Of Tourism
               Mahanadi Bhawan, Naya Mantralaya, Atal Nagar, Nava Raipur, District- Raipur
               (C.G.)

               2 - Managing Director Chhattisgarh Tourism Board Udyog Bhawan, Iind Flore,
               Ring Road No. 01, Telibandha, Raipur, District- Raipur (C.G.)

               3 - General Manager Chhattisgarh Tourism Board, Udyog Bhawan, Iind Flore,
               Ring Road No. 01, Telibandha, Raipur, District- Raipur (C.G.)

                                                                                      ... Respondent(s)

(Cause title taken from Case Information System)

For Petitioner : Mr. Jitendra Nath Nande, Advocate

For Respondent No.1/State : Mr. Vinay Pandey, Deputy A.G. and Mr.
Akhilesh Kumar, Govt. Advocate

For Respondents No.2 and 3 : Ms. Anuja Sharma, Advocate on behalf of
Mr. Ashish Shrivastava, Senior Advocate

Hon’ble Shri Justice Ravindra Kumar Agrawal
Order on Board
Digitally
signed by
VEDPRAKASH
VEDPRAKASH DEWANGAN
DEWANGAN Date:

2025.06.13
19:15:27
+0530
2

12/06/2025

1. Challenge in the present petition is the order rated 06-09-2019, by which

the services of the petitioner from the post of Assistant Grade-3 from

Chhattisgarh Tourism Board, Raipur has been terminated.

2. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that despite the

termination order dated 06-09-2019, the respondent No. 3 has taken

work from the petitioner, but her services have not been regularized and

she is claiming her regularization in the service. But no decision has

been taken by the respondent authorities, therefore, she is claiming

quashment of the impugned order dated 06-09-2019.

3. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents/State would

submit that the services of the petitioner have been terminated since

06-09-2019 and after about 06 years, she is challenging her termination

order and the petition is suffered from delay and leches.

4. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material

annexed with the petition.

5. From perusal of the impugned order, it reveals that the services of the

petitioner have been terminated vide order dated 06-09-2019 from the

post of Assistant Grade-3 from Chhattisgarh Tourism Board, Raipur, but

the petitioner has challenged her termination order after about 06 years,

which apparently a highly belated claim.

6. In the matter of “Bichitranand Behra v. State of Orissa and others”

2023 Live Law SC 883, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Para 21 has held

as under:-

3

“21. Profitably, we may reproduce relevant passages

from certain decisions of this Court:

(A) Union of India v Tarsem Singh, (2008) 8 SCC 648:

“To summarise, normally, a belated service related

claim will be rejected on the ground of delay and

laches (where remedy is sought by filing a writ

petition) or limitation (where remedy is sought by an

application to the Administrative Tribunal). One of the

exceptions to the said rule is cases relating to a

continuing wrong. Where a service related claim is

based on a continuing wrong, relief can be granted

even if there is a long delay in seeking remedy, with

reference to the date on which the continuing wrong

commenced, if such continuing wrong creates a

continuing source of injury. But there is an exception

to the exception. If the grievance is in respect of any

order or administrative decision which related to or

affected several others also, and if the reopening of

the issue would affect the settled rights of third

parties, then the claim will not be entertained. For

example, if the issue relates to payment or refixation

of pay or pension, relief may be granted in spite of

delay as it does not affect the rights of third parties.

But if the claim involved issues relating to seniority or

promotion, etc., affecting others, delay would render

the claim stale and doctrine of laches/limitation will be

applied. Insofar as the consequential relief of recovery

of arrears for a past period is concerned, the

principles relating to recurring/successive wrongs will

apply. As a consequence, the High Courts will restrict
4

the consequential relief relating to arrears normally to

a period of three years prior to the date of filing of the

writ petition.” (emphasis supplied) (B) Union of India v

N Murugesan, (2022) 2 SCC 25:”

7. In the matter of “Rushibhai Jagdishbhai Pathak v. Bhavnagar

Municipal Corporation” 2022 SCC OnLine SC 64, the Hon’ble

Supreme Court in Para 9 has held as under:-

“”9. The doctrine of delay and laches, or for that
matter statutes of limitation, are considered to be

statutes of repose and statutes of peace, though

some contrary opinions have been expressed. 4 The

courts have expressed the view that the law of

limitation rests on the foundations of greater public

interest for three reasons, namely, (a) that long

dormant claims have more of cruelty than justice in

them; (b) that a defendant might have lost the

evidence to disapprove a stale claim; and (iii) that

persons with good causes of action (who are able to

enforce them) should pursue them with reasonable

diligence. 5 Equally, change in de facto position or

character, creation of third party rights over a period

of time, waiver, acquiesce, and need to ensure

certitude in dealings, are equitable public policy

considerations why period of limitation is prescribed

by law. Law of limitation does not apply to writ 4 See

Nav Rattanmal and Others v. State of Rajasthan, AIR

1961 SC 1704 5 State of Kerala and Others v. V. R.

Kalliyanikutty and Another, (1999) 3 SCC 657 relying

on Halsbury’s Laws of England, 4th Edn., Vol. 28, para
5

605; Halsbury’s Laws of England, Vol. 68 (2021) para

1005 petitions, albeit the discretion vested with a

constitutional court is exercised with caution as delay

and laches principle is applied with the aim to secure

the quiet of the community, suppress fraud and

perjury, quicken diligence, and prevent oppression. 6

Therefore, some decisions and judgments do not look

upon pleas of delay and laches with favour, especially

and rightly in cases where the persons suffer from

adeptness, or incapacity to approach the courts for

relief. However, other decisions, while accepting the

rules of limitation as well as delay and laches, have

observed that such rules are not meant to destroy the

rights of the parties but serve a larger public interest

and are founded on public policy. There must be a

lifespan during which a person must approach the

court for their remedy. Otherwise, there would be

unending uncertainty as to the rights and obligations

of the parties.7 Referring to the principle of delay and

laches, this Court, way back in Moons Mills Ltd. v.

M.R. Mehar, President, Industrial Court, Bombay and

Others,8 had referred to the view expressed by Sir

Barnes Peacock in The Lindsay Petroleum Company

AND. Prosper Armstrong Hurd, Abram Farewell, and

John Kemp,9 in the following words:

6 See Popat and Kotecha Property v. State Bank of

India Staff Association, (2005) 7 SCC 510 7 See N.

Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy, (1998) 7 SCC 123 8

AIR 1967 SC 1450 9 (1874) LR 5 PC 221 “Now the

doctrine of laches in Courts of Equity is not an
6

arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would be

practically unjust to give a remedy, either because the

party has, by his conduct, done that which might

fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or

where by his conduct and neglect he has, though

perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other

party in a situation in which it would not be

reasonable to place him if the remedy were

afterwards to be asserted, in either of these cases,

lapse of time and delay are most material. But in

every case, if an argument against relief, which

otherwise would be just, is founded upon mere delay,

that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any

statute of limitations, the validity of that defence must

be tried upon principles substantially equitable. Two

circumstances, always important in such cases, are,

the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done

during the interval, which might affect either party

and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking

the one course or the other, so far as relates to the

remedy.”

8. In view of the submissions made by learned counsel for the parties,

further considering that the petitioner is hopelessly time-barred, I do not

find any ground to admit the petition. Accordingly, the present writ

petition is dismissed.

Sd/-

(Ravindra Kumar Agrawal)
Judge
ved