Madhya Pradesh High Court
Smt.Rajul Jain vs M.P.Electricity Board on 9 April, 2026
Author: Gurpal Singh Ahluwalia
Bench: G. S. Ahluwalia
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:11686
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F.A.No.96/2011, F.A.No.113/2011 & F.A.No.40/2017
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT G WA L I O R
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE G. S. AHLUWALIA
FIRST APPEAL No. 96 of 2011
SMT.RAJUL JAIN AND OTHERS
Versus
M.P.ELECTRICITY BOARD AND OTHERS
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Appearance:
Shri H.K.Shukla with Shri Rajeev Shrivastava- Advocate for the appellants.
Shri Narottam Sharma- Advocate for the respondent No.1.
Shri G.P.Chourasiya- Advocate for the respondent No.2.
Shri Rajendra Jain- Government Advocate for the State.
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
WITH
FIRST APPEAL No. 113 of 2011
M.P.ELECTRICITY BOARD
Versus
SMT.RAJUL JAIN AND OTHERS
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Appearance:
Shri Narottam Sharma- Advocate for the appellant.
Shri H.K.Shukla with Shri Rajeev Shrivastava- Advocate for the respondents No.1 to
5.
Shri G.P.Chourasiya- Advocate for the respondent No.6.
Shri Rajendra Jain- Government Advocate for the State.
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
FIRST APPEAL No. 40 of 2017
GANGARAM KUSHWAH
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: PRINCEE
BARAIYA
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NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:11686
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F.A.No.96/2011, F.A.No.113/2011 & F.A.No.40/2017
Versus
SMT. RAJUL JAIN AND OTHERS
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Appearance:
Shri G.P.Chourasiya- Advocate for the appellant.
Shri H.K.Shukla with Shri Rajeev Shrivastava- Advocate for the respondents No.1 to
5.
Shri Narottam Sharma- Advocate for the respondent No.6.
Shri Rajendra Jain- Government Advocate for the State.
_____________________________________________________________
Reserved on : 06/04/2026
Pronounced on : 09/04/2026
_____________________________________________________________
JUDGMENT
1. By this common judgment, F.A.No. 113/2011 and F.A. No. 40/2017
shall also be disposed of.
2. All the three first appeals have been filed against judgment and decree
dated 22/10/2010 passed by First Additional District Judge, Shivpuri, in Civil
Suit No. 14-A/2010.
3. F.A.No. 96/2011 has been filed by plaintiff for enhancement of
compensation amount, whereas F.A.No. 113/2011 has been filed by M.P.
Electricity Board and F.A. No. 40/2017 has been filed by a farmer/Gangaram
against whom an allegation was made that he had taken an illegal electricity
connection by laying a live electricity wire from electricity pole to his hut,
which resulted in electrocution of the deceased.
4. The facts necessary for disposal of present appeals, in short, are that the
deceased, Girish Jain, was hale and hearty and was an agriculturist by
profession. He used to take agricultural fields on Batai and was also in the
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F.A.No.96/2011, F.A.No.113/2011 & F.A.No.40/2017
business of sale of milk. On 16/11/2009, at about 06:30 a.m., the deceased,
Girish Jain, had gone to the agricultural fields for carrying out agricultural
activities. It is alleged that he came in contact with a live electricity wire,
which was laid by Gangaram Kushwaha/defendant No. 2/appellant in F.A.No.
40/2017, illegally with the permission of M.P. Electricity Board/defendant
No. 1, as a result he died. Accordingly, the suit was filed for compensation to
the tune of Rs. 7,00,000/-.
5. Defendant No. 1 filed its written statement and claimed that no
electricity wire was laid down by defendant No. 1. In fact, the electricity wire
was laid down by defendant No. 2/Gangaram without the consent and
knowledge of defendant No. 1. No complaint was ever made by the deceased,
Girish Jain, with regard to illegal laying down of the electricity wire by
defendant No. 2/Gangaram. It was alleged that the plaintiffs have no right to
claim compensation against defendant No. 1. It was further claimed that in
fact, the deceased should have stayed away from the electricity wire so that
the unfortunate incident would not have taken place.
6. Defendant No. 2 filed his written statement, and it was claimed that the
electricity wire was illegally laid down by the deceased, Girish Jain, himself
in order to keep the cattle away from the fields, and accordingly, he came in
contact with the live electricity wire. Accordingly, it was prayed that plaintiffs
are not entitled for any compensation amount. It was also denied that the
deceased, Girish Jain was in the business of sale of milk, and it was also
claimed that he was not cultivating the lands on Batai purposes. It was
claimed that the deceased is a rich person and was a member of a joint Hindu
family.
7. The trial Court after framing issues and recording evidence, held that
defendant No. 2/Gangaram had illegally laid down an electricity wire from
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F.A.No.96/2011, F.A.No.113/2011 & F.A.No.40/2017
the electricity pole up to his hut, which was passing through the field of the
deceased, and the deceased came in contact with live electricity wire and
suffered electrocution, resulting in his death and awarded a total amount of
Rs.3,98,900/-. It was held that defendant No. 1 will be liable to pay 50% of
the compensation amount, whereas the remaining 50% of compensation
amount is payable by defendant No. 2.
8. The plaintiffs have filed F.A.No. 96/2011 for enhancement, whereas
F.A.No. 113/2011 and F.A.No. 40/2017 have been filed by defendants No. 1
and 2 against the decree passed by the Court below.
9. Challenging the quantum of compensation awarded by trial Court, it is
submitted by counsel for plaintiffs that even if plaintiffs had failed to prove
the monthly income of the deceased, then still the notional income of Rs.
3,000/- per month, as assessed by trial Court is on a lower side. It is submitted
that if the plaintiff has failed to prove the monthly income, then trial Court
could have taken the notification issued under the Minimum Wages Act as a
guiding factor to ascertain the notional income. It is further submitted that the
compensation awarded under customary heads is also on the lower side, and
consortium as well as future prospects have not been awarded.
10. Challenging the judgment and decree passed by Court below, counsel
for M.P. Electricity Board submitted that since the electricity line was
illegally laid down by defendant No. 2, therefore, defendant No. 1/M.P.
Electricity Board should not have been made liable to pay the compensation
amount.
11. Challenging the judgment and decree passed by Court below, counsel
for defendant No. 2 submitted that since the electricity line was illegally laid
down by the deceased, Girish Jain himself, and therefore, defendant No.
2/Gangaram has been wrongly held liable to pay half of the compensation
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F.A.No.96/2011, F.A.No.113/2011 & F.A.No.40/2017
amount.
12. Heard the learned counsel for the parties.
13. The questions for determination are as under:
(1) Whether, the electricity line was illegally laid down
by the deceased, Girish Jain himself, or it was laid down by
defendant No. 2/Gangaram?
(2) Whether, M.P. Electricity Board is liable to pay
compensation amount for not maintaining the electricity line
properly or not?
(3) Whether the compensation awarded to the plaintiffs is
liable to be enhanced or not?
Whether, the electricity line was illegally laid down by the
deceased, Girish Jain himself, or it was laid down by defendant No.
2/Gangaram?
14. Defendant No. 1/M.P. Electricity Board has examined Ravindra Singh
Jain as D.W.-1. He has proved documents Ex.D-1 to Ex.D-5. Ex.D-1 is the
proforma report of electrical accident, which was prepared on 16/11/2009 at
06:30 a.m. According to this report, the accident took place in the field of the
deceased, Girish Jain as he had come in contact with naked live wire. In
paragraph 11 of this report, it is mentioned that “the accident took place due
to contact of illegal naked wire of user (illegal) Shri Gangaram Kushwaha)”.
Detailed report is Ex.D-2, which was also prepared on 16/11/2009 at 09:30
a.m. In this report also, it was mentioned that naked electricity wire was laid
down by Gangaram Kushwaha for lighting his hut, and Girish Jain was not
aware of aforesaid illegal laying down of the electricity wire by Gangaram –
defendant No. 2. The complaint made by M.P. Electricity Board to SHO,
Police Station Kolaras is Ex.D-3, and in that report also it was mentioned that
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F.A.No.96/2011, F.A.No.113/2011 & F.A.No.40/2017
defendant No. 2/Gangaram had illegally laid down an electricity wire from
the electricity pole up to his hut in order to light the bulb. The telegram sent
to various officers of the Electricity Board by Junior Engineer has been
placed on record as Ex.D-4. The Panchnama prepared on 16/11/2009 at about
10:00 a.m. by the officers of M.P. Electricity Board with diagram/sketch of
spot is Ex.D-5. From the sketch, it is clear that illegal electricity connection
was taken from the electricity pole and it went up to the hut of Gangaram
while passing through the fields of Girish Jain.
15. Under these circumstances, it is clear that it is the case of defendant
No. 1 itself that it was defendant No. 2/Gangaram, who had illegally taken an
electricity connection from the electricity pole upto his hut passing through
the field of the deceased, Girish Jain.
16. Gangaram (D.W.-2) has appeared as defence witness No. 2, and it was
his contention that the electricity line was illegally laid down by the deceased
and not by him.
17. In view of defence taken by defendant No. 1 as well as Panchnama and
the detailed report which were prepared on the very same day, coupled with
the fact that it was found on the spot that the electricity wire was illegally laid
down by defendant No. 2 from the electricity pole upto his hut in order to use
the electricity for lighting purposes, it is clear that trial Court did not commit
any mistake by holding that the electricity line was illegally laid down by
defendant No. 2 from the electricity pole upto his hut. Accordingly, it is held
that electricity line was not illegally laid down by the deceased, but it was
illegally laid down by defendant No. 2/Gangaram.
Whether, M.P. Electricity Board is liable to pay compensation
amount for not maintaining the electricity line properly or not?
18. The next question for consideration is as to whether defendant No. 1 is
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F.A.No.96/2011, F.A.No.113/2011 & F.A.No.40/2017
equally liable to pay the compensation amount or not?
19. The Division Bench of this Court in the case of Smt. Shail Kumari vs
M.P. Electricity Board, decided on 17/01/2001 in F.A.No. 416/1999 applied
the principle of strict liability and held as under:
“8. In 1975 JLJ 806 1975 MPLJ 744 (Manoharlal Sobharam
Gupta and others v. Madhya Pradesh Electricity Board), claim
for damage was based on negligence by MPEB when death of
wife was caused by live electricity wire lying on street. Learned
Judges were called upon to determine the standard of care
required from the Electricity Board and the burden to prove
negligence. After dealing with question, the Court held that the
standard of care required of a body like Electricity Board is a
high one owing to the dangerous nature of electricity. It is
negligence on its part to omit to use all reasonable known
means to keep the electricity harmless. There is no burden on
plaintiff to prove negligence. If the defendant produces no
material and evidence to negative negligence, negligence will
be presumed. Live broken electric wires carrying high tension
energy- are generally not found in a public place, street or road
and therefore, if such a thing happens, a prima facie inference of
carelessness on part of defendant in transmitting energy or in
properly maintaining transmission lines can be drawn. Precisely,
it is said in para 4 of the judgment that:
“4. The defendant has a statutory authority under the
Electricity Act, 1910, read with the Electricity Supply Act,
1948, to transmit electric energy. The defendant, therefore,
cannot be made liable for nuisance for the escape of
electrical energy on the principle accepted in the case of
Rylands v. Fletcher (LR 1 Ex. 265). The defendant,
however, is still liable for negligence. It is negligence to
omit to use all reasonable known means to keep the
electricity harmless (see Clerk & Lindsell on Torts, 13th
edition, paragraph 1536). The burden of proving that there
was no negligence is on the defendant and there is no
obligation on the plaintiff to prove negligence. Further, the
standard of care required is a high one owing to the
dangerous nature of electricity (see Charlesworth on
Negligence, 5th edition, p. 531). If the defendant produces
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NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:116868
F.A.No.96/2011, F.A.No.113/2011 & F.A.No.40/2017no material and offers no evidence to negative negligence,
negligence will be presumed. This result will also follow
on the principle of res ipsa loquitur. Live broken electric
wires carrying high tension energy are generally not found
in a public place, street or road, therefore, if such a thing
happens, a prima facie inference can be drawn that there
has been some carelessness on the part of the defendant in
transmitting electric energy or in properly maintaining the
transmission lines. This inference is further supported by
Rule 91 of the Indian Electricity Rules, 1956. This rule
provides that every overhead line which is not covered
with insulating material and which is erected over any part
of a street or other public place or any factory or mine or
on any consumer’s premises shall be protected with a
device approved by the Inspector for rendering the line
electrically harmless in case it breaks. If the precaution
under this rule is taken, the line, in case it breaks, would
become dead and harmless. The fact that the line after it
broke did not become harmless shows that necessary
precaution was not taken. As the defendant has not
produced any evidence whatsoever to place the facts
showing that all necessary precautions were taken and
there was no negligence on its part, it must be held that the
accident happened because of the negligence of the
defendant.”
This judgment was followed by this Court in 1999(1)
MPLJ 587 Chairman, M.P. Electricity Board, Jabalpur and
ors. v. Smt. Gindiabai) wherein, in paragraph 8, the Court
said that “the M.P. Electricity Board is a statutory
authority under the Electricity Act, 1910 read with the
Electricity Supply Act, 1948. It has the duty to transmit
electric energy and regulate the supply. It is expected of
the Board to do whatever is required to be done to avoid
an accident. Its negligence cannot be equated with the
negligence of an individual or a situational negligence.
There is presumption of negligence when an accident of
this nature occurs. Heavy onus is cast on the Board. It is
required to discharge the onus……………”
9. In 2000 ACJ 1286/Kiranbala Dandapat and others v.
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F.A.No.96/2011, F.A.No.113/2011 & F.A.No.40/2017
Secretary, Grid Corporation of Orissa Ltd. and anr.), in
paragraph 7, application of doctrine of res ipsa loquitur has been
discussed in the following terms:
“7. It is pleaded by the opposite parties that there was no
negligence involved. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
would seem to apply to the facts of the case. It is explained
in a very illustrative passage in Clerk & Lindsell on torts,
16th Edn., pp. 568-569, which reads as follows:
“Doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. The onus of proof, which
lies on a party alleging negligence is, as pointed out, that
he should establish his case by a preponderance of
probabilities. This he will normally have to do by proving
that the other party acted carelessly. Such evidence is not
always forthcoming. It is possible, however, in certain
cases for him to rely on the mere fact that something
happened as affording prima facie evidence of want of due
care on the other’s part: ‘res ipsa loquitur is a principle
which helps him to do so”. In effect, therefore, reliance on
it is a confession by the plaintiff that he has no affirmative
evidence of negligence. The classic statement of the
circumstances in which he is able to do so is by Erle, C.J.:
“There must be reasonable evidence of negligence. But
where the thing is shown to be under the management of
the defendant or his servants, and the accident is such as in
the ordinary course of thing does not happen if those who
have the management use proper care, it affords
reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the
defendants, that the accident arose from want of care”.
It is no more than a rule of evidence and states no
principle of law. “This convenient and succinct formula”,
said Morris, L.J., “possesses no magic qualities; nor has it
any added virtue, other than that of brevity, merely
because it is expressed in Latin”. It is only a convenient
label to apply, to a set of circumstances in which a plaintiff
proves a case so as to call for a rebuttal from the
defendant, without having to allege and prove any specific
act or omission on the part of the defendant. He merely
proves a result, not any particular act or omission
producing the result. The Court hears only the plaintiff’s
side of the story, and if this makes it more probable than
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F.A.No.96/2011, F.A.No.113/2011 & F.A.No.40/2017
not that the occurrence was caused by the negligence of
the defendant, the doctrine res ipsa loquitur is said to
apply, and the plaintiff will be entitled to succeed unless
the defendant by evidence rebuts that probability. It is not
necessary for res ipsa loquitur to be specifically pleaded.
Reference may be made to another passage from the
same book at “Liability to children. An occupier must be
prepared for children to be less careful than adults.
Something which would not be a danger’ to an adult may
very well be one to a child, and a warning sufficient for an
adult may be insufficient for a child. In Moleney v.
Lambeth London Borough Council, an occupier was held
liable to a four years old boy who fell through the bars of a
balustrade. If a person of the size of the plaintiff lost his
balance he was liable to go through the gap. The staircase
did not comply with the occupier’s duty of care to a child
of that age. But in Ward v. Hertfordshire C.C., it was held
there was no liability to a child aged eight who fell against
a long standing brick and flint wall in a school’s
playground. The wall was not inherently dangerous and
the presence of a supervisor would not have prevented the
accident.”
Then, in paragraph 8, it is said that:
“8. The question of negligence of a company engaged in
transmission of electric energy was considered in Sugbec
Railway, Light, Heat, Power Co. Ltd. v. Vandry [(1920)
AC 662]. The concerned Railway company, in exercise of
statutory powers, had erected two overhead cables for the
distribution of electric current. In that case, on account of
a violent wind, a branch from a tree growing about 28 feet
away from the cables was broken, which resulted in the
breaking down of the cables and the high tension current
found its way along with the low tension cable into the
respondents’ premises and caused a fire. An action for
damages was brought by the respondents against the
concerned power company. The Court of appeal held that
the company was liable for the damage without proof that
it had been negligent, since it had failed to establish that it
could not have prevented the escape of the electric current,
further that its statutory power afforded no defence, since
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NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:1168611
F.A.No.96/2011, F.A.No.113/2011 & F.A.No.40/2017the escape of the current was not necessarily incidental to
the exercise of those powers.”
See also 1992 ACJ 554 (Padma Behari Lal v. Orissa State
Electricity Board and another), 1994 ACJ 623 (Seemu alias
Seema v. Himachal Pradesh State Electricity Board and others)
and 2000 AC 1199 (Executive Engineer, Electricity (M&RE)
Division, Awantipora, Anantnag v. Mohammad Ashraf Bhat and
others).
10. The legal position, therefore, is that the MPEB is a statutory
authority under the Electricity Act, 1910, r/w the Electricity
Supply Act, 1948. It has the duty to transmit electric energy and
regulate the supply. Therefore, it is the responsibility of MPEB
to take all possible steps to avoid any accident in the
transmission and regulation of electric supply and any
negligence on its part is actionable at the instance of person who
has suffered any damage to person or property. Claimant has to
point out certain instances indicating negligence on the part of
MPEB. But that onus is not that strong as which lies on MPEB
to prove that it had taken all steps to prevent such occurrences
and in performance of this duty it had not committed any kind
of negligence. Looking to the nature of function in discharge,
namely, supply of electricity, duty to take care is high.
Assuming that the claimant is not in a position to state exactly
what actually happened since he himself is not sufferer,
statement that the deceased died due to electric shock from
electricity line of the respondent No.1 is sufficient to apply the
principle of res ipsa loquitur helping the Court to come to the
conclusion that the death of deceased took place in the accident
alleged.”
20. The said judgment was assailed before the Supreme Court, and the
Supreme Court in the case of M.P. Electricity Board Vs. Shail Kumari &
Ors., reported in (2002) 2 SCC 162 has held as under:-
“8. Even assuming that all such measures have been
adopted, a person undertaking an activity involving hazardous
or risky exposure to human life, is liable under law of torts to
compensate for the injury suffered by any other person,
irrespective of any negligence or carelessness on the part of the
managers of such undertakings. The basis of such liability is the
foreseeable risk inherent in the very nature of such activity. The
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NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:1168612
F.A.No.96/2011, F.A.No.113/2011 & F.A.No.40/2017liability cast on such person is known, in law, as “strict
liability”. It differs from the liability which arises on account of
the negligence or fault in this way i.e. the concept of negligence
comprehends that the foreseeable harm could be avoided by
taking reasonable precautions. If the defendant did all that
which could be done for avoiding the harm he cannot be held
liable when the action is based on any negligence attributed.
But such consideration is not relevant in cases of strict liability
where the defendant is held liable irrespective of whether he
could have avoided the particular harm by taking precautions.
9. The doctrine of strict liability has its origin in English
common law when it was propounded in the celebrated case
of Rylands v. Fletcher [(1868) 3 HL 330 : (1861-73) All ER
Rep 1] . Blackburn, J., the author of the said rule had observed
thus in the said decision: (All ER p. 7E-F)
“[T]he true rule of law is that the person who, for his
own purposes, brings on his land, and collects and keeps
there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must
keep it at his peril, and, if he does not do so, he is prima
facie answerable for all the damage which is the natural
consequence of its escape.”
10. There are seven exceptions formulated by means of
case-law to the doctrine of strict liability. It is unnecessary to
enumerate those exceptions barring one which is this: “Act of
stranger i.e. if the escape was caused by the unforeseeable act of
a stranger, the rule does not apply.” (Vide p. 535, Winfield on
Tort, 15th Edn.)
11. The rule of strict liability has been approved and
followed in many subsequent decisions in England. A recent
decision in recognition of the said doctrine is rendered by the
House of Lords in Cambridge Water Co. Ltd. v. Eastern
Counties Leather plc. [(1994) 1 All ER 53 (HL)] The said
principle gained approval in India, and decisions of the High
Courts are a legion to that effect. A Constitution Bench of this
Court in Charan Lal Sahu v. Union of India [(1990) 1 SCC 613]
and a Division Bench in Gujarat SRTC v. Ramanbhai
Prabhatbhai [(1987) 3 SCC 234 : 1987 SCC (Cri) 482] had
followed with approval the principle
in Rylands v. Fletcher [(1868) 3 HL 330 : (1861-73) All ER Rep
1] . By referring to the above two decisions a two-Judge Bench
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F.A.No.96/2011, F.A.No.113/2011 & F.A.No.40/2017
of this Court has reiterated the same principle in Kaushnuma
Begum v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. [(2001) 2 SCC 9 : 2001
SCC (Cri) 268]
12. In M.C. Mehta v. Union of India [(1987) 1 SCC 395 :
1987 SCC (L&S) 37] this Court has gone even beyond the rule
of strict liability by holding that: (SCC p. 421, para 31)
Where an enterprise is engaged in a hazardous or
inherently dangerous activity and harm is caused on
anyone on account of the accident in the operation of such
activity, the enterprise is strictly and absolutely liable to
compensate those who are affected by the accident; such
liability is not subject to any of the exceptions to the
principle of strict liability under the rule
in Rylands v. Fletcher [(1868) 3 HL 330 : (1861-73) All
ER Rep 1] .”
21. Thus, it is clear that once, it is the duty of the Electricity Board to
supply electricity, then the principle of strict liability would be applicable, and
the Electricity Board cannot run away from its liability by saying that illegal
pilferage was being done either by the deceased or by somebody else.
22. Under these circumstances, it is held that trial Court did not commit
any mistake by holding the Electricity Board also responsible for the
accident.
Whether the compensation awarded to the plaintiffs is liable to be
enhanced or not?
23. It is submitted by counsel for plaintiffs that although, trial Court has
come to a conclusion that plaintiffs have failed to prove the monthly income
of the deceased, but in such circumstances, trial Court should have taken the
assistance of the notification issued under Minimum Wages Act. It is
submitted that as per the notification, the minimum wages on the date of
accident of an unskilled labourer were Rs.3,520/-, and therefore, trial Court
should have taken the notional income of the deceased as Rs.3,520/- per
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F.A.No.96/2011, F.A.No.113/2011 & F.A.No.40/2017
month and not Rs.3,000/- per month. It is further submitted that the expenses
awarded under the customary heads are on a lower side, and consortium as
well as future prospects have not been awarded.
24. Refuting the aforesaid submissions, it is submitted by counsel for
defendant No. 1/M.P. Electricity Board and defendant No. 2/Gangaram that
the guidelines laid down by the Supreme Court in case of Motor Accident
Claim cases, cannot be made applicable, and trial Court did not commit any
mistake by awarding the compensation by considering the monthly notional
income of the deceased as Rs. 3,000/- and it is further submitted that no
future prospects or consortium is to be paid.
25. Considered the submissions made by counsel for the parties.
26. In order to adjudicate the amount of compensation, uniform guidelines
are always advisable or desired so that all victims of accident must get
compensation on the basis of uniform guidelines.
27. Under these circumstances, merely because guidelines with regard to
adjudication /calculation of compensation amount in motor accident claim
cases has been laid down by the Supreme Court, then it cannot be said that
the aforesaid guidelines cannot be made applicable to other cases where
compensation is to be awarded/calculated on account of some accident.
28. Therefore, contention of counsel for defendants No. 1 and 2 that the
guidelines laid down by the Supreme Court in case of Motor Accident Claim
Cases should not be made applicable to cases where a person has died on
account of electrocution is misconceived and is hereby rejected. Furthermore,
it is a well established principle of law that where the plaintiffs fail to lead
convincing evidence to prove the income of the deceased, then notification
issued under the Minimum Wages Act can be looked into.
29. According to the notification issued under the Minimum Wages Act,
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: PRINCEE
BARAIYA
Signing time: 4/9/2026
05:31:28 PM
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:11686
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F.A.No.96/2011, F.A.No.113/2011 & F.A.No.40/2017
the monthly income of an unskilled labourer on the date of accident was Rs.
3,520/-, therefore, this Court is of considered opinion that trial Court should
have taken the notional income of the deceased as Rs. 3,520/- per month in
place of Rs. 3,000/-. Furthermore, trial Court has not awarded any consortium
to the plaintiffs and has also not awarded future prospects.
30. So far as the multiplier and personal deductions are concerned, no
objection has been raised by plaintiffs in that regard.
31. Under these circumstances, this Court is of considered opinion that
plaintiffs are entitled for following compensation amount:-
Monthly Income Rs. 3,520/-
Yearly income: Rs. 42,240/-
Personal expenses @ 1/4 Rs. 10,560/-
Loss of yearly dependency Rs. 31680/-
Future Prospects @ 25% Rs. 7,920/-
Yearly loss of Income Rs. 39,600/-
Multiplier @ 13 Rs. 5,14,800/-
Funeral expenses Rs. 15,000/-
Lost of estate Rs. 15,000/-
Consortium @ Rs. 40,000 x 5 Rs. 2,00,000/-
Total amount Rs. 7,44,800/-
32. Although, the plaintiffs had claimed Rs. 7,00,000/- by way of
compensation amount, but this Court is of considered opinion that since just
and proper compensation is Rs. 7,44,800/-, therefore, the plaintiffs are
entitled for entire amount of Rs. 7,44,800/-. Trial Court had awarded Rs.
3,98,900/- by way of compensation. Accordingly, the plaintiffs are entitled for
a further amount of Rs. 3,46,800/-.
33. It appears that the plaintiffs were permitted to file the suit as an
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: PRINCEE
BARAIYA
Signing time: 4/9/2026
05:31:28 PM
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:11686
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F.A.No.96/2011, F.A.No.113/2011 & F.A.No.40/2017
indigent person. Accordingly, they were also permitted to file present appeal
as an indigent persons. Since a decree has been awarded, therefore, plaintiffs
are liable to pay Court fee on the entire awarded amount of Rs. 7,44,800/-.
34. It is submitted by counsel for plaintiffs that since the compensation
amount awarded by trial Court has not been released so far, therefore, no
Court fee has been paid on the amount awarded by trial Court.
35. Accordingly, it is directed that plaintiffs are entitled for a total
compensation amount of Rs. 7,44,800/-, but the same shall be paid only after
payment of Court fee. The remaining conditions of judgment and decree
passed by trial Court regarding interest as well as defendant No. 1 is liable to
pay 50% of the compensation amount and defendant No. 2 is liable to pay the
remaining 50% of the compensation amount shall remain the same.
36. With aforesaid modification, judgment and decree dated 22/10/2010
passed by First Additional District Judge, Shivpuri, in Civil Suit No. 14-
A/2010 passed by trial Court is hereby affirmed.
37. Appeal succeeds and is hereby allowed. Decree be drawn accordingly.
(G.S. Ahluwalia)
Judge
PjS/-
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: PRINCEE
BARAIYA
Signing time: 4/9/2026
05:31:28 PM