Madhya Pradesh High Court
Smt. Pushpa vs Sumit Narang on 17 February, 2026
Author: Sanjeev S Kalgaonkar
Bench: Sanjeev S Kalgaonkar
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NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:4804
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT I N D O R E
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE SANJEEV S KALGAONKAR
ON THE 17TH OF FEBRUARY, 2026
MISC. CRIMINAL CASE No. 45335 of 2019
SMT. PUSHPA
Versus
SUMIT NARANG AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri Yogesh Kumar Mittal, advocate for the petitioner.
Shri Rishiraj Trivedi, advocate for respondent No.1.
Shri B.S. Gandhi, advocate for respondent No.2.
.....................................................................................................................
ORDER
This petition under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. is filed for quashing of
the private complaint and the summoning order dated 13.04.2018 passed
by Judicial Magistrate First Class, Ujjain regarding registration of
complaint for offence punishable under Sections 409, 420, 467, 468, 471
read with Section 120B of IPC.
2. The exposition of facts, in brief, giving rise to present petition, is as
under:-
A. Sumit Narang filed a private complaint against Aadarsh
Vikram Sahakari Grah Nirman Samiti, Ujjain through its President
Yogesh Sharma (respondent No.1), Yogesh Sharma (respondent
No.2), Pushpa Maheshwari (respondent No.3) and ShyamsundarSignature Not Verified
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Rathi (respondent No.4) inter-alia alleging that the he (complainant
Sumit Narang) had purchased plot No. 120, Shivaji Park Colony,
Ujjain from Pushpa Maheshwari through registered sale deed dated
26.2.2003. Pushpa Maheshwari had purchased said plot from
respondent No. 1/ society through registered sale deed dated
2.5.2000. Pushpa Maheshwari had informed the complainant that
respondent No.1 society had earlier sold the plot to Rajesh Rathi.
Rajesh Rathi had executed a power of attorney in favour of his
nephew Shyamsundar Rathi. Shyamsundar Rathi had surrendered
the plot on 31.3.1995. Thereafter, respondent no.1 society had
transferred the plot to Pushpa Maheshwari.
B. The complainant had mutation of the plot from Municipal
Corporation, Ujjain on the basis of registered sale deed. The
adjacent plots No. 121 and 15 belong to the complainant and his
mother. The complainant had applied for permission to construct
which was granted vide letter dated 2.6.2003. The complainant and
his mother had taken loan of Rs. 25 lacs from ICICI Bank and
constructed a house thereupon.
C. Rajesh Rathi filed a civil suit No. 66A/2004 for declaration
of title, permanent injunction and cancellation of sale deed. The
Xth Additional District Judge, Ujjain vide judgment dated
25.1.2016 decreed the suit in favour of Rajesh Rathi and declared
the registered sale deed executed in favour of Pushpa Maheshwari
dated 2.6.2000 and the registered sale deed in favour of
complainant Sumit Narang dated 26.2.2003, null and void. It was
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further declared that the construction on the plot is illegal. The
appeal against the judgment and decree is pending before the High
Court of Madhya Pradesh.
D. It is alleged that all the respondent conspired to defraud and
cheat the complainant. The respondents had knowledge that they
did not have any right, title or interest over the disputed plot. The
respondents no. 1, 2 and 3 have conspired and executed a forge
surrender deed of the disputed plot to cheat the complainant.
Pushpa Maheshwari/respondent No.2 did not file any written
statement and remained ex-parte in the civil suit. Therefore, all the
accused have committed offence punishable under Sections 420,
467, 468, 471 and 120-B of IPC.
E. The Judicial Magistrate First Class. Ujjain recorded
statement of the complainant/Sumit Narang under Section 200 of
Cr.P.C. on 30.10.2017. On the basis of statement of complainant,
the Judicial Magistrate First Class vide impugned order dated
13.4.2018 took cognisance for offence punishable under Sections
409, 420, 467, 468, 471 and 120B of IPC against respondents No. 1
to 4 mentioned in the complaint and directed issuance of summons
to secure their presence.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner, in addition to the grounds
mentioned in the petition, submitted that the petitioner Pushpa
Maheshwari was a bonafide purchaser of the plot in dispute. Learned
counsel referring to the timeline of the litigation submits that plot No. 120
Shivaji Park Colony was purchased by Rajesh Rathi vide registered sale
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deed dated 13.9.1985. Rajesh Rathi executed a general power of attorney
dated 18.8.2019 in favour of his nephew Shyamsundar Rathi.
Shyamsundar Rathi surrendered the plot in favour of Aadarsh Vikram
Sahakari Grah Nirman Samiti Ujjain vide surrender deed dated 31.3.1995
and handed over the possession of plot to the society. The petitioner
Pushpa Maheshwari purchased the disputed plot through registered sale
deed dated 2.5.2000 from the society. Later, she sold the plot to the
complainant Sumit Narang vide registered sale deed dated 26.2.2003.
Thereafter, the civil suit No. 66A/2004 was filed before IIIrd Additional
District Judge, Ujjain by the first purchaser Rajesh Rathi on 10.11.2004.
The judgment and decree granting relief in favour of Rajesh Rathi in civil
suit No. 22A/2003 was passed on 25.1.2016. The present complaint was
filed on 2.7.2017 alleging conspiracy for cheating and forgery against the
petitioner. Learned counsel for the petitioner relying on the judgment of
the Supreme Court in the case of Randheer Singh Vs. State of UP and
others reported in (2021) 14 SCC 626 contended that the petitioner was a
bonafide purchaser for value. She had purchased the plot through
registered sale deed executed by the society. There was no intention to
cheat from inception. The petitioner cannot be prosecuted for making a
false document in view of law laid down in case of Randheer Singh
(supra). Learned counsel further submitted that the trial Court without
considering the fact that the forgery of surrendered deed has not been
established by the complainant, proceeded to take cognisance against the
petitioner for criminal conspiracy of forging the document. The surrender
deed was executed in the year 1995, whereas the complainant had
purchased the plot in dispute in year 2000. Therefore, there cannot be any
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intention to defraud the complainant from inception by executing a
registered sale deed in his favour. The dispute is predominantly civil in
nature. The competent court of civil jurisdiction had passed the judgment
and decree, therefore, the present private complaint is not maintainable. It
deserves to be quashed.
4. Per-contra learned counsel for respondents submitted that
respondent is defrauded by executing the sale deed in his favour. The
respondent was misrepresented about title of petitioner on the plot in
dispute. He purchased the plot and construct a house thereupon. The
petitioner did not appear in the civil suit to support the claim of Rajesh
Rathi. It goes to show her involvement in the conspiracy to defraud and
cheat the complainant. Learned counsel referring to the judgment of the
Supreme Court in the case of C.S. Prasad Vs. C. Satya Kumar and
others reported in 2026 INSC 39 contended that mere existence of civil
litigation cannot absolve the petitioner from criminal liability. The civil
liability and criminal liability may arise from same set of facts. The
conclusion of civil proceeding does not bar the prosecution where the
ingredients of criminal offences are prima facie disclosed. Learned
counsel contends that the Judicial Magistrate has taken cognisance on the
basis of the complaint and the statement recorded under Section 200 of
Cr.P.C. and found prima facie sufficient grounds to proceed under Section
204 of Cr.P.C. The petitioner instead of assailing the order in criminal
revision has resorted to inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C.
Availability of adequate alternate relief bars the jurisdiction under Section
482 of Cr.P.C. The petition is meritless.
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5. Heard both the parties. Perused the record.
6. The Apex Court in the case of Indian Oil Corpn. v. NEPC India
Ltd., reported in (2006) 6 SCC 736 has held as under:
“12. The principles relating to exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure to quash complaints and criminal proceedings
have been stated and reiterated by this Court in several decisions. To mention a
few– Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia v. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre
[(1988) 1 SCC 692 : 1988 SCC (Cri) 234], State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal
[1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 426], Rupan Deol Bajaj v. Kanwar
Pal Singh Gill [(1995) 6 SCC 194 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 1059], Central Bureau of
Investigation v. Duncans Agro Industries Ltd. [(1996) 5 SCC 591 : 1996 SCC
(Cri) 1045], State of Bihar v. Rajendra Agrawalla [(1996) 8 SCC 164 : 1996
SCC (Cri) 628], Rajesh Bajaj v. State NCT of Delhi [(1999) 3 SCC 259 : 1999
SCC (Cri) 401], Medchl Chemicals & Pharma (P) Ltd. v. Biological E. Ltd.
[(2000) 3 SCC 269 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 615], Hridaya Ranjan Prasad Verma v.
State of Bihar [(2000) 4 SCC 168 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 786], M. Krishnan v. Vijay
Singh [(2001) 8 SCC 645 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 19] and Zandu Pharmaceutical
Works Ltd. v. Mohd. Sharaful Haque [(2005) 1 SCC 122 : 2005 SCC (Cri)
283].
The principles, relevant to our purpose are:
(i) A complaint can be quashed where the allegations made in the
complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their
entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out the case alleged
against the accused. For this purpose, the complaint has to be examined as a
whole, but without examining the merits of the allegations. Neither a detailed
inquiry nor a meticulous analysis of the material nor an assessment of the
reliability or genuineness of the allegations in the complaint, is warranted
while examining prayer for quashing of a complaint.
(ii) A complaint may also be quashed where it is a clear abuse of the process of
the court, as when the criminal proceeding is found to have been initiated with
mala fides/malice for wreaking vengeance or to cause harm, or where the
allegations are absurd and inherently improbable.
(iii) The power to quash shall not, however, be used to stifle or scuttle a
legitimate prosecution. The power should be used sparingly and with abundant
caution.
(iv) The complaint is not required to verbatim reproduce the legal ingredients of
the offence alleged. If the necessary factual foundation is laid in the complaint,
merely on the ground that a few ingredients have not been stated in detail, the
proceedings should not be quashed. Quashing of the complaint is warranted
only where the complaint is so bereft of even the basic facts which areSignature Not Verified
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absolutely necessary for making out the offence.
(v) A given set of facts may make out: (a) purely a civil wrong; or (b)purely a
criminal offence; or (c) a civil wrong as also a criminal offence. A commercial
transaction or a contractual dispute, apart from furnishing a cause of action for
seeking remedy in civil law, may also involve a criminal offence. As the nature
and scope of a civil proceeding are different from a criminal proceeding, the
mere fact that the complaint relates to a commercial transaction or breach of
contract, for which a civil remedy is available or has been availed, is not by
itself a ground to quash the criminal proceedings. The test is whether the
allegations in the complaint disclose a criminal offence or not. (emphasis
added)
7. In case of Delhi Race Club (1940) Ltd. v. State of U.P., reported
in (2024) 10 SCC 690, it was laid down that-
36. What can be discerned from the above is that the offences of criminal
breach of trust (Section 406 IPC) and cheating (Section 420 IPC) have specific
ingredients:
In order to constitute a criminal breach of trust (Section 406 IPC)
(1) There must be entrustment with person for property or dominion over the
property, and
(2) The person entrusted:
(a) Dishonestly misappropriated or converted property to his own use, or
(b) Dishonestly used or disposed of the property or wilfully suffers any other
person so to do in violation of:
(i) Any direction of law prescribing the method in which the trust is
discharged; or
(ii) Legal contract touching the discharge of trust (see : S.W.
Palanitkar v. State of Bihar, (2002) 1 SCC 241 ).
Similarly, in respect of an offence under Section 420IPC, the essential
ingredients are:
(1) Deception of any person, either by making a false or misleading
representation or by other action or by omission;
(2) Fraudulently or dishonestly inducing any person to deliver any property, or
(3) The consent that any person shall retain any property and finally
intentionally inducing that person to do or omit to do anything which he would
not do or omit (see : Harmanpreet Singh Ahluwalia v. State of Punjab, (2009)
7 SCC 712 ).
37. Further, in both the aforesaid sections, mens rea i.e. intention to defraud or
the dishonest intention must be present, and in the case of cheating it must be
there from the very beginning or inception.
39. Every act of breach of trust may not result in a penal offence of criminal
breach of trust unless there is evidence of manipulating act of fraudulent
misappropriation. An act of breach of trust involves a civil wrong in respect of
which the person may seek his remedy for damages in civil courts but, any
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breach of trust with a mens rea, gives rise to a criminal prosecution as well. It
has been held in Hari Prasad Chamaria v. Bishun Kumar Surekha, (1973) 2
SCC 823 as under :
“4. We have heard Mr Maheshwari on behalf of the appellant and are
of the opinion that no case has been made out against the respondents
under Section 420 of the Penal Code, 1860. For the purpose of the
present appeal, we would assume that the various allegations of fact
which have been made in the complaint by the appellant are correct.
Even after making that allowance, we find that the complaint does not
disclose the commission of any offence on the part of the respondents
under Section 420 of the Penal Code, 1860. There is nothing in the
complaint to show that the respondent had dishonest or fraudulent
intention at the time the appellant parted with Rs 35,000. There is also
nothing to indicate that the respondents induced the appellant to pay
them Rs 35,000 by deceiving him. It is further not the case of the
appellant that a representation was made by the respondents to him at
or before the time he paid the money to them and that at the time the
representation was made, the respondents knew the same to be false.
The fact that the respondents subsequently did not abide by their
commitment that they would show the appellant to be the proprietor of
Drang Transport Corporation and would also render accounts to him in
the month of December might create civil liability for them, but this
fact would not be sufficient to fasten criminal liability on the
respondents for the offence of cheating.”
40. To put it in other words, the case of cheating and dishonest intention starts
with the very inception of the transaction. But in the case of criminal breach of
trust, a person who comes into possession of the movable property and
receives it legally, but illegally retains it or converts it to his own use against
the terms of the contract, then the question is, in a case like this, whether the
retention is with dishonest intention or not, whether the retention involves
criminal breach of trust or only a civil liability would depend upon the facts of
each case.
41. The distinction between mere breach of contract and the offence of
criminal breach of trust and cheating is a fine one. In case of cheating, the
intention of the accused at the time of inducement should be looked into which
may be judged by a subsequent conduct, but for this, the subsequent conduct is
not the sole test. Mere breach of contract cannot give rise to a criminal
prosecution for cheating unless fraudulent or dishonest intention is shown
right from the beginning of the transaction i.e. the time when the offence is
said to have been committed. Therefore, it is this intention, which is the gist of
the offence.
42. Whereas, for the criminal breach of trust, the property must have been
entrusted to the accused or he must have dominion over it. The property in
respect of which the offence of breach of trust has been committed must be
either the property of some person other than the accused or the beneficial
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interest in or ownership of it must be of some other person. The accused must
hold that property on trust of such other person. Although the offence i.e. the
offence of breach of trust and cheating involve dishonest intention, yet they
are mutually exclusive and different in basic concept.
43. There is a distinction between criminal breach of trust and cheating. For
cheating, criminal intention is necessary at the time of making a false or
misleading representation i.e. since inception. In criminal breach of trust, mere
proof of entrustment is sufficient. Thus, in case of criminal breach of trust, the
offender is lawfully entrusted with the property, and he dishonestly
misappropriated the same. Whereas, in case of cheating, the offender
fraudulently or dishonestly induces a person by deceiving him to deliver any
property. In such a situation, both the offences cannot co-exist simultaneously.
8. In matter of C.S. Prasad Vs. C. Satya Kumar and others reported
in 2026 INSC 39, it was held that-
25. Testing on the aforesaid parameters, we find that the complaint dated
08.01.2020 made by the appellant contains categorical allegations that
respondent Nos. 1 to 3, by abusing the advanced age and medical vulnerability
of the executants, caused the execution and registration of the three settlement
deeds to their unlawful advantage, and thereafter used such documents as
genuine for the purpose of deriving proprietary benefits. The allegations in the
complaint also disclose dishonest intention at the inception of the transaction
as well as fabrication and wrongful use of documents. At this stage, we must
note that the High Court in its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C. is
bound to take the allegations on its face value. Whether these allegations can
ultimately be proved is a matter strictly within the province of the Trial Court.
26. In the impugned order, the High Court has quashed the proceedings
primarily on the ground that the validity of the settlement deeds has been
upheld in the proceedings before the Civil Court. We are of the view that this
approach adopted by the High Court is not correct. It is a settled principle of
criminal jurisprudence that civil liability and criminal liability may arise from
the same set of facts and that the pendency or conclusion of civil proceedings
does not bar prosecution where the ingredients of a criminal offence are
disclosed. In Kathyayini v. Sidharth P.S. Reddy, this Court had made it crystal
clear that “pendency of civil proceedings on the same subject matter, involving
the same parties is no justification to quash the criminal proceedings if a
prima facie case exists against the accused persons.”
27. Adjudication in civil matters and criminal prosecution proceed on different
principles. The decree passed by the Civil Court neither records findings on
criminal intent nor on the existence of offences such as forgery, cheating, or
use of forged documents. Therefore, civil adjudication cannot always be
treated as determinative of criminal culpability at the stage of quashment.
Moreover, in the case at hand, the civil proceedings have not attained finality.
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28. Adjudication of forgery, cheating or use of forged documents in relation to
a settlement deed will always carry a civil element. Therefore, there cannot be
any general proposition that whenever dispute involves a civil element, a
criminal proceeding cannot go on. Criminal liability must be examined
independently. Respondent Nos. 1 to 3 were entitled to acquittal only upon
failure of proof in the trial and not at the threshold jurisdiction under
Section 482 of the Cr. P.C. To permit quashing on the sole ground of a civil
suit would encourage unscrupulous litigants to defeat criminal prosecution by
instituting civil proceedings.
******
31. It is a settled proposition that when a factual foundation for prosecution
exists, criminal law cannot be short-circuited by invoking inherent jurisdiction
under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C. Where allegations require adjudication on
evidence, the proper course is to permit the trial to proceed in accordance with
law. In the present case, the issues relating to the state of mind of the
executants at the time of execution of the settlement deeds, the role of
respondent Nos. 1 to 3 in the execution and the use of the settlement deeds, the
existence of fraudulent intent, and the manner in which proprietary advantage
was obtained by them, all require a full-fledged trial on evidence.”
9. In matter of Randheer Singh v. State of U.P., reported in (2021) 14
SCC 626, the Supreme Court, while considering the precedents on the
issue, observed as under-
24. A fraudulent, fabricated or forged deed could mean a deed which was not
actually executed, but a deed which had fraudulently been manufactured by
forging the signature of the ostensible executants. It is one thing to say that
Bela Rani fraudulently executed a power of attorney authorising the sale of
property knowing that she had no title to convey the property. It is another
thing to say that the power of attorney itself was a forged, fraudulent,
fabricated or manufactured one, meaning thereby that it had never been
executed by Bela Rani. Her signature had been forged. It is impossible to
fathom how the investigating authorities could even have been prima facie
satisfied that the deed had been forged or fabricated or was fraudulent without
even examining the apparent executant Bela Rani, who has not even been cited
as a witness.
27. In Mohd. Ibrahim v. State of Bihar, (2009) 8 SCC 751, this Court held as
under :
“19. To constitute an offence under Section 420, there should not only
be cheating, but as a consequence of such cheating, the accused should
have dishonestly induced the person deceived
(i) to deliver any property to any person, or
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(ii) to make, alter or destroy wholly or in part a valuable security (or
anything signed or sealed and which is capable of being converted into
a valuable security).
20. When a sale deed is executed conveying a property claiming
ownership thereto, it may be possible for the purchaser under such sale
deed to allege that the vendor has cheated him by making a false
representation of ownership and fraudulently induced him to part with
the sale consideration. But in this case the complaint is not by the
purchaser. On the other hand, the purchaser is made a co-accused.
21. It is not the case of the complainant that any of the accused tried to
deceive him either by making a false or misleading representation or by
any other action or omission, nor is it his case that they offered him any
fraudulent or dishonest inducement to deliver any property or to
consent to the retention thereof by any person or to intentionally induce
him to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he
were not so deceived. Nor did the complainant allege that the first
appellant pretended to be the complainant while executing the sale
deeds. Therefore, it cannot be said that the first accused by the act of
executing sale deeds in favour of the second accused or the second
accused by reason of being the purchaser, or the third, fourth and fifth
accused, by reason of being the witness, scribe and stamp vendor in
regard to the sale deeds, deceived the complainant in any manner.
22. As the ingredients of cheating as stated in Section 415 are not
found, it cannot be said that there was an offence punishable under
Sections 417, 418, 419 or 420 of the Code.
A clarification
23. When we say that execution of a sale deed by a person, purporting
to convey a property which is not his, as his property, is not making a
false document and therefore not forgery, we should not be understood
as holding that such an act can never be a criminal offence. If a person
sells a property knowing that it does not belong to him, and thereby
defrauds the person who purchased the property, the person defrauded,
that is, the purchaser, may complain that the vendor committed the
fraudulent act of cheating. But a third party who is not the purchaser
under the deed may not be able to make such complaint.
24. The term “fraud” is not defined in the Code. The dictionary
definition of “fraud” is ‘deliberate deception, treachery or cheating
intended to gain advantage’. Section 17 of the Contract Act, 1872
defines “fraud” with reference to a party to a contract.
***
27. The term “fraudulently” is mostly used with the term “dishonestly”
which is defined in Section 24 as follows:
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’24. “Dishonestly”.–Whoever does anything with the intention of
causing wrongful gain to one person or wrongful loss to another
person, is said to do that thing “dishonestly”.’
28 [Ed. : Para 28 corrected vide Official Corrigendum No.
F.3/Ed.B.J./149/2009 dated 6-10-2009.] . To “defraud” or do something
fraudulently is not by itself made an offence under the Penal Code, but
various acts when done fraudulently (or fraudulently and dishonestly)
are made offences. These include:
(i) Fraudulent removal or concealment of property (Sections 206, 421
and 424).
(ii) Fraudulent claim to property to prevent seizure (Section 207).
(iii) Fraudulent suffering or obtaining a decree (Sections 208 and 210).
(iv) Fraudulent possession/delivery of counterfeit coin (Sections 239,
240, 242 and 243).
(v) Fraudulent alteration/diminishing weight of coin (Sections 246 to
253).
(vi) Fraudulent acts relating to stamps (Sections 255 to 261).
(vii) Fraudulent use of false instrument/weight/measure (Sections 264
to 266).
(viii) Cheating (Sections 415 to 420).
(ix) Fraudulent prevention of debt being available to creditors (Section
422).
(x) Fraudulent execution of deed of transfer containing false statement
of consideration (Section 423).
(xi) Forgery making or executing a false document (Sections 463 to
471 and 474).
(xii) Fraudulent cancellation/destruction of valuable security, etc.
(Section 477).
(xiii) Fraudulently going through marriage ceremony (Section 496).
It follows therefore that by merely alleging or showing that a person
acted fraudulently, it cannot be assumed that he committed an offence
punishable under the Code or any other law, unless that fraudulent act
is specified to be an offence under the Code or other law.
Section 504 of the Penal Code
29. The allegations in the complaint do not also make out the
ingredients of an offence under Section 504 of the Penal Code. Section
504 refers to intentional insult with intent to provoke breach of peace.
The allegation of the complainant is that when he enquired with
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Accused 1 and 2 about the sale deeds, they asserted that they will
obtain possession of land under the sale deeds and he can do whatever
he wants. The statement attributed to Appellants 1 and 2, it cannot be
said to amount to an “insult with intent to provoke breach of peace”.
The statement attributed to the accused, even if it was true, was merely
a statement referring to the consequence of execution of the sale deeds
by the first appellant in favour of the second appellant.
Conclusion
30. The averments in the complaint if assumed to be true, do not make
out any offence under Sections 420, 467, 471 and 504 of the Code, but
may technically show the ingredients of offences of wrongful restraint
under Section 341 and causing hurt under Section 323IPC.”
28. In Paramjeet Batra v. State of Uttarakhand, (2013) 11 SCC 673, this Court
held that :
“12. While exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code the
High Court has to be cautious. This power is to be used sparingly and
only for the purpose of preventing abuse of the process of any court or
otherwise to secure ends of justice. Whether a complaint discloses a
criminal offence or not depends upon the nature of facts alleged
therein. Whether essential ingredients of criminal offence are present or
not has to be judged by the High Court. A complaint disclosing civil
transactions may also have a criminal texture. But the High Court must
see whether a dispute which is essentially of a civil nature is given a
cloak of criminal offence. In such a situation, if a civil remedy is
available and is, in fact, adopted as has happened in this case, the High
Court should not hesitate to quash the criminal proceedings to prevent
abuse of process of the court.”
29. In Uma Shankar Gopalika v. State of Bihar, (2005) 10 SCC 336, this Court
found that the complaint, in that case, did not disclose any criminal offence at
all, much less any offence under Section 420 or Section 120-BIPC. The case
was purely a civil dispute between the parties for which remedy lay before the
civil court.
30. In Vesa Holdings (P) Ltd. v. State of Kerala, (2015) 8 SCC 293, this Court
held :
“13. It is true that a given set of facts may make out a civil wrong as
also a criminal offence and only because a civil remedy may be
available to the complainant that itself cannot be a ground to quash a
criminal proceeding. The real test is whether the allegations in the
complaint disclose the criminal offence of cheating or not. In the
present case there is nothing to show that at the very inception there
was any intention on behalf of the accused persons to cheat which is a
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the complaint does not disclose any criminal offence at all. The
criminal proceedings should not be encouraged when it is found to be
mala fide or otherwise an abuse of the process of the court. The
superior courts while exercising this power should also strive to serve
the ends of justice. In our opinion, in view of these facts allowing the
police investigation to continue would amount to an abuse of the
process of the court and the High Court [Maniprasad v. State of
Kerala, 2011 SCC OnLine Ker 4251] committed an error in refusing to
exercise the power under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code
to quash the proceedings.”
31. In Robert John D’Souza v. Stephen V. Gomes, (2015) 9 SCC 96, this Court
held
“12. As far as the offence of cheating is concerned, the same is defined
in Section 415IPC, for which the punishment is provided under Section
420IPC. Section 415 reads as under:
‘415. Cheating.–Whoever, by deceiving any person, fraudulently or
dishonestly induces the person so deceived to deliver any property to
any person, or to consent that any person shall retain any property, or
intentionally induces the person so deceived to do or omit to do
anything which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived,
and which act or omission causes or is likely to cause damage or harm
to that person in body, mind, reputation or property, is said to “cheat”.
Explanation.–A dishonest concealment of facts is a deception within
the meaning of this section.
Illustrations
***’
From the above language of the section, one of the essential ingredients
for the offence of cheating is deception, but in the present case, from
the contents of the complaint it nowhere reflects that the complainant
was deceived or he or anyone else was induced to deliver the property
by deception. What was done, was so reflected in the resolutions, and
sale deeds.
13. In Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia v. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao
Angre, (1988) 1 SCC 692, a three-Judge Bench of this Court has laid
down the law as to quashment of proceedings under Section 482CrPC
as follows :
‘7. The legal position is well settled that when a prosecution at
the initial stage is asked to be quashed, the test to be applied by
the court is as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as
made prima facie establish the offence. It is also for the court to
take into consideration any special features which appear in aSignature Not Verified
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15NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:4804
particular case to consider whether it is expedient and in the
interest of justice to permit a prosecution to continue. This is so
on the basis that the court cannot be utilised for any oblique
purpose and where in the opinion of the court chances of an
ultimate conviction are bleak and, therefore, no useful purpose
is likely to be served by allowing a criminal prosecution to
continue, the court may while taking into consideration the
special facts of a case also quash the proceeding even though it
may be at a preliminary stage.’
15. In Inder Mohan Goswami v. State of Uttaranchal, (2007) 12 SCC 1
has observed as under :
’25. Reference to the following cases would reveal that the
courts have consistently taken the view that they must use this
extraordinary power to prevent injustice and secure the ends of
justice. The English courts have also used inherent power to
achieve the same objective. It is generally agreed that the
Crown Court has inherent power to protect its process from
abuse. In Connelly v. Director of Public Prosecutions, 1964 AC
1254 : (1964) 2 WLR 1145 (HL)] Lord Devlin stated that where
particular criminal proceedings constitute an abuse of process,
the court is empowered to refuse to allow the indictment to
proceed to trial. Lord Salmon in Director of Public
Prosecutions v. Humphrys, 1977 AC 1 : (1976) 2 WLR 857
(HL)] stressed the importance of the inherent power when he
observed that it is only if the prosecution amounts to an abuse
of the process of the court and is oppressive and vexatious that
the Judge has the power to intervene. He further mentioned that
the court’s power to prevent such abuse is of great constitutional
importance and should be jealously preserved.
***
46. The court must ensure that criminal prosecution is not used
as an instrument of harassment or for seeking private vendetta
or with an ulterior motive to pressurise the accused. On analysis
of the aforementioned cases, we are of the opinion that it is
neither possible nor desirable to lay down an inflexible rule that
would govern the exercise of inherent jurisdiction. Inherent
jurisdiction of the High Courts under Section 482CrPC though
wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution
and only when it is justified by the tests specifically laid down
in the statute itself and in the aforementioned cases. In view of
the settled legal position, the impugned judgment cannot be
sustained.’
16. In view of the above discussion and the facts and circumstances of
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the case, we are of the view that none of the offences for which the
appellants are summoned, is made out from the complaint and material
on record. We further find that it is nothing but abuse of process of law
on the part of the complainant to implicate the appellants in a criminal
case after a period of twelve years of execution of registered sale deeds
in question, who is neither party to the sale deeds nor a member of the
Society. Therefore, we allow the appeal and set aside the orders passed
by the High Court [Walter D’Mello v. Stephen V. Gomes, 2014 SCC
OnLine Kar 12058] and that of the courts below. Accordingly, the order
passed by the Magistrate summoning the appellants in the criminal
complaint filed by Respondent 1, in respect of the offences punishable
under Sections 406, 409 and 420IPC, also stands quashed.”
33. In this case, it appears that criminal proceedings are being taken recourse
to as a weapon of harassment against a purchaser. It is reiterated at the cost of
repetition that the FIR does not disclose any offence so far as the appellant is
concerned. There is no whisper of how and in what manner, this appellant is
involved in any criminal offence and the charge-sheet, the relevant part
whereof has been extracted above, is absolutely vague. There can be no doubt
that jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC should be used sparingly for the
purpose of preventing abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure
the ends of justice. Whether a complaint discloses criminal offence or not
depends on the nature of the allegation and whether the essential ingredients of
a criminal offence are present or not has to be judged by the High Court. There
can be no doubt that a complaint disclosing civil transactions may also have a
criminal texture. The High Court has, however, to see whether the dispute of a
civil nature has been given colour of criminal offence. In such a situation, the
High Court should not hesitate to quash the criminal proceedings as held by
this Court in Paramjeet Batra extracted above.
10. The material is examined in the light of aforestated prepositions of
law.
11. Petitioner Puspa Maheshwari is prosecuted for executing a sale
deed dated 26/02/2003 of Plot no. 120, Shivaji Park, Ujjain (hereinafter
referred to “the disputed plot”) in favour of complainant Sumit Narang,
which was declared null and void vide judgment dated 25/01/2016 passed
in Civil Suit no. 22-A/2003.
12. The material on record reveals that Rajesh Rathi had purchased the
disputed plot from the Society vide registered sale deed dated 13/09/1985.
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Shyamsunder Rathi surrendered the disputed plot in favour of Aadarsh
Vikram Sahakari Gruh Nirman Samiti, Ujjain vide surrender deed dated
31/03/1995 on the basis of general power of attorney dated 18/08/1990
executed by Rajesh Rathi in favour of his nephew Shyamsunder Rathi.
The validity of this transaction is subject matter of appeal before the First
Appellate Court.
13. Be that as it may, Petitioner Pushpa Maheshwari purchased the
disputed plot almost five years after the transaction with regard to
surrender of the disputed plot. The contentions advanced by learned
counsel for the petitioner has substance that petitioner Pushpa
Maheshwari is a bonafide purchaser for value. The recitals of sale-deed
and long time gap of five years substantiates the contentions.
14. The material on record and the averments in the complaint show
that petitioner Pushpa Maheshwari had purchased the disputed plot
through registered sale deed dated 02/05/2000 from Aadarsh Vikram
Sahakari Gruh Nirman Samiti, Ujjain. She was in possession of the
disputed plot from 02/05/2000 till she executed the sale deed in favour of
complainant Sumit Narang on 26/02/2003. No objection was raised
regarding transfer of the disputed plot in favour of Puspa Maheshwari for
almost three years.
15. Rajesh Rathi filed a civil suit for declaration of title and for
declaring the sale deeds dated 02/05/2000 and 26/02/2003 as null and
void. This civil suit was filed on 10/11/2004 without impleading the
general power of attorney Shyamsunder Rathi, who has allegedly
surrendered the disputed plot on behalf of Rajesh Rathi and executed the
surrender deed dated 31/03/1995 without consent of Rajesh Rathi.
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16. There is no allegation in the complaint and the evidence of the
complainant recorded under section 200 of the Cr.P.C that petitioner
Pushpa Maheshwari was acquainted with Shyamsunder Rathi or she has
connived with Shyamsunder Rathi for surrender of the disputed plot on
behalf of Rajesh Rathi. There is general allegation that all the accused
conspired to defraud the complainant. They had knowledge that the
disputed plot was already sold to Rajesh Rathi. It is alleged that petitioner
Pushpa Maheshwari had deliberately refrained from appearing in civil
suit. Mere refraining to participate in the civil litigation, when petitioner
Pushpa Maheshwari had already transferred the property and left with no
interest in it, cannot be inferred as mens-rea for defrauding the
complainant. The complainant, in para-9, specifically stated that Pushpa
Maheshwari was in possession of the disputed plot at the time of transfer
of the said plot in his favour. It shows that Pushpa Maheshwari had
purchased and was in possession of the disputed plot from the Society
therefore, no inference of intention to defraud the complainant can be
drawn from the material on record against Pushpa Maheshwari. The
dispute with regard to ownership of the disputed plot and the effect of
surrender deed dated 31/03/1995 are the disputed questions to be
determined by the Civil Court on the basis of evidence. The validity of
the transaction is subject matter of challenge before the First Appellate
Court. It goes to show that the dispute is necessarily civil in nature.
17. There is no allegation that the petitioner impersonated some other
person or dishonestly interpolated or forged the sale deed to defraud the
complainant. Therefore, necessary ingredient to constitute the offence of
making false document is not prima-facie made out against the petitioner
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in view of the law laid down in cases of Randheer Singh and Mohd.
Ibrahim (supra).
18. In view of the above discussions, this Court is of the considered
opinion that the continuation of prosecution against the petitioner in
aforestated scenario would be an abuse of process of Court. Therefore,
the inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. is invoked for
the ends of justice and the private complaint and the summoning order
dated 13.4.2018 passed by JMFC, Ujjain are quashed with reference to
the petitioner- Smt. Pushpa.
19. Petition is accordingly allowed.
C.C. as per rules.
(SANJEEV S KALGAONKAR)
JUDGE
BDJ
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