Chattisgarh High Court
Smt. Nidhi Sao vs Greenearth Infraventures Private … on 16 April, 2026
1
2026:CGHC:17484
AFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
MA No. 173 of 2023
Smt. Nidhi Sao W/o Shri Ashish Sao Aged About 40 Years Resident Of
AMARDEEP
CHOUBEY
301, Block-A Sun Heritage (Sun City Colony), Jagdalpur, District Bastar
Digitally signed
by AMARDEEP
CHOUBEY
(C.G.) Through Her Power Of Attorney Holder Shri Ashish Sao, Son Of
Date: 2026.04.20
14:51:47 +0530
Shri Dalchand Sao, Aged About 49 Years, Resident Of 301, Block-A,
Sun Heritage (Sun City Colony) Jagdalpur, District Bastar (C.G.)
(Allottee)
... Appellant
versus
Greenearth Infraventures Private Limited, Resident Of 13a Panchsheel
Nagar, Raipur (C.G.) Through Its Shri K.V. Singh (Director), Resident Of
13a, Panchsheel Nagar, Raipur (C.G.) (Promoter)
.... Respondent
(Cause title is taken from CIS)
For Appellant : Mr. Manish Nigam, Advocate
For Respondent : Mr. Mayank Kumar, Advocate
Hon’ble Shri Justice Bibhu Datta Guru
Judgment on Board
16/04/2026
1. The appellant/allottee has preferred the present appeal under
Section 58 of the Real Estate (Regulation And Development) Act,
2
2016 being aggrieved by the impugned order dated 15/09/2023
passed by the learned Chhattisgarh Real Estate Appellate
Tribunal, Raipur (C.G.) (for brevity ‘the Tribunal’) in Appeal
No.20/2022 (Smt. Nidhi Sao Vs. Green Earth Infraventures),
arising out of the order dated 22.11.2018 passed by the learned
Chhattisgarh Real Estate Regulatory Authority, Raipur, C.G. (for
brevity ‘the RERA’) Case No. M-PRO-2018-00124 (Smt. Nidhi
Sao Vs. Green Earth Infraventures), whereby, it was directed to
the respondent/promoter to complete the finishing work of the
apartment in question and to hand over possession of the same to
the appellant/allottee within a period of two months and also
directed that the appellant shall deposit the balance amount.
2. This is an admitted appeal. The following substantial question of
law arises for adjudication of the matter :
“Whether the Chhattisgarh Real Estate
Appellate Tribunal erred in law in dismissing
the complaint filed by the appellant/allottee on
the ground of limitation ?”
3. With the consent of learned counsel appearing for the parties, the
appeal is heard finally.
4. The appellant/allottee lodged a complaint against the respondent/
promoter before the RERA alleging, inter alia, that the appellant
entered into a sale agreement on 26/05/2012, to purchase the
Flat No. 210 in Block Orchid-4 situated in “Green Earth City”
located in Amleshwar, Durg, developed by the respondent herein.
3
The appellant alleges that the respondent was pressurizing her to
take possession of the said apartment while demanding additional
payment. The appellant has also complained that the quality of
construction of the apartment in question is substandard.
Thereafter, the appellant filed a complaint under Section 31 of the
Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Authority Act, 2016
(for brevity ‘the Act’) in the prescribed format (Form M), for return
of amount and compensation on account of inferior quality of
construction and failure of the construction work within time as
prescribed in the sale agreement executed between the parties on
26/05/2012.
5. Notice regarding the said complaint was issued to the respondent.
The respondent appeared before the RERA and submitted a
written reply, denying the allegations made by the appellant. The
respondent stated that the appellant failed to make payments
within the stipulated time as per the sale agreement dated
26/05/2012. The respondent also denied the allegations regarding
inferior quality of construction. It further stated that due to the
appellant’s failure to make timely payments, interest was levied on
the outstanding amount in accordance with the terms of the sale
agreement, and the same was demanded from the appellant. The
allegation made by the appellant regarding the pressure to take
possession of the apartment was also denied. Additionally, the
respondent stated in the reply that the appellant had never raised
any complaint or communicated any issue with them regarding
4
the said apartment. The respondent further stated in reply that a
completion certificate for the apartment in question was obtained
from the competent authority on November 1, 2017.
6. After hearing the parties and upon due appreciation of the entire
facts and circumstances of the case, on the basis of material
available on record, the RERA dismissed the complaint filed by
the appellant. However, a direction was issued to the respondent
to complete the finishing work of the apartment in question and to
hand over the possession of the same to the appellant/allottee
within a period of two months. At the same time, RERA also
directed the appellant to deposit the balance amount in execution
of registry of the said flat.
7. Aggrieved by the order of the RERA, the appellant preferred an
appeal before the Tribunal, who by the impugned order dated
15/9/2023, dismissed the Appeal of the appellant/allottee by
taking suo-moto cognizance of the point of limitation in filing the
Complaint before RERA. Thus, this appeal by the
appellant/allottee.
8. Learned counsel for the appellant/allottee submits that the order
passed by the RERA as well as by the Tribunal are arbitrary,
erroneous and has been passed without following due provisions
of law. Learned counsel further submits that the Tribunal erred in
law in holding that the complaint filed by the appellant before the
RERA was barred by limitation,despite the fact that the Act does
5
not prescribe any specific period of limitation for filing complaints
before the RERA. In absence of an express statutory provision,
the importation of the Limitation Act cannot be assumed as a
matter of course. According to the learned counsel, the Limitation
Act, by its own framework, applies to “Courts” unless its
applicability is expressly or by necessary implication extended to
quasi-judicial authorities. The Authority under RERA, being a
specialized regulatory body with a distinct adjudicatory
mechanism, does not fall within the strict ambit of a “Court” as
contemplated under the Limitation Act. In support of his
contention, he placed reliance upon the decision of the Supreme
Court in the matter of Ganesan (represented by its power agent
G. Rukmani Ganesan) Vs. Commissioner, Tamil Nadu Hindu
Religious and Charitable Endowments Board and Others
reported in (2019) 7 SCC 108.
9. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the respondent
would support the order impugned passed by the learned
Tribunal. He would submit that the complaint filed by the
appellant on 4/9/2018 whereas the cause of action arose on
25/5/2015, which fact can be seen from the agreement. Thus, the
Tribunal rightly observed that the complaint filed by the appellant
before the RERA is barred by limitation. Learned counsel would
also submit that the appeal filed by the appellant before this Court
under Section 58 of the Act tself is not maintainable in view of
reliefs claimed by the appellant, as the appeal is under valued and
6
also suffers from deficit of Court fee.
10. In reply to the aforesaid objection raised by the respondent
regarding under valuation of appeal and deficit of Court fee,
learned counsel for the appellant would submit that the appellant
is pressing only relief clause (i) & hence the objection of
respondent is sustainable.
11. I have heard learned counsel for the parties, perused the record
and the impugned orders with utmost circumspection.
12. Upon hearing the learned counsel for the appellant and perusing
the record, the core issue that arises for consideration is whether
the Tribunal was justified in dismissing the appeal on the ground
of limitation by holding that the complaint filed before the RERA
was time-barred.
13. At the outset, it is necessary to examine the statutory framework
of the Act. A careful reading of the Act reveals that there is no
prescribed period of limitation for filing a complaint under Section
31 before the Authority or the Adjudicating Officer. The statute is
conspicuously silent on this aspect. For the sake of convenience,
Section 31(1) of the Act is quoted below :
“31. Filing of complaints with the Authority or the
adjudicating officer- (1) Any aggrieved person may
file a complaint with the Authority or the adjudicating
officer, as the case may be, for any violation or
contravention of the provisions of this Act or the
Rules and Regulations made thereunder against any
promoter, allottee or real estate agent as the case
7may be.”
XXX XXX XXX
14. In such circumstances, the question arises whether the provisions
of Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 can be imported into
proceedings under the Act. It is a settled principle of law that the
Limitation Act applies primarily to “courts” and not to quasi-judicial
authorities, unless expressly provided or necessarily implied.
15. The RERA is a specialized regulatory body created for expeditious
adjudication of disputes between allottees and promoters. It does
not strictly fall within the ambit of a “Court”.
16. In the matter of Ganesan (supra), the Supreme Court in paras 27
and 28 held as under:-
“27. Section 29(2) provides that where any special or
local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application
a period of limitation different from the period
prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of Section
3 shall apply as if such period were the period
prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of
determining any period of limitation and the provisions
contained in Sections 4 to 21 (inclusive) shall apply
only insofar as, and to the extent to which, they are
not expressly excluded by such special or local law.
Whether prescription of appeal of limitation of any suit
or application in any special or local law relates to suit,
application or appeal to be filed in court or it may refer
to statutory authorities and tribunals also, is the
question to be answered. Different special or local
laws have been enacted by the legislature covering
different subjects, different rights and liabilities,
8methodology of establishing, determining rights and
liabilities and remedies provided therein. Special or
local law may also provide remedy by institution of
suits, appeals and applications in the courts i.e. civil
court and to its normal hierarchy and also create
special forum for determining rights and liabilities and
provide remedies. Most common example of creating
statutory authorities for determining rights, liabilities
and remedies are taxing statutes where assessing
authorities have been provided for with hierarchy of
authorities. The remedy of appeal and revision is also
provided in the taxing statutes in which the authorities
are different from the normal civil courts. Section 29(2)
in reference to different special or local laws came for
consideration before this Court in a large number of
cases. This Court had occasion to consider the
provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963, in reference to
different statutes which contain provisions of suits,
appeals or applications to the courts/ authorities/
tribunals. There are series of judgments of this Court
holding that provisions of the Limitation Act are
directed only when suit, appeal or application are to
be filed in a court unless there are express provisions
in a special or local law.
28. Section 29(2) also came for consideration before
this Court in several cases. There is another set of
cases where it was held that the provisions of the
Limitation Act, 1963 are to be applied even for suit,
appeal or application under special/local law is to be
filed before statutory authorities and the tribunal. We
shall notice both sets of cases to find out the ratio
which needs to be applied in the present case.
29. The first case to be noticed is Town Municipal
9Council, Athani v. Labour Court. In the above case
applications under Section 33-C(2) of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 were filed by various workmen of
the appellant. The question which was considered by
this Court in the above case was as to whether Article
137 of the Schedule of the Limitation Act, 1963
governs applications under Section 33-C(2) of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Referring to various
articles of the Limitation Act, 1963, this Court laid
down the following: (SCC pp. 882-83, para 12).
“12. … The scope of the various articles in this
division cannot be held to have been so enlarged
as to include within them applications to bodies
other than courts, such as a quasi-judicial tribunal,
or even an executive authority. An Industrial
Tribunal or a Labour Court dealing with applications
or references under the Act are not courts and they
are in no way governed either by the Code of Civil
Procedure or the Code of Criminal Procedure. We
cannot, therefore, accept the submission made that
this article will apply even to applications made to
an Industrial Tribunal or a Labour Court.”
30. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in Nityananda,
M. Joshi v. LIC, had occasion to consider the
applicability of Article 137 of the Limitation Act to an
application filed under Sections 33-C(1) and (2) of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 before the Labour Court.
The three-Judge Bench categorically held that the
scheme of the Limitation Act is that it only deals with
application to courts, and the Labour Court is not a
court within the Limitation Act, 1963. The following
was laid down in para 3: (SCC p. 200)
“3. In our view Article 137 only contemplates
10
applications to courts. In the Third Division of the
Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963 all the other
applications mentioned in the various articles are
applications filed in a court. Further Section 4 of the
Limitation Act, 1963, provides for the contingency
when the prescribed period for any application
expires on a holiday and the only contingency
contemplated is “when the court is closed”. Again
under Section 5 it is only a court which is enabled
to admit an application after the prescribed period
has expired if if th the court is satisfied that the
applicant had sufficient cause for not preferring the
application. It seems to us that the scheme of the
Limitation Act is that it only deals with applications
to courts, and that the Labour Court is not a court
within the Limitation Act, 1963.”
(emphasis added)
17. In the light of the aforesaid law laid down by the Supreme Court, it
is manifest that the applicability of the provisions of the Limitation
Act, 1963 in the context of various statutes that provide for the
filing of suits, appeals, or applications before courts, authorities, or
tribunals. The provisions of the Limitation Act are primarily
attracted when such proceedings are instituted before a court of
law, unless their applicability is expressly or by necessary
implication extended under a special or local statute. Thus, the
provisions of Article 137 of the Limitation Act will not be applicable
to a complaint under Section 31(1) of the Act before the RERA.
18. In the case at hand, the appellant filed a complaint before the
RERA under Section 31 (1) of the Act, 2016 which is a creature
11
under the special Act wherein there is no provision of limitation
and even there is no express provision or implication of
applicability of the Limitation Act. Thus, the Tribunal committed
gross error by applying the provisions of Article 137 of the
Limitation Act to the complaint filed by the appellant under Section
31(1) of the Act before the RERA.
19. It is pertinent to mention here that from the language of the Act
2016, the intention of the legislature to exclude the applicability of
the provisions of the Limitation Act is manifestly clear. The
provisions of the Limitation Act, which the legislature did not
incorporate in the Act, 2016, cannot be imported into it by analogy.
An enactment being the will of the legislature, the paramount rule
of interpretation, which overrides all others, is that a statute is to
be expounded ‘according to the intent of them that made it’. ‘The
will of the Legislature is the supreme law of the land, and
demands perfect obedience. If the Legislature willfully omits to
incorporate something of an analogous law in a subsequent
statue, or even if there is a casus omissus in a statute, the
language of which is otherwise plain and unambiguous, the Court
is not competent to supply the omission by engrafting on it or
introducing in it, under the guise of interpretation, by analogy of
implication, something what it thinks to be a general principle of
justice and equity. To do so ‘would be entrenching upon the
preserves of Legislature’, the primary function of a Court of law
being jus dicere and not jus dare.
12
20. In the light of what has been stated above, I am of the considered
view that the Tribunal was in error in importing whole hog the
principle of Article 137 of the Limitation Act into the Act, 2016. In
fact, the scheme of the Act, 2016 clearly indicates that the RERA
is an authority under the said Act. The Chairman of the RERA is to
be appointed by the Government and he is entrusted with various
functions under the Act, 2016. There is no question of treating the
Chairman of the RERA as a Court under the Act, 2016. The
definition of ‘Court’ refers to the Civil Court constituted by the
Legislature in the State for administration of justice. The
Constitution of Court in this country has been by Legislative
enactments.
21. In view of the aforesaid facts & circumstances, it is held that by
applying Article 137 of the Limitation Act to the case at hand, the
Tribunal committed gross error in dismissing the appeal of the
appellant on the ground of Limitation. Thus, the order impugned is
bad in law.
22. When the complaint under Section 31(1) of the Act filed by the
appellant was dismissed by the RERA, the appellant filed an
appeal before the Tribunal. However, without entering into the
merits of the case, the Tribunal dismissed the appeal on the
ground that the complaint filed under Section 31(1) of the Act was
beyond the prescribed period of limitation and barred by limitation.
23. A perusal of the Tribunal’s order itself, particularly paragraph 11,
reveals that the respondent/promoter had not raised any objection
13
regarding limitation before the RERA. Moreover, the RERA had
also not framed any issue for determination on the question of
limitation. Despite this, the Tribunal proceeded to dismiss the
appeal solely on the ground of limitation, without adjudicating the
matter on merits.
24. In view of the aforesaid discussion, this Court is of the considered
opinion that the Tribunal committed a manifest error in dismissing
the appeal solely on the ground of limitation, particularly when no
such objection was raised before the RERA and no issue on
limitation was framed or adjudicated. The Tribunal, for the first
time at the appellate stage, relied upon limitation without it being
raised or considered earlier. This kind of approach shows a
procedural irregularity, as the matter was decided on a ground
that was not properly raised or examined. The Tribunal ought to
have confined its consideration to the legality and propriety of the
order passed by the RERA and adjudicate the appeal on merits.
The impugned order, therefore, cannot be sustained and is liable
to be set aside.
25. As a sequence, the appeal is allowed and the aforesaid
substantial question of law is answered accordingly. The
impugned order dated 15.09.2023 passed by the Tribunal is set
aside. The matter is remanded back to the Tribunal with a
direction to decide the appeal filed by the appellant/allottee afresh
on merits.
14
26. It is made clear that this Court has not expressed any opinion on
the merits of the matter and the Tribunal may proceed with the
matter, in accordance with law and on its own merits, without
insisting upon the question of limitation.
SD/-
(Bibhu Datta Guru)
Judge
Gowrli/
Amardeep
15
Head Note
Article 137 of Limitation Act will not be applicable
to a complaint u/S 31(1) of Real Estate (Regulation
And Development) Act, 2016 filed before the Real
Estate Regulatory Authority (RERA).
