Rajasthan High Court – Jaipur
Smt. Mithlesh Kumari W/O Shri Hari … vs Mrs. Krishna Kumari W/O Mr. Anandi Lal … on 1 April, 2026
[2026:RJ-JP:13459]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN
BENCH AT JAIPUR
S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 17898/2024
1 Smt. Mithlesh Kumari W/o Shri Hari Prakash Kuchhal D/o
R.d. Modi, Aged About 84 Years, R/o House No. - 110,
Hari Marg, Civil Lines, Jaipur (Raj.) At Present R/o Plot
No. 73, Gaurav Nagar, Civil Lines, Jaipur (Raj.)
1.1 Mrs. Sapna Prasad D/o Late Smt. Mithlesh Kumari, And
Shri Hari Prakash Kuchhal W/o Shri Madhusudan Prasad,
Age About 62 Years, Resident Of M-11, Green Park Main,
New Delhi- 110016.
1.2 Mrs. Roopali Rajvanshy D/o Late Smt. Mithlesh Kumari,
And Shri Hari Prakash Kuchhal W/o Shri Shekha
Rajvanshy, R/o 43632, Bryant Street, Fremont, California-
94538 (USA)
1.3 Rahul Kuchhal S/o Late Smt. Mithlesh Kumari, And Shri
Hari Prakash Kuchhal, Aged About 55 Years, Resident Of
73, Gaurav Nagar, Raj Bhawan Road Civil Lines, Jaipur-
302006.
1.4 Bhagwan Singh S/o Late Shri Shiv Lal Singh, Aged About
75 Years, Resident Of 78, Hari Marg, Civil Lines, Jaipur.
----Plaintiffs/Petitioners
Versus
1 Mrs. Krishna Kumari W/o Mr. Anandi Lal Roongata, R/o
House No. 55, Sangram Colony, C-Scheme, Jaipur
(Rajasthan) (Since Died)
1.1 Shri Anandi Lal Roongta S/o Shri Ram Niwas Roongta,
Resident Of 55, Sangram Colony, C-Scheme, Jaipur-
302001
1.2 Shri Vinod Kumar Roongta S/o Shri Anandi Lal Roongta,
Resident Of 55, Sangram Colony, C-Scheme, Jaipur-
302001
1.3 Shri Raman Roongta S/o Shri Anandi Lal Roonta, Resident
Of 55, Sangram Colony, C-Scheme, Jaipur-302001
1.4 Smt. Suman Roongta W/o Shri Suresh D/o Shri Anandi
Lal Roongta, Resident Of 55, Sangram Colony, C-Scheme,
Jaipur-302001
2 Ashok Kumar Rawat S/o Mr. Ramnarayan Rawat, R/o
1/492, Mor Kutir, Khadi Gramoudhyog, Sanganer, Jaipur
(Rajasthan)
3 Mrs. Vimla Roongata W/o Mr. Vinod Kumar Roongata,
R/o-5, Sangram Colony, C-Scheme, Jaipur (Rajasthan)
4 Bharat Sangh, Through Appropriate Authority , Income
Tax Department, Through Income Tax Officer, Income Tax
Department, B-Wing, 8Th Floor, Janpath Bhawan, New
Delhi.
5 Ravindra Kumar Rawat S/o Late Mr. Ramnarayan Rawat,
R/o 1/492, Mor Kutir, Khadi Gramudhyog Road, Sanganer,
Jaipur.
6 Radha Rawat W/o Late Krishan Kumar Rawat, R/o 1/492,
Mor Kutir, Khadi Gramudhyog Road, Sanganer, Jaipur.
----Defendants/Respondents
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For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Prakash Chandra Jain with
Ms. Vinni Jain
For Respondent(s) : Mr. Ashok Mehta, Sr. Adv. assisted by
Mr. Mudit Singhvi,
Ms. Priya Khushlani
Mr. Vineet Mehta
Mr. Aditya Bohra with
Ms. Priyanshi Roongta
Mr. Kanishk Singhal on behalf of
Mr. Gunjan Pathak
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE BIPIN GUPTA
Judgment
Date of hearing and conclusion of arguments 25.03.2026
Date on which the judgment was reserved 25.03.2026
Whether the full judgment or only the operative Full Judgment
part is pronounced
Date of pronouncement 01.04.2026
1. The present writ petition has been filed assailing the order
dated 21.09.2024, passed by learned Additional District and
Session Judge, No. 1, Jaipur Metropolitan-II, in Civil Suit No.
59/2012, whereby the application filed by the plaintiffs-petitioners
under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC, has been dismissed.
2. The controversy, in a narrow compass, is that the plaintiffs-
petitioners instituted a civil suit bearing No. 36/2000 (renumbered
as Civil Suit No. 59/2012) for partition, rendition of accounts, and
permanent injunction in respect of undivided land admeasuring 17
bighas and 12 biswas situated at Khasra No. 126, Village
Durgapura, Tehsil Sanganer, District Jaipur.
3. During the course of the proceedings, the plaintiffs-
petitioners filed an application under Order VI Rule 17 CPC
seeking amendment of the pleadings. The plaintiffs-petitioners
stated in the application that the disputed land was jointly owned
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by the plaintiffs and defendant No. 1 in the year 1970. In 1976,
the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (hereinafter
referred to as the “Act of 1976”) was enacted and enforced in the
State of Rajasthan in March 1976. Thereafter, both the joint
tenants filed their statements as mandated under Section 6(1) of
the Act of 1976.
3.1 As per Section 5 of the Act of 1976, any transfer of land
exceeding the prescribed ceiling limit cannot be effected in any
manner whatsoever, and any such transfer, if made, is deemed to
be ‘null and void’. Thus, the alleged transfer of the disputed land
bearing Khasra No. 126 on 01.02.1977, whether by way of
contribution to a firm as capital or through any other mode, is hit
by Section 5 of the Act of 1976 and is therefore void ab initio.
3.2 Subsequently, the distribution of land through a dissolution
deed dated 31.03.1986 among the partners is also founded on an
illegal and void initial transfer and is in direct contravention of the
statutory provisions. Hence, such distribution is non est in the
eyes of law and is liable to be declared null and void. Since the
initial transfer itself is void and all subsequent transactions derive
from that illegality, the principle that ‘void transactions confer no
title’ applies. Therefore, the land must revert to its original legal
status, and all subsequent entries or claims based on such void
transactions deserve to be set aside.
3.3 It was further pleaded in the application that the title of the
civil suit be amended to reflect a suit for ‘declaration’. It was
submitted that although the partnership firm, namely Rajasthan
Industrial Company (hereinafter referred to as ‘the firm’),
underwent changes in its constitution on 22.07.1979 and
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01.09.1984, the crucial fact remains that neither the plaintiffs nor
defendant No. 1 ever executed any sale deed; no registered
document of transfer exists, and no legal conveyance of the
disputed land was ever made in favour of the firm. Thus, the firm
never acquired legal title or ownership of the disputed land.
Accordingly, as the disputed land was governed by the provisions
of the Act of 1976, the said land or any portion thereof could not
have been transferred in the name of the Firm.
4. The defendant-respondent No. 1 filed a detailed reply to the
said application, denying the amendments sought by the
plaintiffs-petitioners.
5. After hearing both parties, the learned Trial Court, vide order
dated 21.09.2024, dismissed the application filed by the
plaintiffs-petitioners, inter alia, on the ground that the amendment
had been sought after an inordinate delay and would change the
nature of the suit.
6. Aggrieved by the impugned order dated 21.09.2024, the
plaintiffs-petitioners has preferred the present writ petition.
7. Learned counsel for the plaintiffs-petitioners submitted that
the learned Trial Court committed an illegality in passing the
impugned order, as the same is vitiated by an error of law. He
further contended that while dealing with an application under
Order 6 Rule 17 CPC, the consequences of the amendment cannot
be pre-supposed.
8. Learned counsel for the plaintiffs-petitioners submitted that
Order 6 Rule 17 CPC specifically provides that all amendments
shall be allowed as may be necessary for determining the real
controversy between the parties. He further contended that the
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delay in filing the application cannot be attributed to the
plaintiffs-petitioners, as the application was filed on 16.09.2019
but was decided after a lapse of five years. He argued that, in any
case, delay alone cannot be a ground for rejecting an application
seeking amendment. He, therefore, prayed that the present writ
petition be allowed and the amendment sought by the
plaintiffs-petitioners be permitted for proper adjudication of the
suit.
9. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents vehemently
opposed the application filed under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC and
submitted that the amendment was sought after a delay of nearly
17 years from the commencement of the trial following the
framing of issues. He further submitted that the matter is still
pending adjudication and, despite having been instituted in the
year 2000, the suit remains at the stage of recording evidence,
thereby defeating the objective of expeditious disposal.
10. Learned counsel for the respondents further submitted that
the amendment sought by the plaintiffs-petitioners alters the
nature of the suit and materially changes the cause of action,
which cannot be permitted. He contended that the plaintiffs-
petitioners’ belated attempt to introduce new claims and withdraw
or contradict earlier admissions, after having voluntarily
participated in the partnership and executed agreements, is prima
facie mala fide and liable to be rejected.
11. Learned counsel for the respondents, while referring to the
proposed amendments, submitted that the inclusion of the relief
of ‘declaration’ fundamentally changes the nature of the suit.
Further, no amendment introducing a declaratory relief can be
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permitted after such an inordinate delay, particularly when the
transactions sought to be declared ‘null and void’ pertain to the
years 1977 and 1986, whereas the suit was filed in the year 2000
and no relief was claimed in the suit and now after 19 years from
the date of filing the suit in 2019, time barred claims cannot be
permitted to be raised. Therefore, the proposed amendment seeks
to revive a claim that is ex facie barred by limitation and cannot
be permitted.
12. Learned counsel for the respondents also contended that the
new relief sought pertains to declaring the dissolution deed dated
31.03.1986 as sham/void. If the plaintiffs-petitioners was fully
aware of the said deed and its alleged nature at the time of its
execution, no relief for declaring the dissolution deed as void was
sought in the original plaint and thus, the plaintiffs-petitioners has
failed to satisfy the requirement of ‘due diligence’.
13. Learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the
proviso to Order 6 Rule 17 CPC squarely applies to the present
case, as it mandates that no amendment shall be allowed after the
commencement of the trial unless due diligence is established. In
the present case, the suit was instituted in 2000 and issues were
framed in 2001, whereas the amendment application was filed
only in 2019, clearly demonstrating a lack of bona fides and an
attempt to abuse the process of the Court. He, therefore, prayed
that the present writ petition be dismissed, as the amendments
sought are hopelessly barred by limitation and would change the
nature of the suit.
14. Learned counsel for the respondents relied upon the
following judgments to advance his arguments:
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(i) G. Chinna Ramalingaiah and Ors. vs Pedda
Sunkanna Goud and Ors.; AIR 1993 AP 47.
(ii) Vishwambhar and Ors. Vs. Laxminarayana
(Dead) through L.Rs. and Ors.; (2001) 6 SCC 163.
(iii) Van Vibhag Karamchari Griha Nirman Sahkari
Sanstha Maryadit vs Ramesh Chander and Ors.;
(2010) 14 SCC 596.
(2012) 2 SCC 300.
Application No. 1458 of 2013 in Civil Suit No. 873 of
2010 (Decided On: 18.11.2013) {High Court of
Madras}.
(vi)Mashyak Grihnirman Sahakari Sanstha
Maryadit vs Usman Habib Dhuka and Ors.; (2013) 9
SCC 485.
(vii)Voltas Limited vs Rolta India Limited; (2014) 4
SCC 516.
(viii)Vijay Hathisingh Shah & Anr. vs Gitaben
Parshottamdas Mukhi and Ors.; (2019) 5 SCC 360.
(ix)M. Revanna vs Anjanamma (Dead) by Legal
Representatives and Ors.; (2019) 4 SCC 332.
(x)Pandit Malhari Mahale vs Monika Pandit Mahale
and Ors.; (2020) 11 SCC 549.
(xi)State of U.P. vs Hari Ram; (2013) 4 SCC 280.
(xii)Chhotu Ram and Ors. vs Jaipur Development
Authority and Ors.; 2019 (3) WLN 66 (Raj.)
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15. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the
material available on record.
16. A bare perusal of the record reveals that the suit was
instituted in the year 2000 and the issues were framed in the year
2001. Thereafter, the plaintiffs-petitioners filed an application
under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC in the year 2019 i.e. after a delay of
nearly 18 years from the date of commencement of the trial. By
way of the proposed amendment, the plaintiffs-petitioners sought
a challenge to transactions dated 01.02.1977 and 31.03.1986 as
sham/void, incorporate pleadings related to invalidity under the
Act of 1976 and to incorporate a substantive relief of declaration.
17. Thus, the principal question that arises for consideration is
whether such an amendment, sought at a belated stage, deserves
to be allowed or not.
18. The scope and ambit of Order 6 Rule 17 is well settled. The
provision empowers the Court to allow amendment of pleadings at
any stage of the proceedings if such amendment is necessary for
determining the real questions in controversy. The proviso,
introduced thereafter vide Amendment Act of 2002, restricts such
power after commencement of trial unless the Court concludes
that despite due diligence, the party could not have raised the
matter earlier.
For ready reference, Order 6 Rule 17 CPC is reproduced herein
below:
“17. Amendment of pleadings.–The Court may at
any stage of the proceedings allow either party to alter
or amend his pleadings in such manner and on such
terms as may be just, and all such amendments shall be
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[2026:RJ-JP:13459] (9 of 13) [CW-17898/2024]made as may be necessary for the purpose of
determining the real questions in controversy between
the parties:
Provided that no application for amendment shall be
allowed after the trial has commenced, unless the Court
comes to the conclusion that in spite of due diligence,
the party could not have raised the matter before the
commencement of trial.”
19. The proviso to Order 6 Rule 17 CPC clearly mandates that no
amendment shall be allowed after commencement of trial unless
the party satisfies the Court that, despite due diligence, the
matter could not have been raised earlier. However, in the present
case, the plaintiffs-petitioners was admittedly aware of the alleged
transfer of 1977 and the dissolution deed dated 1986, at the very
inception of the suit. Despite such knowledge, no relief for
declaration was sought when the suit was originally filed in the
year 2000. Furthermore, no satisfactory explanation has been
furnished by the plaintiffs-petitioners demonstrating ‘due
diligence’ for not raising these pleas earlier.
20. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Life Insurance
Corporation of India vs Sanjeev Builders Private Limited &
Anr.; 2022 (16) SCC 1 has categorically held that an amendment
introducing a time-barred claim is a relevant and valid ground for
rejection of application filed under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC. The
relevant paragraph reads as under:
“71. Our final conclusions may be summed up thus:
71.1. Order II Rule 2 Code of Civil Procedure operates
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[2026:RJ-JP:13459] (10 of 13) [CW-17898/2024]conditions for application thereof are satisfied and the
field of amendment of pleadings falls far beyond its
purview. The plea of amendment being barred Under
Order II Rule 2 Code of Civil Procedure is, thus,
misconceived and hence negatived.
71.2. All amendments are to be allowed which are
necessary for determining the real question in
controversy provided it does not cause injustice or
prejudice to the other side. This is mandatory, as is
apparent from the use of the word “shall”, in the latter
part of Order VI Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
71.3. The prayer for amendment is to be allowed.
71.3.1. If the amendment is required for effective and
proper adjudication of the controversy between the
parties.
71.3.2. To avoid multiplicity of proceedings, provided
(a) the amendment does not result in injustice to
the other side
(b) by the amendment, the parties seeking
amendment does not seek to withdraw any clear
admission made by the party which confers a
right on the other side and
(c) the amendment does not raise a time barred
claim, resulting in divesting of the other side of
a valuable accrued right (in certain situations).
71.4. A prayer for amendment is generally required
to be allowed unless:
71.4.1 By the amendment, a time barred claim is
sought to be introduced, in which case the fact that
the claim would be time barred becomes a relevant
factor for consideration.
71.4.2.The amendment changes the nature of the suit.
71.4.3.The prayer for amendment is malafide, or
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[2026:RJ-JP:13459] (11 of 13) [CW-17898/2024]71.4.4.By the amendment, the other side loses a valid
defence.
71.5. In dealing with a prayer for amendment of
pleadings, the court should avoid a hypertechnical
approach, and is ordinarily required to be liberal
especially where the opposite party can be compensated
by costs.
71.6. Where the amendment would enable the court to
pin-pointedly consider the dispute and would aid in
rendering a more satisfactory decision, the prayer for
amendment should be allowed.
71.7. Where the amendment merely sought to introduce
an additional or a new approach without introducing a
time barred cause of action, the amendment is liable to
be allowed even after expiry of limitation.
71.8. Amendment may be justifiably allowed where it is
intended to rectify the absence of material particulars in
the plaint.
71.9. Delay in applying for amendment alone is not a
ground to disallow the prayer. Where the aspect of
delay is arguable, the prayer for amendment could be
allowed and the issue of limitation framed separately for
decision.
71.10. Where the amendment changes the nature of the
suit or the cause of action, so as to set up an entirely
new case, foreign to the case set up in the plaint, the
amendment must be disallowed. Where, however, the
amendment sought is only with respect to the relief in
the plaint, and is predicated on facts which are already
pleaded in the plaint, ordinarily the amendment is
required to be allowed.
71.11. Where the amendment is sought before
commencement of trial, the court is required to be
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[2026:RJ-JP:13459] (12 of 13) [CW-17898/2024]mind the fact that the opposite party would have a
chance to meet the case set up in amendment. As such,
where the amendment does not result in irreparable
prejudice to the opposite party, or divest the opposite
party of an advantage which it had secured as a result
of an admission by the party seeking amendment, the
amendment is required to be allowed. Equally, where
the amendment is necessary for the court to effectively
adjudicate on the main issues in controversy between
the parties, the amendment should be allowed.”
(Emphasis Supplied)
21. Thus, as per the principles laid down in the case of Sanjeev
Builders (supra), an amendment must be refused where it
introduces a time-barred claim; and it results in divesting the
opposite party of a valuable accrued right. While applying the said
ratio of the Hon’ble Apex Court, this Court is of the opinion that
allowing of the amendment as sought in the application would
revive stale claims and unsettle rights that have accrued to the
defendants over decades.
22. Furthermore, the original suit is one for partition, rendition of
accounts, and injunction. By way of amendment, the plaintiffs-
petitioners seeks to convert it into a suit for declaration
challenging past transactions. This is not a mere elaboration of
existing pleadings but an attempt to introduce an entirely new
cause of action which would alter the foundation of the suit.
Moreover, where the amendment changes the nature of the suit or
sets up a new case, the same must be disallowed.
23. Thus, this Court is of the firm opinion that the amendment
application was filed by the plaintiffs-petitioners after an
inordinate and unexplained delay, and the plaintiffs-petitioners
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failed to demonstrate due diligence as required under the proviso
to Order 6 Rule 17 CPC. The proposed amendment further
introduced claims which are ex-facie barred by limitation and
would fundamentally alter the nature and character of the suit.
Moreover, permitting such an amendment would cause serious
prejudice to the defendants by depriving them of rights that have
already accrued.
24. In view of the above discussion, this Court is of the opinion
that the learned Trial Court has rightly appreciated the facts and
law and has not committed any jurisdictional error or illegality
warranting interference by this Court. Accordingly, the present
writ petition stands dismissed and the order dated 21.09.2024,
passed by learned Additional District and Session Judge, No. 1,
Jaipur Metropolitan-II, in Civil Suit No. 59/2012, is hereby upheld.
25. Pending application(s), if any, stands disposed of.
(BIPIN GUPTA),J
Sudha/
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