Andhra Pradesh High Court – Amravati
Smt. Kasina Mohini vs Smt. Gopisetti Rajya Lakshmi on 2 May, 2025
APHC010542012014
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
AT AMARAVATI [3524]
(Special Original Jurisdiction)
FRIDAY, THE SECOND DAY OF MAY
TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FIVE
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE RAVI NATH TILHARI
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE MAHESWARA RAO KUNCHEAM
WRIT PETITION NO: 4572/2014
Between:
Smt. Kasina Mohini ...PETITIONER
AND
Smt Gopisetti Rajya Lakshmi and Others ...RESPONDENT(S)
Counsel for the Petitioner:
1. J.V.PHANIDUTH
Counsel for the Respondent(S):
1. GP FOR REVENUE
2. NIMMAGADDA REVATHI
The Court made the following:
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ORDER:
– (per Hon’ble MRK, J)
Heard Sri J.V. Phaniduth, learned counsel for the petitioner and Smt.
Nimagadda Revathi, learned counsel for respondent Nos. 1 & 2. No
representation for respondent Nos.3 & 4.
2. The Writ Petitioner is an applicant in L.G.O.P No.155 of 2007. She
filed the said L.G.O.P on the file of Principal District Judge, Krishna, at
Machilipatnam (for brevity hereinafter referred to as ‘Primary Authority’)
U/s 7-A of A.P. Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982 (in short ‘Act’) to
evict the respondent Nos.1 & 2 herein. The Primary Authority after a full-
fledged trial, allowed the L.G.O.P No.155 of 2007 on 29.01.2013.
3. Challenging the above said orders dated 29.01.2013, respondents
Nos.1 & 2 herein instituted L.G.A No.7 of 2013, before the Special Court
under A.P. Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982 (hereinafter referred to
as ‘Appellate Authority’). The Appellate Authority allowed the Appeal on
25.11.2013, thereby setting aside the Primary Authority orders dated
29.01.2013 in L.G.O.P No.155 of 2007.
4. Being aggrieved by the same, the petitioner instituted the present
writ petition by invoking the powers under Article 226 of the Constitution
of India, seeking to set-aside the Appellate Authority orders dated
25.11.2013 in L.G.A No.7 of 2013.
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Crux of the case by the petitioner:-
5. One Pedarla Yasodhamma, who is the owner of the L.G.O.P 155 of
2007 scheduled property, (hereinafter for the sake of brevity referred to as
‘Subject Property’) by virtue of Registered Sale Deed No.4193 of 1961,
dated 19.11.1961 SRO, Vijayawada, sold the same in favour of Smt. N.
Naghu Bhai vide Registered Sale Deed, Doc. No.1915 of 1975 dated
26.02.1975.
6. Thereafter, said Smt.N.Nagu Bhai along with her husband, N.Gopala
Krishnayya, executed Registered Sale Deed vide Document No. 5209 of
1981, dated 06.06.1981, (Ex-A3) SRO, Vijayawada in favour of
Smt.N.Satyabhama. The said Smt.N.Satyabhama through her G.P.A
holder, namely N.Ravindra Prasad, sold the property through Registered
Sale Deed dated 13.05.2005 (Ex-A1), in favour of the writ petitioner
/Applicant in L.G.O.P No.155 of 2007.
7. It is further case of the petitioner that, as she is having registered
documents, which show her clear title over the L.G.O.P No.155 of 2007
Subject Property. In fact, she also protected the said property, by raising
a fence. The Applicant further stated that the Subject Property is at a
distance, making it difficult for her to supervise the same day in and day
out and also to protect it. She further contended that respondent Nos.1 &
2/respondents in L.G.O.P No.155 of 2007, in an attempt to snatch away
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the Subject property from her, raised temporary structures thereon.
Respondents Nos.1 & 2, being influential persons in the said locality, did
not care about/heed the petitioner’s request to vacate the same. Hence,
the writ petitioner instituted the L.G.O.P No.1551 of 2007 before the
Primary Authority by invoking the Section 7-A of A.P Land Grabbing
(prohibition) Act, 1982, seeking eviction of the Respondent Nos.1 & 2 and
also for recovery of vacant possession including the mesne profits at the
rate of Rs.1000/- per month from 01.11.2005 onwards till the delivery of
possession.
Brief case of respondent Nos.1 & 2 :-
8. The respondent Nos.1 & 2 herein, who are wife and husband, in their
common counter, denied the case asserted by the petitioner that she
acquired rights over the Subject Property through the Registered Deeds.
They further denied the flow of title as set-out by the petitioner. Further,
respondent Nos.1 & 2 also stated that the property is not a vacant place.
In fact, it has been occupied with a small house for a long period.
9. It is stated that initially, the Subject Property, was owned by
Sri Ravulapalli Chandra Mouli, who gifted the same to her daughter
namely, Smt. Lalithamba towards ‘Pasupu Kumkuma’ at the time of her
marriage. She enjoyed the gifted property for a considerable period by
paying taxes, etc. Thereafter, the said Lalithamba further executed
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registered Gift Deed dated 24.12.1998 (Ex-B.1), in favour of her husband
namely, Konda Nageswara Rao, who inturn executed registered Sale
Deed dated 21.10.2000 (Ex-B.2), in favour of the K.Lakshmi. The said
K.Lakshmi sold the same to Smt. Gopisetti RajyaLakshmi, who is the 1st
respondent in L.G.O.P No.155 of 2007. The 2nd Respondent is the
husband of the 1st Respondent.
10. It is further asserted in the counter that one N. Ravindra Prasad
contacted the 1st Respondent and asked her to sell the Subject Property.
But she refused to do so after learning about his greedy acts. The 1st
Respondent filed Civil Suit O.S No.617 of 2006 on the file of II Addl. Junior
Civil Judge, Vijayawada, against him, seeking a permanent injunction and
obtained interim orders. It is also stated that there were divergent views
expressed in respect of claiming mesne profit in L.G.O.P application as
well as the caveat petition lodged by the petitioner. Similarly, the
petitioner’s husband has taken different stands in his petition.
11. Basing upon the pleadings, the Primary Authority framed the
following issues:
1.Whether the predecessors in title of the petitioner have got
title to the petition schedule property as pleaded in the petition and
whether the registered sale deed dated. 13-05-2005 is true, valid
and binding on the respondents and whether the petitioner got title
to the petition schedule property?
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2. Whether the respondents have grabbed the petition
schedule property and whether they are land grabbers and are liable
for eviction from the petition schedule property?
3. Whether the petitioners are entitled for decree for eviction
of the respondents from the petition schedule property and for
recovery of possession of the petition schedule property after
ejecting the respondents therefrom and for mesne profits as prayed
for?
4. To what relief?
12. Before the L.G.O.P No.155 of 2007, the writ petitioner herself was
examined as P.W-1 and Ex-A.1 to Ex-A.4 were marked. Conversely, the
1st respondent was examined as R.W-1 and Ex-B.1 to Ex-B.26 were
marked.
13. In fact, the Primary Authority, upon due appreciation of oral and
documentary evidence placed on record, on issue No.1, held that,
petitioner is the absolute owner of the Subject Property and she has a
valid title to the same. In respect of issue No.2, it was found that
respondent Nos.1 & 2, without any lawful entitlement, had illegally taken
possession of the Subject Property. On the issue No.3, it was held that
respondent Nos.1 & 2 are land grabbers, as they occupied the petitioner’s
land. Therefore, the petitioner is entitled for possession of the same, after
ejecting the respondents therefrom.
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14. Finally, by allowing the L.G.O.P No.155 of 2007 on 29.01.2013, the
Primary Authority directed the Respondent Nos.1 & 2 to vacate the
Subject Property within one (1) month and also directed them to pay a
sum of Rs.1000/- per month towards compensation for un-authorised
occupation of the Subject Property, from the date of the application till the
date of delivery to the petitioner.
15. Thereafter, respondent Nos.1 & 2 challenged the orders dated
29.01.2013 made in L.G.O.P No.155 of 2007 before the Special Court
under the Act. The Appellate Authority, on the main ground that the
petitioner’s predecessor in title has no title to the land under Sale Deed
dated 13.05.2005 (Ex-A.1), thereby, set aside the Judgment of the
L.G.O.P. No.155 of 2007. Consequently, it allowed the L.G.A No.7 of
2013 vide its orders dated 25.11.2013. Thus, the instant case emanated
from the reversal findings by the Primary and Appellate Authorities.
Submissions of the learned counsels:-
16. Sri J.V.Phaniduth, learned counsel for the petitioner, asserted that,
the Appellate Authority powers are akin to the Civil Court’s Jurisdiction.
But the said powers had not at all followed the established procedure in
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deciding an Appeal. Learned counsel also contended that, Appellate
Authority, being the final Court of facts, ought to have framed the points
for determination and addressed all the aspects in the lis. He further
submitted that the Primary Authority had arrived at cogent reasoning
regarding the title of the petitioner, but the Appellate Authority, without
considering the same, simply passed the orders in the Appeal by brushing
aside the well-founded reasoning of the Primary Authority. The learned
counsel relied on the decision reported in 2006, AIR SCW 4855, and
finally prays to allow the Writ Petition.
17. Per contra, Smt. Nimagadda Revathi, learned counsel for
respondent Nos.1 & 2, stated that the Appellate Authority, by duly
following the procedure enunciated in the Act, arrived at its findings in the
lis. She further submitted that, the Appellate Authority rightly examined the
case by taking into consideration the relevant material on record. At last,
she supported the reasoning of the Appellate Authority Orders.
Consideration of the Court:-
18. Perused the material on record, having regard to the rival
contentions, the moot point that arises for our consideration is that:-
Whether the impugned order dated 25.11.2013 in LGA No.7
of 2013, by the Special court under A.P. Land Grabbing
9(prohibition) Act, in setting aside the orders dated 29.01.2013
in L.G.O.P No.155 of 2013 of the District Judge, Krishna at
Machilipatnam (Primary Authority) is legally sustainable or
not?
19. Before considering the facts in the instant case, it is profitable to
refer to the salient features and relevant provisions of the A.P Land
Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982 which is a special enactment and a self
contained code which aims to curb the unlawful activity of land grabbing
in the state.
Section 2(e) Defines as Land Grabbing means every activity
of grabbing of any land (whether belonging to the Government, a
local authority, a religious or charitable institution or endowment,
including a wakf, or any other private person) by a person or
group of persons, without any lawful entitlement and with a view
to illegally taking possession of such lands, or enter into or create
illegal tenancies or lease and licences agreements or any other
illegal agreements in respect of such lands, or to construct
unauthorised structures thereon for sale or hire, or give such
lands to any person on rental or lease and licence basis for
construction, or use and occupation, of unauthorised structures;
and the term “to grab land” shall be construed accordingly;
Section 3 Land Grabbing to be Unlawful. This section
explicitly declares land grabbing in any form to be unlawful,
making it a punishable offense under the Act.
Section 4 Prohibition of Land Grabbing. This section
prohibits any person from committing or causing land grabbing. It
also states that continuing to occupy grabbed land unlawfully
after the Act’s commencement is an offense.
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Section 5 Penalty for Other Offences in Connection with
Land Grabbing. This section prescribes penalties for various
activities related to land grabbing, such as selling, allotting,
advertising for sale of grabbed land, instigating land grabbing, or
using grabbed land for sale or allotment purposes. The
punishment includes imprisonment and fines.
Section 7 Constitution of Special Courts. This section
empowers the government to establish Special Courts to ensure
speedy inquiry and trial of cases related to land grabbing and the
determination of ownership or lawful possession of grabbed land.
Section 8 Procedure and Powers of the Special Courts.
This section prescribes the procedures followed by the Special
Courts. It grants them the powers of a Civil Court and a Court of
Session. The Special Court can also determine the order of civil
and criminal liability Proceedings. Notably, it allows the special
Court to order the eviction of a land grabber and direction the
restoration of the grabbed land to its rightful owner.
Section 9 Special Court to have the powers of the Civil
Court and the Court of Session. This Section deals with the
Special Court Power to have power of the civil court and the Court
of Session.
Section 10 Defines the Burden of Proof:
“Where in any proceedings under this Act, a land is alleged to have
been grabbed, and such land is primafacie proved to be the land owned
by the Government or by a private person the Special Court or as the
case may be, the Special Tribunal shall presume that the person who is
alleged to have grabbed the land is a land-grabber and the burden of
proving that the land has not been grabbed by him shall be on suchperson.”
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This is a significant provision that shifts the burden of proof. If
it is prima facie proven that, the land in question belongs to the
government or a private person, the Special Court or Tribunal will
presume that the person alleged to have grabbed the land is a
land grabber. The onus then falls on that person to prove
otherwise.
Section15: Act to over ride. This section gives the Land
Grabbing Act a superior standing, stating that its provisions will
prevail over any inconsistent provisions in other existing laws,
customs, usages, agreements, or court orders.
20. On a plain reading of the above provisions of the Act, it evident that
ample jurisdictional powers are conferred upon the adjudicating
authorities constituted under the Act. It is relevant to state that, by virtue
of Section 9 engrafted under the Act, coupled with the aid of Rules 13, 16
& 17 of the Act, the Special Courts are vested with the same powers as
those of Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure. Accordingly, when
disputes arise under the Act, it is for the Special courts constituted by
virtue of the provisions of the Act, are alone empowered to determine all
the issues, including the title issue, among the parties arising out of the
Act. In a nutshell, Courts established under the Act are entitled to
determine the questions of title in order to arrive at the logical conclusions
in the cases arising out of the Act.
21. In the wake of the above statutory provisions, coupled with the fact
that the Primary Authority, after appreciating all the relevant documents,
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more particularly, the flow of title of the petitioner, held that the petitioner
has an absolute title. Whereas, the 1st Appellate Authority by referring to
only 2 documents out of the total 26 documents produced by the
respondent Nos.1 & 2, held that predecessor in title of the petitioner had
no valid title, as on execution of Ex-A1- Registered Sale Deed dated
13.05.2005. Hence, no title has been passed in favour of the petitioner.
Under this scanner, we have examined the instant case material on
record.
22. Now, we have to see whether the Appellate Authority, while deciding
the L.G.A No.7 of 2013, followed the procedure enunciated in A.P. Land
Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982, and Rules thereon in the instant case.
23. The Appellate Authority, while adjudicating the L.G.A No.7 of 2013,
had not framed any points for determination and also had not addressed
the arguments asserted by both counsels in its orders. In fact, the
Appellate Authority passed its orders in a cryptic manner. Furthermore,
the Appellate Authority did not discuss or apply any statutory framework
in passing its orders. In fact, the Appellate Authority did not consider the
cogent well founded findings arrived at by the Primary Authority in orders
dated 29.01.2013 in L.G.O.P No.155 of 2017, which remained as an
inherent flaw in the lis.
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24. The Apex Court (3 Judge Bench) in the case of Santosh Hazari Vs.
Purushottam Tiwari1, in its vivid terms, had held as under:-
“15…..The appellate court has jurisdiction to reverse or affirm
the findings of the trial court. First appeal is a valuable right of the
parties and unless restricted by law, the whole case is therein open
for rehearing both on questions of fact and law. The judgment of the
appellate court must, therefore, reflect its conscious application of
mind and record findings supported by reasons, on all the issues
arising along with the contentions put forth, and pressed by the
parties for decision of the appellate court. The task of an appellate
court affirming the findings of the trial court is an easier one. The
appellate court agreeing with the view of the trial court need not
restate the effect of the evidence or reiterate the reasons given by
the trial court; expression of general agreement with reasons given
by the court, decision of which is under appeal, would ordinarily
suffice…..”
25. Reverting to the case on hand, the Appellate Authority, on the sole
ground that the petitioner’s vendor (N.Satyabhama), though purchased
land of an extent of 275-2/9 Sq. yards, vide registered Sale Deed dated
06.06.1981 (Ex-A3), from her vendor, N.Naghu Bhai. But, the said
N.Naghu Bhai, had purchased 146½ Sq. yards from her vendor
(P.Yasodhama) by virtue of registered Sale Deed dated 26.02.1975 (Ex-
A.4), as such, the said registered Sale transaction is valid in respect of
146 ½ Sq. yards only, so far as the remaining extent is declared as void.
1
(2001) 3 SCC 179
14
26. The Appellate Authority also observed that the vendor (N. Satya
Bhama) of the petitioner executed Sale Deed dated 28.12.1994 (Ex.B.24)
for an extent of 140 Sq. yards in favour of Tirumala Raju Venkata Satya
Anjaneyulu. The Appellate Authority held that, based upon stray recitals
made in a copy of the complainant petition dated 21.02.2005 (FIR in
Cr.No.143/2005 dt:11.04.2005) (Ex.B.21) filed by the G.P.A. Holder on
behalf of the Smt.N.Satya Bhama and concluded that she sold an extent
of land of 194 Sq. yards to Datla Anjaneya Raju by way of Sale Deed.
Thus, the petitioner’s vendor had no land at the time of the execution of
Ex.A.1 in favour of the petitioner. As a result, the Appellate Authority
declared the registered Sale Deed dated 13.05.2005 (Ex.A.1) as void.
27. Apparently, Ex.B.21 is only a complainant petition. Subsequently,
the same was registered as FIR in Cr.No.143/2005, statedly preferred by
the GPA Holder of the vendor of the petitioner. It also reveals that 194 Sq.
yards of land out of 275-2/9 Sq. yards of the total site was sold to one
Datla Anjaneya Raju, while the remaining property is a vacant site, which
is in peaceful possession and enjoyment of the petitioner’s vendor only.
But, the Appellate Authority did not appreciate Ex.B.21 in toto, instead it
relied on with a portion of the said document in passing the orders under
challenge. As stated supra, Ex.B.21 is only a complainant petition,
initiating the criminal proceedings, which later turned into criminal case as
15
C.C No.921/2006 before the I Addl. Chief Metropolitan Magistrate,
Vijayawada. At last, the said criminal case ended with an acquittal by the
competent Criminal Court through its Judgment dated 24.02.2011 (Ex-
B.23). Undisputedly, a mere recital in the complainant petition (criminal
proceedings), which was not even specifically pleaded by the respondent
Nos.1 & 2, in their counter in L.G.O.P No.155 of 2007, before the Primary
Authority does not hold much weight.
28. In this context, it is apt to note that, in the absence of “Specific
Pleading,” merely relying on a stray sentence in the criminal proceeding,
would not be a sole determining factor in declaring the registered Sale
Deed (Ex-A1) which was in favour of the petitioner, as void. It is well settled
that no party should be permitted to travel beyond its pleadings, and that
all necessary and material facts must be pleaded and supported by the
party in the case it presents. The object and purpose of pleading is to
enable the adversary party to know the case it has to meet.
29. In fact, it is well settled in Bachhaj Nahar Vs. Nilima Mandal2 that,
without there being pleading, evidence could not be led, as it is time tested
principle. Again, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in 3 Judge Bench decision
2
(2008) 17 SCC 491
16
in the case of Arikala Narasa Reddy Vs. Venkata Ram Reddy Reddy
gari3, categorically, held as under:-
“…..15. This Court has consistently held that the
court cannot go beyond the pleadings of the parties. The parties
have to take proper pleadings and establish by adducing
evidence that by a particular irregularity/illegality, the result of the
election has been “materially affected”. There can be no dispute
to the settled legal proposition that “as a rule relief not founded
on the pleadings should not be granted”. Thus, a decision of the
case should not be based on grounds outside the pleadings of
the parties. In the absence of pleadings, evidence if any,
produced by the parties, cannot be considered……”
30. Added to that, a mere recital in the criminal complainant (Ex- B.21),
which was also ended in an acquittal, after the full-fledged Criminal Court
Judgment (Ex-B.23), is not a decisive reason to declare the entire Ex-A.1
as void by the Appellate Authority. More particularly, without culminating
overall facts and circumstances involved in the lis.
31. Admittedly, respondent Nos.1 & 2 produced the registered Sale
Deed dated 28.12.1994 (Ex-B.24), which reveals that, the vendor sold an
extent of land 140 Sq. yards in R.S. No.125 of 59 while retaining her
property, which was acquired through registered Sale Deed (Ex-A3) from
her vendor therein. Further, Ex-B.24, which shows the southern side
boundary discloses the vendor’s property (N.Satya Bhama represented by
3
(2014) 5 SCC 312
17
her G.P.A Holder N.Ravindra Prasad). As such, Ex-B.24, dated
28.12.1994, also clinches that the title was derived through registered
Sale Deed before the Sub-Registrar Office, Vijayawada, which is nothing
but Ex-A.3 only.
32. Therefore, it is crystal clear that the major part in the total extent of
land (275-2/9 Sq. yards) was alienated, as such, the remaining extent of
available small extents of 53.84 Sq. yards and 31.66 Sq. yards in total
85.5 Sq. yards of land was alienated in favour of the petitioner under
registered Sale Deed dated 13.05.2005 (Ex-A1).
33. Another notable aspect is that, as arrived by the Primary Authority
the boundaries also support the version of the petitioner’s flow of title. As
stated supra, the registered Sale Deed (Ex-B.24) clearly mentions the
southern boundary, which shows the land belonging to the petitioner’s
vendor (N.Satya Bhama) land existed. As such, the remaining small
portion of land extents come to the petitioner through registered Sale Deed
dated 13.05.2005 (Ex-A.1).
34. It is also relevant to note the well settled legal principle that, even in
the case of any discrepancy, the boundaries should normally prevail, as
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held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Subhaga Vs. Shobha4 also
supports the assertion of the petitioner.
35. In V. Laxminarasamma Vs. A. Yadaiah (dead) and others5, the 3
Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court also approved the expression
arrived in Konda Lakshmana Bapuji Vs Govt of A.P6 that the Tribunal
and Special Courts constituted under the Act have Jurisdiction to
determine the plea of title among the parties in the lis.
36. Another aspect is that the Appellate Authority had chosen to refer
only two documents, which were exhibited on behalf of respondent Nos.1
& 2. For the reasons best known to it, the said Authority had not ventured
to lay its hand on the other exhibited documents marked on behalf of
respondent Nos.1 & 2 while arriving at its conclusion in the orders under
the Appeal.
37. The respondent Nos.1 & 2 claim their flow of title derived from one
Ravulapali Chandramouli, who is the owner of the Subject Property. He in
turn gifted the property in favour of his daughter K.Lalithamba towards
‘Pasupu Kumkuma’ at the time of her marriage. It is also asserted that said
Lalithamba enjoyed the property and later executed Gift Deed dated
4
2006, AIR, SCW, 4855
5
2009 (5) SCC, 478
6
2002 (3) SCC, 258
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24.09.1998 (Ex-B.1) in favour of her husband namely, Konda Nageswara
Rao. The said Konda Nageswara Rao then executed registered Sale
Deed dated 21.10.2000 (Ex.B.2) in favour of Smt. K.Laxmi who in turn
executed registered Sale Deed dated 22.08.2002 (Ex.B3) in favour of the
1st respondent.
38. Though the respondent Nos.1 & 2 claim that Ravulapalli
Chandramouli’s ancestors are owners of the Subject Property,
surprisingly, they did not plead this said foundational fact in their counter
filed in L.G.O.P No.155 of 2007, before the Primary Authority. It is evident
from the material available on record that they have not filed any document
to substantiate that Ravulapali Chandramouli or his ancestors had title
over the Subject Property in the lis. More so, the 1st respondent in her
cross examination on 11.10.2012 in L.G.O.P No.155/2007 before the
Primary Authority, clearly deposed that she has not filed any document to
show how Ravalapauli Chandra Mouli got title over the Subject Property.
For the sake of comprehensive view, the relevant portion of the same read
as under:-
“I did not produce any document in the Court to show as to how
Rivulapalli Chandramouli got title to the petition schedule property. My
counter was drafted on my instructions. I did not give any paper
publication before purchasing the petition schedule property calling
for objections if any from the public. It is true that the door number of
the petition schedule property is not mentioned in Exs.B7 to B9 tax
receipts. I do not remember whether the door number of the petition
20schedule property is mentioned in the tax receipts given in my name
or not”.
The above deposition of the 1st respondent crystal clears the inherent flaw
relating to the very case setup of the 1st respondent itself.
39. In so far as, the 1st respondent’s further version that Ravulapali
Chandra Mouli had given a gift in favour of her daughter K. Lalithamba at
the time of her marriage towards the ‘Pasupu Kumkuma’, the said version
projects a claim as if it were an oral gift. Even then, the onus rests on them
to examine the relevant witnesses or elderly persons to prove the version
of ‘Pasupu Kumkuma’.
40. Again, as rightly arrived at by the Primary Authority, the said
K.Lalithamba executing Gift Deed dated 24.12.1998 (Ex.B.1) in favour of
her husband does not appear to be trustworthy. The tax receipts exhibited
by the 1st respondent do not indicate that the said receipts relate to the
disputed property. So far as Ex-B.15 to Ex-B.26 (Except Ex-B.24) are
related to the other Jurisdictional documents, which do not play a decisive
factor in substantiating the title of the 1st respondent. In fact, Ex-B.24 has
already been dealt with by us in detail in the preceding para.
41. In addition to that, other jurisdictional Forums documents, in view of
specific provisions engrafted in the Sections 8, 9, 10 and 15 of the Act and
Rules there on plays a determining role in adjudicating process under the
21
provisions of the A.P Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982., as the above
Act is self contained code.
42. In fact, the Primary Authority, after a roving enquiry, arrived at its
unequivocal findings based on the pleadings, facts and law. In the light
above discussion, more particularly, the decision-making process adopted
by the Appellate Authority in passing the orders dated 25.11.2013 in L.G.A
No.7 of 2013, suffers from inherent flaws.
43. The petitioner, with the cogent documentary evidence, beginning
from the year 1961 onwards, had established her stream of title over the
Subject Property in a satisfactory manner. By doing so, the petitioner,
prima facie, set out her case within the statutory parameters enunciated
in the Act, more particularly, by proving that respondent Nos.1 & 2 are land
grabbers. As such, the Primary Authority rightly invoked Section 10 of the
Act in its unequivocal findings in the orders dated 29.01.2013 made in
L.G.O.P No.155 of 2007. However, the Appellate Authority, in a slipshod
method and without taking into consideration the totality of the facts and
law, reversed the well founded orders of the Primary Authority dated
29.01.2013 in L.G.O.P No.155 of 2007. Therefore, in our considered
opinion, the Appellate Authority’s orders dated 25.11.2013 in L.G.A No. 7
of 2013 are not sustainable.
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44. It is apt to refer to the settled principle held by the Apex Court in
State of A.P Vs P.V. Hanumantha Rao (dead) through LR’s7, which
firmly expressed that in the ‘decision making process’ if the court, Tribunal
or authority deciding the case, has ignored vital evidence and thereby
arrived at erroneous conclusions or has misconstrued the provision of the
relevant Act or misunderstood the score of its Jurisdiction, the
constitutional power of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 can be
invoked to set right such flaws, in order to prevent gross in justice to the
party complaining.
Conclusion:-
45. In the light of the above discussion and legal position, in the
considered opinion of this Court, we hold that the petitioner has
successfully established that he had acquired title over the Subject
Property by placing the flow of title right from the year 1961 onwards.
Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed with the following terms:-
i. The orders dated 25.11.2013 in L.G.A No.7 of 2013 by the
special court under the Act are hereby set aside and the
orders dated 29.01.2013 in L.G.O.P No.155 of 2007 on the
file of the District Judge, Krishna at Machilipatnam, shall
stand restored.
7
2003 (10) SCC 123
23ii. The respondent Nos.1 & 2, shall hand over the vacant
possession of the Subject Property to the petitioner, within a
period of three (3) months from today, failing which, the
petitioner can take steps for eviction of the respondent Nos.1
& 2 and to take delivery of possession of the Subject
Property.
iii. The respondent Nos.1 & 2 are also directed to pay a sum of
Rs.1,000/- (rupees One Thousand only) per month, towards
compensation for unauthorized use and occupation of the
Subject Property to the petitioner from the date of institution
of L.G.O.P No.155 of 2017, i.e., on 31.08.2006, till the date
of actual delivery of possession of the land to the petitioner.
No costs. As a sequel, all pending applications shall stand closed.
_____________________
RAVI NATH TILHARI, J______________________________
MAHESWARA RAO KUNCHEAM, J
2nd May, 2025
GVK
24107
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE RAVI NATH TILHARI
AND
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE MAHESWARA RAO KUNCHEAMWRIT PETITION No.4572 of 2014
Dt. 05.05.2025
GVK