Supreme Court – Daily Orders
Shri Balaji Industrial Engineering … vs Steel Authority Of India Limited Iisco … on 22 April, 2026
Author: Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha
Bench: Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL No. OF 2026
(@ SLP (C) No. 8111 OF 2026)
SHRI BALAJI INDUSTRIAL
ENGINEERING LTD. (FORMERLY
KNOWN AS BALAJI INDUSTRIAL
PRODUCTS LTD.) ... APPELLANT
VERSUS
STEEL AUTHORITY OF INDIA
LTD. - IISCO STEEL PLANT [FORMERLY
KNOWN AS IISCO STEEL PLANT) … RESPONDENT
ORDER
Leave granted.
2. This appeal arises from the judgment and order dated 02.02.2026
passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of Calcutta. By the
said judgment, the Division Bench, in an appeal under Section 37 of
the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (1996 Act), set aside the
judgment dated 08.08.2023, whereby the petition filed by the
respondent under Section 34 of the 1996 Act had been dismissed. The
Division Bench remitted the matter to the Commercial Division to be
renumbered and heard afresh.
3. The facts giving rise to the filing of this appeal, in brief, are that on
12.01.2005, a tender was issued by the Steel Authority of India
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
Jayant Kumar Arora
Limited (respondent) for the sale of approximately 60,000 metric
Date: 2026.04.30
16:51:56 IST
Reason:
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tonnes of Run-of-Mine (Iron Ore) on specified commercial terms. A
dispute arose between the parties regarding termination and the
alleged breach of contract and the same was referred to Arbitration.
4. The Arbitral Tribunal, by an award dated 19.06.2013, inter alia, held
that the respondent had wrongfully terminated the Contract and failed
to deliver the contracted Iron Ore to the appellant. The Tribunal
accordingly directed the respondent to refund the security amount,
reimburse the amounts paid, and compensate the appellant for the
additional cost incurred in procuring Iron Ore from the market, along
with interest.
5. The respondent challenged the Award dated 19.06.2013 in a petition
under Section 34 of the 1996 Act before the learned Single Judge of
the High Court. During the pendency of the said petition, the
Commercial Courts Act, 2015 (2015 Act) came into force w.e.f.
23.10.2015. However, the respondent did not raise any objection
regarding the transfer of the petition to the Commercial Division.
6. The learned Single Judge, by an order dated 08.08.2023, inter alia,
held that the respondent had failed to deliver the contracted Iron Ore
despite receiving payment, and that the findings recorded by the
Arbitral Tribunal were based on the evidence on record. The learned
Single Judge concluded that no grounds for interference under Section
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34 of the 1996 Act were made out. Accordingly, the petition wasdismissed.
7. The respondent thereafter filed an appeal under Section 37 of the
1996 Act. The Division Bench of the High Court, by the impugned
order dated 02.02.2026, held that the petition under Section 34 of the
1996 Act ought to have been transferred to the Commercial Division
under Section 15 of the 2015 Act. It was further held that the
judgment and order had been passed by a non-Commercial Division.
On this ground of lack of jurisdiction, the order dated 08.08.2023
passed by the learned Single Judge was set aside, and the petition was
directed to be transmitted to the Commercial Division for renumbering
and fresh hearing. The Division Bench clarified that it had not
examined the merits of the case and all points raised by the parties
are kept open. Accordingly, the appeal was disposed of. It is in this
factual background that the present appeal arises for our
consideration.
8. Learned senior counsel for the appellant, while inviting the attention
of this Court to the cause list, submitted that the learned Single Judge
was designated as Commercial Court and, therefore, the order passed
by him cannot be treated as one without jurisdiction. It was contended
that the distinction between the Commercial Division and the non-
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Commercial Division is merely an internal administrative roster
allocation and does not affect the inherent jurisdiction of the Court. It
was further urged that the non-transfer of the matter under Section
15 of the 2015 Act, constitutes only a procedural or administrative
irregularity and cannot render a judgment passed on merits as one
without jurisdiction.
9. Learned senior counsel for the respondent, on the other hand,
submitted that the learned Single Judge who decided the petition
under Section 34 of the 1996 Act lacked jurisdiction, as he had not
been assigned the roster by the Chief Justice to deal with such
matters. It was contended that the order was without jurisdiction and
was, therefore, rightly set aside by the Division Bench. In support of
the aforesaid submissions, reliance has been placed on the decisions
of this Court1.
10. We have considered the rival submissions and have perused the
record.
11. The legal position concerning allocation of business and authority of
the Chief Justice as the master of roster is well-settled. A two-Judge
Bench of this Court in Garden Reach Shipbuilders and Engineers
Ltd. (supra), by placing reliance on the earlier decisions of this Court 2
1 Neeta Singh & Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.; 2024 SCC OnLine SC 5761; State of Rajasthan v.
Prakash Chand & Ors.; (1998) 1 SCC 1; Pepsi Foods Ltd. & Anr. v. Special Judicial Magistrate & Ors.; (1998) 5
SCC 749; Garden Reach Shipbuilders and Engineers Ltd. v. GRSE Ltd. Workmens Union & Ors.; 2025 SCC
OnLine SC 582
2 State of Rajasthan v. Prakash Chand, (1998) 1 SCC 1 and Campaign for Judicial Accountability and
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reiterated that any adjudication by a Bench in a matter not assigned
to it by the Chief Justice would be without jurisdiction and in nullity.
The mandate that a Bench acting outside the roster would lack
jurisdiction is a salutary principle, integral to maintaining judicial
discipline and institutional coherence. We are in agreement with the
view expressed by a two-Judge Bench of this Court in Garden Reach
Shipbuilders and Engineers Ltd. (supra).
12. We may advert to the facts of the case in hand. The cause list annexed
with the Special Leave Petition clearly indicates that the learned Single
Judge who decided the petition under Section 34 of the 1996 Act, was
designated as a Commercial Court.
13. It is also pertinent to take note of Section 15 of the 2015 Act which
contemplates transfer of pending cases to the Commercial Division.
Sub-section (5) thereof, expressly provides that where such transfer
has not taken place, the Commercial Appellate Division may, upon
application of any party, withdraw and transfer the matter. Section 15
(5) reads as under:
“In the event that such suit or application is not
transferred in the manner specified in sub-section (1),
sub-section (2) or sub-section (3), the Commercial
Appellate Division of the High Court may, on the
application of any of the parties to the suit, withdraw
such suit or application from the court before which it is
pending and transfer the same for trial or disposal toReforms v. Union of India & Anr.; (2018) 1 SCC 196
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the Commercial Division or Commercial Court, as the
case may be, having territorial jurisdiction over such
suit, and such order of transfer shall be final and
binding.”Thus, Section 15(5) of the 2015 Act requires parties also to seek
transfer.
14. In the instant case, admittedly, the respondent did not file any such
application before the learned Single Judge dealing with the petition
under Section 34 of the 1996 Act. The respondent participated in the
proceeding without demur and invited a decision on merits.
15. Thus, in the facts of the case, it can safely be concluded that the
learned Single Judge was designated as Commercial Court and the
judgment rendered by him cannot be treated either as a nullity or one
passed without jurisdiction.
16. The Division Bench, therefore, was not justified in setting aside the
judgment of the learned Single Judge solely on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction, without examining the merits of the case.
17. For the foregoing reasons, the impugned judgment and order dated
02.02.2026 passed by the Division Bench of the High Court is
quashed and set aside. The matter is remitted to the Commercial
Appellate Division of the High Court, which shall hear and decide the
appeal under Section 37 of the 1996 Act afresh on merits. All
contentions of the parties are kept open.
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18. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed. There shall be no order as to costs.
…..…….……………….………….……….J.
[PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA]
…..…….……………….………….……….J.
[ALOK ARADHE]
NEW DELHI;
APRIL 22, 2026.
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ITEM NO.2 COURT NO.6 SECTION XVI
S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A
RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (C) No(s). 8111/2026
[Arising out of impugned final judgment and order dated 02-02-2026
in APO No. 65/2024 passed by the High Court at Calcutta]
SHRI BALAJI INDUSTRIAL ENGINEERING Ltd.
(FORMERLY KNOWN AS BALAJI INDUSTRIAL
PRODUCTS Ltd.) Petitioner(s)
VERSUS
STEEL AUTHORITY OF INDIA LIMITED
– IISCO STEEL PLANT (FORMERLY KNOWN AS IISCO
STEEL PLANT) Respondent(s)
FOR ADMISSION
IA No. 63972/2026 – PERMISSION TO FILE ADDITIONAL DOCUMENTS/FACTS/
ANNEXURES
Date : 22-04-2026 This matter was called on for hearing today.
CORAM : HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE ALOK ARADHE
For Petitioner(s) : Ms. Rekha Palli, Sr. Adv.
Mr. Lakshay Saini, Adv.
Ms. Akanksha Mehra, AOR
Mr. Tanay Agarwal, Adv.
Ms. Darshana Sett, Adv.
Ms. Mili Tomar, Adv.
Mr. Abhiraj Choudhary, Adv.
For Respondent(s) : Mr. Rupesh Kumar, Sr. Adv.
Ms. Pankhuri Shrivastava, Adv.
Ms. Neelam Sharma, AOR
Mr. Alekshendra Sharma, Adv.
Mr. Deepankar Kumar, Adv.
Mr. Mukul, Adv.
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UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following
O R D E R
1. Leave granted.
2. The appeal is allowed in terms of the signed order.
3. Pending interlocutory application(s), if any, is/are disposed
of.
(JAYANT KUMAR ARORA) (NIDHI WASON)
ASTT. REGISTRAR-cum-PS ASSISTANT REGISTRAR
(Signed order is placed on the file)
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