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HomeDistrict CourtsDelhi District CourtShiv Pujan Tiwari vs State on 23 February, 2026

Shiv Pujan Tiwari vs State on 23 February, 2026

Delhi District Court

Shiv Pujan Tiwari vs State on 23 February, 2026

    IN THE COURT OF DR. SAURABH KULSHRESHTHA,
   DISTRICT JUDGE-04 (SOUTH), SAKET COURTS, DELHI:
EARLIER POSTED AS ADDITIONAL SESSIONS JUDGE-03, WEST
         DISTRICT, TIS HAZARI COURTS, DELHI.


CNR No. DLWT01-007031/2024
CR No. 394/2024
P.S. Ranjit NAgar
Shiv Pujan Tiwari v. State

In the matter of:

Shiv Pujan Tiwari
S/o Shri Satya Dev Tiwari
R/o C-11/3, Panchsheel Apartment,
Vikalp Khand-3, Gomti Nagar
Rohit Residency, Gomti Nagar, Lucknow,
Uttar Pradesh - 226010                            ..............Petitioner

Versus

The State (NCT of Delhi)                          ............. Respondent

Date of Institution             :     20.08.2024
Date of Reserving Judgment      :     20.01.2026
Date of Pronouncement           :     23.02.2026
Decision                        :     Revision Dismissed


                              JUDGMENT

1. This revision petition is directed against the order dated
25.04.2024 passed by Ld. ACMM, West District, Tis Hazari Courts,

C.R. No. 294/ 2024 Page no. 1 of 18
Shiv Poojan Tiwari v. State
Delhi
in case FIR No. 778/2014 P.S Ranjeet Nagar whereby the present
petitioner/ accused Shiv Pujan Tiwari was summoned for the offences
under sections 406/420/34 of the IPC.

2. It is seen that in the present case, charge-sheet was filed
against the petitioner/ accused for the offences under sections
406
/420/34 of the IPC in case FIR No. 778/2014 P.S Ranjeet Nagar and
thereafter on 25.04.2024, the Ld. ACMM, West District, Tis Hazari
Courts, Delhi, passed the following order:

“Material on record prima facie discloses
commission of offence under Section 406/420/34
IPC. The said offences are cognizable with
permission of court. Mere statement of
complainants/ victims will not imply acquittal of
accused without express order of the court in this
regard. Similarly, mere recording of statement at the
time of deciding bail application does not imply that
cognizance is not to be taken.

After careful perusal of record, I take cognizance of
the offence under section 406/420/34 IPC.

Accused Lalit Kumar Dahiya has already been
declared PO vide order dated 03.07.2019.

There is no material on record to summon Sahil
Kumar who is kept in column no. 12.

Issue summons against accused Shiv Pujan Tiwari
through IO, returnable on 13.08.2024.”

C.R. No. 294/ 2024 Page no. 2 of 18
Shiv Poojan Tiwari v. State

3. By way of present revision petition the aforesaid order dated
25.04.2024 passed by the Ld. Trial Court, whereby the present petitioner/
accsued has been summoned, has been assailed by the petitioner/
accused.

4. Ld. Counsel for the petitioner/ accused has contended that
the Ld. Trial Court has selectively recorded the submissions of the
petitioner’s counsel and that the submissions recorded were restricted
only to the point of compromise whereas the petitioner’s counsel has
argued on other aspects as well. It has been further contended that the
Ld. Trial Court has not passed a speaking/ reasoned summoning order. It
has been further contended that the petitioner/ accused cannot be
summoned simultaneously for the offences under sections 420 IPC and
406 of the IPC as both these offences operate in different spheres. It has
been further submitted that the charge-sheet does not disclose the
commission of any criminal offence and the dispute in question was of
commercial nature and that there is not even a single document which
substantiates the allegation of promise of 7% return qua the investments
and has further argued that any investment in the market is subject to
market risk and no criminal liability can be fastened in case an investor
suffers any losses. He has accordingly prayed for setting aside of the
impugned order dated 25.04.2024. Reliance has been placed on the
following judgments: Sanjit Bakshi v. State of NCT of Delhi passed in
Crl.
M.C. No. 4177/2019 by the Hon’ble High Court of Delhi; Rasiklal
Mohanlal Gangani v. State
, passed in Crl.
M.C No. 6012/2019 by the

C.R. No. 294/ 2024 Page no. 3 of 18
Shiv Poojan Tiwari v. State
Hon’ble High Court of Delhi; Delhi Race Club (1940) Ltd. v. State of
Uttar Pradesh
, passed in Criminal Appeal No. 3114/2024 by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court of Indi; M/s J.M. Laboratories v. State of Andhra
Pradesh
, passed in SLP (Crl.) No. 5067/2024 by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court of India; Sachin Garg v. State of U.P. passed in SLP (Crl.)
No.
4415/2023 by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India; Vikas Thakur v.
State of NCT of Delhi
, passed in Crl. M.C No. 6619/2023 by the
Hon’ble High Court of Delhi.

5. On the other hand, Ld. Addl. P.P for the State has opposed
the present revision petition and has contended that no detailed order is
required at the stage of summoning of an accused in a State case where
charge sheet has been filed by the police. He has further submitted that
the impugned order has been passed by the Ld. ACMM after considering
the entire material on record. He has further contended that the material
on record clearly discloses that there are sufficient grounds for
proceeding against the petitioner/ accused for the offences under section
406
/420/34 IPC and the petitioner/ accused has been rightly summoned.
He has further submitted that all contentions of the petitioner/ accused
can be considered by the Ld. ACMM/ ACJM at the stage of charge.
Accordingly, the Ld. Addl. P.P for the State has prayed that the revision
petition be dismissed.

6. I have heard the Ld. Counsel for the petitioner/ accused and
the Ld. Addl. P.P for the State and have given due consideration to their
rival contentions and perused the record.

C.R. No. 294/ 2024 Page no. 4 of 18
Shiv Poojan Tiwari v. State

7. At the outset it may be noted that the scope of interference
in revision proceedings is extremely limited and the same has been
enunciated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and the Hon’ble High Court
of Delhi in a number of judgments. In the judgment titled as Sanjaysinh
Ramrao Chavan v. Dattatray Galabrao Phalke
as reported in (2015) 3
SCC123, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed:

“….14….Unless the order passed by the Magistrate
is perverse or the view taken by the court is wholly
unreasonable or there is non-consideration of any
relevant material or there is palpable misreading of
records, the Revisional Court is not justified in
setting aside the order, merely because another view
is possible. The Revisional Court is not meant to act
as an appellate court. The whole purpose of the
revisional jurisdiction is to preserve the power in the
court to do justice in accordance with the principles
of criminal jurisprudence. The revisional power of
the court under Sections 397 to 401 CrPC is not to
be equated with that of an appeal. Unless the finding
of the court, whose decision is sought to be revised,
is shown to be perverse or untenable in law or is
grossly erroneous or glaringly unreasonable or
where the decision is based on no material or where
the material facts are wholly ignored or where the
judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or
capriciously, the courts may not interfere with
decision in exercise of their revisional
jurisdiction…..”

8. In the judgment titled as Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander

C.R. No. 294/ 2024 Page no. 5 of 18
Shiv Poojan Tiwari v. State
reported as (2012) 9 SCC 460, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed:

“……….8. Before examining the merits of the
present case, we must advert to the discussion as to
the ambit and scope of the power which the courts
including the High Court can exercise under Section
397
and Section 482 of the Code. Section 397 of
the Code vests the court with the power to call for
and examine the records of an inferior court for the
purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and
regularity of any proceedings or order made in a
case. The object of this provision is to set right a
patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There
has to be a well- founded error and it may not be
appropriate for the court to scrutinize the orders,
which upon the face of it bears a token of careful
consideration and appear to be in accordance with
law. If one looks into the various judgments of this
Court, it emerges that the revisional jurisdiction can
be invoked where the decisions under challenge are
grossly erroneous, there is no compliance with the
provisions of law, the finding recorded is based on
no evidence, material evidence is ignored or judicial
discretion is exercised arbitrarily or perversely.
These are not exhaustive classes, but are merely
indicative. Each case would have to be determined
on its own merits.

9. Another well-accepted norm is that the revisional
jurisdiction of the higher court is a very limited one
and cannot be exercised in a routine manner. One of
the inbuilt restrictions is that it should not be against

C.R. No. 294/ 2024 Page no. 6 of 18
Shiv Poojan Tiwari v. State
an interim or interlocutory order. The Court has to
keep in mind that the exercise of revisional
jurisdiction itself should not lead to injustice ex
facie. Where the Court is dealing with the question
as to whether the charge has been framed properly
and in accordance with law in a given case, it may
be reluctant to interfere in exercise of its revisional
jurisdiction unless the case substantially falls within
the categories aforestated……”

9. In the judgment titled as Chandra Babu v. State, reported as
(2015) 8 SCC 774, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed:

“11. …It is well settled in law that inherent as well
as revisional jurisdiction should be exercised
cautiously. Normally, a revisional jurisdiction
should be exercised on a question of law. However,
when factual appreciation is involved, then it must
find place in the class of cases resulting in a
perverse finding. Basically, the power is required to
be exercised so that justice is done and there is no
abuse of power by the Court…..”

10. In the judgment titled as Taron Mohan v. State, 2021 SCC
OnLine Del 312, the Hon’ble High Court of Delhi has observed:

“……9. The scope of interference in a revision
petition is extremely narrow. It is well settled that
Section 397 CrPC gives the High Courts or the
Sessions Courts jurisdiction to consider the
correctness, legality or propriety of any finding inter

C.R. No. 294/ 2024 Page no. 7 of 18
Shiv Poojan Tiwari v. State
se an order and as to the regularity of the
proceedings of any inferior court. It is also well
settled that while considering the legality, propriety
or correctness of a finding or a conclusion, normally
the revising court does not dwell at length upon the
facts and evidence of the case. A court in revision
considers the material only to satisfy itself about the
legality and propriety of the findings, sentence and
order and refrains from substituting its own
conclusion on an elaborate consideration of
evidence…….”

11. The first contention of the Ld. Counsel for the petitioner/
accused is that the Ld. Trial Court has selectively recorded the
submissions of the petitioner’s counsel and that the submissions recorded
were restricted only to the point of compromise whereas the petitioner’s
counsel had argued on other aspects as well. In this respect it may be
noted that at the stage of taking cognizance and passing of the
summoning order the accused or his counsel has no unqualified right of
audience and therefore the Ld. Counsel for the petitioner/ accused had no
vested legal right to address detailed arguments at that stage as the
accused had yet not been summoned. The Ld. Counsel for the petitioner/
accused can address all his submissions in detail at the stage of charge
and the Ld. ACJM would consider the same. Accordingly, this contention
does not affect the validity and legality of the summoning order.

12. Secondly, the Ld. Counsel for the petitioner/ accused has
contended that the summoning order is liable to be set aside as the Ld.

C.R. No. 294/ 2024 Page no. 8 of 18
Shiv Poojan Tiwari v. State
ACJM has not passed a detailed speaking order and has not given any
clear reasons for summoning the petitioner/ accused.

13. The observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the
judgment titled as State of Gujarat v. Afroz Mohammed Hasanfatta,
(2019) 20 SCC 539 constitute a complete answer to the contentions
raised by the Ld. Counsel for the petitioner/ accused. The Hon’ble
Supreme Court has held in the said judgment that:

“22. In summoning the accused, it is not necessary
for the Magistrate to examine the merits and
demerits of the case and whether the materials
collected is adequate for supporting the conviction.
The court is not required to evaluate the evidence
and its merits. The standard to be adopted for
summoning the accused under Section 204 CrPC is
not the same at the time of framing the charge. For
issuance of summons under Section 204 CrPC, the
expression used is “there is sufficient ground for
proceeding…”; whereas for framing the charges, the
expression used in Sections 240 and 246 IPC is
“there is ground for presuming that the accused has
committed an offence…”. At the stage of taking
cognizance of the offence based upon a police report
and for issuance of summons under Section 204
CrPC, detailed enquiry regarding the merits and
demerits of the case is not required. The fact that
after investigation of the case, the police has filed
charge-sheet along with the materials thereon may
be considered as sufficient ground for proceeding
for issuance of summons under Section 204 CrPC.

C.R. No. 294/ 2024 Page no. 9 of 18
Shiv Poojan Tiwari v. State

23. Insofar as taking cognizance based on the police
report is concerned, the Magistrate has the
advantage of the charge-sheet, statement of
witnesses and other evidence collected by the police
during the investigation. Investigating officer/SHO
collects the necessary evidence during the
investigation conducted in compliance with the
provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code and in
accordance with the rules of investigation. Evidence
and materials so collected are sifted at the level of
the investigating officer and thereafter, charge-sheet
was filed. In appropriate cases, opinion of the Public
Prosecutor is also obtained before filing the charge-
sheet. The court thus has the advantage of the police
report along with the materials placed before it by
the police. Under Section 190(1)(b) CrPC, where the
Magistrate has taken cognizance of an offence upon
a police report and the Magistrate is satisfied that
there is sufficient ground for proceeding, the
Magistrate directs issuance of process. In case of
taking cognizance of an offence based upon the
police report, the Magistrate is not required to
record reasons for issuing the process. In cases
instituted on a police report, the Magistrate is only
required to pass an order issuing summons to the
accused. Such an order of issuing summons to the
accused is based upon subject to satisfaction of the
Magistrate considering the police report and other
documents and satisfying himself that there is
sufficient ground for proceeding against the
accused. In a case based upon the police report, at
the stage of issuing the summons to the accused, the
Magistrate is not required to record any reason. In

C.R. No. 294/ 2024 Page no. 10 of 18
Shiv Poojan Tiwari v. State
case, if the charge-sheet is barred by law or where
there is lack of jurisdiction or when the charge-sheet
is rejected or not taken on file, then the Magistrate is
required to record his reasons for rejection of the
charge-sheet and for not taking it on file.

24. In the present case, cognizance of the offence
has been taken by taking into consideration the
charge-sheet filed by the police for the offence
under Sections 420, 465, 467, 468, 471, 477-A and
120-B IPC, the order for issuance of process without
explicitly recording reasons for its satisfaction for
issue of process does not suffer from any illegality.

14. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Gujarat v. Afroz
Mohammed Hasanfatta
, (2019) 20 SCC 539 further held that:

“51. While hearing revision under Section 397
CrPC, the High Court does not sit as an appellate
court and will not reappreciate the evidence unless
the judgment of the lower court suffers from
perversity. Based on the charge-sheet and the
materials produced thereon when the Magistrate was
satisfied that there are sufficient grounds for
proceeding, the learned Single Judge was not
justified in examining the merits and demerits of the
case and substitute its own view. When the
satisfaction of the Magistrate was based on the
charge-sheet and the materials placed before him,
the satisfaction cannot be said to be erroneous or
perverse and the satisfaction ought not to have been
interfered with.

C.R. No. 294/ 2024 Page no. 11 of 18
Shiv Poojan Tiwari v. State

52. As discussed earlier, while taking cognizance of
an offence based upon a police report, it is the
satisfaction of the Magistrate that there is sufficient
ground to proceed against the accused. As discussed
earlier, along with the second supplementary charge-
sheet, number of materials like statement of
witnesses, bank statement of the respondent-accused
and his company Nile Trading Corporation and
other bank statement, call detail records and other
materials were placed. Upon consideration of the
second supplementary charge-sheet and the
materials placed thereon, the Magistrate satisfied
himself that there is sufficient ground to proceed
against the respondent and issued summons. The
learned Single Judge, in our considered view, erred
in interfering with the order of the Magistrate in
exercise of revisional jurisdiction.

53. In our view, the learned Single Judge ought not
to have gone into the merits of the matter when the
matter is in nascent stage. When the prosecution
relies upon the materials, strict standard of proof is
not to be applied at the stage of issuance of
summons nor to examine the probable defence
which the accused may take. All that the court is
required to do is to satisfy itself as to whether there
are sufficient grounds for proceeding. The learned
Single Judge committed a serious error in going into
the merits and demerits of the case and the
impugned order.”

15. Furthermore, in the judgment titled as Bhushan Kumar v.
State (NCT of Delhi
), (2012) 5 SCC 424 the Hon’ble Supreme Court has

C.R. No. 294/ 2024 Page no. 12 of 18
Shiv Poojan Tiwari v. State
held:

“…….13. Section 204 of the Code does not mandate
the Magistrate to explicitly state the reasons for
issuance of summons. It clearly states that if in the
opinion of a Magistrate taking cognizance of an
offence, there is sufficient ground for proceeding,
then the summons may be issued. This section
mandates the Magistrate to form an opinion as to
whether there exists a sufficient ground for
summons to be issued but it is nowhere mentioned
in the section that the explicit narration of the same
is mandatory, meaning thereby that it is not a
prerequisite for deciding the validity of the
summons issued.

14. Time and again it has been stated by this Court
that the summoning order under Section 204 of the
Code requires no explicit reasons to be stated
because it is imperative that the Magistrate must
have taken notice of the accusations and applied his
mind to the allegations made in the police report and
the materials filed therewith…….

……..19.This being the settled legal position, the
order passed by the Magistrate could not be faulted
with only on the ground that the summoning order
was not a reasoned order…”

16. The authorities cited by the Ld. Counsel for the petitioner/
accused which relate to complaint cases are therefore not applicable to
the facts and circumstances of the present case. Even the other

C.R. No. 294/ 2024 Page no. 13 of 18
Shiv Poojan Tiwari v. State
judgments cited by the Ld. Counsel for the petitioner are not applicable
to the facts and circumstances of the present case in view of the aforesaid
two judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. The necessary conclusion
is that the impugned summoning order cannot be set aside on this ground
alone.

17. Further this Court is not exercising powers of the nature as
enunciated under section 482 Cr.P.C. and therefore this Court cannot by
itself consider the merits and demerits of the case in detail after
examining the entire material on record and dismiss the case against the
petitioner/ accused by substituting its own opinion for the opinion of the
Ld. ACJM, while exercising revisional jurisdiction. At any rate the
immediately next stage in the proceedings would be arguments and
consideration on the point of charge and all the issues raised by the Ld.
Counsel for the petitioner can very well be considered at that stage. If, on
consideration of the submissions made by the petitioner/ accused, no
case in made out against him, he would be discharged by the Ld. Trial
Court.

18. The next contention of the Ld. Counsel for the petitioner/
accused is that the offences under sections 420 IPC and 406 IPC operate
in different spheres and the two cannot stand together. He has further
contended that the petitioner/ accused could not have been summoned
for both the said offences simultaneously. Reliance has been placed on
the judgment titled as Delhi Race Club (1940) Ltd. v. State of Uttar
Pradesh
, (2024) 10 SCC 690.
There is no dispute about the legal

C.R. No. 294/ 2024 Page no. 14 of 18
Shiv Poojan Tiwari v. State
proposition enunciated in the said judgment titled as Delhi Race Club
(1940) Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh
, (2024) 10 SCC 690.

19. However, it is pertinent to note the provisions of section 221
(1)
of the Code of Criminal Procedure which provide as under:

221. Where it is doubtful what offence has been
committed.–(1) If a single act or series of acts is of
such a nature that it is doubtful which of several
offences the facts which can be proved will
constitute, the accused may be charged with having
committed all or any of such offences, and any
number of such charges may be tried at once; or he
may be charged in the alternative with having
committed some one of the said offences.

Illustrations (a) A is accused of an act which may
amount to theft, or receiving stolen property, or
criminal breach of trust or cheating. He may be
charged with theft, receiving stolen property,
criminal breach of trust and cheating, or he may be
charged with having committed theft, or receiving
stolen property, or criminal breach of trust or
cheating.

20. In this respect reference may be made to the judgment titled
as Sunil Kumar Paul v. State of W.B., 1964 SCC OnLine SC 260; AIR
1965 SC 706 the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held:

“………The framing of a charge under Section 236
is, in the nature of things, earlier than the stage when

C.R. No. 294/ 2024 Page no. 15 of 18
Shiv Poojan Tiwari v. State
it can be said what facts have been proved, a stage
which is reached when the court delivers its
judgment. The power of the court to frame various
charges contemplated by Section 236 CrPC
therefore arises when it cannot be said with any
definiteness, either by the prosecutor or by the court,
that such and such facts would be proved. The court
had at the time of framing the charges, therefore to
consider what different offences could be made out
on the basis of the allegations made by the
prosecution in the complaint or in the charge
submitted by the investigating agency or by the
allegations made by the various prosecution
witnesses examined prior to the framing of the
charge. All such possible offences could be charged
in view of the provisions of Section 236 CrPC as it
can be reasonably said that it was doubtful as to
which of the offences the facts which could be
ultimately proved would constitute. ………

………It follows that the Special Court could
therefore have framed a charge under Section 420
IPC at the relevant time if it had been of the opinion
that it was doubtful whether these facts constitute an
offence under Section 409 IPC as stated in the
charge-sheet or an offence under Section 420 IPC.
[Para 15]

19. We therefore hold that at the trial of the
appellant for an offence under Section 409 IPC, in
this case, the appellant could have also been charged
for an offence under Section 420 IPC in view of
Section 236 of the Code of Criminal

C.R. No. 294/ 2024 Page no. 16 of 18
Shiv Poojan Tiwari v. State
Procedure…….”

21. Reference may also be made to the judgment titled as Bhim
Sain Arora v. State
, 2025 SCC OnLine Del 6721 of the Hon’ble High
Court of Delhi in this respect.

22. Thus the isssue would have to be decided in light of the
facts and circumstances of each case. If, after considering the
contentions of the petitioner/ accused the Ld. ACJM is of the opinion
that a prima facie case is disclosed and only one of the offences out of
the offences under section 420 and section 406 of the IPC is clearly
made out he would frame charge only for one of those offences. It would
be open to the Ld. ACJM to examine that if on consideration of the facts
and circumstances of the case and the law laid down in the aforesaid
judgments, the provisions of section 221(1) Cr.P.C. can be pressed into
operation or not and pass appropriate order at the stage of framing of
charges. However, setting aside the impugned order and remanding back
the matter for passing of a fresh summing order on this ground would
unnecessarily delay the proceedings. This issue can always be agitated
by the petitioner at the stage of charge and can very well be considered
by the Ld. ACJM at the stage of charge.

23. Considering the aforesaid facts and circumstances and
bearing in mind the legal position discussed herein-above, I am of the
opinion that no ground is made out for interfering with the impugned
order dated 25.04.2024 passed by Ld. ACMM, West District, Tis Hazari

C.R. No. 294/ 2024 Page no. 17 of 18
Shiv Poojan Tiwari v. State
Courts, Delhi summoning the petitioner/ accused in case FIR No.
778/2014, P.S Ranjit Nagar for the offences under section 406/420/34 of
the IPC. The revision petition is accordingly dismissed. No costs.

24. File be consigned to Record Room, after necessary
compliance. TCR be sent back along with a copy of this judgment to the
Ld. Trial Court.

Digitally signed
by SAURABH

                                                SAURABH      KULSHRESHTHA
                                                KULSHRESHTHA
                                                             Date: 2026.02.23
                                                             17:25:42 +0530
(Pronounced in the open court
on the 23.02.2026).
                                              (Dr. Saurabh Kulshreshtha)
                                                District Judge-04 (South)
                                                      Saket Courts, Delhi

                                                       Earlier posted as:
                                    Additional Sessions Judge-03 (West)
                                                Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi


Note: This Judgment has been pronounced in terms of Note 2 of the
Transfer Order No. 8/D-3/Gaz.IA/DHC/2026 dated 06.02.2026. File be
sent back to the Court of Ld. ASJ-03, West, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi.

C.R. No. 294/ 2024                                        Page no. 18 of 18
Shiv Poojan Tiwari v. State
 



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