Delhi District Court
Shemford Schools Pvt Ltd vs Anju Satish And Sons Trust on 21 July, 2025
IN THE COURT OF JUDICIAL MAGISTRATE FIRST CLASS (NI
ACT), NORTH-WEST, ROHINI, DELHI
Presided by :- Ms. Nitika
CNR No. DLNW02-005963-2015
CC No. 14107/2016
Shemford Schools Pvt. Ltd.
Having its registered office at
Shemrock Heritage, Block-F,
Sector-9, Delhi-110085
Through its Director
Sh. Amol Arora S/o Sh. D.R. Arora
.....Complainant
Versus
Anju Satish & Sons Trust
Through its Trustee Mrs. Anju Singh
W/o Sh. Satish Singh
R/o Prakash Nagar, Phulwari Sharif
Khagual Road, P.O. and PS
Phulwari Sharif Patna, Bihar.
.........Accused
JUDGMENT
(1) Offence complained of : Section 138 N.I.
Act
(2) Plea of accused : Pleaded not guilty
(3) Date of institution of case : 01.09.2015
(4) Reserved for Judgment : 12.06.2025
(5) Date of pronouncement : 21.07.2025
(6) Final Order/Judgment : Acquitted
BRIEF STATEMENT OF REASONS FOR THE DECISION
1. The present case pertains to a complaint filed under Digitally
signed by
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section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 by
Shemford Schools Pvt. Ltd. through its Director Sh. Amol
Arora (hereinafter referred to as ‘complainant’) against Ms.
Anju Satish & Sons Trust through its trustee Mrs. Anju Singh
(hereinafter referred to as ‘accused’) for dishonor of cheque
bearing number 255108 dated 05.04.2015 for a sum of Rs.
6,74,160/-, drawn on J& K Bank (herein after referred to as
‘cheque in question’).
FACTUAL MATRIX
2. The factual matrix of the complainant’s case is that
the complainant is a registered company incorporated under
the provisions of the Companies Act, 1956 and is involved in
the business of managing and operating schools pan India by
way of devising its own unique methodologies, curriculum,
systems and technical know-how in this field. Mr Amol
Arora is the director of the said company and has filed the
present complaint on behalf of the company. The board
resolution authorising the director to represent the company
is Ex. PW1/1. Mr Amit Chaudhary, son of Shri Krishan Lal,
is the SPA holder on behalf of Shri Amol Arora. The SPA in
favour of Shri Amit Chaudhary is Ex. PW1/2. It is the case of
the complainant that the accused had entered into an
agreement with the complainant on 9th September 2014 in the
form of a Franchise for the operation and management of a
senior secondary school upon a piece of land owned by the
accused which is located at Barhi District, Hazari Bagh,
Jharkhand. The copy of the said agreement is Ex. PW 1/3
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(OSR). As per the said agreement, the complainant had
agreed to advance its aid and assistance to the accused in the
form of its expertise and knowledge in the setup and
operation of the said school by way of a continuous license
( franchise) upon the terms and conditions encapsulated in
the said agreement. The said school was to operate in
accordance with the CBSE norms and regulations. As per the
terms and conditions of the said agreement, it was agreed
between the parties that a Principal Management Fee
(hereinafter referred to as ‘PMF’), as per Annexure A.
Appended to the agreement would be paid by the accused to
the complainant by way of four installments for a total sum of
rupees 23,59,560/-. The amount of Rs. 23,59,560/- was
agreed to be paid by way of four cheques out of which one
was drawn upon SBI and the rest of the three were drawn
upon Jammu & Kashmir Bank. It was further a term of the
agreement between the parties that the said principal
management fee shall be non-refundable even in the event of
termination of the agreement on any account. The table as
per Annexure A is reproduced herein below :
S. No. License Fee+ Cheque Date of Drawer Bank
Service Tax @ No. Cheque
12.36%
1 Rs.5,00,000/- 010775 21.08.2014 SBI
2 Rs.6,23,600/- 255106 09.09.2014 Jammu &
Kashmir
3 Rs.5,61,800/- 255107 05.01.2015 Jammu &
Kashmir
4 Rs.6,74,160/- 255108 05.04.2015 Jammu &
Kashmir
Total Rs.23,59,560/-
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3. Complainant tendered his pre-summoning evidence
on 10.03.2016 by way of affidavit EX PW1/A and relied
upon following documents in his evidence :
Ex PW1/1 : The resolution dated 21.08.2016.
Ex. PW1/2 : The Special Power of Attorney.
Ex. PW1/3 : Copy of agreement.
Ex. PW1/4 : Original Cheque in question.
Ex PW1/5 : Bank Return memo dated 03.07.2015
Ex PW1/5 : Legal notice dated 25.02.2017
Ex PW1/6 : Speed post receipt
Ex PW1/7 : Tracking report.
4. The complainant submitted that the accused had
made payment of the principal management fee by way of
four cheques out of which three were duly presented and
encashed. However the cheque in question towards the
payment of the fourth installment when presented for
encashment was returned dishonoured on account of
insufficient funds and the fourth tranche payment remained
unpaid on account of the said dishonour. The complainant
averred that as per clause 5 of the said agreement, the accused
was liable to pay all the four installments i.e., the tranche
payments to the complainant without failure under all
circumstances on account of being duly earned in view of the
said agreement. It was further contended by the complainant
that the factum of the said dishonour was communicated by
the complainant to the accused but the said communication NITIKA
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was of no avail as the accused failed to make payment of the
fourth installment. Consequently, the complainant was
constrained and thereby served a legal demand notice dated
1st of August 2025 upon the accused which is exhibit PW1/5.
The postal receipt and tracking report of the demand notice is
exhibit PW 1/6 and Pw 1/7 respectively. Since the accused
failed to make payment of the last installment despite due
service of notice, the complainant therefore instituted the
present complaint. The SPA holder of the complainant
examined himself while tendering pre-summoning evidence
and after considering the complaint and the material
available on record, cognizance of the offence u/s 138 of the
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 was taken and summons
were issued by the Court against the accused on 10.03.2016.
APPEARANCE OF ACCUSED AND PROCEEDINGS
5. Since prima facie offence u/s 138 of Negotiable
Instrument Act was made out, the accused was summoned
vide order dated 10.03.2016. Accused entered his appearance
and notice was served upon him for offence punishable u/s
138 NI Act on 17.04.2023, to which he pleaded not guilty
and claimed trial.
6. In his plea of defense, accused has submitted that
they executed an agreement for obtaining the franchise from
the complainant. It is stated that as the land on which the
school was supposed to be constructed, went into a litigation,
therefore neither the school was opened nor the franchise was
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opened. Accused stated that she never used the name of
franchise of the complainant. She stated that she has no
liabilities towards the complainant. The accused expressly
denied the receipt of any legal demand notice from the
complainant.
7. Thereafter, considering the plea of defence raised
and in view of the application filed by the accused under
Sec.145(2), NI Act, the accused was permitted to cross
examine the complainant vide order dated 31.05.2023 by
allowing the said application.
COMPLAINANT’S EVIDENCE
8. The complainant adopted his pre summoning
evidence and placed reliance upon the documents EX CW1/1
to Ex CW1/7. Complainant was cross-examined by Ld.
counsel for accused and was discharged on 23.02.2024 and
complainant’s evidence was closed on even date.
STATEMENT OF ACCUSED AND DEFENCE EVIDENCE
9. All the incriminating evidences and material were put to
the accused and her statement as per Section 313 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure, 1973, (hereinafter referred to as
CrPC) was recorded distinctly to this effect on 19.12.2024.
The accused averred in her statement that the cheque in
question was issued in favour of the complainant in the
nature of a security cheque and not against any existing debt
or liability. It was stated by the accused that since the land
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upon which the proposed school was to be constructed was
lis pendens and hence the school was never opened therefore,
no services of the complainant were availed by the accused
and hence there was no outstanding liability of the accused
towards the cheque in question. The agreement which is Ex
PW1/3 was admitted by the accused. The signatures upon the
cheque in question were also admitted by the accused. The
accused, however, refused the receipt of any legal demand
notice from the complainant. The accused further stated that
a blank signed cheque was issued in favour of the
complainant whereof upon the arising of the aforesaid
dispute with regard to the land on which the proposed school
was to be constructed, the accused had told the complaint to
refrain from presenting the cheque in question for
encashment but the complainant nevertheless went ahead to
present the same and allegedly misused the security cheques
given to it by the accused.
10. Accused chose to lead DE and examined her husband
in her defence as DW1, who was cross-examined and
discharged on 02.05.2025. The defence evidence was closed
vide order dated 02.05.2025.
FINAL ARGUMENTS
11. Final arguments were heard at length on behalf of
both the parties.
LEGAL PROVISION
12. Before weighing the evidences adduced by the
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parties, the statutory provision under consideration is being
recapitulated for understanding the essential ingredients of
an offence under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act,
1881 :
Dishonour of Cheque for insufficiency, etc. of
funds in the account: Where any cheque drawn by
a person on an account maintained by him with a
banker for payment of any amount of money to
another person from out of that account for the
discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other
liability, is returned by the bank unpaid, either
because of the amount of money standing to the
credit of that account is insufficient to honour the
cheque or that it exceeds the amount arranged to
be paid from that account by an agreement made
with that bank, such person shall be deemed to
have committed an offence and shall, without
prejudice to any other provision of this Act, be
punished with imprisonment for a term which may
extend to two years, or with fine which may
extend to twice the amount of the cheque, or with
both. Provided that nothing contained in this
section shall apply unless–
(a) the cheque has been presented to the bank
within a period of six months from the date on
which it is drawn or within the period of its
validity, whichever is earlier;
(b) the payee or the holder in due course of the
cheque, as the case may be, makes a demand for
the payment of the said amount of money by
giving a notice in writing, to the drawer of the
cheque, [within thirty days] of the receipt of
information by him from the bank regarding the
return of the cheque as unpaid; and
(c) the drawer of such cheque fails to make the
payment of the said amount of money to the payee
or as the case may be, to the holder in due course
of the cheque within fifteen days of the receipt of
the said notice.
Explanation.–For the purposes of this section,
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“debt or other liability” means a legally
enforceable debt or other liability.
13. The essential constituent ingredients of an offence
under Section 138 of Negotiable Instrument Act can be
enlisted as follows :
i) Person must have drawn a cheque on an
account maintained by him in a bank for
payment of a certain amount of money to
another person from out of that account;
ii) The cheque should have been issued for
the discharge, in whole or in part, of any
debt or other liability;
iii) That cheque has been presented to the bank
within a period of six months from the date
on which it is drawn or within the period of
its validity whichever is earlier;
iv) That cheque is returned by the bank
unpaid, either because of the amount of
money standing to the credit of the account
is insufficient to honour the cheque or that it
exceeds the amount arranged to be paid
from that account by an agreement made
with the bank;
v) The payee or the holder in due course of
the cheque makes a demand for the payment
of the said amount of money by giving a
notice in writing, to the drawer of the
cheque, within 30 days of the receipt of
information by him from the bank regarding
the return of the cheque as unpaid;
vi) The drawer of such cheque fails to make
payment of the said amount of money to the
payee or the holder in due course of the
cheque within 15 days of the receipt of the
said notice.
POINTS FOR DETERMINATION
14. Upon a thorough and thoughtful consideration of
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the rival submissions made on behalf of both the parties, the
Court has culled out the following points which require
deliberation and discussion in order to put the present
controversy at rest and for an effective adjudication of the lis
at hand:
i. Whether the accused had received any legal demand notice
from the complainant as envisaged by Section 138 of the NI
Act?
ii. Whether there existed any debt or liability of the accused
towards the complainant giving rise to the statutory
presumption as per Section 118 r/w Section 139 of NI Act?
iii. If the answer to question at serial number (ii) is in the
affirmative then whether the accused has succeeded in
raising a plausible defence by way of tilting the
preponderance of probabilities in its favour?
ASSESSMENT OF FACTS AND ANALYSIS
POINT NO.(i) Service of demand notice upon the accused :
15. The accused has vehemently and repeatedly
asserted that the demand notice was never delivered upon it.
The accused has made a categorical assertion to this affect in
it’s plea of defence at the time of framing of Notice under
Section 251 of the CrPC and has also taken the same stance at
the time of deposing the statement as per Section 313 of
CrPC. The complainant has relied upon the postal receipts
and tracking reports for proof of delivery of demand notice
upon the accused which are Ex PW1/6 and Ex PW1/7.
At this stage, it is pertinent to heed to the notable
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observations of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the verdict of
‘C.C. Alavi Haji vs Palapetty Muhammed & Anr on 18 May,
2007′ whereby the Hon’ble Apex Court while referring to
Section 27 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (for short ‘GC
Act‘) has noted that a presumption is to be suitably raised in
favour of due delivery through postal mode where the Notice
has been aptly and accurately addressed to the accused upon
his last known address and that the complainant is liberated
from any further responsibility thereafter. The relevant
extract of ratio is as follows:
” Section 27 gives rise to a presumption that service
of notice has been effected when it is sent to the
correct address by registered post. In view of the
said presumption, when stating that a notice has
been sent by registered post to the address of the
drawer, it is unnecessary to further aver in the
complaint that in spite of the return of the notice
unserved, it is deemed to have been served or that
the addressee is deemed to have knowledge of the
notice. Unless and until the contrary is proved by the
addressee, service of notice is deemed to have been
effected at the time at which the letter would have
been delivered in the ordinary course of business.
This Court has already held that when a notice is
sent by registered post and is returned with a postal
endorsement refused or not available in the house or
house locked or shop closed or addressee not in
station, due service has to be presumed. [Vide
Jagdish Singh Vs. Natthu Singh ; State of M.P. Vs.
Hiralal & Ors. and V.Raja Kumari Vs.
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P.Subbarama Naidu & Anr. ] It is, therefore,
manifest that in view of the presumption available
under Section 27 of the Act, it is not necessary to
aver in the complaint under Section 138 of the Act
that service of notice was evaded by the accused or
that the accused had a role to play in the return of the
notice unserved.
16. In the given factual scenario, it is significant to
note that though the accused has repeatedly averred the non-
delivery of demand notice upon her yet she has failed to
adduce any evidence to rebut the claim of the complainant as
to the due delivery of demand notice. A mere averment at the
time of entering the plea of defence that the demand notice
was never delivered to her which plea has remained
unsubstantiated throughout due to absence of any evidence to
this effect, would be of no avail to the accused as it is by that
very reason insufficient to put a dent in the claim of the
complainant. The husband of the accused Trustee who has
been examined by the accused as DW-1 has admitted the
address on the demand notice as the correct address. The
relevant excerpt of the examination of DW-1 is reproduced
herein below:
“At this stage, the witness is shown the address mentioned
on the legal notice and the witness has confirmed that the
address mentioned in the legal notice is his address. The
witness is also shown the delivery proof Ex.PW1/7 of the
legal notice and the delivery proof confirms that the legal
notice was delivered to Phulwari Sharif.”
17. Since it is admitted that DW1 is the husband of
accused who is representing the Trust, thus the demand
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notice can be concluded to have delivered upon her address.
Although the witness (DW1) has stated that the address
mentioned upon the demand notice is an incomplete address
yet he has failed to corroborate the same by way of any
evidence apart from the mere assertion at the time of
rendering his deposition. Further, it is also crucial to be borne
in mind that the process was also served upon the accused on
the same address as mentioned in the demand notice and the
accused has even entered appearance in furtherance of the
due execution of such processes. Thus, there is no room for
doubt in light of the tracking report alongwith postal receipts
furnished by the complainant that the demand notice was
duly served upon the accused upon the last known address”.
POINT NO.(ii): Existence of a legally enforceable debt or
liability AND POINT NO.(iii) : Whether the accused has
succeeded in raising a plausible defence by way of tilting the
preponderance of probabilities in it’s favour?
18. The issuance of the cheque in question and the
signatures upon the said cheque are an admitted fact from
which the presumption of existence of a legally enforceable
debt or liability can be invoked in favour of the complainant.
However, it is settled legal position of the law relating to
Negotiable Instruments that the said presumption is
rebuttable in nature as opposed to a conclusive one. And the
degree of proof necessitated to be adduced by the accused in
order to rebut the said presumption has also been elucidated
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by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the verdict titled as
Ranagappa v Sri Mohan (2010) 11 SCC 441. 22. It was held
by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the said case that:
“28. In the absence of compelling justifications, reverse onus
clauses usually impose an evidentiary burden and not a
persuasive burden. Keeping this in view, it is a settled
position that when an accused has to rebut the presumption
under Section 139, the standard of proof for doing so is that of
“preponderance of probabilities”. Therefore, if the accused is
able to raise a probable defence which creates doubts about
the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, the
prosecution can fail. As clarified in the citations, the accused
can rely on the materials submitted by the complainant in
order to raise such a defence and it is conceivable that in some
cases the accused may not need to adduce evidence of his/her
own.”
19. It is indubitable and apposite to state that one of
the primary considerations for the invocation of the clutches
of Section 138, NI Act is the existence of a debt or liability,
albeit a legally enforceable debt or liability. The expression
‘legally enforceable debt or liability’ as envisaged under the
explanation appended to Section 138 of the Act is not only an
all-encompassing one in its scope but is also categorical in
nature at the same time. The moot question which arises for
consideration herein is whether the post-dated cheque issued
by the accused for payment of PMF could be considered to
have been issued in discharge of a legally enforceable debt or
liability?
20. The law with regard to the scope and ambit of the
expression ‘legally enforceable debt or liability’ is no longer
res integra. In the celebrated verdict of Hon’ble Supreme
Court, titled as Sampelly Satyanarayana Rao V. Indian
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Renewable Energy Development Agency Limited, it has
been held by the Hon’ble Apex Court that :
” We are of the view that the question whether a post-dated
cheque is for “discharge of debt or liability” depends on the
nature of the transaction. If on the date of the cheque liability
or debt exists or the amount has become legally recoverable,
the Section is attracted and not otherwise. …
… Crucial question to determine applicability of Section
138 of the Act is whether the cheque represents discharge of
existing enforceable debt or liability or whether it represents
advance payment without there being subsisting debt or
liability.”
21. In the given factual scenario, it must be noted that
the cheque in question was issued by way of an advance
payment towards the PMF for the services to be provided by
the complainant to the accused for the setting up of the
purported school and for the allied services connected
thereto. However, the said school could not be set up on
account of pending litigation upon the proposed piece of land
upon which the said school was to be constructed nor were
any services imparted to or availed of by the accused towards
such intended setting up of the school. It is pertinent to note
that the complainant, regardless of the non-establishment of
the purported school, went ahead to encash the other three
cheques issued by the accused as per the Annexure A
appended to the impugned agreement and also went on to
present the fourth impugned cheque in question for
encashment which got dishonoured on account of
insufficiency of funds.
22. The relevant clause of the agreement upon which
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the edifice of the complainant’s case has been built is
extracted herein below:
5 MANAGEMENT FEE & OTHER CONTRIBUTIONS
“51. An amount of Rs. __ as per Annexure attached __ plus
service tax @ 12.36% has been paid as a onetime Principal
Management Fee as per Annexure-A. It is clarified that this
Principal Management Fee is paid by Second Party for the
services provided by First Party in assisting the Second Party
to set up the School and services connected therewith. The
Principal Management Fee is not for use of any trademarks,
logos, slogans of the First Party. This amount is considered
fully earned and shall not be refunded on termination of this
Agreement for whatsoever reason.
5.2 The first Party in lieu of the continuous support and
provision of the System to the Second Party shall charge 8%
(eight percent) plus applicable tax of the “Gross Receipts” of
the School from the Second Party as its Continuous
Management Fee.
5.3 Such Continuous Management Fee fee received before
and including the last day of any particular month shall
become due by the seventh (7th) day of the succeeding
month.
5.4 The Second Party shall not withhold, in any
circumstances, whether for non performance by the First
Party of any of its obligations under this Agreement, or
otherwise, the payment of Continuous Management Fee
accrued to the First Party under this Agreement. All monies
received by the First Party are non-refundable and
considered fully earned.
5.5 Late payment of Continuous Management Fee and other
amount due under this Agreement shall be subject to interest
of 3% per month. No such assessment, or payment thereof,
however, shall relieve the Second Party of any obligation
hereunder, at law or in equity. In the event of such additional
charge not being paid, the First Party may terminate the
Agreement in addition to exercising any other remedies
available to the first Party might have under this Agreement
or by law.
5.6 The second party shall follow the rules and guidelines of
the first party attached in Annexure-B.”
23. A thorough consideration of the terms and clauses
of the impugned Agreement and especially clause 5 of the
agreement puts forth the following facts-
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The Fee which constituted the part of the agreement
was bifurcated into two heads namely, PMF (Principal
Management Fee) and CMF (Continuous
Management Fee)
The present complaint is premised upon the claim
towards the PMF in the form of tranche payments by
way of four installments in terms of Annexure A of the
said agreement.
A meticulous examination of the terms of the said clause 5
including clause 5.1 read with clause 5.4 reveals that the
PMF which constitutes the basis of the claim of the
complainant in the present case was an amount which was to
accrue in favour of the complainant contingent upon the
setting up of the proposed school. The expression “It is
clarified that this Principal Management Fee is paid by
Second Party for the services provided by First Party in
assisting the Second Party to set up the School and services
connected therewith.” used in clause 5.1 of Ex. PW1/3
makes it amply and abundantly clear that the fee in the form
of Principal Management Fee was an amount contingent to
accrue in favour of the complainant in furtherance of the
process of setting up of the proposed school and specifically
for the services which were supposedly to be rendered
towards the said setting up. It is to be expressly noted at this
stage that it is an undisputed fact that the proposed school
never saw light of the day as the land upon which it was
scheduled to be situated ended up being lis pendens.
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24. Further, there is nothing on record to reflect or
establish the fact as to what services were in fact provided by
the complainant towards the process of setting-up as alleged.
In addition, it is significant to note that it has been
unequivocally admitted by the AR for the complainant in his
deposition during cross-examination that no services or
apparatus were ever advanced to the accused apart from a
mere training course to the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of
the trust. The relevant excerpt of the cross-examination is
extracted herein below:
“We had given our name, location rights and training and
knowledge to open the school to the trust run by Anju Singh.
The name of the trust is Anju Sethiya & Sons Trust. We had
provided the training to two people in Delhi who are the
chairman and vice chairman of the trust. Vice chairman of
the Trust is Mrs. Anju Singh herself and the position of the
chairman is held by her husband. I do not remember the
exact duration of the training. I was not present when the
training was imparted. Vol. The training is imparted by the
Training Team. It is correct the we have not supplied any
equipment to the trust.”
25. Thus, it can be sufficiently surmised that no
services towards the setting up of the school nor any allied
services for that purpose were rendered by the complainant
to the accused barring the aforesaid training. And so far as
the recompense for the said training is to be considered, the
three cheques which have been encashed by the complainant
in accordance with Annexure A can be taken to have covered
the expenses incurred towards the same, and especially in
light of the fact that no computation of the costs incurred
towards the imparting of the abovesaid training have been
furnished on record by the complainant to quantify the exact
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CC No. 14107/2016 Page No. 18 of 20 NITIKA
Date: 2025.07.21
16:47:51 +0530
amount. On the basis of the above discussion it is evidently
clear that the presumption in the present case under section
139 of the Act has been adequately rebutted as the accused
has been able to establish a probable defence i.e., by showing
the prevalence of preponderance of probabilities in its
favour. Therefore, it can be effectively concluded that there
was an absence of an existing debt or liability of the accused
towards the complainant both at the time of the drawal of the
cheque as well as on date mentioned upon the cheque. In fact,
the cheque in question was in essence issued as an advance
payment towards the Principal Management Fee (PMF)
which was to eventually accrue in favour of the complainant
as and when the process of setting up of the purported school
would have commenced.
26. Thus, there is no scope of doubt as to the dent
which the accused has been able to create in the case of the
complainant in the form of raising preponderance of
probabilities in its favour by establishing the conspicuous
absence of a legal debt or liability upon the accused towards
the complainant.
CONCLUSION
27. From the above discussion, it is concluded that the
accused has raised a probable defence and has sufficiently
established the preponderance of probabilities in its favour
by showing that there was absence of an existing debt or
liability with regard to the cheque in question. Thus, the
primary ingredient as envisaged under Section 138
Negotiable Act, 1881 has remained disproved. NITIKA
Digitally signed
by NITIKA
CC No. 14107/2016 Page No. 19 of 20 Date: 2025.07.21
16:47:59 +0530
Consequently, this Court finds the accused Anju Satish &
Sons Trust, through its Trustee Mrs. Anju Singh not guilty of
the offence under Section 138, Negotiable Instruments Act,
1881 and thereby acquits the accused of all charges under
section 138, Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.
28. Bail bonds already furnished are extended for six
months U/s 437A Cr. PC 1973/481 BNSS, 2023 with
direction to appear before Ld. Appellate Court as and when
notice of appeal is received.
File be consigned to record room after due
compliance.
Announced in open court on 21.07.2025
(Nitika)
JMFC (NI Act) /North West
Rohini/Delhi
NITIKA
It is certified that this judgment contains twenty pages and Digitally signed
by NITIKA
each page bears my signatures. Date:
2025.07.21
16:48:14 +0530(Nitika)
JMFC (NI Act) /North West
Rohini/DelhiCC No. 14107/2016 Page No. 20 of 20
