Sheetal Dass And Others vs Of on 25 February, 2026

Himachal Pradesh High Court

Sheetal Dass And Others vs Of on 25 February, 2026

                                          1
                                                                                ( 2026:HHC:4185 )



         IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA

                                          Cr.M.M.O. No. 62 of 2026
                                          Reserved on: 09.01.2026.




                                                                         .

                                          Decided on: 25.02.2026


    Sheetal Dass and others                                      ....... Petitioners





                                  Versus




                                                of
    Union of India                                               ......Respondent

    Coram
                         rt
    The Hon'ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.

    Whether approved for reporting?1 No

    For the Petitioners:                  Ms Shalini Thakur, Advocate.

    For the Respondent:                   Mr     Balram    Sharma,      Deputy


                                          Solicitor General of India, with
                                          Mr Rajeev Sharma, Advocate.




    Rakesh Kainthla, Judge

The petitioners have filed the present petition for

quashing of complaint No.3 of 2023, titled Union of India versus

M/s Symbiosis Pharmaceuticals, summoning order dated

06.09.2025 and consequential proceedings pending before

learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Nalagarh, District

Solan, H.P (learned Trial Court). (Parties shall hereinafter be

referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the

learned Trial Court for convenience.)
1
Whether the reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the Judgment?Yes

::: Downloaded on – 25/02/2026 20:32:28 :::CIS
2
( 2026:HHC:4185 )

2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present

petition are that the complainant, Drugs Inspector, Central

Drugs Standard Control Organization (CDSCO), Zonal Office,

.

Baddi filed a complaint against the accused for violation of

Sections, 16, 18(a)(i), 18 (a)(vi), 18 (B), 18(C), 32 & 34 of Drugs

and Cosmetics Act, 1940 (in short, ‘Drugs Act‘) read with Rule

84(E), Rules 69-A, 70-A and 74-B read with paragraph 16.10,

of
and 26 of Schedule M of the Drugs Rules, 1945 punishable
rt
under Sections 28(A) and 27(d) of the Drugs Act. It was asserted

that the complainant drew the samples of drugs including

Vemifol Plus capsules manufactured by M/s Symbiosis

Pharmaceuticals Pvt. Ltd. at Trilokpur Road, Kala Amb,

Himachal Pradesh and marketed by M/s Vivex Pharmaceuticals,

Pvt, Ltd, Mohali, from Mr. Sunil Kumar, Proprietor of the firm

M/s Ranveer Medical Agency, Near Bus Stand, Baddi, Solan, for

analysis. The samples were sent to the laboratory after

completing the formalities. The report of analysis issued by the

laboratory mentioned that the sample was not of standard

quality, as the samples did not conform the claim as per the

patent and proprietary in respect of the “Assay of Alpha Lipoic

Acid” (result obtained as 59.91%, whereas the limit is not less

than 90%). The reports of analysis were sent to Sunil Kumar,

::: Downloaded on – 25/02/2026 20:32:28 :::CIS
3
( 2026:HHC:4185 )

and he was asked to disclose the source of procurement of the

drugs. He disclosed that he had procured the drugs from M/s

Sahil Enterprises, Mohali and M/s Vivex Pharmaceuticals,

.

Mohali. The reports were also sent to Sahil Enterprises and

Vivex Enterprises. They were also asked to disclose the source

of procurement of drugs. They disclosed that the drugs were

procured from M/s Symbiosis Pharmaceuticals. The report was

of
sent to M/s Symbiosis Pharmaceuticals. It was observed that the
rt
firm had not performed the process validation for the products

and had not performed the stability study for Vemifol plus, and

in this manner, violated the condition of the licence. The firm

showed its willingness to challenge the sample, and the sample

was sent to the Director, Central Drugs Testing Laboratory,

Kolkata (CDTL). A report was issued by CDTL, Kolkata, that the

sample did not conform to the manufacturer’s specification

with respect to “Assay of Alpha Lipoic Acid” (result reported as

74.081% of the claim while the limit is 90% to 110% of the

claim). Hence, the complainant filed a complaint before the

Court to take action against the accused.

3. The learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to

summon the accused.

::: Downloaded on – 25/02/2026 20:32:28 :::CIS
4

( 2026:HHC:4185 )

4. Being aggrieved by the filing of the complaint and

summoning the accused, the accused/petitioners have filed the

present petition asserting that they were arrayed because of

.

their designation as active Directors. There is no evidence that

they were in charge or responsible for the conduct of the

company at the relevant time, which is a requirement under

Section 34 of the Drugs Act. No specific role, control,

of
knowledge, supervision or responsibility was attributed to any
rt
of the accused. The complaint describes the sampling process,

testing, chain of custody and correspondence, which does not

concern the petitioners. The Directors cannot be prosecuted

simply because of their position in the company. The drug was

manufactured under a valid licence. The summoning order is

non-speaking and mechanical. Therefore, it was prayed that the

present petition be allowed and the complaint and the

proceedings pending before the learned Trial Court be set-

aside.

5. I have heard Ms Shalini Thakur, learned counsel for

the petitioners/accused, and Mr Balram Sharma, learned

Deputy Solicitor General of India, assisted by Mr Rajeev

Sharma, learned counsel for the respondent.

::: Downloaded on – 25/02/2026 20:32:28 :::CIS
5

( 2026:HHC:4185 )

6. Ms Shalini Thakur, learned counsel for the

petitioners/accused, submitted that the complaint does not

mention the specific role of the petitioners/accused. The

.

petitioners/ accused have been described as the active Directors,

which is not sufficient, and it was required to be asserted that

they were in charge and responsible for the company for its

affairs. The petitioners/ accused could not have been

of
summoned in the absence of the requisite averments; therefore,
rt
she prayed that the present petition be allowed, the complaint

and the proceedings pending before the learned Trial Court be

quashed. She relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme

Court in Shailyamanyu Singh versus State of Maharashtra, 2025

INSC 995 and judgment of this Court in M/s Symbiosis

Pharmaceuticals versus Union of India, 2025: HHC: 7724, in

support of her submissions.

7. Mr. Balram Sharma, learned Deputy Solicitor

General of India for the respondents, submitted that necessary

averments have been made in the complaint. The truthfulness

of allegations made in the complaint is not to be seen at this

stage. The matter is pending before the learned Trial Court,

which should be left to adjudicate it; therefore, he prayed that

the present petition be dismissed.

::: Downloaded on – 25/02/2026 20:32:28 :::CIS
6

( 2026:HHC:4185 )

8. I have given considerable thought to the

submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records

carefully.

.

9. The law relating to quashing of criminal cases was

explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in B.N. John v. State of

U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 7 as under: –

of
“7. As far as the quashing of criminal cases is concerned,
it is now more or less well settled as regards the
principles to be applied by the court. In this regard, one
may refer to the decision of this Court in State of
rt
Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335,
wherein this Court has summarised some of the

principles under which FIR/complaints/criminal cases
could be quashed in the following words:

“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the

various relevant provisions of the Code under
Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated
by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the
exercise of the extraordinary power under Article

226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of

the Code which we have extracted and reproduced
above, we give the following categories of cases by
way of illustration wherein such power could be

exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of
any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice,
though it may not be possible to lay down any
precise, clearly defined and sufficiently
channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid
formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad
kinds of cases wherein such power should be
exercised.

(1) Where the allegations made in the first
information report or the complaint, even if
they are taken at their face value and accepted

::: Downloaded on – 25/02/2026 20:32:28 :::CIS
7
( 2026:HHC:4185 )

in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute
any offence or make out a case against the
accused.

(2) Where the allegations in the first
information report and other materials, if any,

.

accompanying the FIR do not disclose a

cognizable offence, justifying an investigation
by police officers under Section 156(1) of the

Code except under an order of a Magistrate
within the purview of Section 155(2) of the
Code.

of
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made
in the FIR or complaint and the evidence
collected in support of the same do not disclose
the commission of any offence and make out a
rt
case against the accused.

(4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not

constitute a cognizable offence but constitute
only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation
is permitted by a police officer without an order

of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section
155(2) of the Code.

(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or

complaint are so absurd and inherently
improbable on the basis of which no prudent

person can ever reach a just conclusion that
there is sufficient ground for proceeding
against the accused.

(6) Where there is an express legal bar
engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code
or the concerned Act (under which a criminal
proceeding is instituted) to the institution and
continuance of the proceedings, and/or where
there is a specific provision in the Code or the
concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for
the grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly
attended with mala fide and/or where the
proceeding is maliciously instituted with an

::: Downloaded on – 25/02/2026 20:32:28 :::CIS
8
( 2026:HHC:4185 )

ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the
accused and with a view to spite him due to a
private and personal grudge.” (emphasis
added)

8. Of the aforesaid criteria, clause no. (1), (4) and (6)

.

would be of relevance to us in this case.

In clause (1), it has been mentioned that where the
allegations made in the first information report or the

complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and
accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute
any offence or make out a case against the accused, then

of
the FIR or the complaint can be quashed.
As per clause (4), where the allegations in the FIR do not
constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a
non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by
rt
a police officer without an order dated by the Magistrate
as contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the CrPC, and in

such a situation, the FIR can be quashed.
Similarly, as provided under clause (6), if there is an
express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the

CrPC or the concerned Act under which the criminal
proceedings are instituted, such proceedings can be
quashed.”

10. This position was reiterated in Ajay Malik v. State of

Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 185, wherein it was observed:

“8. It is well established that a High Court, in exercising
its extraordinary powers under Section 482 of the CrPC,
may issue orders to prevent the abuse of court processes
or to secure the ends of justice. These inherent powers
are neither controlled nor limited by any other statutory
provision. However, given the broad and profound nature
of this authority, the High Court must exercise it
sparingly. The conditions for invoking such powers are
embedded within Section 482 of the CrPC itself, allowing
the High Court to act only in cases of clear abuse of
process or where intervention is essential to uphold the
ends of justice.

::: Downloaded on – 25/02/2026 20:32:28 :::CIS
9

( 2026:HHC:4185 )

9. It is in this backdrop that this Court, over the course of
several decades, has laid down the principles and
guidelines that High Courts must follow before quashing
criminal proceedings at the threshold, thereby pre-
empting the Prosecution from building its case before the

.

Trial Court. The grounds for quashing, inter alia,

contemplate the following situations : (i) the criminal
complaint has been filed with mala fides; (ii) the FIR
represents an abuse of the legal process; ( iii) no prima

facie offence is made out; (iv) the dispute is civil in
nature; (v.) the complaint contains vague and omnibus
allegations; and (vi) the parties are willing to settle and

of
compound the dispute amicably ( State of Haryana v.
Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335).

11. A similar view was taken in Rajendra Bihari Lal v.

rt
State of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2265, wherein it was

observed:

“70. The aforesaid decisions of this Court make it clear

that where the High Court is satisfied that the process of
any court is being abused or likely to be abused or that
the ends of justice would not be secured, it is not only

empowered but also obligated under the law to exercise
its inherent powers. The provision does not confer any

new power on the High Court but rather saves the power
which the High Court already possesses, from before the
enactment of the legislation, by reason of its very

existence. In exercise of its power, it would be legitimate
for the High Court to quash any criminal proceedings if
the High Court finds that the initiation or continuation of
it may lead to abuse of process of court, and quashing of
the proceedings would serve the ends of justice.”

12. The present petition is to be decided as per the

parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

::: Downloaded on – 25/02/2026 20:32:28 :::CIS
10

( 2026:HHC:4185 )

13. Section 34 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act reads as
under: –

34. Offences by companies.–(1) Where an offence under
this Act has been committed by a company, every person

.

who at the time the offence was committed, was in

charge of, and was responsible to the company for the
conduct of the business of the company, as well as the
company shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and

shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished ac-
cordingly:

of
Provided that nothing contained in this sub-section shall
render any such person liable to any punishment pro-
vided in this Act if he proves that the offence was com-
mitted without his knowledge or that he exercised all due
rt
diligence to prevent the commission of such offence.

14. It is apparent from the bare perusal of the Section

that a company is primarily liable for the commission of an

offence punishable under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act.

Vicarious liability has been fastened upon a person who, at the

time of the offence, was in charge of and responsible to the

company for the conduct of its business. It was laid down by the

Hon’ble Supreme Court in Susela Padmavathi Amma versus M/s

Bharti Airtel Limited, 2024 INSC 206 that a person cannot be

made liable unless, at the material time, he was not only in

charge of but was also responsible to the company for the

conduct of its business. It was observed:-

18. In the case of State of Haryana v. Brij Lal Mitta (1998)
5 SCC 343, this Court observed thus:

::: Downloaded on – 25/02/2026 20:32:28 :::CIS
11

( 2026:HHC:4185 )

“8. Nonetheless, we find that the impugned
judgment of the High Court has got to be upheld
for an altogether different reason. Admittedly,
the three respondents were being prosecuted as
directors of the manufacturers with the aid of

.

Section 34(1) of the Act, which reads as under:

“34. Offences by companies.–(1) Where an
offence under this Act has been committed

by a company, every person who at the time
the offence was committed, was in charge of,
and was responsible to the company for the

of
conduct of the business of the company, as
well as the company shall be deemed to be
guilty of the offence and shall be liable to be
rtproceeded against and punished accordingly:

Provided that nothing contained in this
sub-section shall render any such person

liable to any punishment provided in this
Act if he proves that the offence was com-
mitted without his knowledge or that he
exercised all due diligence to prevent the

commission of such offence.”

It is thus seen that the vicarious liability of a

person for being prosecuted for an offence com-
mitted under the Act by a company arises if, at

the material time, he was in charge of and was
also responsible to the company for the conduct
of its business. Simply because a person is a di-

rector of the company, it does not necessarily
mean that he fulfils both the above require-
ments so as to make him liable. Conversely,
without being a director, a person can be in
charge of and responsible to the company for
the conduct of its business. From the complaint
in question, we, however, find that except for a
bald statement that the respondents were direc-
tors of the manufacturers, there is no other al-
legation to indicate, even prima facie, that they
were in charge of the company and also respon-

::: Downloaded on – 25/02/2026 20:32:28 :::CIS
12

( 2026:HHC:4185 )

sible to the company for the conduct of its busi-
ness.”

19. It could thus be seen that this Court had held that
simply because a person is a director of the company, it
does not necessarily mean that he fulfils the twin re-

.

quirements of Section 34(1) of the said Act to make him
liable. It has been held that a person cannot be made li-
able unless, at the material time, he was in charge of and

was also responsible to the company for the conduct of
its business.

20. In the case of S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals Ltd. (supra),

of
this Court was considering the question as to whether it
was sufficient to make the person liable for being a direc-
tor of a company under Section 141 of the Negotiable In-
struments Act, 1881. This Court considered the definition
rt
of the word “director” as defined in Section 2(13) of the
Companies Act, 1956. This Court observed thus:

“8. ……. There is nothing which suggests that
simply by being a director in a company, one is
supposed to discharge particular functions on

behalf of a company. It happens that a person
may be a director in a company, but he may not
know anything about the day-to-day function-

ing of the company. As a director, he may be at-
tending meetings of the Board of Directors of

the company, where usually they decide policy
matters and guide the course of business of a
company. It may be that a Board of Directors

may appoint sub-committees consisting of one
or two directors out of the Board of the com-
pany, who may be made responsible for the
day-to-day functions of the company. These are
matters which form part of the resolutions of
the Board of Directors of a company. Nothing is
oral. What emerges from this is that the role of a
director in a company is a question of fact, de-
pending on the peculiar facts in each case. There
is no universal rule that a director of a company
is in charge of its everyday affairs. We have dis-

::: Downloaded on – 25/02/2026 20:32:28 :::CIS
13

( 2026:HHC:4185 )

cussed about the position of a director in a com-
pany in order to illustrate the point that there is
no magic as such in a particular word, be it di-
rector, manager or secretary. It all depends
upon the respective roles assigned to the offi-

.

cers in a company. …..”

21. It was held that merely because a person is a director
of a company, it is not necessary that he is aware of the

day-to-day functioning of the company. This Court held
that there is no universal rule that a director of a com-
pany is in charge of its everyday affairs. It was, therefore,

of
necessary to aver how the director of the company was in
charge of the day-to-day affairs of the company or re-
sponsible to the affairs of the company. This Court, how-
ever, clarified that the position of a managing director or
rt
a joint managing director in a company may be different.
This Court further held that these persons, as the desig-

nation of their office suggests, are in charge of a com-
pany and are responsible for the conduct of the business
of the company. To escape liability, they will have to
prove that when the offence was committed, they had no

knowledge of the offence or that they exercised all due
diligence to prevent the commission of the offence.

22. In the case of Pooja Ravinder Devidasani v. State of

Maharashtra (2014) 16 SCC 1, this Court observed thus:

“17. …… Every person connected with the Com-
pany will not fall into the ambit of the provision.
Time and again, it has been asserted by this

Court that only those persons who were in
charge of and responsible for the conduct of the
business of the Company at the time of the
commission of an offence will be liable for
criminal action. A Director, who was not in
charge of and was not responsible for the con-
duct of the business of the Company at the rele-
vant time, will not be liable for an offence under
Section 141 of the NI Act. In National Small In-
dustries Corpn. [National Small Industries
Corpn. Ltd. v. Harmeet Singh Paintal, (2010) 3

::: Downloaded on – 25/02/2026 20:32:28 :::CIS
14
( 2026:HHC:4185 )

SCC 330 : (2010) 1 SCC (Civ) 677: (2010) 2 SCC
(Cri) 1113] this Court observed : (SCC p. 336,
paras 13-14)

“13. Section 141 is a penal provision creating
vicarious liability, and which, as per settled

.

law, must be strictly construed. It is there-
fore not sufficient to make a bald, cursory
statement in a complaint that the Director

(arrayed as an accused) is in charge of and
responsible to the company for the conduct
of the business of the company without any-

of
thing more as to the role of the Director. But
the complaint should spell out as to how and
in what manner Respondent 1 was in charge
rtof or was responsible to the accused Com-
pany for the conduct of its business. This is
in consonance with the strict interpretation

of penal statutes, especially where such
statutes create vicarious liability.

14. A company may have a number of Direc-
tors, and to make any or all the Directors as

accused in a complaint merely on the basis of
a statement that they are in charge of and re-
sponsible for the conduct of the business of

the company without anything more is not a
sufficient or adequate fulfilment of the re-

quirements under Section 141.”(emphasis in
original)

18. In Girdhari Lal Gupta v. D.H. Mehta [Girdhari
Lal Gupta v. D.H. Mehta, (1971) 3 SCC 189: 1971
SCC (Cri) 279: AIR 1971 SC 2162], this Court ob-
served that a person “in charge of a business”

means that the person should be in overall con-
trol of the day-to-day business of the Company.

19. A Director of a company is liable to be con-
victed for an offence committed by the company
if he/she was in charge of and was responsible
to the company for the conduct of its business
or if it is proved that the offence was committed

::: Downloaded on – 25/02/2026 20:32:28 :::CIS
15
( 2026:HHC:4185 )

with the consent or connivance of, or was at-
tributable to any negligence on the part of the
Director concerned (see State of Karnataka v.
Pratap Chand [State of Karnataka v. Pratap
Chand, (1981) 2 SCC 335: 1981 SCC (Cri) 453] ).

.

20. In other words, the law laid down by this
Court is that for making a Director of a company
liable for the offences committed by the com-

pany under Section 141 of the NI Act, there must
be specific averments against the Director
showing as to how and in what manner the Di-

of
rector was responsible for the conduct of the
business of the company.

21. In Sabitha Ramamurthy v. R.B.S.
Channabasavaradhya [Sabitha Ramamurthy v.
rt
R.B.S. Channabasavaradhya, (2006) 10 SCC 581
(2007) 1 SCC (Cri) 621], it was held by this Court

that : (SCC pp. 584-85, para 7)

“7. … It is not necessary for the complainant
to specifically reproduce the wordings of the

section, but what is required is a clear state-
ment of fact so as to enable the court to ar-
rive at a prima facie opinion that the accused

is vicariously liable. Section 141 raises a legal
fiction. By reason of the said provision, a

person although is not personally liable for
the commission of such an offence would be
vicariously liable therefor. Such vicarious li-

ability can be inferred so far as a company
registered or incorporated under the Compa-
nies Act, 1956 is concerned only if the requi-
site statements, which are required to be
averred in the complaint petition, are made
so as to make the accused therein vicariously
liable for the offence committed by the com-
pany.” (emphasis supplied)

By verbatim reproducing the words of the sec-
tion without a clear statement of fact supported
by proper evidence, so as to make the accused

::: Downloaded on – 25/02/2026 20:32:28 :::CIS
16
( 2026:HHC:4185 )

vicariously liable, is a ground for quashing pro-
ceedings initiated against such person under
Section 141 of the NI Act.”

23. It could thus clearly be seen that this Court has held
that merely reproducing the words of the section without

.

a clear statement of fact as to how and in what manner a
director of the company was responsible for the conduct
of the business of the company, would not ipso facto

make the director vicariously liable.

24. A similar view has previously been taken by this Court
in the case of K.K. Ahuja v. V.K. Vora (2009) 10 SCC 48.

of

25. In the case of State of NCT of Delhi through Prosecut-
ing Officer, Insecticides, Government of NCT, Delhi v.
Rajiv Khurana (2010) 11 SCC 469, this Court reiterated the
rt
position thus:

“17. The ratio of all these cases is that the com-

plainant is required to state in the complaint
how a Director who is sought to be made an ac-
cused was in charge of the business of the com-
pany or responsible for the conduct of the com-

pany’s business. Every Director need not be and
is not in charge of the business of the company.
If that is the position with regard to a Director,

it is needless to emphasise that in the case of
non-Director officers, it is all the more neces-

sary to state what were his duties and responsi-
bilities in the conduct of business of the com-

pany and how and in what manner he is respon-
sible or liable.”

26. In the case of Ashoke Mal Bafna (supra), this Court
observed thus:

“9. To fasten vicarious liability under Section
141 of the Act on a person, the law is well settled
by this Court in a catena of cases that the com-
plainant should specifically show as to how and
in what manner the accused was responsible.
Simply because a person is a Director of a de-
faulter Company, does not make him liable un-

::: Downloaded on – 25/02/2026 20:32:28 :::CIS
17
( 2026:HHC:4185 )

der the Act. Time and again, it has been asserted
by this Court that only the person who was at
the helm of affairs of the Company and in
charge of and responsible for the conduct of the
business at the time of commission of an of-

.

fence will be liable for criminal action. (See

Pooja Ravinder Devidasani v. State of Maha-
rashtra [Pooja Ravinder Devidasaniv. State of
Maharashtra, (2014) 16 SCC 1 : (2015) 3 SCC

(Civ) 384 : (2015) 3 SCC (Cri) 378: AIR 2015 SC
675].)

of

10. In other words, the law laid down by this
Court is that for making a Director of a Company
liable for the offences committed by the Com-

rt pany under Section 141 of the Act, there must be
specific averments against the Director showing
as to how and in what manner the Director was

responsible for the conduct of the business of
the Company.”

27. A similar view has been taken by this Court in the case
of Lalankumar Singh v. State of Maharashtra 2022 SCC

OnLine SC 1383, to which one of us (B.R. Gavai, J.) was a
party.

15. A similar view was taken in Shailyamanyu Singh v.

State of Maharashtra, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1740 , wherein it was

observed:-

21. A holistic reading of the language of Sections 34(1)
and 34(2) of the D&C Act would make it clear that every
person who is in charge of the day-to-day affairs of the
company would be liable to face prosecution under the
Act. The Director or Directors, other than the one who is
in charge of the day-to-day affairs of the company, can
also be prosecuted ‘where it is proved’ that the offence
has been committed with the consent, connivance or is
attributable to any neglect on the part of such Director.

::: Downloaded on – 25/02/2026 20:32:28 :::CIS
18

( 2026:HHC:4185 )

22. No doubt, at the stage of taking cognisance, the
standard of proof required would be much lower than
that required at the stage of final decision of a criminal
case. Nevertheless, there definitely has to exist a prima
facie allegation in the complaint which can satisfy the

.

Court regarding the consent, connivance or attributable

neglect on the part of the Director who is sought to be
prosecuted by taking recourse to the concept of vicarious
liability as provided under Section 34(2) of the D&C Act.

23. This Court in the case of Dayle De’Souza v. Union
of India (2021) 20 SCC 135 , while relying upon an earlier

of
judgment in National Small Industries Corporation
Limited v. Harmeet Singh Paintal (2010) 3 SCC 330 held
that the primary responsibility is upon the complainant
to make specific averments in the complaint so as to
rt
make the accused vicariously liable for the offence
committed by the company. While fastening the criminal

liability, there is no presumption that every Director
knows about the transactions of the company. Criminal
liability can be fastened only upon those directors or
persons who, at the time of the commission of the

offence, were in charge of and were responsible for the
day-to-day business of the company.

16. Thus, the complainant needs to aver in the

complaint that the person sought to be held vicariously liable is

in charge and responsible to the company for its affairs.

17. In the present case. The complainant asserted in

para 17, 17(ii), 17(vi) & 17(v) as under: –

“17. That, after completing all the scrutiny,
investigation and correspondence under the said Act,
the complainant has found that accused No.: 1 to 9
alongwith the Role(s) and responsibility are being the
Manufacturing Firm- the site where the impugned
product/batch was manufactured; the Managing
Director & other Director(s) of the firm(s) ( including

::: Downloaded on – 25/02/2026 20:32:28 :::CIS
19
( 2026:HHC:4185 )

the Marketing firm) as Direct Beneficiary- as in charge
of the firm to conduct the day to day basis business/
production(s), controlling/supervise the technical &
other staffs etc. and was involved for overall business
activities through the Company/ manufacturing/

.

Marketing firm at that time when the impugned product

was manufactured for sale & distribution across the
country; and also the Approved Competent Persons, who
had involved as active participants and manufactured &

tested the impugned drug in question which has been
declared as not of standard quality, hence, are liable for
punishment for the offences committed under the said

of
Act. The details for the accused No. 1 to 9 are as follows:

xxxxxx
II. Mr Jagbir Singh, Active Director, (Mobile No.:

rt
9812810325) of the form situated at: M/s Symbiosis
Pharmaceuticals Pvt. Ltd., (Plant 3), C/o Ovation

Remedies Situated at Trilokpur Road, Kala Amb, District
Sirmour-173030, Himachal Pradesh. (Mr Jagbir Singh is
the Active/Managing Director of the firm and registered
with the Ministry of Corporate Affairs, Government of

India, having DIN/PAN No.: 00821561. Further, he has
issued the Authority Letter to Mrs Sneha Sharma w/o Sh.
Anil to represent the Hon’ble CJM Court. Also, refer to

the constitution details on the copy of licenses as on
Form 25-A and Form 28-A issued by the State Licensing

Authority on 22.06.2016 and the same is retained up to
21st June, 2026 vide retention letter no.: HFW-N

(ADC)2016-1366 dated 26th July, 2021. The copy of the
Authority Letter issued to Mrs Sneha Sharma and the
copy of Licenses on Form 25-A & Form 28-A alongwith
retention letter, are enclosed herewith as (Annexure P-

15) for the perusal of this Hon’ble Court.

xxxx
VI. Mr Satish Kumar Singh, s/o Akchhaybar Singh,
Krishana Nagar Colony, Roorkee, Haridwar,
Uttarakhand-247667 (approved/Competent person
responsible as Manufacturing Chemist). The name &
Signature of Mr Satish Kumar is as mentioned on the

::: Downloaded on – 25/02/2026 20:32:28 :::CIS
20
( 2026:HHC:4185 )

“Batch Manufacturing Record” (BMR) of the impugned
product vides BMR Format No.QR/QA/012/00/F2 issued
on 25th February 2022 for the impugned Batch No.: SOC-
1911A and the manufacturing stared on 28 th February
2022. The copy of the aforesaid BMR is enclosed

.

herewith as (Annexure P-18) for the perusal of this

Hon’ble Court.

xxxxxx

V) Mr Harnek Singh, Active Director (DIN/PIN)
No.09141882) of the firm situated at: M/s Symbiosis
Pharmaceuticals Pvt. Ltd. (Plant 3), C/o Ovation

of
Remedies situated at Trilokpur Road, Kala Amb, District
Sirmour-173030, Himachal Pradesh. Mr Harnek Singh is
the Active Director registered also with the Ministry of
Corporate Affairs, Government of India, having DIN/PAN
rt
No.09141882. The copy of company information,
including the Bank and all active Directors, including Mr

Harnek Singh, is enclosed herewith as (Annexure P-17)
for the perusal of this Hon’ble Court.”

18. Para-17 of the complaint specifically mentioned that

the accused are in charge of the firm to conduct day to day basis

business/production, controlling and supervising the technical

and other staff and were involved in overall business activities

through the company. The specific words that they were

responsible for the firm are missing, but the averments that

they were involved in overall business activities and were

controlling/supervising the technical and other staff show that

they were responsible to the company for its affairs as the

company was acting through them at the relevant time.

Therefore, the submission that the requirements are lacking

::: Downloaded on – 25/02/2026 20:32:28 :::CIS
21
( 2026:HHC:4185 )

and the learned Trial Court erred in summoning the accused

cannot be accepted.

19. It was submitted that the summoning order is bad

.

because it does not show the application of mind by the learned

Magistrate, however, the summoning order has not been placed

on record and only copy of summons (Annexure P-2) has been

of
filed; therefore, in absence of the summoning order, it cannot

be said that the summoning order was passed without the
rt
application of the mind.

20. No other point was urged.

22. In view of the above, the present petition fails, and

the same is dismissed.

21. The observation made herein before shall remain

confined to the disposal of the petition and will have no bearing,

whatsoever, on the merits of the case.

(Rakesh Kainthla)
Judge
25 February, 2026
(Yogesh)

::: Downloaded on – 25/02/2026 20:32:28 :::CIS