Andhra Pradesh High Court – Amravati
Shaik Chand Basha vs The State Of Andhra Pradesh on 16 March, 2026
APHC010437482025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
AT AMARAVATI [3521]
(Special Original Jurisdiction)
MONDAY,THE SIXTEENTH DAY OF MARCH
TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY SIX
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE DR JUSTICE Y. LAKSHMANA RAO
WRIT PETITION NO: 22212/2025
Between:
1. SHAIK CHAND BASHA, S/O.SHAIK MABU SAB, AGED ABOUT 64
YEARS, OCC CULTIVATION, R/O.REDDYVARIPALLI VILLAGE AND
POST, KASPA, T.SUNDUPALLIMANDAL, ANNAMAYYA DISTRICT.
2. SHAIK SHAMEEM,, W/O.CHAND BASHA, AGED ABOUT 54 YEARS,
OCC HOUSEWIFE, R/O.REDDYVARIPALLI VILLAGE AND POST,
KASPA, T.SUNDUPALLIMANDAL, ANNAMAYYA DISTRICT.
...PETITIONER(S)
AND
1. THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH, REP. ITS PRINCIPAL
SECRETARY, HOME DEPARTMENT, A.P. SECRETARIAT,
VELAGAPUDI, AMARAVATI, GUNTUR DISTRICT.
2. THE SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE, RAYACHOTY, ANNAMAYYA
DISTRICT.
3. THE DEPUTY SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE, RAYACHOTY,
ANNAMAYYA DISTRICT.
4. THE CIRCLE INSPECTOR OF POLICE, RAYACHOTY RURAL
POLICE STATION, ANNAMAYYA DISTRICT.
5. THE SUBINSPECTOR OF POLICE, T.SUNDUPALLI POLICE
STATION, ANNAMAYYA DISTRICT.
6. SOMALRAJU ESWARAMMA, W/O.RAMA RAJU, AGED ABOUT 58
YEARS, R/O.ETIGADDARACHAPALLI,T.SUNDUPALLI VILLAGE AND
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MANDAL, YSR KADAPA DSITRICT.
7. SHAIK FARIDABI, W/O. SHAIK KHADAR VALI, AGED ABOUT 46
YEARS, R/O.T.SUNDUPALLI VILLAGE POST AND MANDAL, YSR
KADAPA DISTRICT.
...RESPONDENT(S):
Counsel for the Petitioner(S):
SHAIK ALTAF
Counsel for the Respondent(S):
1. GP FOR HOME
2. PHANI TEJA CHERUVU
The Court made the following:
ORDER:
The Writ Petition has been filed under Article 226 of the Constitution
of India seeking the following relief:-
“…to issue a Wirt of Mandamus or any other appropriate Writ or
Order or Direction declaring the order dated 02 06 2024 passed by
the 5th respondent as illegal arbitrary unconstitutional and
consequently direct the 5th respondent to grant Police Aid for
effective implementation of the decrees passed by the learned
Principal Junior Civil Judge Rayachoty in O S No 17 of 2012 and O S
No 16 of 2013 by setting aside the order dated 02 06 2024 passed by
the 5th respondent and pass ….”
2. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioners and the learned Assistant
Government Pleader.
3. Mr. Shaik Khader Mastan, the learned counsel, representing Mr. Shaik
Altaf, the learned counsel for the petitioner submits that, in spite of there being
an ex-parte permanent injunction granted in O.S.No.17 of 2012 on 31.10.2013
by the learned Principal Junior Civil Judge, Rayachoty, Respondent Nos.6 and
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7 have been interfering with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the
property. Respondent Nos.6 and 7 have purposefully not joined the trial in the
above-mentioned suit. The learned counsel for the petitioner relied on several
judgments of this Court as well as the Hon’ble Apex Court, contending that the
petitioners are entitled for grant of police protection, inasmuch as the police
are not granting any aid for effective implementation of the decree passed by
the competent Civil Court.
4. On the other hand, Mr.C.Phani Teja, the learned counsel for
Respondent Nos.6 and 7, submits that the unofficial respondents have filed
two suits against the petitioners for the relief of permanent injunction
restraining them from interfering with the peaceful possession and enjoyment
of the property. The learned counsel for Respondent Nos.6 and 7 further
submits that the lifespan of the ex-parte permanent injunction would be only
12 years as per Article 64 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and since the two suits
are pending against the petitioners at the behest of the unofficial respondents,
the petitioners are bound to contest those suits and see that the suits are
brought to their logical conclusion in accordance with law.
5. Similarly, Mr. P. Ajay Babu, learned Assistant Government Pleader, on
written instructions, submits that there are Civil suits pending between the
petitioners and the unofficial respondents. Respondent Nos.3to 5 would follow
the orders of the Civil Court or this Court. Undeniably, the petitioners have
instituted a suit in O.S.No.17 of 2012 for the relief of permanent injunction.
The suit in O.S.No.17 of 2012 was instituted by one Shaik Jaharabi, mother of
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Petitioner No.1. She got an ex-parte permanent injunction restraining
Respondent Nos.6 and 7 from ever interfering with the peaceful possession
and enjoyment of the property by the mother of Petitioner No.1.
6. For the contention of learned counsel for Respondent Nos.6 and 7 that
the limitation for enforcing the ex-parte permanent injunction has expired, the
learned counsel for the petitioners would submit that the limitation would start
from the day when the unofficial respondents allegedly interfere with the
peaceful possession and enjoyment of the property of the petitioners. The suit
in O.S. No.17 of 2012 was decreed at the behest of the mother of Petitioner
No.1.
7. As seen from the record, Respondent No.6 has instituted a suit in O.S.
No.132 of 2024 on the file of the learned Principal Junior Civil Judge,
Rayachoty, for the grant of permanent injunction against the petitioners and
one Shaik Soniya. Similarly, Respondent No.7 has also instituted a suit in
O.S. No.133 of 2024 against the petitioners and one Shaik Soniya for similar
relief. It appears that no injunction, let alone an ex-parte or temporary
injunction, has been granted by any of the courts in favour of the unofficial
respondents.
8. The learned counsel for the petitioner has relied on the judgment of this
Court in W.P. No.731 of 2022, wherein the learned Division Bench confirmed
the order passed by the learned Single Judge granting police aid to the writ
petitioner therein. A learned Single Judge of this Court in W.P. No.15111 of
2024 dismissed the writ petition as withdrawn and liberty was given to the
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petitioners to approach the appropriate forum in accordance with law. The
petitioners have also filed another W.P. No.1517 of 2024, wherein a learned
Single Judge of this Court directed the respondent police to dispose of the
representation submitted by the petitioners dated 16.12.2023, keeping in view
the fact that the suits in O.S.Nos.17 of 2012 and 16 of 2013 on the file of the
learned Principal Junior Civil Judge, Rayachoty, were decreed in favour of the
mother of Petitioner No.1, and the subject property in the said suits devolved
upon Petitioner No.1.
9. In view of the clear direction given by the learned Single Judge of this
Court in W.P. No.1517 of 2024 dated 01.05.2024, there is no need to pass
any orders afresh, and the respondent police are duty-bound to follow the
directions of the learned Single Judge of this Court. Since the ex-parte
injunction granted in the year 2013 is in force and unchallenged, and
Petitioner No.1 has become the legal heir of the plaintiff in O.S.No.17 of 2012,
the injunction shall continue to be in force inasmuch as the decree of
injunction is heritable as per Section 50 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908,
and also it operates against the LRs of the defendant and even at the behest
of the LRs of the plaintiff as per the judgment of the High Court of Kerala in
Kathiyammakutty Umma v. Thalakkadath Kattil Karappan 1 , and the
judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Girijanandini Devi v. Bijendra Narain
Choudhary 2 . The limitation would commence from the date on which the
1
1988 SCC OnLine Ker 46
2
AIR 1967 SC 1124
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opposite party interferes with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the
property. Therefore, there is no issue of limitation in this regard.
10. In this regard, it is apposite to refer the Judgment of the High Court
Kerala in Kathiyammakutty Umma supra at paragraph No.4 it is held as
under:
4. Section 50 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short „the Code‟)
enables the holder of a decree to execute the same against legal
representatives of the deceased judgment-debtor. In such execution,
the decree holder is subject to a restriction in sub-section (2) that the
execution shall only be to the extent of the property of the deceased
which has come to the hands of the legal representative. The
limitation imposed by sub-sec. (2) applies generally in cases of
money decrees. In the case of a decree of injunction, the modes of
execution are prescribed in O. 21, R. 32 of the Code. Sub-rule (1)
enables the decree holder to enforce the decree by detention of the
judgment-debtor in the civil prison or by attachment of his properties
or by both. Sub-rule (5) is an additional mode to be followed in
execution of the decree for injunction. There is no inhibition in R. 32
that the modes of execution prescribed therein cannot be exercised
against the legal representatives of the judgment-debtor. In other
words, what is permitted in S. 50 of the Code is not denied or even
curtailed in O. 21, R. 32. S. 146 of the Code enables taking of
proceedings or making of applications against any one who claims
under the person against whom such proceedings or applications
could have been taken or made. The right conferred in S. 146 is not
in any way restricted by O. 21, R. 32. Hence it is not open to the legal
representative of the judgment-debtor in a decree for injunction to
contend that he is not liable under the decree. There is no dispute in
this case that the judgment-debtors had right over the property which
lies near the property in respect of which the decree for injunction
was granted. The suit was filed in view of the boundary dispute over
the respective properties. The boundary claimed by the plaintiff was
upheld in the suit and hence the decree was passed by the trial court.
In such a case, law does not impose any inhibition on the decree
holder in executing the decree for injunction, after the death of the
original judgment debtor against the legal representatives claiming
under the said judgment-debtor.
11. Similarly, it is apposite to refer the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court
in Girijanandini Devi supra at paragraph No.14 it is held as under:
14. Finally, it was urged that since defendants Mode Narain and
Rajballav Narain had died during the pendency of the proceedings,
the High Court was incompetent to pass a decree for account against
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their estates. Rajballav who was defendant No. 6 died during the
pendency of the suit in the Trial Court and Mode Narain who was
defendant No. 1 in the suit died during the pendency of the appeal in
the High Court. But a claim for rendition of account is not a personal
claim. It is not extinguished because the party who claims an account,
the party who is called upon to account dies. The maxim
‘actiopersonalismoritur cum persona” a personal action dies with the
person, has a limited application. It operates in a limited class of
actions ex delicto such as actions for damages for defamation,
assault or other personal injuries not causing the death of the party,
and in other actions where after the death of the party the relief
granted could not be enjoyed or granting it would be nugatory. An
action for account is not an action for damages ex delicto, and does
not fall within the enumerated classes. Nor is it such that the relief
claimed being personal could not be enjoyed after death, or granting
it would be nugatory. Death of the person liable to render an account
for property received by him does not therefore affect the liability of
his estate.It may be noticed that this question was not raised in the
Trial Court and in the High Court. It was merely contended that
because the plaintiff Bijendra Narain was receiving income of the
lands of his share no decree for accounts could be made. The High
Court rejected the contention that no account would be directed in
favour of the plaintiff on that account. They pointed out that the mere
fact that the plaintiff was in possession of some portion of properties
of the joint family since 1941 cannot possibly absolve the defendants,
who were in charge of their dealings with the management of the
properties, from rendering accounts of the joint family estate. The
plaintiff was since September 1941 severed from the joint family in
estate and also in mess and residence, and he was entitled to claim
an account from the defendants from September 1941, but not for
past dealings. The fact that the plaintiff is in possession of some of
the properties will, of course, have to be taken into account in finally
adjusting the account.
12. Respondent Nos.6 and 7 have not obtained any favourable orders
granting injunction against the petitioners. Hence, the respondent police are
under a legal obligation to grant necessary police aid to the petitioners with
regard to the disputed property.
13. In this regard, it is apposite to mention the judgment of the Hon’ble
Division Bench of this Court in Satayanarayanna Tiwari v. S.H.O., P.S.
Santhoshnagar3, wherein at Paragraph No.5 it is held as under:
3
1982 SCC OnLine AP 83
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5. This very question was raised and answered against Mr.
Jagannadha Rao’s contention by an earlier Division Bench of this
court in R. Audemma v. P. Narasimham, AIR 1971 Andhra Pradesh
53. Our learned brother Ramachandra Rao, J. while referring to the
unreported judgment of a single Judge of this Court in C.R.P. No.67
of 1959 dated 22-7-1960 which held that an order of injunction is
capable of enforcement only by punishing its disobedience in the
manner provided by Order 39, Rule 2(3) Civil Procedure Code and
that it is not open to the Civil Courts to enforce the same with the aid
of the police, held:
“Order 39. Rule 2(3) provides only for punishment by attachment
of the property or by detention in civil prison of the person who
committed breach. But it does not further provide for implementation
of the order of injunction itself. Order 39, Rule 2(3) cannot be said to
be an express provision with respect to implementation of the order of
injunction, but is only a provision which provides penalty for
disobedience of the order. In such a case there being no other
express provision in the Code for enforcement of the order, it is not
only proper but also necessary that the courts should render all aid to
the aggrieved party to derive full benefits of the order. Though an
order of injunction under Order 39 Civil Procedure Code is only
interim in nature, still it clothes the person who obtained order with
certain rights and he is entitled to enforce the aforesaid right against
the party who is bound by the order. No doubt in such a case, the
aggrieved party himself could approach the police authorities to
prevent obstruction to the enforcement of the order or to the exercise
of the right which he derives under the order of the Court. But we do
not see why when the same person brings to the notice of court that
enforcement of the order is sought to be prevented or obstructed, the
court should not exercise its inherent power under Section 151 Civil
Procedure Code and direct the police authorities to render all aid to
the aggrieved party in the implementation of the court’s order.
In our opinion, the exercise of such power is necessary for the
ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process and the civil court
has ample jurisdiction to pass such orders under Section 151 C.P.C.”
The court further held that the police are bound to obey such
directions. We find ourselves in full agreement with the view
expressed above. It is the duty of all the authorities in the State to see
that the orders of the civil court and that of the High Court are not only
enforced faithfully but all persons seeking enforcement of such orders
are given full help and protection in furtherance thereof. In the
aforesaid judgment the learned Judges further observed (at p.57 of
AIR):
“We are clearly of the opinion that in order to do justice between
the parties or to prevent the abuse of process of the Court, the Civil
Courts have ample jurisdiction to give directions to the police
authorities to render aid to the aggrieved parties with regard to the
implementation of the orders of the court or the exercise of the rights
created under the orders of the Court. That the police authorities owe
a legal duty to the public to enforce the law is clear from a decision of
the Court of Appeal, reported in R. v. Metropolitan Police Commr.,
(1968) 1 All England Reporter 763.
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If the police authorities are under a legal duty to enforce the law
and the public or the citizens are entitled to seek directions under
Article 226 of the Constitution for discharge of such duties by the
police authorities, we feel that the civil courts also can give
appropriate directions under Section 151 Civil Procedure Code to
render aid to the aggrieved parties for the due and proper
implementation of the orders of court.”
We feel it unnecessary to add anything further to these
observations except to record our full agreement with those views.
14. The Division Bench of this Court in Satyanarayana Tiwari supra has
considered the law in detail and held that the respondent police are under a
legal obligation to grant police aid to the petitioners. The Division Bench
observed that under Order XXXIX Rules 2(3) of the Civil Procedure Code,
1908 (for brevity ‘the CPC‘), the remedy is only to arrest the person who
violated the injunction, and there is no positive remedy to grant protection from
the police side in respect of the disputed property.
15. In view of the orders passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in
W.P. No.1517 of 2024, there is no need to pass any further orders afresh,
inasmuch as the respondent police are duty-bound to follow the directions
given by the learned Single Judge of this Court on the earlier occasion.
16. In the result, the Writ Petition is disposed of. There shall be no order as
to costs.
As a sequel, Miscellaneous petitions, if any pending, shall stand closed.
_________________________
DR. Y. LAKSHMANA RAO, J
Date: 16.03.2026
RSI
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175
THE HONOURABLE DR JUSTICE Y. LAKSHMANA RAO
WRIT PETITION NO: 22212 of 2025
Date: 16.03.2026
RSI