Delhi District Court
Sh Ram Kishore Yadav vs Azad Singh on 21 April, 2026
IN THE COURT OF ADDITIONAL SESSIONS JUDGE (FTC)
SOUTH-WEST DISTRICT, NEW DELHI
PRESIDED BY : Ms. Swati Gupta-I
CA No. 98/2025
CNR No. DLSW010021942025
IN THE MATTER OF
Ram Kishore Yadav,
S/o Sh. Suraj Pal Singh Yadav,
R/o D-17, Gali no. 24,
Shyam Vihar, Phase-I,
New Delhi-110043. .......APPELLANT
VERSUS
Aazad Singh,
S/o Sh. Hawa Singh,
R/o H. No. 41, C-Block,
Village End Enclave, Near Mata Mandir,
Shyam Vihar, Phase-2,
New Delhi-110043. ......RESPONDENT
Date of institution : 12.03.2025
Date on which order reserved : 17.03.2026
Date of pronouncement : 21.04.2026
JUDGMENT
1. The present appeal has been preferred against the
judgment dated 10.02.2025, passed by the Court of Ld.JMFC, NI
Act-08, South West, Dwarka, New Delhi in CC no. 37759/2019
titled ‘Azad Singh vs. Ram Kishore Yadav’, whereby the
appellant was convicted for the offence punishable under Section
138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act and the order on sentence
SWATI dated 12.02.2025 whereby the convict/appellant was sentenced to
GUPTA undergo SI for 01 year and 06 months and to pay fine of Rs.18
Digitally signed
by SWATI
Ram Kishore Yadav vs. Azad Singh
GUPTA CA No. 98/2025 Page 1 of 14
Date:
2026.04.21
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lakhs, to be paid to the complainant as compensation, in default
of payment of fine, the convict/appellant was further sentenced to
undergo SI for four months.
2. On notice of the appeal having been issued to the
respondent Sh. Azad Singh, he entered appearance through his
counsel and contested the appeal. However, no formal reply has
been filed by the respondent.
3. It may be noted here itself that the appellant was
accused before the Ld. Trial Court and the respondent was the
complainant before the Ld. Trial Court. Any reference to the
appellant/accused or respondent/complainant may be construed
accordingly.
4. Facts of the complaint:-
4.1 Before proceeding further, it would be appropriate to
refer briefly to the facts culminating in the present appeal. The
case of the complainant/respondent is that the accused had
allured and convinced the complainant that he could secure a job
for his daughter in the Civil Aviation Department and on the
assurance of the appellant/accused, the complainant/respondent
was induced to pay Rs. 12,75,000/- to the accused within a short
period through cheque and cash. Out of the said amount,
Rs.5,00,000/- was paid in October 2018, Rs. 2,75,000/- in
November 2018 and Rs. 5,00,000/- in December 2018. Even
after receiving the amount, the accused assured that he would getSWATI complainant’s daughter employed in Civil Aviation. The
GUPTA complainant later came to know that he had been cheated and
defrauded by the accused, whereupon he requested the accused to
Digitally signed
by SWATI
GUPTA
Ram Kishore Yadav vs. Azad Singh
Date:
2026.04.21 CA No. 98/2025 Page 2 of 14
15:15:51 +0530
repay his money. The accused/appellant assured and promised to
repay the said amount and also issued a cheque bearing no.
775932 dt. 04.06.2019 drawn on Indian Bank, Shantiniketan,
New Delhi. The appellant/accused also executed the document
dt. 06.05.2019, whereby he admitted his liability of the cheque
amount. The cheque, however, on being presented got
dishonored and was returned unpaid with remarks “funds
insufficient” vide return memo dated 05.08.2019. Thereafter, the
complainant had sent a legal notice dated 26.08.2019 to the
accused, however, despite service of the legal notice, neither the
accused/appellant replied to the legal notice nor made the
payment of the cheque amount. Consequently, a complaint case
U/s 138 NI Act was filed by the respondent/complainant before
the Ld. Trial Court, which resulted in conviction of the appellant.
5. Grounds of appeal
5.1 Present appeal has been filed by the appellant on the
following grounds as mentioned in the appeal:-
(i) The judgment passed by the Ld. Trial Court is
legally unsustainable, arbitrary, and contrary to the settled
principles of law and contrary to the facts.
(ii) The impugned order is absolutely perverse, illegal,
capricious and erroneous, both in law and in facts and hence is
liable to be set aside.
(iii) The Ld. Trial Court failed to appreciate the fact that
as per the complainant, he had paid Rs.12,75,000/- to the
SWATI appellant/accused for securing a govt. job for his daughter in the
GUPTA Civil Aviation Department and therefore, admittedly, the amount
paid by the complainant to the accused/appellant was for illegal
Digitally signed
by SWATI GUPTA
Date: 2026.04.21 Ram Kishore Yadav vs. Azad Singh
15:15:58 +0530 CA No. 98/2025 Page 3 of 14
consideration.
(iv) The complainant cannot take legal recourse/remedy
to enforce an illegal transaction. Reliance has been placed upon
Section 23 and Section 10 of the Indian Contract Act. Since the
amount paid was not a legally enforceable debt and therefore, the
appellant could not have been convicted for the offence
punishable U/s 138 NI Act. Reliance is also placed on judgment
of Hon’ble High Court of Delhi in the case of Vijender Singh Vs.
Laxmi Narayan and others. Ld. Trial Court also failed to
appreciate that respondent/complainant himself admitted that the
alleged cheque was not issued for any legal consideration.
(v) The Ld. Trial Court ignored the fact that the
appellant did not receive any payment in his bank account.
(vi) The complainant during the course of his cross-
examination had given different contradictory versions regarding
the payment, however, all these facts were ignored by the Ld.
Trial Court while passing the impugned judgment.
(vii) Ld. Trial Court also completely ignored the version
of the appellant that he had taken the loan from the
respondent/complainant of Rs.5 lakh with interest @5% per
annum and that he had already repaid Rs.2.5 lakhs to Rs.3 lakhs
and thus, he was not liable to pay the cheque amount in question.
(viii) That the appellant/accused had given the blank
signed cheque and blank signed paper to the
SWATI complainant/respondent at the time of receiving the aforesaid
GUPTA loan.
Digitally signed 5.2 On the basis of the above grounds, it is prayed that
by SWATI GUPTA
Date: 2026.04.21 the present appeal may be allowed and the impugned judgment
15:16:05 +0530
Ram Kishore Yadav vs. Azad Singh
CA No. 98/2025 Page 4 of 14
as well as the order on sentence may be set aside.
6. Arguments of the respondent to oppose the appeal
6.1 Ld. Counsel for the respondent/complainant has
vehemently opposed the appeal on the following grounds :-
(i) The Ld. Trial Court rightly evaluated the evidence
on record and convicted the accused for offence U/s 138 NI Act
vide the impugned judgment which is a detailed and well
reasoned judgment.
(ii) All the contentions of the accused have been dealt
with by the Ld. Trial Court in the impugned judgment.
(iii) In response to the notice U/s 251 Cr.P.C., the
appellant had admitted his signatures on the cheque in question.
Hence, complainant was entited to benefit of presumption U/s
118 and 139 NI Act.
(iv) The defence of the appellant that he had taken a loan
of Rs.5 lakhs from the complainant and that he had paid an
amount of Rs.2.5-3 lakhs is a bald defence as the appellant failed
to prove any such defence before the Ld. Trial Court.
(v) Amount of Rs.12.75 lakhs is legally recoverable
from the accused as he had cheated the complainant.
(vi) The complainant proved his case before the Ld. Trial
Court against the accused, whereas the accused failed to prove
his defence before the Ld. Trial Court.
7. The record has been carefully and thoroughly
SWATI perused. The submissions of learned counsel for the respondent
GUPTA have been duly heard and considered.
Digitally signed
by SWATI
GUPTA
Date: 2026.04.21 Ram Kishore Yadav vs. Azad Singh
15:16:13 +0530 CA No. 98/2025 Page 5 of 14
8. Analysis
8.1 The controversy in the present case lies within a
narrow compass. As already noted above, as per the complainant
he paid the sum of Rs.12,75,000/- to the accused on the
assurance of accused that he would get daughter of complainant
employed in civil aviation. Further, in his cross-examination as
CW1, the complainant/respondent also stated that “I had
advanced this money to him because he had assured me that he
would be able to secure employment for my daughter in Civil
Aviation which is PSU (inhone kaha tha ki inki jaan pehchan hai
civil aviation mein aur ye apne ladke ki naukri civil aviation
mein lagvayenge aur meri beti ki bhi lagwa denge Inhone kaha
ki bager paise Ke kaam nahi hota. Naukary lagvane ke liye main
bhi paise de raha hu aap ko bhi dene hong. Par inhone mere saath
cheating ki)”. Further, in the cross-examination of the
complainant CW1, it is also recorded that ” I am well aware that
giving and taking of bribe is a legal offence. However, I had
advanced the money to the accused for the purpose of bribing
official in civil aviation for securing employment for my
daughter.”
8.2 At this stage, it is relevant to refer to the judgment of
Hon’ble Delhi High Court passed in the case of Virender Singh
versus Laxmi Narayan and another (2006) 135 DLT 273 , wherein
a similar situation arose and a sum of Rs.80,000/- was given by
the complainant to the accused for the purpose of securing a job
for the complainant’s nephew in Haryana Police. After analysing
SWATI
GUPTA the legal position, Hon’ble High Court held that the said amount
of Rs.80,000/- could not be said to be recoverable in law and
Digitally signed
by SWATI
GUPTA Ram Kishore Yadav vs. Azad Singh
Date: 2026.04.21 CA No. 98/2025 Page 6 of 14
15:16:19 +0530
thus, there did not exist any legally enforceable debt or liability
for the discharge of which, it could be said that the cheque in
question was issued. It was also held that Section 138 NI Act was
not attracted in the said case. Relevant portion of the said
judgment is reproduced hereunder for the sake of ready
reference:
“7. The question which requires to be answered is:
Whether the cheque for Rs.80,000/- issued by
the petitioner in favor of the respondent No.1
(complainant) was for the discharge of any debt or
other liability?
Now, the explanation in Section 138 of the said
Act makes it clear that the expression “debt or other
liability” has reference only to a legally enforceable
debt or liability. Conversely, if a cheque is issued in
respect of a debt or liability which is not legally
enforceable then, Section 138 of the said Act would not
apply. Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872,
inter alia, stipulates that every agreement of which the
object or consideration is unlawful is void. The said
Section 23 reads as under:
23. The consideration or object of an agreement is
lawful, unlessit is forbidden by law; or
is of such a nature that, if permitted, it would
defeat the provisions of any law; or
is fraudulent; or
involves or implies injury to the person or
property of another; or the court regards it as immoral,
or opposed to public policy.
In each of these cases, the consideration or
object of an agreement is said to be unlawful. Every
agreement of which the object or consideration is
unlawful is void.”
An agreement which is void is not enforceable
by law [see: Sections 2(g) and 10 of the Indian
Contract Act, 1872]. The question, therefore, is – Was
the agreement between the petitioner and the
SWATI complainant for securing a job for the complainant’s
nephew in the Haryana Police, legally enforceable?
GUPTA Fortunately, the answer is provided straightaway by
Digitally signed
by SWATI Ram Kishore Yadav vs. Azad Singh
GUPTA
Date: 2026.04.21
CA No. 98/2025 Page 7 of 14
15:16:27 +0530
illustration (f) to Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act,
1872. The said illustration (f) reads as under:
(f) A promises to obtain for B an employment in
the public service, and B promises to pay 1,000 rupees
to A. The agreement is void, as the consideration for it
is unlawful.
Clearly, the facts of the present case fit into this
illustration. Therefore, it can be safely stated that the
agreement between the petitioner and the complainant
was void as the consideration of Rs.80,000/- was in the
nature of an illegal gratification and was unlawful. The
next question, taking illustration (f) further, is – B
having paid A the promised sum of 1,000 rupees but, A
not fulfillling his promise of obtaining for B an
employment in public service, does B have a remedy in
law to seek restitution and return of the 1000 rupees
that he has paid to A? What is the obligation of a
person who has received an advantage under a void
agreement? Is A bound to return the sum of 1,000/-
rupees to B?
8. Apparently, these questions are answered by
Section 65 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 which
reads as under:
“65. When an agreement is discovered be void
or when a contract becomes void, any person who has
received any advantage under such agreement or
contract is bound to restore it, or to make compensation
for it, to the person from whom he received it.”
But, the provision applies to (1) an agreement
which is “discovered to be void” or (2) a contract
which “becomes void”. The expressions “agreement”
and “contract” have distinct meanings under the
Contract Act. As mentioned earlier, an “agreement”
becomes a “contract” only if it is enforceable in law.
Thus, the phrase “a contract becomes void” appearing
in the said Section 65 would not have any application
in the case where an agreement is void ab initio. It has
already been indicated above that the agreement in the
present case was void from the very beginning.
Therefore, the agreement in question as also the
agreement of the type mentioned in illustration (f) to
SWATI the said Section 23 cannot fall within the phrase “a
contract becomes void”. This leaves us with
GUPTA
Digitally signed
by SWATI GUPTA Ram Kishore Yadav vs. Azad Singh
Date: 2026.04.21 CA No. 98/2025 Page 8 of 14
15:16:34 +0530
agreements which are “discovered to be void”. This has
reference to those agreements which, the contracting
parties or one of them did not know, at the time of
entering into the agreement, that the same was not
enforceable in law but, it was later “discovered” by
them or one of them as being void. Where the parties
are aware and have knowledge that the agreement is
unlawful and despite this knowledge they go ahead
with the agreement, they would not be able to take
recourse to the provisions of the said Section 65
because there would be no “discovery” of the invalidity
of the agreement. That the agreement was unlawful
and, therefore, void, was known to them all along. This
aspect and the provisions of the said Section 65 were
discussed in detail and analysed by the Supreme Court
in Kuju Collieries Ltd v. Jharkhand Mines Ltd. in the
following manner:
“6. We are of the view that Section 65 of the
Contract Act cannot help the plaintiff on the facts and
circumstances of this case. Section 65 reads as follows:
“When an agreement is discovered to be void,
or when a contract becomes void, any person who has
received any advantage under such agreement or
contract is bound to restore it, or to make compensation
for it, to the person from whom he received it.”
The section makes a distinction between an
agreement and a contract. According to Section 2 of the
Contract Act an agreement which is enforceable by law
is a contract and an agreement which is not enforceable
by law is said to be void. Therefore, when the earlier
part of the section speaks of an agreement being
discovered to be void it means that the agreement is not
enforceable and is, therefore, not a contract. It means
that it was void. It may be that the parties or one of the
parties to the agreement may not have, when they
entered into the agreement, known that the agreement
was in law not enforceable. They might have come to
know later that the agreement was not enforceable. The
second part of the section refers to a contract becoming
void. That refers to a case where an agreement which
was originally enforceable and was, therefore, a
contract, becomes void due to subsequent happenings.
SWATI In both these cases any person who has received any
GUPTA
Digitally signed Ram Kishore Yadav vs. Azad Singh
by SWATI CA No. 98/2025 Page 9 of 14
GUPTA
Date: 2026.04.21
15:16:41 +0530
advantage under such agreement or contract is bound to
restore such advantage, or to make compensation for it
to the person from whom he received it. But where
even at the time when the agreement is entered into
both the parties knew that if was not lawful and,
therefore, void, there was not contract but only an
agreement and it is not a case where it is discovered to
be void subsequently. Nor is it a case of the contract
becoming void due to subsequent happenings.
Therefore, Section 65 of the Contract Act did not apply.
In Kuju Collieries Ltd (supra) a sum of
Rs.80,000/- (coincidentally) had been paid by one party
as salami for a mining lease. The stipulation for
payment of salami was illegal and the lease on the basis
of that was also illegal. The question of the return of
the said sum of Rs.80,000/- arose in the context of the
provisions of the said Section 65. The Supreme Court
held that since the parties were aware of the illegality
of the agreement at the time it was entered into, it was
not a case of an agreement which was “discovered to be
void” subsequent to its execution. Consequently,
Section 65 was found not to be applicable and the
return of the sum of Rs.80,000/- could not be enforced.
The Supreme Court observed as under:
“12. The further question is whether it could be
said that this contract was either discovered to be void
or became void. The facts enumerated above would
show that the contract was void at its inception and this
is not a case where it became void subsequently. Nor
could it be said that the agreement was discovered to be
void after it was entered into. As pointed out by the
trial Court the plaintiff was already in the business of
mining and had the advantage of consulting its lawyers
and solicitors. So there was no occasion for the plaintiff
to have been under any kind of ignorance of law under
the Act and the Rules. Clearly, therefore, this is not a
case to which Section 65 of the Contract Act applies.
Nor is it a case to which Section 70 or Section 72 of the
Contract Act applies. The payment of the money was
not made lawfully, nor was it done under a mistake or
under coercion.
SWATI 13. We agree with the trial Court that the
GUPTA plaintiff should have been aware of the illegality of the
Digitally signed
by SWATI GUPTA Ram Kishore Yadav vs. Azad Singh
Date: 2026.04.21 CA No. 98/2025 Page 10 of 14
15:16:48 +0530
agreement even when it entered into it and therefore
Section 65 of the Contract Act cannot help it.”
9. In Tarsem Singh v. Sukhminder Singh , the
Supreme Court distinguished cases falling under
Section 20 and those falling under Sections 23 and 24
of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. It held:
“37. We may point out that there are many
facets of this question, as for example (and there are
many more examples) the agreement being void for
any of the reasons set out in Section 23 and 24, in
which case even the refund of the amount already paid
under that agreement may not be ordered. But, as
pointed out above, we are dealing only with a matter in
which one party had received an advantage under an
agreement which was “discovered to be void” on
account of Section 20 of the Act. It is to this limited
extent that we say that, on the principle contained in
Section 65 of the Act, the petitioner having received Rs
77,000 as earnest money from the respondent in
pursuance of that agreement, is bound to refund the
said amount to the respondent. A decree for refund of
this amount was, therefore, rightly passed by the lower
appellate court.”
Clearly, a review of the legal position with
regard to the scope and ambit of the said Section 65
indicates that it would not apply to cases falling under
Section 23. In other words, agreements which are void
ab initio and their illegality is known to the parties at
the time of execution would not fall within the purview
of Section 65. An agreement of the kind mentioned in
illustration (f) to Section 23 and the one at hand being
void ab initio and to the knowledge of the parties
would also not benefit from the equitable principle of
restitution embedded in Section 65. So, neither the sum
of 1,000 rupees mentioned in the said illustration (f)
nor the sum of Rs.80,000/- paid in the present case is
recoverable in law.
xxxxxxxxxxx
In the present case neither party is a victim of
SWATI exploitation. Both had voluntarily and by their free will
GUPTA joined hands to flout the law. Therefore, in terms of the
Digitally signed
by SWATI GUPTA
Date: 2026.04.21 Ram Kishore Yadav vs. Azad Singh
15:16:55 +0530 CA No. 98/2025 Page 11 of 14
Supreme Court decisions in Sita Ram v. Radha Bai
(supra) and Mohd. Salimuddin (supra) themselves, the
parties being in pari delicto, the doctrine would apply
and the sum of Rs.80,000/- could not be recovered in a
court of law. Meaning thereby that there did not exist
any legally enforceable debt or liability for the
discharge of which it could be said that the cheque in
question was issued. Consequently, Section 138 of the
said Act would not be attracted. This legal position was
not appreciated by the courts below and it is for this
reason that they fell into error. That being the case, the
conviction of the petitioner is set aside. It is, however,
made clear by the learned Counsel for the petitioner
that the sum of Rs.1 lac, which had been deposited
pursuant to the orders by the court below, has already
been withdrawn by the respondent No.1 and that he
would not be pressing for its return. The learned
Counsel for the petitioner also submits that to maintain
his bona fides, he would be paying a further sum of
Rs.20,000/- within two months to the
complainant/respondent No.1. He submits that the said
sum will be deposited in the trial court, which the
complainant/respondent No.1 may withdraw
immediately thereafter.”
8.3 The aforesaid judgment squarely applies to the facts
of the present case. In the present case also, the sum of
Rs.12,75,000/- has been given by the complainant to the accused
for securing a job for his daughter in a PSU/civil aviation. It is
also evident form the cross-examination of CW-1 that the said
amount was being given to the accused for the purpose of bribing
official in Civil Aviation. Hence, the said amount of
Rs.12,75,000/- cannot be said to be recoverable in law and the
cheque issued for the repayment of the amount cannot be said to
SWATI be a cheque which is issued in discharge of a legally recoverable
GUPTA debt or liability. Hence, one of the main ingredients of offence
Digitally signed under section 138NI act cannot be said to be fulfilled.
by SWATI
GUPTA
Date: 2026.04.21
15:17:02 +0530 Ram Kishore Yadav vs. Azad Singh
CA No. 98/2025 Page 12 of 14
8.4 Ld. Trial Court totally lost sight of the above legal
position and approached the material on record from a totally
different perspective i.e. admissions made by accused and
contradictions in the case of the accused and the inability of the
accused to prove the same even on balance of probabilities. Ld
Trial Court noted the defence of accused regarding loan of
Rs.5,00,000/- taken from complainant and part repayment of the
same. As per Ld. Trial court, the accused miserably failed to
bring any evidence on record regarding repayment of the loan to
the complainant. Ld. Trial Court also observed that it was
immaterial that as per the accused, the cheque in question was
issued to the complainant as a blank signed cheque. Ld. Trial
Court also gave the benefit of presumption under section 118 and
139 NI Act to the complainant, as the accused had admitted the
execution of the cheque-in question. While the observations
made by the Ld. Trial Court may not be totally incorrect in the
facts of the present case. However, the admissions of the accused
or inconsistencies that there may be in the defence of the accused
lose significance in light of the fact that as per the case set up by
complainant himself, the cheque has not been issued to discharge
legally recoverable debt or liability and hence, Section 138 NI
Act cannot be said to be attracted.
9. Finding
9.1 In view of the aforesaid discussion, the impugned
judgment and order on point of sentence are liable to be set aside
SWATI and the accused is entitled to be acquitted of the offence
GUPTA punishable U/s 138 NI Act. Accordingly, the present appeal
Digitally signed
by SWATI GUPTA stands allowed and the impugned judgement dated 10.02.2025
Date: 2026.04.21
15:17:09 +0530 Ram Kishore Yadav vs. Azad Singh
CA No. 98/2025 Page 13 of 14
and the order on the poit of sentence dated 12.02.2025 are hereby
set aside. The accused/appellant Ram Kishore Yadav is hereby
acquitted for the offence punishable U/s 138 NI Act.
9.2 The present appeal is disposed off accordingly.
9.3 Copy of this judgment be sent along with the Trial
Court Record.
9.4 The appeal file be consigned to Record Room.
Digitally signed
Announced in the open court SWATI by SWATI
GUPTA
on: 21st April, 2026 GUPTA Date: 2026.04.21
15:17:14 +0530
(Swati Gupta-I)
Additional Sessions Judge (FTC)
South-West District, Dwarka Courts,
New Delhi.
Ram Kishore Yadav vs. Azad Singh
CA No. 98/2025 Page 14 of 14