Supreme Court – Daily Orders
Sarju Prasad vs State Of U.P on 19 February, 2026
Author: Aravind Kumar
Bench: Aravind Kumar
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. /2026
(@ SLP (Crl). No. 12970/2025)
SARJU PRASAD …...Petitioner(s)
VERSUS
STATE OF U.P & ANR. …...Respondent(s)
O R D E R
1. Leave granted.
2. Heard learned counsel for the parties.
3. The present appeal has been filed against the final
judgment and order dated 03.09.2024 passed in Criminal
Miscellaneous Bail Application No. 9309/2024 passed by
the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench
whereby the High Court granted regular bail to the
Respondent no. 2-accused. The gist of the prosecution
case is that an FIR No. 154/14 came to be registered on
17.06.2014 in Crime No. 410/14 under Section 147, 148,
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
149, 302, 201 and 120 IPC whereunder it was alleged that
KANCHAN CHOUHAN
Date: 2026.02.28
12:27:35 IST
Reason:
the informant while proceeding for his morning walk saw
smoke rising from a ditch and on inspection he found
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that a dead person was found in a burnt condition. On
investigation the chargesheet came to be filed after
taking note of the fact that the appellant herein, the
father of the deceased had filed a complaint on
09.07.2014 about missing of his son and on his
identification of the dead body and conducting the
further investigation, chargesheet came to be filed.
4. On account of the appellant having absconded there
was spit up chargesheet and the remaining accused were
proceeded against and after conducting the trial by
judgment dated 28.03.2023 the accused persons were
convicted for the offences alleged against them.
Undisputedly the said convicted persons have carried the
judgment of the Sessions Court in appeal and same has
been pending before Allahabad High Court whereunder
there has been suspension of sentences and bail has been
granted to the said accused persons. For 09 long years,
the respondent no. 2 was absconding. Inspite of
permanent Non-bailable warrant issued against him, he
has not been traceable and the fact that there was
reward issued against him also did not yield result.
After great efforts and after State authorities formed a
Special Task force, Respondent no. 2 was successfully
apprehended in May, 2024 and was taken into custody and
the trial has proceeded against him.
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5. An application filed by the Respondent no. 2 before
the Trial Court for being enlarged on bail which came to
be rejected by assigning cogent reasons namely it came
to be held that accused-applicant was absconding since
2014; non-bailable warrants had been issued against him;
and, a price money for Rs. 50,000/- had been announced
for those who give information about his whereabouts,
apart from there being criminal history of six cases to
the credit of his account. These factors persuaded the
Trial Court to reject the application for bail. Being
aggrieved by the same, the Respondent no. 2 approached
the Jurisdictional High Court and by the impugned order
by assigning the following reason the High Court granted
the bail:
“7. Considering the fact that the evidence has
already come and the conviction judgment of the
other co-accused is subject to appeal before this
Court in which the appellants have been enlarged on
bail coupled with the fact that the criminal
history of the applicant is duly explained in the
supplementary affidavit in which the applicant is
either on bail or has been acquitted, as such, the
applicant is entitled to be enlarged on bail. In
view thereof, the application is allowed.”
6. Questioning the same, the appellant who is the
complainant of his missing son is before this Court
contending inter alia that the High Court completely
ignored the material evidence before it and on ipse
dixit has granted bail. He would also contend that
accused has a long and detailed criminal history of 16
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cases including the present one and the fact that he was
absconding for 09 long years though pleaded and urged
before the High Court by the State Public Prosecutor has
been brushed aside under the impugned order without
assigning any reason whatsoever or in other words on the
ground that he has been enlarged on bail on those
criminal cases or acquitted in some of them as the
reason to grant bail. By relying upon the judgment of
this Court in case of “Mahipal vs. Rajesh Kumar Alias
Polia and Another” reported in (2020) 2 SCC 118, he
seeks for the petition being allowed and impugned order
being set aside.
7. Per contra, learned senior counsel appearing for
Respondent no. 2 vehemently opposing the said prayer and
would contend that that this Court while considering the
prayer for either examining the prayer for setting aside
the order of bail or for cancellation of bail which has
already been granted will have to be slow or in other
words such prayer has to be considered with utmost
circumspection. He would submit that primary factors to
be considered while examining such a prayer would be as
to whether the accused is at flight risk or he is likely
to induce or threaten the prosecution witnesses or
likely to delay the trial and in the absence thereof
this court should be slow in interfering with the
discretionary relief granted by the High Court. He would
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also further contend that in the instant case such
circumstances has not arisen and mere reason of
absconding would not be a ground to deny the liberty
enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.
As such he would pray for the appeal being dismissed and
in support of his submission, he has relied upon the
following judgments:
(i) 2025 SCC Online SC 3035
(ii) 2023 SCC Online SC 1347
(iii) (1995) 1 SCC 349
8. Learned Standing counsel for the Respondent no. 1 –
State would support the appellant and would also assail
the impugned order contending that the High Court
completely erred in ignoring the relevant material,
which was available on record and merely because the co-
accused who have been tried, convicted and sentenced to
life imprisonment having been granted bail by suspending
their sentence by the Appellate Court by itself is not a
factor which ought to have weighed with the High Court
for granting bail in favour of Respondent no. 2. As such
he has prayed for the appeal being allowed and the order
of bail that passed by the High Court being set aside.
9. Having heard the learned counsels for the parties and
after bestowing our careful and anxious consideration to
the rival contentions raised at the bar, it would be apt
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and apposite to note at this juncture that this Court
has outlined the consideration on the basis of which
discretion under Section 439 Cr.P.C. has to be exercised
while granting bail.
10. In Gurcharan Singh & Ors vs State (Delhi
Administration) (1978) 1 SCC 118, this Court has held as
to the various parameters which was considered while
granting bail. It has been held:-
“24. Section 439(1) CrPC of the new Code, on the
other hand, confers special powers on the High
Court or the Court of Session in respect of bail.
Unlike under Section 437(1) there is no ban imposed
under Section 439(1), CrPC against granting of bail
by the High Court or the Court of Session to
persons accused of an offence punishable with death
or imprisonment for life. It is, however,
legitimate to suppose that the High Court or the
Court of Session will be approached by an accused
only after he has failed before the Magistrate and
after the investigation has progressed throwing
light on the evidence and circumstances implicating
the accused. Even so, the High Court or the Court
of Session will have to exercise its judicial
discretion in considering the question of granting
of bail under Section 439(1) CrPC of the new Code.
The overriding considerations in granting bail to
which we adverted to earlier and which are common
both in the case of Section 437(1) and Section
439(1) CrPC of the new Code are the nature and
gravity of the circumstances in which the offence
is committed; the position and the status of the
accused with reference to the victim and the
witnesses; the likelihood, of the accused fleeing
from justice; of repeating the offence; of
jeopardising his own life being faced with a grim
prospect of possible conviction in the case; of
tampering with witnesses; the history of the case
as well as of its investigation and other relevant
grounds which, in view of so many valuable factors,
cannot be exhaustively set out.”
11. In fact, the above factors do not constitute an
exhaustive list, they are only illustrative, the grant
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of bail requires various factors, which ultimately
depends upon the specific facts and circumstances of the
case; there cannot be any straight jacket formula with a
mathematical precision which can be prescribed for grant
of bail. What would be the relevant factors, would
depend upon the facts and circumstances of the each case
which and same will have to be considered, evaluated and
weighed by the Jurisdictional Court namely it would
relate to prima facie involvement of the accused, nature
and gravity of the charge, severity of the punishment
and the character, position and standing of the accused
vide State of U.P. through CBI vs. Amarmani Tripathi
[(2005) 8 SCC 21].
12. It is also trite law that once the bail is granted,
the Appellate Court usually refuse to interfere with the
same as it pertains to liberty of an individual.
Constitution Bench of this Court in Bihar Legal Support
Society vs. Chief Justice of India [(1986) 4 SCC 767]
has observed as under:
“3. The question whether special leave petitions
against refusal of bail or anticipatory bail should
be listed immediately or not is a question within
the administrative jurisdiction of the Chief
Justice and we cannot give any direction in that
behalf. But, we may point out that every petitioner
who files a special leave petition against (sic
refusal) of bail or anticipatory bail has an
opportunity of mentioning his case before the
learned Chief Justice in his administrative
capacity for urgent listing and wherever a case
deserves urgent listing, the Chief Justice makes an
appropriate order for urgent listing. It may,7
however, be pointed out that this Court was never
intended to be a regular court of appeal against
orders made by the High Court or the sessions court
or the Magistrates. It was created as an Apex Court
for the purpose of laying down the law for the
entire country and extraordinary jurisdiction for
granting special leave was conferred upon it under
Article 136 of the Constitution so that it could
interfere whenever it found that law was not
correctly enunciated by the lower courts or
tribunals and it was necessary to pronounce the
correct law on the subject. This extraordinary
jurisdiction could also be availed by the Apex
Court for the purpose of correcting grave
miscarriage of justice, but such cases would be
exceptional by their very nature. It is not every
case where the Apex Court finds that some injustice
has been done that it would grant special leave and
interfere. That would be convening the Apex Court
into a regular court of appeal and moreover, by so
doing, the Apex Court would soon be reduced to a
position where it will find itself unable to remedy
any injustice at all, on account of the tremendous
backlog of cases which is bound to accumulate. We
must realise that in the vast majority of cases the
High Courts must become final even if they are
wrong. The Apex Court can also be wrong on
occasions but since there is no further appeal,
what the Apex Court says is final. That is why one
American Judge said of the Supreme Court of the
United States: “We are right because we are final:
we are not final because we are right”. We must,
therefore, reconcile ourselves to the idea that
like the Apex Court which may be wrong on
occasions, the High Courts may also be wrong and it
is not every error of the High Court which the Apex
Court can possibly correct. We think it would be
desirable to set up a National Court of Appeal
which would be in a position to entertain appeals
by special leave from the decisions of the High
Courts and the Tribunals in the country in civil,
criminal, revenue and labour cases and so far as
the present Apex Court is concerned, it should
concern itself only with entertaining cases,
involving questions of constitutional law and
public law. But until any such policy decision is
endorsed by the Government, the Apex Court must
interfere only in the limited class of cases where
there is a substantial question of law involved
which needs to be finally laid at rest by the Apex
Court for the entire country or where there is
grave, blatant and atrocious miscarriage of
justice. Sometimes, we Judges feel that when a case
comes before us and we find that injustice has been
done, how can we shut our eyes to it. But the
answer to this anguished query is that the judges
of the Apex Court may not shut their eyes to8
injustice but they must equally not keep their eyes
too wide open, otherwise the Apex Court would not
be able to perform the high and noble role which it
was intended to perform according to the faith of
the Constitution-makers. It is for this reason that
the Apex Court has evolved, as a matter of self-
discipline, certain norms to guide it in the
exercise of its discretion in cases where special
leave petition are filed against orders granting or
refusing bail or anticipatory bail. These norms
have to be articulated in order that the people may
know as to what is the judicial policy of the Apex
Court in entertaining such special leave petitions.
That would go a long way towards introducing a
measure of certainty in judicial response to such
special leave petitions and would also tend to
reduce the inflow of such special leave petitions.
This was the reason why a bench of this Court
consisting of two of us viz. the Chief Justice and
Justice Ranganath Misra, clearly enunciated in an
order made on October 30, 1985 in Special Leave
Petition (Criminal) No. 2938 of 1985 that this
Court should not “interfere with the orders
granting or refusing bail or anticipatory bail” and
that “these are matters in which the High Court
should normally become the final authority”. We
reiterate this policy principle laid down by the
bench of this Court and hold that this Court should
not ordinarily, save in exceptional cases,
interfere with orders granting or refusing bail or
anticipatory bail, because these are matters in
which the High Court should normally be the final
arbiter.”
13. The above principle has been consistently followed by
this Court in Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee,
[2010) 14 SCC 496] and reiterated as follows: –
“9. We are of the opinion that the impugned order is
clearly unsustainable. It is trite that this Court does
not, normally, interfere with an order passed by the
High Court granting or rejecting bail to the accused.
However, it is equally incumbent upon the High Court to
exercise its discretion judiciously, cautiously and
strictly in compliance with the basic principles laid
down in a plethora of decisions of this Court on the
point. It is well settled that, among other
circumstances, the factors to be borne in mind while
considering an application for bail are:
(i) whether there is any prima facie or
reasonable ground to believe that the accused
had committed the offence;
(ii) nature and gravity of the accusation;
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(iii) severity of the punishment in the event
of conviction;
(iv) danger of the accused absconding or
fleeing, if released on bail;
(v) character, behaviour, means, position and
standing of the accused;
(vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated;
(vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses
being influenced; and
(viii) danger, of course, of justice being
thwarted by grant of bail.
10. It is manifest that if the High Court does not
advert to these relevant considerations and
mechanically grants bail, the said order would suffer
from the vice of non-application of mind, rendering it
to be illegal. In Masroor [2009) 14 SCC 286: (2010) 1
SCC (Cri) 1368], a Division Bench of this Court, of
which one of us (D.K. Jain, J.) was a member, observed
as follows: (SCC p. 290, para 13)
“13. … Though at the stage of granting bail an
elaborate examination of evidence and detailed
reasons touching the merit of the case, which
may prejudice the accused, should be avoided,
but there is a need to indicate in such order
reasons for prima facie concluding why bail was
being granted particularly where the accused is
charged of having committed a serious offence.”
14. Thus, the Appellate Court or the Higher forum which
examines whether the order granting bail suffers from
non-application of mind or is not borne out of a prima
facie view on evidence on record, would be an essential
feature. It is thus necessary for this Court to assess
whether on the basis of an evidence on record, there
exists a prima facie case or reasonable ground that the
accused has committed the crime also taking in account
the seriousness of the crime and the severity of the
punishment. It is worth noting that in the instant case
what is being considered relates to whether the High
Court had exercised the discretionary power under
Section 439 in granting bail appropriately or not. Such
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an assessment is different from deciding whether
circumstances subsequent to the grant of bail have made
it necessary to cancel the same. If the twin factors are
conspicuously present then in such an event this Court
would be required to examine both the factors. The first
situation requires to analyze whether the granting of
bail is illegal, perverse, unjustified or arbitrary. On
the other hand, an application for cancellation of bail
looks at whether supervening circumstances have occurred
warranting cancellation. In the case of “Neeru Yadav vs.
State of U.P”. [(2016) 15 SCC 422, this Court has held
following:
“12. In Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee
[Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee, (2010) 14
SCC 496 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 765] , while dealing
with the Court’s role to interfere with the power of
the High Court to grant bail to the accused, the
Court observed that it is to be seen that the High
Court has exercised this discretion judiciously,
cautiously and strictly in compliance with the basic
principles laid down in a catena of judgments on that
point. The Court proceeded to enumerate the factors:
(SCC p. 499, para 9)
“9. … among other circumstances, the factors
[which are] to be borne in mind while considering
an application for bail are:
(i) whether there is any prima facie or
reasonable ground to believe that the accused
had committed the offence;
(ii) nature and gravity of the accusation;
(iii) severity of the punishment in the event
of conviction;
(iv) danger of the accused absconding or
fleeing, if released on bail;
(v) character, behaviour, means, position and
standing of the accused;
(vi) likelihood of the offence being
repeated;
(vii) reasonable apprehension of the
witnesses being influenced; and
(viii) danger, of course, of justice being
thwarted by grant of bail.”11
15. Thus, it would be necessary to examine, determine,
adjudicate, analyze and answer whether the High Court
while granting bail to respondent no. 2 accused has
properly exercised its discretion under Section 439 CrPC
by following parameters laid down by this Court. In this
background we deem it proper to take note of the finding
recorded by the learned Trial Court while refusing to
grant bail to the Respondent no. 2. The fact that the
accused was absconding since 2014, Non-bailable warrant
issued against him and price money of Rs. 50,000/- had
been announced on him, as well as Respondent no. 2
having 06 criminal history of cases or all factors which
cumulatively persuaded the learned Trial judge to refuse
the grant the bail or exercise the discretionary power
in his favour. As against this finding or the reasoning
adopted by the Trial court when compared with the
reasoning adopted by the High Court, it can be discerned
from the impugned order that the High Court having
noticed these factors at para 7 (supra) has purportedly
taken note of supplementary affidavit under which the
respondent no. 2 has contended that he was either on
bail in the earlier cases or has been acquitted in some
of the cases to arrive at a conclusion that Applicant
(Respondent No.2 herein) was entitled for being released
on bail.
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16. The severity of the crime alleged to have been
committed by the Respondent no. 2, the consequences
flowing out of it and the factor that there was warrant
issued against him as also reward for disclosing about
his whereabouts as he was absconding for 09 long years
have been given a complete go by. In the other word the
High Court seems to have erred in ignoring the material
evidence available on record or conveniently overlooked
the same. Yet another factor which cannot go unnoticed
is that the fact that the respondent no. 2 subsequent to
the impugned order is said to have had a fight with his
wife and assaulted her which also resulted in 02 FIRs
registered in Crime No. 124/2025 and 47/2025 would
disclose his culpable mental state of mind.
17. Mr. Gaurav Bhatia, learned senior counsel appearing
for respondent no. 2 has made an strenuous effort to
contend that the prosecution lodged against the
Respondent no. 2 on account of matrimonial dispute would
in no way throw any light to the facts of the present
case or in other words it would have no bearing on the
present case, though at first blush looks attractive, we
are not impressed by the said argument for the simple
reason that while granting a bail a condition that would
be imposed as has happened in the instant case is to the
effect “the applicant should not commit any of the acts
similar to the offence of which he is accused or
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suspected of” which does not mean and include that he
should have committed the crime of murder only and it
would definitely include any acts whatsoever made either
directly or indirectly in this regard is itself a ground
to reject the bail. In fact, the complainant in two FIRs
which has been subsequently registered is lodged by none
other than wife of the Respondent no. 2. As such taking
into consideration the fact that the Respondent no. 2
has a colorful history of criminal record and subsequent
to the bail granted by the High court he has indulged in
a criminal act and not merely there are the chances of
such offences being repeated are the factors which have
persuaded us to set aside the impugned order. Hence, we
allow this Appeal, set aside the impugned order and
direct the Respondent no. 2 to surrender within a period
of two weeks from today, failing which the authorities
would be at liberty to take him into custody. It is also
made clear that in the event of recording of the
material witnesses is not concluded within a period of
09 months from today, the respondent no. 2 would be at
liberty to file a fresh application for grant of bail
before the jurisdictional Trial Court and in such an
event the trial Court shall consider the application on
its own merit and based on the material that would be
available and without being influenced by any of the
observations made by it earlier or the observation made
under the impugned order of the High court or this
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order.
18. All pending application(s) are consigned to records.
…………………………………………………………………. J
(ARAVIND KUMAR)
…………………………………………………………………. J.
(PRASANNA B. VARALE)
New Delhi,
19th February, 2026
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ITEM NO.13 COURT NO.15 SECTION II
S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A
RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No(s). 12970/2025
[Arising out of impugned final judgment and order dated 03-09-2024
in CRMBA No. 9309/2024 passed by the High Court of Judicature at
Allahabad, Lucknow Bench]
SARJU PRASAD Petitioner(s)
VERSUS
STATE OF U.P & ANR. Respondent(s)
IA No. 189856/2025 – EXEMPTION FROM FILING O.T.
Date : 19-02-2026 This matter was called on for hearing today.
CORAM : HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE ARAVIND KUMAR
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE PRASANNA B. VARALE
For Petitioner(s) Mr. Pradeep Kant, Sr. Adv.
Mr. Abhinav Agrawal, AOR
Mr. Shubham Kumar, Adv.
Mr. Piyush Bhardwaj, Adv.
Mr. Shivam Sengupta, Adv.
Mr. Ketan Priyadarshee, Adv.
For Respondent(s) Mr. Namit Saxena, AOR
Mr. Gaurav Bhatia, Sr. Adv.
Mr. Utkarsh Jaiswal, AOR
Mr. Neelmani Guha, Adv.
Mr. Shivam Wadhwa, Adv.
Mr. Pranshu Dwivedi, Adv.
Mr. Prasanjay J Sahani, Adv.
UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following
O R D E R
1. Leave granted.
2. The appeal is allowed, in terms of the signed order.
3. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.
(KANCHAN CHOUHAN) (AVGV RAMU)
SENIOR PERSONAL ASSISTANT COURT MASTER (NSH)
[Signed Order is placed on the file.]
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