Chattisgarh High Court
Santosh @ Golu Srivas vs State Of Chhattisgarh on 6 April, 2026
Author: Ramesh Sinha
Bench: Ramesh Sinha
1
2026:CGHC:15519-DB
AFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
ROHIT CRA No. 206 of 2022
KUMAR
CHANDRA
Digitally
Santosh @ Golu Srivas S/o Bharat Srivas Aged About 35 Years R/o
signed by
ROHIT KUMAR
CHANDRA
Village- Dilwapara Pandatarai, Presently residing at Rabeli, P.S.-
Pipariya, District- Kabirdham, Chhattisgarh
... Appellant
versus
State of Chhattisgarh Through P.S.- Pipariya, District : Kawardha,
Chhattisgarh
... Respondent
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
For Appellants : Mr. Saurabh Dangi, Advocate
For Respondent/State : Mr. Priyank Rathi, Govt. Advocate
———————————————————————————————-
Hon’ble Mr. Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice and
Hon’ble Mr. Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge
Judgment on Board
Per Ramesh Sinha, CJ
06.04.2026
1. In this criminal appeal filed under Section 374(2) of Cr.P.C., the
accused-appellant is calling in question the legality, validity and
correctness of the impugned judgment of conviction and order of
sentence dated 27.12.2021, passed in Sessions Case No.06 of
2020 (State of Chhattisgarh v. Santosh @ Golu Shrivas), by the
Sessions Judge, Kabirdham (Kawardha), Chhattisgarh, whereby
the appellant has been convicted for offence under Section 302 of
2
IPC and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life and fine of
Rs. 500/-, in default of payment of fine, additional RI for one
month.
2. The prosecution case, in brief, is that on 18.11.2019, in village
Rabeli, the husband of Lata Shrivas (the accused) had been
consuming alcohol since morning. He was suspicious of his wife,
Lata Shrivas. Due to poverty, Lata Shrivas used to work as a
labourer. The accused quarrelled with her, closed the door of the
house, poured kerosene on her, and set her on fire with a
matchstick. While in a burning condition, Lata Shrivas opened the
door, ran outside, and extinguished the fire in a nearby pond. She
was then taken to the District Hospital, Kawardha, by Vehicle 112.
On the same day, Head Constable Krishnakumar Chandravanshi
(PW-9), who was on duty at the Police Assistance Centre at the
District Hospital, prepared an application (Ex.P-14) for her
medical treatment and submitted it to the District Hospital,
Kabirdham. Dr. Anjubala (PW-10) sent an intimation (Ex.P-16) to
the Station House Officer, Kawardha, and after conducting a
medical examination of Lata Shrivas, provided a medical report
(Ex.P-14).
3. On 18.11.2019, Head Constable Krishnakumar Chandravanshi
(PW-9) also submitted an application (Ex.P-15) to the SDM,
Kawardha, for recording the dying declaration of Lata Shrivas. On
the instructions of the SDM, Kawardha, B. Chauhan (PW-11)
reached the District Hospital, Kawardha, and recorded the dying
3
declaration (Ex.P-17) of Lata Shrivas. On 20.11.2019, Inspector
Mukesh Som (PW-12) registered a rural complaint (Ex.P-18) at
the District Hospital, Kawardha, based on the statement of Lata
Shrivas. On the basis of this complaint, a case under Section 307
of the IPC was registered against the accused vide Ex.P-19 on
21.11.2019. On the same day, a site map (Ex.P-02) was prepared.
A 5-litre jerrycan, a matchbox, and a piece of burnt saree were
seized from the place of occurrence vide seizure memo (Ex.P-08),
and a sealed panchnama (Ex.P-20) was prepared. On
04.12.2019, an application (Ex.P-21) was sent to the Naib
Tehsildar, Pipariya, for preparation of a site map by the Patwari.
Thereafter, Patwari Deepak Kaushik (PW-7) prepared the site
map and panchnamas (Ex.P-03 and Ex.P-04).
4. On 09.12.2019, information regarding the death of Lata Shrivas
during treatment at the District Hospital, Kawardha, was received
from Dr. Keshav Dhruv (PW-8) vide Ex.P-13. Thereafter, Inspector
Mukesh Som (PW-12) issued notice (Ex.P-11) to the panch
witnesses for preparation of the inquest panchnama. In the
presence of five witnesses, the inquest of the dead body of Lata
Shrivas was conducted, and the inquest report (Ex.P-12) was
prepared (though due to a typographical error, it has been
mentioned as Ex.P-11). An application (Ex.P-22) was sent to the
District Hospital, Kawardha, for conducting the post-mortem
examination. A rural intimation was registered (Ex.P-24), and an
entry of unnatural death was recorded (Ex.P-23). On 09.12.2019,
4
Dr. Dharmendra Kumar (PW-13) conducted the post-mortem
examination after receiving the body along with application Ex.P-
22, and submitted the post-mortem report (Ex.P-29).
5. On 10.12.2019, Inspector Mukesh Som (PW-12) took the accused
into custody and, after interrogation, recorded his memorandum
statement (Ex.P-06). At the instance of the accused, a T-shirt was
seized vide seizure memo (Ex.P-07). The accused was formally
arrested vide Ex.P-24, and information regarding his arrest was
given to his family members (Ex.P-25). The seized articles were
sent to the State Forensic Science Laboratory, Raipur, for
chemical examination along with a forwarding letter (Ex.P-26)
issued by the Superintendent of Police. The receipt of dispatch is
Ex.P-27, and the FSL report is Ex.P-28.
6. Statements of witnesses were recorded, and upon completion of
the investigation, a charge-sheet was filed against the accused
before the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kawardha. The
case was thereafter committed to the Court of the Sessions Judge
for trial. When charges under Section 302 of the IPC were framed
against the accused and read over to him, he denied the
allegations and claimed trial.
7. In support of its case, the prosecution examined Savitri (PW-1),
Sushila (PW-2), Tribhuvan (PW-3), Prabha (PW-4), Manoj (PW-5),
Arjun (PW-6), Patwari Deepak Kaushik (PW-7), Dr. Keshav Dhruv
(PW-8), Head Constable Krishnakumar Chandravanshi (PW-9),
5
Dr. Anjubala (PW-10), B. Chauhan (PW-11), Inspector Mukesh
Som (PW-12), and Dr. Dharmendra Kumar (PW-13). The
statement of the accused was recorded under Section 313 of the
CrPC, in which he denied his guilt. However, he did not examine
any witness in his defence.
8. The learned trial Court, after appreciating the oral and
documentary evidence on record, convicted and sentenced the
accused as mentioned in the opening paragraph of the judgment.
Aggrieved by the said judgment of conviction and order of
sentence, the accused/appellant has preferred the present
appeal.
9. Mr. Saurabh Dangi, learned counsel appearing for the appellant
submitted that the impugned judgment of conviction and order of
sentence passed by the learned trial Court is contrary to law and
evidence on record and is therefore liable to be set aside. He
further submitted that although the prosecution has examined
PW-1 and PW-2 as eyewitnesses, their testimonies are not
reliable and suffer from material contradictions and
inconsistencies, rendering them unworthy of credence. Their
presence at the scene of occurrence is doubtful, and their
statements do not inspire confidence to sustain a conviction. He
also submitted that the prosecution has further relied upon the
alleged dying declaration of the deceased, which is also doubtful
due to non-compliance with proper procedure and absence of
clear evidence regarding the mental fitness of the deceased at the
6
time of making such statement. There is no independent
corroboration of either the alleged eyewitness accounts or the
dying declaration. Moreover, the alleged motive has not been
conclusively proved, and the seizure and forensic evidence do not
firmly establish the involvement of the appellant. Hence, the
prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt.
He contended that without prejudice to the above submissions,
even if the prosecution case is taken at its highest, the incident
appears to have occurred in the course of a sudden quarrel
without any premeditation or intention to cause death. The facts
and circumstances indicate, at best, an offence falling under
culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304
IPC, and not under Section 302 IPC. It is a settled principle that
where the evidence is doubtful or two views are possible, the one
favourable to the accused must be adopted. Therefore, it is most
respectfully prayed that this Hon’ble Court may be pleased to set
aside the conviction and sentence and acquit the appellant, or in
the alternative, convert the conviction to a lesser offence under
Section 304 IPC and reduce the sentence accordingly, in the
interest of justice.
10. Per-contra, learned State counsel submitted that the impugned
judgment of conviction and sentence passed by the learned trial
Court is well-reasoned, legally sound, and based on proper
appreciation of oral as well as documentary evidence on record,
and therefore calls for no interference. He further submitted that
7
conviction has been rightfully rests on the dying declaration (Ex.
P-17) of the deceased Lata Shriwas recorded by an Executive
Magistrate (PW-11) shortly after the incident and certified for
mental fitness by the attending medical officer (PW-10), the
declaration is clear, unambiguous, and free from any tutoring and
the deceased specifically named the accused as the perpetrator
who poured kerosene on her and set her ablaze. He further
submitted that the sequence of events detailed in the dying
declaration is materially corroborated by independent witnesses
neighbours Savitri Bai (PW-1) and Sushila Bai (PW-2) witnessed
the deceased running out and jumping into the pond to extinguish
the flames, precisely matching the victim’s account. He also
submitted that the medical testimony of Dr. Dharmendra Kumar
(PW-13) validates the nature of the homicidal death, confirming
50-55% burn injuries. Furthermore, the FSL report (Ex. P-28)
conclusively established the presence of kerosene oil on the
seized burnt saree piece found at the crime scene and on the T-
shirt recovered at the instance of the accused. The prosecution
firmly established the motive of the accused, who suspected his
wife’s character, leading to a fatal altercation. His guilty mind and
culpable conduct were further highlighted by PW-1, who testified
that the accused stood idle outside his home while his wife was
burning in the pond, making zero attempts to save her. It is
further submitted that the act of the accused was deliberate and
brutal, clearly demonstrating intention to cause death, thereby
8
attracting the offence under Section 302 IPC. The manner in
which the accused confined the deceased, poured kerosene, and
set her ablaze leaves no scope for any inference other than that
of culpable intent. The defence has failed to create any
reasonable doubt or discredit the prosecution evidence in any
substantial manner. The plea of sudden quarrel or absence of
intention is wholly untenable in light of the gravity and nature of
the act committed.
11. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and considered
their rival submissions made herein-above and also went through
the original records of the trial Court with utmost circumspection
and carefully as well.
12. The conviction of the appellants have been substantially based on
the dying declaration (Ex.P-17), supported by the evidence of Dr.
Dr. Anjubala (PW-8), who has certified that ‘the patient is fit for
statement’, evidence of Naib Tehsildar B. Couhan (PW-11), who
has recorded the same and evidence of Smt. Savitri Bai (PW-1)
and Smt. Sushila Bai (PW-2), who were the eyewitnesses of the
incident.
13. At this stage, it would be appropriate to notice Section 32 (1) of
the Evidence Act which states as under: –
“32. Cases in which statement of relevant fact by
person who is dead or cannot be found, etc., is
relevant.–Statements, written or verbal, of relevant
facts made by a person who is dead, or who cannot be
9found, or who has become incapable of giving
evidence,or whose attendance cannot be procured
without an amount of delay or expense which, under
the circumstances of the case, appears to the Court
unreasonable, are themselves relevant facts in the
following cases:–
(1) when it relates to cause of death.–When the
statement is made by a person as to the cause of his
death, or as to any of the circumstances of the
transaction which resulted in his death, in cases in
which the cause of that person’s death comes into
question.
Such statements are relevant whether the
person who made them was or was not, at the time
when they were made, under expectation of death,
and whatever may be the nature of the proceeding in
which the cause of his death comes into question.
xxx xxx xxx”
14. The general ground of admissibility of the evidence mentioned in
Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act is that inthe matter in question,
no better evidence is to be had. The provisions in Section 32(1)
constitute further exceptions to the rule which exclude hearsay. As
a general rule, oral evidence must be direct (Section 60). The
eight clauses of Section 32 may be regarded as exceptions to it,
which are mainly based on two conditions: a necessity for the
evidence and a circumstantial guarantee of trustworthiness.
Hearsay is excluded because it is considered not sufficiently
trustworthy. It is rejected because it lacks the sanction of the tests
applied to admissible evidence, namely, the oath and cross-
10
examination. But where there are special circumstances which
gives a guarantee of trustworthiness to the testimony, it is
admitted even though it comes from a second-hand source. The
Supreme Court emphasized on the principle enumerated in the
famous legal maxim of the Law of Evidence, i.e., nemo moriturus
praesumitur mentire which means a man will not meet his Maker
with a lie inhis mouth. Our Indian Law also recognizes this fact
that”a dying man seldom lies” or in other words “truth sits upon the
lips of a dying man”. The relevance or this very fact, is an
exception to the rule of hearsay evidence. 12.Section 32(1) of the
Evidence Act is famously referred to as the “dying declaration”
section, although the said phrase itself does not find mention
under the Evidence Act. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court
have considered the scope and ambit of Section 32 of the
Evidence Act, particularly, Section 32(1) on various occasions
including in the matter of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of
Maharashtra, reported in (1984) 4 SCC 116 in which their
Lordships have summarised the principles enumerated in Section
32(1) of the Evidence Act, including relating to”circumstances of
the transaction”, which are as under: –
“21. Thus, from a review of the authorities mentioned
above and the clear language of Section32(1) of the
Evidence Act, the following propositions emerge:-
(1) Section 32 is an exception to the rule of
hearsay and makes admissible the statement
of a person who dies, whether the death is a
11homicide or a suicide, provided the statement
relates to the cause of death, or exhibits
circumstances leading to the death. In this
respect, as indicated above, the Indian
Evidence Act, in view of the peculiar conditions
of our society and the diverse nature and
character of our people, has thought it
necessary to widen the sphere of Section 32 to
avoid injustice.
(2) The test of proximity cannot be too literally
construed and practically reduced to a cut-
and-dried formula of universal application so
as to be confined in a straitjacket. Distance of
time would depend or vary with the
circumstances of each case. For instance,
where death is a logical culmination of a
continuous drama long in process and is, as it
were, a finale of the story, the statement
regarding each step directly connected with
the end of the drama would be admissible
because the entire statement would have to be
read as an organic whole and not torn from the
context. Sometimes statements relevant to or
furnishing an immediate motive may also be
admissible as being a part of the transaction of
death. It is manifest that all these statements
come to light only after the death of the
deceased who speaks from death. For
instance, where the death takes place within a
very short time of the marriage or the distance
of time is not spread over more than 3-4
months the statement may be admissible
under Section 32.
12
(3) The second part of clause (1) of Section 32
is yet another exception to the rule that in
criminal law the evidence of a person who was
not being subjected to or given an opportunity
of being cross-examined by the accused,
would be valueless because the place of
cross-examination is taken by the solemnity
and sanctity of oath for the simple reason that
a person on the verge of death is not likely to
make a false statement unless there is strong
evidence to show that the statement was
secured either by prompting or tutoring.
(4) It may be important to note that Section
32does not speak of homicide alone but
includes suicide also, hence all the
circumstances which may be relevant to prove
a case of homicide would be equally relevant
to prove a case of suicide.
(5) Where the main evidence consists of
statements and letters written by the deceased
which are directly connected with or related to
her death and which reveal a tell-tale story, the
said statement would clearly fall within the four
corners of Section 32 and, therefore,
admissible. The distance of time alone in such
cases would not make the statement
irrelevant.”
15. In the matter of Purshottam Chopra and another v. State
(Government of NCT of Delhi), reported in (2020) 11 SCC 489 ,
principles relating to recording of dying declaration and its
13
admissibility and reliability were summed up in paragraph 21 as
under: –
“21. For what has been noticed hereinabove, some of
the principles relating to recording of dying declaration
and its admissibility and reliability could be usefully
summed up as under:-
21.1. A dying declaration could be the sole basis
of conviction even without corroboration, if it
inspires confidence of the court.
21.2. The court should be satisfied that the
declarant was in a fit state of mind at the time of
making the statement; and that it was a voluntary
statement, which was not the result of tutoring,
prompting or imagination.
21.3. Where a dying declaration is suspicious or
is suffering from any infirmity such as want of fit
state of mind of the declarant or of like nature, it
should not be acted upon without corroborative
evidence.
21.4. When the eyewitnesses affirm that the
deceased was not in a fit and conscious state to
make the statement, the medical opinion cannot
prevail.
21.5. The law does not provide as to who could
record dying declaration nor there is any
prescribed format or procedure for the same but
the person recording dying declaration must be
satisfied that the maker is in a fit state of mind
and is capable of making the statement.
21.6. Although presence of a Magistrate is not
absolutely necessary for recording of a dying
14declaration but to ensure authenticity and
credibility,it is expected that a Magistrate be
requested to record such dying declaration
and/or attestation be obtained from other
persons present at the time of recording the
dying declaration.
21.7. As regards a burns case, the percentage
and degree of burns would not, by itself, be
decisive of the credibility of dying declaration;
and the decisive factor would be the quality of
evidence about the fit and conscious state of the
declarant to make the statement.
21.8. If after careful scrutiny, the court finds the
statement placed as dying declaration to be
voluntary and also finds it coherent and
consistent, there is no legal impediment in
recording conviction on its basis even without
corroboration.”
16. Where several dying declarations are made the test is whether the
version of the deceased is proved to be false in respect of the
integral part of the case. A dying declaration should satisfy all the
necessary tests and one such important test is that if there are
more than one dying declarations they should be consistent
particularly in material particulars [See: Kamla v. State of Punjab,
(1993) 1 SCC 1]
17. In the matter of Mohanlal Gangaram Gehani v. State of
Maharashtra, reported in AIR 1982 SC 839, their Lordships of the
Supreme Court held that where there are more than one
15
statement in the nature of dying declaration made by the accused,
one first in time must be preferred.
18. In a recent judgment rendered by their Lordships of the Supreme
Court in the matter of Makhan Singh v. State of Haryana ,
reported in AIR 2022 SC 3793 : 2022 SCC Online SC 1019 ,
while considering the issue of multiple dying declarations, their
Lordships have held as under:-
“9. It could thus be seen that the Court is required to
examine as to whether the dying declaration is true
and reliable; as to whether it has been recorded by a
person at a time when the deceased was fit physically
and mentally to make the declaration; as to whether it
has been made under any tutoring/duress/prompting.
The dying declaration can be the sole basis for
recording conviction and if it is found reliable and
trustworthy, no corroboration is required. In case there
are multiple dying declarations and there are
inconsistencies between them, the dying declaration
recorded by the higher officer like a Magistrate can be
relied upon. However, this is with the condition that
there is no circumstance giving rise to any suspicion
about its truthfulness. In case there are circumstances
wherein the declaration has not been found to be
made voluntarily and is not supported by any other
evidence, the Court is required to scrutinize the facts
of an individual case very carefully and take a decision
as to which of the declarations is worth reliance.
xxx xxx xxx
20. We therefore find that in the facts and
circumstances of the present case, the first dying
16declaration (Ex. DO/C) will have to be considered to
be more reliable and trustworthy as against the
second one (Ex. PE). In any case, the benefit of doubt
which has been given to the other accused by the trial
court, ought to have been equally given to the present
appellant when the evidence was totally identical
against all the three accused.”
19. In addition to this, a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in
the matter of Laxman v. State of Maharashtra, reported in
(2002) 6 SCC 710 has clearly held that a certification by the
doctor is essentially a rule of caution and therefore the voluntary
and truthful nature of the declaration can be established
otherwise. Their Lordships held in paragraph 5 of the report as
under: –
“5. The Court also in the aforesaid case relied upon
the decision of this Court in Harjit Kaur v. State of
Punjab [(1999) 6 SCC 545] wherein the Magistrate in
his evidence had stated that he had ascertained from
the doctor whether she was in a fit condition to make
a statement and obtained an endorsement to that
effect and merely because an endorsement was made
not on the declaration but on the application would not
render the dying declaration suspicious in any
manner. For the reasons already indicated earlier,we
have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that
the observations of this Court in Paparambaka
Rosamma v. State of A.P. [(1999) 7 SCC 695] (at
SCC p. 701, para 8) to the effect that “in the absence
of a medical certification that the injured was in a fit
state of mind at the time of making the declaration, it
17would be very much risky to accept the subjective
satisfaction of a Magistrate who opined that the
injured was in a fit state of mind at the time of making
a declaration” has been too broadly stated and is not
the correct enunciation of law. It is indeed a
hypertechnical view that the certification of the doctor
was to the effect that the patient is conscious and
there was no certification that the patient was in a fit
state of mind specially when the Magistrate
categorically stated in his evidence indicating the
questions he had put to the patient and from the
answers elicited was satisfied that the patient was in a
fit state of mind where after he recorded the dying
declaration. Therefore, the judgment of this court in
Paparambaka Rosamma (supra) must be held to be
not correctly decided and we affirm the law laid down
by this Court in Koli Chunilal Savji v. Stateof Gujarat
[(1999) 9 SCC 562].
20. The Supreme Court in the matter of Jagbir Singh v. State (NCT
of Delhi), reported in (2019) 8 SCC 779 following the principle of
law laid down in Laxman (supra) has clearly held that even
absence of the certificate by a doctor is not fatal to act upon a
dying declaration, however, the requirement remains that the
person who records dying declaration must ensure that the patient
was in a fit condition, both mentally and physically, to give the
declaration.
21. Returning to the facts of the present case in the light of principles
of law laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the
aforestated judgments, it is quite vivid that before recording the
18
dying declaration of deceased Lata Shrivas, she was certified by
Dr. Anjubala (PW-10) that the patient is fit for giving statement,
thereafter, deceased dying declaration (Ex.P-17) has been
recorded by the Executive Magistrate B. Couhan (PW-11) in which
the deceased has clearly stated that her husband (the accused)
had been consumed alcohol since morning. He was suspecting
about her character, she was poor and due to poverty, she used
to work as a labourer and as such, her husband used to suspect
upon her character. The accused quarrelled with her, closed the
door of the house, poured kerosene on her, and set her on fire
with a matchstick. She opened the door on burning condition, ran
outside, and extinguished the fire in a nearby pond. While
examination of Dr. Anjubala (PW-10) before the trial Court, neither
the prosecution nor the defence has put any question to this
witness regarding whether the deceased Lata Shrivas was in a fit
condition to give statement or not. Further, from perusal of the
dying declaration, it is apparently clear that there is signature of
the said Doctor which is indicative of the fact that she was present
when the dying declaration was recorded and she had given her
opinion that the deceased was fit to give her dying declaration.
Nothing has been extracted from the statements of Dr. Anjubala
(PW-10) and Executive Magistrate B. Chouhan (PW-11) to hold
that the deceased was not in fit physical and mental state of mind
to give dying declaration and she (deceased) had not given any
dying declaration. The statement given by the Executive
19
Magistrate cannot be disbelieved as he is a Government Officer
and has no vested interested in either of the parties. Even there is
no suggestion as to why the Executive Magistrate would have
deposed falsely against the appellant. As such, there is sufficient
evidence available on record to believe that the dying declaration
has been given by Lata Shrivas (deceased) and her dying
declaration (Ex.P-17) is true and voluntary.
22. Further, FSL Report Ex.P. 28 revealed the presence of traces of
kerosene oil in the half-burnt sari and matchbox seized from the
scene of crime, and in a T-shirt seized from the accused. Lata
Shrivas died on 09.12.2019 due to kerosene burns sustained on
18.11.2019. According to Dr. Dharmendra (PW-13), Lata Shrivas
died due to septic shock in the burnt parts. Consequently, it is
plausible to conclude that the nature of Lata Shrivas’s death was
homicidal.
23. At the time of the incident in question, the accused and the
deceased, Lata Shrivas, were present in the house. The accused
closed the door, doused Lata Shrivas with kerosene, and then set
her on fire with a matchstick. This clearly indicates that the
accused intended to cause Lata Shrivas’s death.
24. In view of the above discussion, this Court is of the considered
opinion that the judgment passed by learned trial Court is based
on proper appreciation of evidence which is neither perverse nor
contrary to the record as well as law laid down by the Hon’ble
20
Supreme Court and the same needs no interference as such, the
judgment of conviction and order of sentence awarded to the
appellant Santosh @ Golu Shrivas is hereby affirmed.
25. In the result, the instant criminal appeal is hereby dismissed. The
appellant is reported to be in jail. He shall serve the remaining
period of jail sentence as has been awarded to him by the learned
trial Court.
26. Registry is directed to send a copy of this judgment and transmit
the original records to the trial Court concerned forthwith for
necessary information and compliance and further to send a copy
of this judgment to the concerned Superintendent of Jail where
the appellant is undergoing his jail sentence to serve the same on
the appellant informing him that he is at liberty to assail the
present judgment passed by this Court by preferring an appeal
before the Hon’ble Supreme Court with the assistance of High
Court Legal Services Committee or the Supreme Court Legal
Services Committee.
Sd/- Sd/-
(Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha)
Judge Chief Justice
Chandra
21
Head - Note
Once a dying declaration is found to be authentic inspiring
confidence of the Court, then the same can be relied upon and can be
the sole basis for conviction without any corroboration.