Bombay High Court
Sahil Rahu Gilani vs State Of Maharashtra And Anr on 28 April, 2025
Author: Sarang V. Kotwal
Bench: Sarang V. Kotwal, S. M. Modak
2025:BHC-AS:19046-DB
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL WRIT PETITION NO. 2364 OF 2024
Sahil Raju Gilani ..Petitioner
Versus
The State of Maharashtra & Anr. ..Respondents
WITH
INTERIM APPLICATION NO. 2483 OF 2024
........
WITH
INTERIM APPLICATION (ST) NO. 21832 OF 2024
IN
CRIMINAL WRIT PETITION NO. 2364 OF 2024
__________
Mr. Aabad Ponda, Sr. Advocate a/w. Ms. Fazaa Shroff, Mr. D. V.
Deokar, Sachin Pandey and Mustafa Shroff i/b. Ms. Fazaa Shroff
for Petitioner.
Mr. J. P. Yagnik, APP for State/Respondent.
Mr. Harish Salve, Sr. Advocate (appeared through V.C.) a/w. Mrs.
Taubon Irani, Danish Aftab Chowdhary and Shreyas Chaturvedi for
the Respondent No.2.
__________
CORAM : SARANG V. KOTWAL &
S. M. MODAK, JJ.
RESERVED ON : 15 APRIL 2025
PRONOUNCED ON : 28 APRIL 2025
Digitally
signed by
VINOD
VINOD BHASKAR
BHASKAR GOKHALE
GOKHALE Date:
2025.04.28
15:19:38
+0530
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ORDER:
(Per Sarang V. Kotwal, J.)
1. This is a petition filed by the father of a girl child ‘S’ for
the writ of Habeas Corpus. By way of interim order, the Petitioner
has sought directions restraining the Respondent No.2 who is the
mother of the child and the Petitioner’s wife from taking away the
minor girl outside the territory of India. Another prayer in the
nature of interim relief is for the directions regarding access of the
minor girl.
2. Heard Mr. Aabad Ponda, learned Senior Counsel for the
Petitioner, Mr. Yagnik, learned APP for the State/Respondent No.1
and Mr. Harish Salve, learned Senior Counsel for the Respondent
No.2.
3. The facts mentioned in the petition are that the
Respondent No.2 was born in Pakistan. She became an Indian
Citizen on 07.06.1995 and she was issued an Indian Passport on
28.08.1995. After that, she surrendered her Indian citizenship and
became a U.S. National on 17.12.2007. The Respondent No.2
currently lives in India with an American Passport and travels with
a PIO (Person of Indian Origin) Card which has expired on
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24.03.2023. It is mentioned in the petition that the Respondent
No.2 had applied for an OCI card on 27.06.2017, but FRRO
rejected that application and had directed her to apply for an
Indian VISA. The issue is pending before the Delhi High Court in
Writ Petition (C) No.2063 of 2019 as the FRRO had initiated steps
to cancel her PIO card. It is further mentioned in the petition that
the Respondent No.2 is a fashion stylist, having a Bachelor’s
Degree from USA. She is a business woman and also works in
Hindi film industry. She is an influencer on social media and
because of her nature of work she has to travel frequently.
According to the Petitioner, she does not have any fixed place of
business and she has no concrete roots in India either on personal
level or on the professional level.
4. The Petitioner got married with the Respondent No.2 on
06.10.2019. The couple was blessed with their daughter on
06.04.2022. The daughter was born in Mumbai and stayed in
Mumbai from May 2022 up to 30.01.2024. She was admitted to a
school in Mumbai. Mr. Ponda, learned senior counsel for the
Petitioner submitted that the Petitioner has paid the school fees up
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to July 2026. The child has a Passport on the Mumbai address. Her
Aadhaar card and PAN card also has the same address. In this
background, according to the Petitioner, the Respondent No.2,
clandestinely, on the pretext of temporarily visiting her father in
New Delhi, took away the minor child from Mumbai. The return
tickets were booked for both, the nurse and the minor child for
11.02.2024, but the child was not brought to Mumbai and was
kept in New Delhi. Instead, the Respondent No.2 sent a legal
notice through her advocate for amicable resolution of marital
dispute by taking recourse to pre-litigation mediation. The
Petitioner replied to that notice vide the reply dated 20.03.2024.
The Respondent No.2, in her notice, had made allegations of
cruelty, domestic violence, financial deprivation and, physical and
mental harassment; which the Petitioner has denied in his reply.
The sum and substance of this background is that the child
remained in New Delhi and, therefore, the Petitioner has filed this
petition in the nature of habeas corpus.
5. In the meantime, the Respondent No.2 had filed a suit in
the Court of Additional District Judge-05, Saket (South), New
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Delhi, bearing Civil Suit No.368 of 2024 seeking following reliefs:
a) pass a decree of permanent injunction in favour
of the plaintiff and against the defendant No.1
and his agents thereby restraining the Defendant
No.1 from entering upon any part of the suit
property bearing No. bearing No.4 Oak Drive,
DLF, Chattarpur Farms, New Delhi-110030 in any
manner.
b) pass a decree of Mandatory Injunction directing
the Defendant No.1 herein to hand over the
Passport of the minor daughter ‘S’ Gilani to the
Plaintiff; and
c) pass a decree of mandatory injunction directing
the Defendant No.1 to give his No objection for
issuance of a new Passport of the minor daughter
by the Defendant No.2 or in the alternative direct
the Defendant No.2 to issue a passport in the
name of minor daughter of the Plaintiff without
insisting upon a No Objection from Defendant
No.1 and handover the same to the Plaintiff.
d) Order the Defendant No.1 to pay for the cost of
the suit.”
6. The petition further mentions that, vide the order dated
29.05.2024, the Additional District Judge-05 granted ex-parte
injunction against the Petitioner directing the Petitioner to deposit
the passport of the child with that Court on or before 04.06.2024.
The Petitioner challenged the said order before the High Court at
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Delhi vide F.A.O. No.194 of 2024. The Delhi High Court vide the
order dated 03.06.2024 stayed the operation of the order passed
by the Additional Sessions Judge-05, Saket. In this background,
Mr. Ponda, learned senior counsel appearing for the Petitioner
made the following submissions.
SUBMISSIONS OF MR. PONDA, LEARNED SENIOR COUNSEL FOR
THE PETITIONER.
7. The Petitioner was and had been the minor child’s
primary caregiver. He spent more hours in the day with the child.
The Respondent No.2 who had a very erratic lifestyle on account
of her business; frequently traveled and did not have any fixed
place of business. She had no concrete roots in India. The child
was enrolled in a school in Mumbai, but since she was taken away
abruptly, she was unable to attend the school since January 2024.
The Petitioner apprehends that the child would be taken away
from him for good to the USA. The daughter is attached to him.
She is in distress as she is unable to meet the Petitioner.
8. Mr. Ponda submitted that the pleadings in the petition
are not specifically denied by the Respondent No.2 and, therefore,
those pleadings will have to be accepted as uncontroverted facts.
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Mr. Ponda submitted that, while considering the grant of directions
in the nature of habeas corpus, religion of the parties must be
taken into account. As per the Mahomedan Law, the father is the
natural guardian of the child. It is now well established that the
petition in the nature of habeas corpus is maintainable in respect
of the disputes raised by one parent against the other for custody
of the child. The manner in which the child is removed from
custody of one parent also plays an important role in consideration
of the reliefs which can be granted under the habeas corpus
petition. Mr. Ponda referred to Section 352 and 354 of the
Mahomedan Law.
Section 352 mentioned in the Mahomedan Law reads thus:-
“352. Right of mother to custody of infant children.
— The mother is entitled to the custody ( hizanat)
of her male child until he has completed the age of
seven years and of her female child until she has
attained puberty. The right continues though she is
divorced by the father of the child, unless she
marries a second husband in which case the
custody belongs to the father.
9. Mr. Ponda submitted that, though this particular
provision mentions that the mother is entitled to the custody of a
female child until the child attends puberty, it is qualified by
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Section 354 as mentioned in the Mahomedan Law; which reads
thus:
354. Females when disqualified for custody.– A
female, including the mother, who is otherwise
entitled to the custody of a child, loses the right of
custody —
(1) if she marries a person not related to the
child within the prohibited degrees (ss.
260-261), e.g., a stranger, but the right
revives on the dissolution of the marriage
by death or divorce; or,
(2) if she goes and resides, during the
subsistence of the marriage, at a distance
from the father’s place of residence; or,
(3) if she is leading an immoral life, as where
she is a prostitute; or,
(4) if she neglects to take proper care of the
child.
10. In particular, Mr. Ponda relied on Sub Section (2). Mr.
Ponda submitted that, in this case the Respondent No.2 had gone
and resided in New Delhi during the subsistence of their marriage;
which is a place distant from the Petitioner-father’s place of
residence and, therefore, the Respondent No.2 has lost the right of
custody of the child. In this context, he relied on certain
Judgments. But, basically, his main thrust of argument was on
Section 354 of the Mahomedan Law, and his contention is that the
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Respondent No.2 has lost the right to have custody of the
daughter. Mr. Ponda relied on the Judgment of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in the case of Athar Hussain V. Syed Siraj Ahmed
and others1, and in particular he relied on paragraphs-33 and 34
which read thus:-
“33. In Siddiqunnisa Bibi v. Nizamuddin Khan, [AIR
1932 All 215], which was a case concerning the right to
custody under Mohammaden Law, the Court held:
“A question has been raised before us whether the
right under the Mahomedan law of the female relation of a
minor girl under the age of puberty to the custody of the
person of the girl is identical with the guardianship of the
person of the minor or whether it is something different and
distinct. The right to the custody of such a minor vested in
her female relations, is absolute and is subject to several
conditions including the absence of residing at a distance
from the father’s place of residence and want of taking
proper care of the child. It is also clear that the supervision
of the child by the father continues in spite of the fact that
she is under the care of her female relation, as the burden of
providing maintenance for the child rests exclusively on the
father.”
34. Thus the question of guardianship can be
independent of and distinct from that of custody in the facts
and circumstances of each case.”
11. As far as the maintainability of the Habeas Corpus
petition is concerned, Mr. Ponda relied on the Judgment of Yashita
Sahu Versus State of Rajasthan2 and Gohar Begam v. Suggi Alias
1 (2010) 2 Supreme Court Cases 654
2 (2020) 3 Supreme Court Cases 67
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Nazma Begam and others3. Though, in Gohar Begam’s case the
right of the Petitioner U/s.491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1898 was mainly considered, but Mr. Ponda’s argument was that
the fact that a person may have a right under the Guardians and
Wards Act, but it may not be the justification to contend that the
said person has no right of custody U/s.491 of the Cr.P.C., 1898.
Mr. Ponda relied on the following other judgments:
i) Gautam Kumar Das Versus NCT of Delhi and others4
ii) Imambandi and others v. Sheikh Haji Mutsaddi and
others5
iii) Meethiyan Sidhiqu Versus Muhammed Kunju Pareeth
Kutty and others6
iv) Wahidunissa Begum w/o Abdul Wahid and another vs.
Shaikh Abdulla s/o SK. Maheboob7
v) Dadu Nemisha Balwan (since deceased) through L.Rs.
Hirabai Dadu Balwan and others vs. Sadik Malikso Bargir and
others8
12. As against these submissions, Mr. Harish Salve, learned
Senior Counsel appearing for the Respondent No.2 made the
3 AIR 1960 SC 93
4 (2024) 10 Supreme Court Cases 588
5 Privy Council – 518 The Law Weekly 1919
6 (1996) 7 Supreme Court Cases 436
7 2000(1) Mh.L.J. 136
8 2020(3) Mh.L.J. 874
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following submissions:
SUBMISSIONS BY MR. HARISH SALVE, LEARNED SENIOR
COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENT NO.2.
13. Mr. Salve raised a preliminary objection regarding very
maintainability of this petition. He submitted that, if the child is in
the lawful custody of one parent, then the petition for the relief of
habeas corpus is not maintainable. The Petitioner had effective
alternate remedy which he could avail. The paramount
consideration in such petitions or in the matter for the custody of
the child is “welfare of the child”. The Guardians and Wards Act,
1890 covers such cases and the Petitioner can prefer appropriate
proceedings under the said Act. Mr. Salve submitted that the
Respondent No.2 had already preferred a petition under sections
7, 10 and 13 of the Guardians and Wards Act before the Judge,
Family Court, Saket, New Delhi. Vide the order dated 31.08.2024,
the said Court had restrained the present Petitioner from removing
the child forcibly from the custody of the present Respondent No.2.
He submitted that the competent Court is lawfully seized of the
proceedings. The Petitioner could have participated in those
proceedings for the same reliefs which he is claiming in the present
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habeas corpus petition. The issues raised by Mr. Ponda in this
petition can be necessarily considered by the said Family Court in
those proceedings; which require elaborate leading of evidence
and consideration of all the provisions. The Petitioner himself
could have filed any similar petition under the Guardian and
Wards Act if he was really interested in the custody of the child.
Mr. Salve specifically referred to Section 4(2), 17 and 24 of the
Guardians and Wards Act. According to him, the religion of the
parties is not material as is clarified in the said Act itself. From the
legal notice and the replies exchanged between the parties, it is
quite clear that the Petitioner was aware of the dispute right from
March 2024 and yet he has not taken any steps for the custody of
the child. In support of his contentions, Mr. Salve referred to the
following Judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
i) Nithya Anand Raghavan Versus State (NCT of Delhi)
and another9
ii) Rajeswari Chandrasekar Ganesh Versus State of Tamil
Nadu and others10
iii) Yashita Sahu Versus State of Rajasthan11
9 (2017) 8 Supreme Court Cases 454
10 (2023) 12 Supreme Court Cases 472
11 (2020) 3 Supreme Court Cases 67
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REASONS AND CONCLUSION:
14. We have considered these submissions. Before referring
to the provisions of the Guardians and Wards Act, it would be
advantageous to refer to the observations of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in the various judgments cited by both the sides. In Nithya’s
case which was decided by a three Judges Bench of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court, the aspect of consideration of habeas corpus
petition in a case of such nature was extensively considered and
decided. The paragraph-47 of the said Judgment reads thus:
“47. In a habeas corpus petition as aforesaid, the High Court
must examine at the threshold whether the minor is in lawful
or unlawful custody of another person (private respondent
named in the writ petition). For considering that issue, in a
case such as the present one, it is enough to note that the
private respondent was none other than the natural guardian
of the minor being her biological mother. Once that fact is
ascertained, it can be presumed that the custody of the minor
with his/her mother is lawful. In such a case, only in
exceptionable situation, the custody of the minor (girl child)
may be ordered to be taken away from her mother for being
given to any other person including the husband (father of
the child), in exercise of writ jurisdiction. Instead, the other
parent can be asked to resort to a substantive prescribed
remedy for getting custody of the child.”
15. Elaborating it further, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Paragraph-53 has further observed that, being a girl child, the
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guardianship of the mother is of utmost significance. Ordinarily,
the custody of a girl child who is around 7 years of age must
ideally be with the mother unless there are circumstances to
indicate that it would be harmful to the girl child to remain in
custody of the mother. In the present case, the child is hardly 3
years of age. In paragraph-63 it is further observed that the Indian
Courts are strictly governed by the provisions of Guardians and
Wards Act, 1890, as applicable to the issue of custody of the minor
within its jurisdiction.
16. In our opinion, this observation directly settles the issue
raised in this petition by the Petitioner. The Hon’ble Supreme Court
has already observed that, in such cases, it can be presumed that
the custody of the minor with her mother is lawful and only in
exceptional circumstance the custody of the minor girl child would
be ordered to be taken away from the mother for being given to
any other person including the father, in exercise of writ
jurisdiction. But, instead, the other parent can be asked to resort to
substantive remedy for getting the custody of the child. Ordinarily,
when the custody of a small girl child, who in this case is around
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three years of age, is already with her mother, then it cannot be
taken away from the mother unless there are circumstances to
indicate that it would be harmful for the child to remain in the
custody of her mother. Like in Nithya’s case and even in the
present case before us, no such material is forthcoming before us
to show that the custody of the daughter if remained with the
mother would be harmful to the daughter. Though, Mr. Ponda
submitted that because of the erratic nature of her business, the
Respondent No.2 is unable to spend sufficient time with the child,
it is a disputed fact which cannot be held as the truth to deny the
custody of the child to the mother. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has
clearly observed in paragraph-63 of Nithya’s case that the Indian
Courts were strictly governed by the provisions of the Guardians
and Wards Act, 1890, as applicable to the issue of custody of the
minor child within its jurisdiction.
17. Mr. Ponda tried to get over these observations by
submitting that the parties in this case before us are Muslims and,
therefore, these observations regarding Guardianship of a mother
of a young daughter are not applicable. He has relied on
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aforementioned Sections 352 and 354 of the Mahomedan Law, as
well as, on the observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the
case of Athar Hussain. In this context, it is necessary to refer to the
submissions of Mr. Salve with reference to Section 17 of the
Guardians and Wards Act; which reads thus:
“17. Matters to be considered by the Court in appointing
guardian – (1) In appointing or declaring the guardian of a
minor, the Court shall, subject to the provisions of this
section, be guided by what, consistently with the law to
which the minor is subject, appears in the circumstances to be
for the welfare of the minor.
(2) In considering what will be for the welfare of the minor,
the Court shall have regard to the age, sex and religion of the
minor, the character and capacity of the proposed guardian
and his nearness of kin to the minor, the wishes, if any, of a
deceased parent, and any existing or previous relations of the
proposed guardian with the minor or his property.
(3) If minor is old enough to form an intelligent preference,
the Court may consider that preference.
(4)[omitted]
(5) The Court shall not appoint or declare any person to be a
guardian against his will.
Sub Section 2 of Section 17 specifically mentions
that, in considering what will be for the welfare of the
minor, the Court shall have regard to the age, sex and
religion of the minor, the character and capacity of the
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proposed guardian and his nearness of kin to the minor.
Thus, the religion of a party is not the only consideration
before the Court in such cases for consideration of the
welfare of the child. The religion of the minor is only one of
the considerations, but it is not a decisive overriding factor.
It is only one of the many factors which the Court has to
consider as to what is for the welfare of the minor. In our
opinion, for a three year old girl child, being in the custody
of her mother would be for her welfare. The mother is
earning sufficiently to provide for herself and for her
daughter.
These observations are made only with reference
to the submissions made by Mr. Ponda in respect of
guardianship of the minor daughter whose mother has taken
away the custody of the minor daughter and is residing at a
distant place from the father. However, since that issue can
also be considered by the Court seized of the petition under
the Guardians and Wards Act, we are restricting our
observations only for the purpose of deciding this habeas
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corpus petition. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Nithya’s case
has clearly observed that the proper remedy with the other
parent who does not have custody is to resort to the
substantive prescribed remedy for getting the custody of the
child. It would be governed by the provisions of the
Guardians and Wards Act, 1890. The said proceedings are
already initiated by the Respondent No.2 before the Family
Court, Saket, New Delhi.
18. In this context, a reference can also be made to the case
of Jose Antonio Zalba Diez Del Corral alias Jose Antonio Zalba
Versus State of West Bengal and others 12. In Jose’s case, the
Hon’ble Supreme Court had referred to the case of Tejaswini Gaud
and others Versus Shekhar Jagdish Prasad Tewari and others 13 and
paragraph-20 from the Tejaswini’s case was quoted, in which it
was held that, in child custody matters, the ordinary remedy lies
only under the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act or the
Guardians and Wards Act, as the case may be. Mr. Ponda submitted
that, in Jose’s case petition for custody of children was already
12 2021 SCC OnLine SC 3434
13 (2019) 7 Supreme Court Cases 42
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pending and then habeas corpus petition was filed. In this case,
habeas corpus petition was filed earlier and, therefore,
consideration would be different and habeas corpus petition would
be maintainable.
19. In this context, the observations of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in the case of Nithya in paragraph-63 are important,
wherein it was observed that, it is not relevant as to which party
first approached the Court or so to say “first strike”.
In short, if the remedy is available, either of the
parents can resort to the substantive remedy prescribed under the
20. In Rajeswari’s case, Nithya’s case was considered,
wherein, it was observed that, the principal duty of the court in
such matters should be to ascertain whether the custody of the
child is unlawful and illegal and whether the welfare of the child
requires that his or her present custody should be changed and the
child be handed over to the care and custody of any other person.
As mentioned earlier, in our opinion, it cannot be conclusively
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observed that the custody of the child should be changed and that
it should be handed over to the Petitioner.
21. Paragraph-99 of Rajeswari’s case is important; which
reads thus:
“99. Thus, it is well established that in issuing the writ of
habeas corpus in the case of minors, the jurisdiction which
the Court exercises is an inherent jurisdiction as distinct
from a statutory jurisdiction conferred by any particular
provision in any special statute. In other words, the
employment of the writ of habeas corpus in child custody
cases is not pursuant to, but independent of any statute. The
jurisdiction exercised by the court rests in such cases on its
inherent equitable powers and exerts the force of the State,
as parens patriae, for the protection of its minor ward, and
the very nature and scope of the inquiry and the result
sought to be accomplished call for the exercise of the
jurisdiction of a court of equity. The primary object of a
habeas corpus petition, as applied to minor children, is to
determine in whose custody the best interests of the child
will probably be advanced. In a habeas corpus proceeding
brought by one parent against the other for the custody of
their child, the Court has before it the question of the rights
of the parties as between themselves, and also has before it,
if presented by the pleadings and the evidence, the question
of the interest which the State, as parens patriae, has in
promoting the best interests of the child.”
22. Paragraph-26 of Tejaswini’s case reads thus:
Welfare of the minor child is the paramount consideration
“26. The court while deciding the child custody cases is
not bound by the mere legal right of the parent or guardian.
Though the provisions of the special statutes govern the
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rights of the parents or guardians, but the welfare of the
minor is the supreme consideration in cases concerning
custody of the minor child. The paramount consideration for
the court ought to be child interest and welfare of the child.”
Thus, it is consistent view in various judgments that
the welfare of the child is of paramount consideration. Therefore,
wherever it is a disputed question of fact which needs elaborate
leading and consideration of evidence and the other provisions, it
would be a proper course for a parent to exercise his right by
approaching the appropriate Court under the Guardians and Wards
Act, 1890; rather than pursuing the remedy under the habeas
corpus petition. It is also well settled that the habeas corpus
petition would be maintainable, but the relief can be granted when
the facts are very clear and consideration of the welfare of the
child demands interference by the Court under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India. In the background of the facts of the present
case, we do not find that this is a case where the Court can
interfere by directing the Respondent No.2 to handover the
custody of a minor child aged 3 years from the mother to the
Petitioner-father. The Petitioner is always at liberty to participate in
the proceedings preferred by the Respondent No.2 herein in the
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Court at Delhi. All these issues can be decided in those
proceedings. The Petitioner is at liberty to initiate appropriate
proceedings in accordance with law for custody of the child. If
such proceedings are preferred, it shall be decided in accordance
with law, independently.
23. With the result, we are of the opinion that no relief can
be granted in this petition by issuing a writ in the nature of habeas
corpus. However, the petition was pending in this Court for quite
some time and various orders were passed from time to time. The
important ad-interim order was passed by the previous Division
Bench of this Court on 18.06.2024. The relevant paragraph-5 of
the said order reads thus:
“5. On the basis of the sequence of events narrated before
us, we are not in a position to dispel the apprehension and
rather in the wake of the steps initiated by Respondent No.2,
by filing a Petition before the Delhi High Court, challenging
the cancellation of PIO card and the relief she has specifically
sought before the Saket Court, which was even granted in her
favour, though subsequently stayed by Delhi High Court, and
though we deem it appropriate to issue notice to Respondent
No.2, at this stage and in the interregnum to protect the
interest of the Petitioner and to prevent Respondent No.2 from
removing the child from India, while she is summoned before
the Court and answer the notice issued, seeking a writ in the
nature of habeas corpus, we deem it appropriate to grant ad-
interim relief in terms of prayer clause (b).”
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23 of 23 1-wp-2364-24+(J)
Though, this order was passed before the Respondent
No.2 participated, it was continued subsequently from time to time
and it is in operation till today. Therefore, we deem it appropriate
to extend the said ad-interim relief for a further period of 60 days
to afford a reasonable opportunity to the Petitioner to approach
the appropriate Court for the custody of his minor daughter.
24. With these observations, the Petition is dismissed.
25. With disposal of the writ petition, both the interim
applications are disposed of.
(S. M. MODAK, J.) (SARANG V. KOTWAL, J.)
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