Delhi High Court
Rhino Finance Private Limited vs Golden Bag Technology Private Limited on 9 February, 2026
$~13
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of Decision: 09.02.2026
+ O.M.P. (COMM) 250/2024, I.A. 30865/2024 (Stay) & I.A.
30868/2024 (Delay of 26 days in Re-filing the petition)
RHINO FINANCE PRIVATE LIMITED .....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Amit K. Pateria, Advocate.
versus
GOLDEN BAG TECHNOLOGY PRIVATE LIMITED
.....Respondent
Through: Mr. Vinam Gupta, Ms. Pragya
Narayan and Ms. Nabam Yama,
Advocates.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARISH VAIDYANATHAN
SHANKAR
% JUDGEMENT (ORAL)
1. The present petition has been filed under Section 34 of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 ["Act"], read with Section
10(2) of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, challenging the impugned
Arbitral Award dated 07.10.2023.
2. At the outset, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
Respondent raises a preliminary objection on the ground of limitation,
submitting that the present petition is barred by delay. He submits that
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a scanned signed copy of the Arbitral Award dated 07.10.2023 was
duly transmitted by email to the parties as well as to their learned
counsel on the same date. However, the present petition was filed only
on 01.04.2024, at a stage when both the prescribed limitation period of
three (3) months and the maximum condonable period of thirty (30)
days had already expired.
3. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Respondent further
submits that a copy of the arbitral award was also dispatched by speed
post to the address of the Petitioner company, as reflected in the
arbitral record, namely, H-55, Sector-63, Noida, Uttar Pradesh-
201301, and that the same was received at the said address on
19.10.2023.
4. Per contra, learned counsel for the Petitioner submits that the
delay occurred on account of the fact that although the award was
transmitted by email on 07.10.2023, the Petitioner was unable to
receive the same as its email server was not functional at the relevant
time.
5. Learned counsel for the Petitioner further submits that the
company was not operational during the relevant period.
6. At this stage, it is noted that on this aspect of Petitioner's
company being not operational, despite repeated queries from this
Court, learned counsel simply reiterated that the Petitioner's email
server was non-functional, thereby preventing receipt of the arbitral
award. Learned counsel for the Petitioner was unable to place on
record any document or material to substantiate the assertion that the
email system was, in fact, non-functional during the said period.
7. Learned counsel appearing for the Respondent, in rebuttal,
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places reliance on the judgment of this Court in Employees State
Insurance Corporation v. M/s Mukesh Associates1, passed in O.M.P.
(COMM) 46/2024, and in particular paragraph no. 27 thereof, which
has been relied upon to contend that service of the signed arbitral
award by electronic means constitutes valid delivery. The relevant
portion of the said judgement is reproduced hereinbelow:
27. This Court is unable to accept the contention that the limitation
would commence only upon receipt of a signed hard copy of the
award by the Petitioner. Delivery of the award to the authorised
counsel of a party constitutes valid receipt for the purposes of
Section 34(3), particularly when the party acts upon such receipt.
The Petitioner, having admittedly acted upon the award received
through counsel, cannot now contend that such delivery was
inconsequential. The law in regard with the service of the award
has been extensively laid down by the Division Bench of this Court
in Kristal Vision Projects Private Limited v. Union of India,
which reads as follow:
"29. Section 31(5) of the Act clearly requires that the
Arbitral Tribunal shall deliver, a signed copy‟ of the
award to each party. This is a mandatory obligation on the
Arbitral Tribunal to comply with as the same impacts the
period of limitation for filing the application under Section
34 of the Act.
30. As per Section 34(3) of the Act, the period for filing
the application challenging the award shall commence
from the date of the delivery of a signed copy of the award
to the party by the Arbitral Tribunal in compliance with
Section 31(5) of the Act.
31. In Ramesh Pratap Singh (Dead) v. Vimala Singh w/o
Bhalendra Kumar Singh, 2004 (2) Arb. LR 147 (MP), the
learned Single Judge of the Madhya Pradesh High Court
has interpreted Section 31(5) and Section 34(3) of the Act
to take a view that photocopy of the award delivered by
the arbitrator did not fulfil the requirement of Section
31(5) of the Act.
32. A Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in
Union of India v. Radha Krishna Seth, 2006 (2) Arb. LR
441 (All.) (DB) has interpreted the expression "signed
copy‟ in Section 31(5) of the Act as an authenticated copy
duly signed to certify the genuineness of the document or
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in other words, it may be called as the certified copy".
33. In Tecco Trichy Engineers (supra), the Hon‟ble
Supreme Court in paragraph 8 has held that the delivery of
an award under Section 31(5) of the Act is not a matter of
mere formality but a matter of substance. The delivery of
the award can only be effective when the party to
arbitration has received the same. The importance of a
valid delivery of the award cannot be undermined as it has
the effect of conferring certain rights on the party, while
also setting in motion the period of limitation which on its
expiry, would bring to an end the right to exercise such
rights.
34. In Continental Telepower Industries Ltd. v. Union of
India, 2009 SCC OnLine Del 1859, the learned Single
Judge of this Court has held that there is no requirement in
Section 31(5) of the Act to deliver an ink signed copy of
the award. Section 34 of the Act does not require the filing
of any ink signed copy of the award along with petition,
though the award would definitely be required by the
Court to appreciate the contentions with respect thereto. It
was further held that the photocopy of the signed award
along with cover letter bearing signature in original of the
arbitrator was sufficient authentication of the photocopy of
the award enclosed. It was observed that Section 31(5) of
the Act uses the expression "signed copy". Copy is
generally understood as something different from the
original. Legislature did not use the expression "signed
award". Thus, the Arbitrator is not required to deliver to
the parties award signed by the members of the Arbitral
Tribunal, as mentioned in Section 31(1) of the Act, but
merely a "copy" thereof. The purpose of qualifying the
word "copy" with "signed" is that there must be some
authentication of the "copy". If it were to be held that the
"copy" must be "ink signed" by the arbitrators, then it will
not be a "copy" but be the award signed by the arbitrators.
That is the only possible meaning of the words "signed"
and "copy" used in conjunction.
35. In ARK Builders (supra) following Tecco Trichy
Engineers (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that
the period of limitation prescribed under Section 34(3) of
the Act would start running only from the date a signed
copy of the award is delivered to/received by the party
making the application for setting it aside under Section
34(1) of the Act. Section 31(1) of the Act obliges the
members of the Arbitral Tribunal to make the award in
writing and sign it. The legal requirement under Section
31(5) of the Act is the delivery of a copy of the award
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signed by the members of the Arbitral Tribunal/Arbitrator,
and not any copy of the award. On a harmonious
construction of Section 31(5) read with Section 34(3) of
the Act, the period of limitation prescribed for filing
objections would commence only from the date when the
signed copy of the award is delivered to the party making
the application for setting aside the award. If the law
prescribes that a copy of the award is to be communicated,
delivered, despatched, forwarded, rendered, or sent to the
parties concerned in a particular way, and since the law
sets a period of limitation for challenging the award in
question by the aggrieved party, then the period of
limitation can only commence from the date on which the
award was received by the party concerned in the manner
prescribed by law.
36. In Benarsi Krishna (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme
Court held that mere delivery of the award to the Counsel
of a party does not amount to delivery to the party itself,
as contemplated under Section 31(5) of the Act. The
statutory scheme envisages that each party must be
provided with a signed copy of the award directly, and
such service must be effected upon the party itself.
Delivery to a party's counsel cannot be deemed to be
sufficient compliance with the requirement of Section
31(5) of the Act.
37. In Anilkumar Jinabhai Patel v. Pravinchandra
Jinabhai Patel, (2018) 15 SCC 178, the Hon‟ble Supreme
Court while placing its reliance on Tecco Trichy (supra)
and ARK Builders (supra), held that by a cumulative
reading of Section 31(5) and Section 34(3) of the Act, it is
clear that the limitation period prescribed for under
Section 34(3) of the Act would only commence on the
date when the signed copy of the award is delivered to the
party that makes the application for setting aside of th
award under Section 34 of the Act.
38. In Ministry of Health & Family Welfare v. Hosmac
Projects Division of Hosmac India (P) Ltd., 2023 SCC
OnLine Del 8296, a Coordinate Bench of this Court while
relying on Benarsi Krishna (supra) and Tecco Trichy
(supra), held that a conjoint reading of Section 2(1)(h) and
Section 31(5) of the Act makes it clear that the term
"party" only means the party itself and not their agent or
advocate. Therefore, only service on the party itself would
constitute proper compliance of the requirement of
delivery of the arbitral award.
39. In Dakshin Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam Ltd. v.
Navigant Technologies (P) Ltd. (2021) 7 SCC 657, the
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Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that that Section 31(5) of
the Act enjoins upon the Arbitrator/Arbitral Tribunal to
provide the signed copy of the arbitral award to the
parties. The receipt of a signed copy of the award is the
date from which the period of limitation for filing
objections under Section 34 of the Act would commence.
There is only one date recognised by law i.e., the date on
which a signed copy of the final award is received by the
parties, from which the period of limitation for filing
objections would start ticking. There can be no finality in
the award, except after it is signed, because signing of the
award gives legal effect and finality to the award. The date
on which the signed award is provided to the parties is a
crucial date in arbitration proceedings under the Act.
40. In National Agricultural Co-operative Marketing
Federation of Indian Ltd. v. R. Piyarelall Import and
Export Ltd. AIR 2016 Cal 160, a Division Bench of the
High Court of Calcutta upheld the decision of the Single
Judge rejecting the petition under Section 34 of the Act for
setting aside an award on the ground of limitation, where
the award was duly signed by all the three arbitrators and a
certified copy of the award was forwarded to each of the
parties by the Registrar of the Indian Council of
Arbitration, but the photocopy of the signed award was not
signed in original by the arbitrators.
41. In Delhi Urban Shelter Improvement Board v.
Lakhvinder Singh 2017 SCC OnLine Del 9810, the
Division Bench of this Court has held that the expression
„signed copy‟ in Section 31(5) of the Act indicates the
legislative intent that a copy authenticated by the
Arbitrator is served on each party. It was held that
authenticity of correspondence in the technologically
advanced times of today does not necessarily pertain to
only signatures in writing, and it would be adverse to read
the expression „signed copy‟ of the award/order in a
restrictive manner so as to connote a copy bearing the
original signatures of the Arbitrator in handwriting.
42. In Ministry of Youth Affairs & Sports v. Ernst &
Young (P) Ltd., 2023 SCC OnLine Del 5182, the Single
Judge Bench of this Court held that the limitation period
for filing a petition under Section 34 of the Act
commenced when a scanned signed copy of the award was
received via email and that the same would constitute a
valid delivery under Section 31(5) of the Act. This Court
held that a subsequent physical collection of the signed
copy would not extend the limitation period. This Court
emphasized that technological advancements allow for
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authenticated digital copies to be considered valid for all
legal purposes.
43. In Dwarika Projects Limited v. Director of Civil
Aviation & Anr., FAO(OS)(COMM) 103/2024, the
Division Bench of this Court has held that the delivery of
a scanned signed copy of the award via e-mail would
constitute a valid delivery under Section 31(5) of the Act
and the limitation period for filing a petition under Section
34 of the Act would commence when the same is received
by the concerned party. It was held that a copy of the
award can also be delivered electronically and there was
no justification to hold or declare that the only mode or
manner in which the Act contemplates the delivery of
award is in the physical format. Technological
advancements allow for authenticated digital copies to be
considered valid for all legal purposes.
44. In view of the above, the law on the mode and manner
of "delivery" of the "signed copy" of the award under
Section 31(5) of the Act is summarized as under:
a) Mandatory Requirement: Section 31(5) of
the Act requires a signed copy to be delivered
to the party and the same has to be strictly
complied with as the period of limitation to
file application under Section 34 of the Act
shall commence only upon delivery of the
signed copy of the award to the parties.
b) Signed Copy: The term "signed copy‟ means
either copy of the award bearing original
signature or a duly authenticated/certified copy
of the signed copy of the award by the Arbitral
Tribunal or the Arbitral Institution
administering the arbitration.
c) Delivery of the Award: It is the obligation of
the Arbitral Tribunal to ensure delivery of the
signed copy to the parties. In case the Arbitral
Tribunal has pronounced the award at a virtual
hearing and directed the parties to collect the
award, it is the responsibility of the Arbitral
Tribunal to dispatch the signed copy of the
award, if any party fails to collect the same.
d) Delivery to the Parties: The Arbitral Tribunal
has to ensure that the signed copy of the award
is delivered to the parties. A delivery of the
signed copy of the award to the counsel of the
parties will constitute a valid delivery in cases
where the parties have duly authorized the
counsel to collect or provided the address of
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the counsel for service of communication to
parties.
e) Electronic Delivery: A signed copy of the
award can be delivered electronically in
accordance with Section 31(5) of the Act
provided that the signed copy of the award
attached to the electronic communication is
duly authenticated by the Arbitral Tribunal or
Arbitral Institution.
f) Delivery by Arbitral Institution: Delivery of
the signed copy of the award by Arbitral
Institution on behalf of the Tribunal to the
parties and / or their authorized counsel shall
be a valid service under Section 31(5) of the
Act in Institutional Arbitrations.
*****
50. It is clear from the factors mentioned above that a valid
delivery of the signed copy of the Award was made to the
Authorized Representative of the Appellant, which is
acknowledged by way of an e-mail addressed to the Arbitral
Tribunal and copied to the Managing Director of the Appellant.
Therefore, the Award was delivered to the Appellant as envisaged
under Section 31(5) of the Act."
(emphasis added)
8. This Court has heard the learned counsel for the parties and
with their able assistance have perused the material placed on record.
9. At this juncture, this Court considers it apposite to reproduce
the relevant provision of Section 34 of the Act, as the same is
necessary for the proper adjudication of the present case:
"34. Application for setting aside arbitral award. -
*****
(3) An application for setting aside may not be made after three
months have elapsed from the date on which the party making that
application had received the arbitral award or, if a request had been
made under section 33, from the date on which that request had
been disposed of by the arbitral tribunal:
Provided that if the Court is satisfied that the applicant was
prevented by sufficient cause from making the application within
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the said period of three months it may entertain the application
within a further period of thirty days, but not thereafter."
10. A plain reading of Section 34(3) of the A&C Act makes it
abundantly clear that the period prescribed therein is mandatory and
inflexible. An application for setting aside an arbitral award must be
filed within three months from the date of receipt of the award,
extendable by a further period of thirty days, but not thereafter. The
law in this regard has been succinctly laid down by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in Chintels India Ltd. v. Bhayana Builders Pvt. Ltd.2,
which reads as follows:
"10. Sections 34(2) and (2-A) then sets out the grounds on which
an arbitral award may be set aside. Section 34(3), which again is
material for decision of the question raised in this appeal, reads as
follows:
"34. (3) An application for setting aside may not be made
after three months have elapsed from the date on which
the party making that application had received the arbitral
award or, if a request had been made under Section 33,
from the date on which that request had been disposed of
by the Arbitral Tribunal:
Provided that if the Court is satisfied that the applicant
was prevented by sufficient cause from making the
application within the said period of three months it may
entertain the application within a further period of thirty
days, but not thereafter."
11. A reading of Section 34(1) would make it clear that an
application made to set aside an award has to be in accordance with
both sub-sections (2) and (3). This would mean that such
application would not only have to be within the limitation period
prescribed by sub-section (3), but would then have to set out
grounds under sub-sections (2) and/or (2-A) for setting aside such
award. What follows from this is that the application itself must be
within time, and if not within a period of three months, must be
accompanied with an application for condonation of delay,
provided it is within a further period of 30 days, this Court having
made it clear that Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 does not
2
2021 SCC Online SC 80
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apply and that any delay beyond 120 days cannot be condoned --
see State of H.P. v. Himachal Techno Engineers at para 5."
(emphasis added)
11. It is an admitted position that a signed copy of the arbitral
award was transmitted vide email dated 07.10.2023 [Annexed as
Annexure-B of the "Affidavit dated 25.09.2024 on behalf of the
Respondent"] to the parties as well as to their respective counsel.
12. While learned counsel for the Petitioner does not dispute receipt
of the said award in his capacity as counsel, it is contended that the
Petitioner itself did not receive the same.
13. However, it emerges from the record that the Petitioner, from
the very same email address from which it claims non-receipt of the
award, addressed emails to the learned Sole Arbitrator dated
07.12.2023 and 23.12.2023 [Annexed as Doc P/A-2 and Doc P/A-4
respectively, of the "Affidavit dated 05.10.2024 on behalf of the
Petitioner"].
14. By way of the aforesaid e-mail communications, the Petitioner
specifically requested the learned Arbitrator to provide a signed copy
of the arbitral award.
15. The fact that the Petitioner was able to successfully
communicate from the said email address from December, 2023
onwards clearly belies the submission advanced on its behalf that the
email system was non-functional during October, 2023, when the
award was transmitted.
16. Learned counsel for the Petitioner further seeks to rely upon
certain averments contained in the written submissions to the effect
that the licence granted to the Petitioner by the Reserve Bank of India
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stood cancelled owing to complaints made by borrowers/end users.
Based upon that, it is contended that the cancellation of the licence
rendered the Petitioner's email systems inoperative, thereby
preventing receipt of the arbitral award.
17. This Court is unable to accept the said submissions. Apart from
the fact that no material has been placed on record to substantiate the
assertion that the Petitioner's email address was non-functional during
the relevant period, the subsequent email communications sent by the
Petitioner itself from the same address wholly undermine the plea
sought to be advanced.
18. In the absence of any cogent material demonstrating that the
Petitioner was prevented, for reasons beyond its control, from
receiving the arbitral award at the time it was duly transmitted, the
explanation offered for the delay cannot be accepted as bona fide or
sufficient.
19. At this stage, this Court expresses its strong disapproval of the
fact that, despite it being an admitted position that the arbitral award
was passed on 07.10.2023 and that the present petition was filed only
on 01.04.2024, the Petitioner deliberately chose not to file any
application seeking condonation of delay at the time of institution of
the petition, notwithstanding its intention to advance various
purported explanations for the delay. It was only after the matter was
listed and pursuant to subsequent directions of this Court that an
affidavit purporting to explain the delay came to be filed, which, in the
opinion of this Court, is wholly unsatisfactory and insufficient for the
reasons discussed hereinabove.
20. Consequently, this Court has no hesitation in holding that the
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present petition has been filed beyond the period of limitation
prescribed under Section 34 of the Act, and is, therefore, barred by
limitation.
CONCLUSION:
21. In view of the foregoing, the present petition under Section 34
of the Act, stands dismissed as being barred by limitation, having been
filed beyond the period prescribed under Section 34(3) of the Act.
22. Pending application(s), if any, is disposed of accordingly.
23. No Order as to costs.
HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.
FEBRUARY 09, 2026/v/kr/sg
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