Jharkhand High Court
Ravishankar Kumar vs The Union Of India Represented Through … on 6 April, 2026
Author: Sujit Narayan Prasad
Bench: Sujit Narayan Prasad, Deepak Roshan
[2026:JHHC:9828-DB]
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
W.P.(S) No. 516 of 2025
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Ravishankar Kumar, aged about 40 years, son of Ishwari Singh, resident of
Eguni, P.O. and P.S. Paraiya, Tahsil Tekari, District Gata, Bihar, Pin-
824209.
... ... Petitioner
Versus
1. The Union of India represented through the Chairmn and C.E.O., Railway
Board, 256-A, Raisinha Road, Rail Bhawan, P.O. Sansadmarg, P.S.-
Kartavyapath New Delhi-110011.
2. The Chairman, Railway Recruitment Board, Ranchi, Railway Offices
Complex, Chutia, near Ranchi Railway Station, P.O. and P.S. Chutia,
District Ranchi, Jharkhand, PIN-834001.
3. The Member Secretary, Railway Recruitment Board, Ranchi, Railway
Offices Complex, Chutia, near Ranchi Railway Station, P.O. and P.S.
Chutia, District Ranchi, Jharkhand, Pin-834001.
4. The Director Establishment (Railway Recruitment Board), Railway Board,
Govt. of India, Ministry of Railways, Rai Sinha Road, Rail Bhawan, P.O.-
Sansadmarg, P.S.-Kartavyapath New Delhi-110011.
... ... Respondents
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CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE DEEPAK ROSHAN
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For the Petitioner : Ms. Bharti V. Kaushal, Advocate
For the Respondent : Mr. Prashant Pallav, A.S.G.I.
Mr. Kumar Vaibhav, C.G.C.
Mr. Ayush, C.G.C.
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CAV/Reserved on 24.03.2026 Pronounced on 06/04/2026
Per Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.
1. The instant writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is
directed against the order dated 23.10.2024 passed in O.A.
No.OA/051/00265/2023 by the learned Central Administrative Tribunal,
Patna Bench, Circuit Bench, Ranchi whereby and whereunder, the relief
sought for in the original application has been refused to be granted by
passing the following order:
“8. This Tribunal has considered the whole matter in its entirety and found
that the counsel for applicant has been harping on hurried disposal of his
representation, and drawing inference that this reflects non-application of
mind. This is in our view is a conjecture and without any basis because every
expeditious decision cannot be termed as non-application of mind unless
proved. There is no reason assigned by the applicant that this order is
without merit. Had it been a decision that would have taken a long time thenPage | 1
[2026:JHHC:9828-DB]it cannot be said that it is because of application of mind and not because
of the lethargy on the part of respondent.
9. The withdrawal of letter issued vide Annexure-8 through another letter
vide Annexure Annexure-9 is based on cogent reasons that it would not be
prudent to change the process when it has already begun. It would have
been another issue of changing the rules of game midway and may have led
to further litigation. Moreover, it relates to the consideration of cases
condoning the delay during the Covid period which started in March 2020.
It is to be noted that when the application for appointment was invited in
2019 this pandemic was not there, hence to use this as the reason for
granting exemption on account of delay in discharge of the applicant after
the cut-off date is not acceptable.
10. Lastly, the applicant while making the application for appointment has
himself mentioned that his date of discharge is 20.03.2020, whereas his
actual discharge was on 30.04.2020 that is after the cut-off date of
31.03.2020 thus making him guilty of making a false statement to make
himself eligible for employment. This fact was noticed during the process of
document verification. The applicant was allowed to appear in the
examination on the basis of his false declaration hence his qualifying in the
examination will not render him eligible for his employment. A parallel
could be drawn with a well qualified candidate of Unreserved category who
has crossed the maximum age limit. He makes a declaration that he belongs
to a reserved category and therefore qualified to appear in the examination.
He is allowed to appear and successfully qualifies the examination. This fact
is detected at the time of document verification. Then he cannot take the plea
that since he has qualified in the examination, he should be allowed to join
because he took advantage of an advanced age that is permitted as a
maximum age limit for a reserved category candidate. On the basis of
consideration of all the factors we find that this O.A. is devoid of merit and
is fit to be dismissed and accordingly it is dismissed. No order as to cost.”
2. The brief facts of the case as per the pleading made in the writ petition
having been enumerated from the original application needs to be referred
here which is as under:
3. It is the case of the petitioner that he was appointed in the Indian Army
against the post of Hav. (OFC) and served w.e.f 19.01.2004 to 30.04.2020,
i.e. for a period a period of more than 16 years. A Centralized Employment
Notice No. CEN No. 01/2019 for non-technical popular categories
(NTPC) Graduate and Under Graduate posts was published on 28.02.2019
on the website of Govt. of India, Ministry of Railway, Railway
Recruitment Boards wherein closing date of online registration of
application was fixed on 31.03.2019. Para 10.2 of the said notice mentions
that Defence personnel to be released within one year from the closing
date of Online Registration of applications for this CEN (i.e. on or before
31.03.2020 can also apply, both for vacancies earmarked for Ex.
Servicemen and for posts not reserved for them). The applicant/petitioner
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herein applied for premature retirement on 27.11.2018 itself before the
publication of the Employment Notice and he was also granted No
Objection Certificate of his Unit on 08.03.2019 itself for applying to the
said post advertised on 28.02.2019. In the meantime, subsequent to his
application the applicant was recommended for pre-mature retirement on
extreme compassionate ground on 28.07.2019 itself. On being declared
successful in the said examination the applicant was shortlisted for
verification of documents. E-Call letter dated 28.11.2022 was issued to
the applicant for verification of documents and medical examination on
07.12.2022. On 07.12.2022 when the applicant appeared before the
authorities for document verification he was orally told that his
candidature had been rejected on the ground that he was not eligible since
he did not retire from defence services on or before 31.03.2020.
4. Aggrieved by this oral rejection of his candidature for different posts of
Level 2, 3, 5 & 6 for which the applicant was shortlisted, he moved the
Tribunal by way of O.A. No. 16/2023 which was disposed of vide order
dated 13.02.2023 with direction to the respondents not to give effect to
oral order and to consider about his candidature and may pass a reason and
speaking order within a reasonable time, but before completion of
selection process. But the respondents did not consider the candidature of
applicant vide impugned order/letter dated 22.03.2023 in terms of para
10.2 and 15.3 (h) of CEN No. 01/2019 and Railway’s Board’s letter dated
21.02.2023 ignoring the earlier guidelines as contained in letter dated
07.02.2023 issued during Covid Pandemic wherein it was specifically
stated in para-3 that “3….. after careful consideration of the matter, the
Competent Authority has decided that ex-servicemen candidates,
shortlisted for posts of CEN 01/2019(NTPC), who were relieved from
service after 31.03.2020 due to exigency of service, if they found otherwise
suitable, may be considered for empanelment.” Applicant has also referred
to a similar case of one Mukesh Anand, Nayak in the defence Forces, who
was relieved from services w.e.f. 31.05.2000 but his candidature was
considered and he was appointed in Guwahati, RRB. Further grievance of
the applicant that the above letter dated 07.02.2023 was withdrawn vide
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letter dated 21.02.2023 without any rhyme and reason and on wrong
interpretation of law.
5. Aggrieved with the order dated 22.03.2023 and letter dated 21.02.2023,
the petitioner preferred O.A. No.OA/051/00265/2023 before the Learned
Central Administrative Tribunal.
6. The learned Central Administrative Tribunal, Circuit Bench, Ranchi
considering the arguments advanced on behalf of the parties had dismissed
the original application being O.A. No. OA/051/00265/2023 vide order
dated 23.10.2024.
7. It is evident as per the pleading made as referred hereinabove that the
petitioner was appointed in the Indian Army against the post of Hav.
(OFC) and served w.e.f 19.01.2004 to 30.04.2020, i.e. for a period a period
of more than 16 years. A Centralized Employment Notice No. CEN No.
01/2019 for non-technical popular categories (NTPC) Graduate and Under
Graduate posts was published on 28.02.2019 on the website of Govt. of
India, Ministry of Railway, Railway Recruitment Boards wherein closing
date of online registration of application was fixed on 31.03.2019. Para
10.2 of the said notice mentions that Defence personnel to be released
within one year from the closing date of Online Registration of
applications for this CEN (i.e. on or before 31.03.2020 can also apply,
both for vacancies earmarked for Ex. Servicemen and for posts not
reserved for them). The applicant applied for premature retirement on
27.11.2018 itself before the publication of the Employment Notice and he
was also granted No Objection Certificate of his Unit on 08.03.2019 itself
for applying to the said post advertised on 28.02.2019. In the meantime,
subsequent to his application the applicant was recommended for pre-
mature retirement on extreme compassionate ground on 28.07.2019 itself.
On being declared successful in the said examination the applicant was
shortlisted for verification of documents. E-Call letter dated 28.11.2022
was issued to the applicant for verification of documents and medical
examination on 07.12.2022. On 07.12.2022 when the applicant appeared
before the authorities for document verification he was orally told that his
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candidature had been rejected on the ground that he was not eligible since
he did not retire from defence services on or before 31.03.2020.
8. The same was questioned the same by filing original application being
O.A. No. 16 of 2023. The tribunal has disposed of the original application
by directing the respondents to pass reasoned order. The reasoned order
was passed on 22.03.2023 justifying the reason of rejection of the
candidature by taking the grounds that the petitioner has not been
separated from service of the armed forces up to 31.03.2020 rather he has
been separated from service on 30.04.2020, as such, the petitioner has
become ineligible in terms of the conditions stipulated as under condition
no.10.2 of the advertisement. The second ground has been taken that the
fact about separation from service although was on 30.04.2020 but the
petitioner has shown the separation from service from 31.03.2020, as such,
the fact has been suppressed.
9. Learned counsel for the petitioner has challenged the aforesaid order by
filing another original application being O.A. No. OA/051/00265/2023
wherein the following prayer was made:
“(A) For quashing and setting aside the order as contained in Order No.
RRB/RNC/CC dated 22.03.2023 issued under the signature of Member
Secretary, Railway Recruitment Board, Ranchi, by which the candidature
of the applicant against the posts advertised vide Employment Notice No.
CEN No. 01/2019 (ΝΤPC) has not been considered in terms of para 10.2
and 15.3(h) of CEN No. 01/2019 (NTPC) and also Railway Board’s letter
No. 2023/E(RRB)/0/01 dated 21.02.2023.
(B) For quashing and setting aside the Letter as contained in
2023/E(RRB)/0/01, dated 21.02.2023 issued under the signature of
Director Estt. (RRB), Railway Board, Govt. of India, New Delhi to the
extent that the same has withdrawn the earlier Letter No.
2023/E(RRB)/06/01 dated 07.02.2023 issued by the same Authority, De.
Director Establishment (RRB) Railway Board, i.e. Respondent No. 4.
(C) For direction upon the respondents to consider the candidature of the
applicant for appointment/empanelment to Level-5 posts after relaxing the
cut-off date, i.e. 30.03.2020 for relieving order of Ex-Service men as has
been done in case of Mukesh Anand.
AND
(D) The applicant prays for allowing the cost of litigation incurred in filing
the instant application upon the respondents.
(E) The applicant prays for relief/relief(s), direction/direction(s) as this
Hon’ble Tribunal may deem fit for doing conscionable justice to the
Applicant under the facts and circumstances of the instant case.”
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10. The written statement was filed defending the decision so taken by the
respondent. The learned Tribunal has passed the order by dismissing the
original application on the ground that the petitioner has not been found
to come under the criteria of condition as stipulated under condition
no.10.2 of the advertisement since the said condition stipulates that in
order to get the benefit of ex-servicemen category, a candidate must be
separated from service up to 31.03.2020.
11. The aforesaid order is under challenge in this writ petition.
Submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner:
12. Ms. Bharti V. Kaushal, learned counsel for the petitioner has taken the
following grounds:
(i) The petitioner has fulfilled the criteria as stipulated under condition
no.10.2 of the advertisement.
(ii) Even admitting the fact that the petitioner has been separated from
service after 31.03.2020 then the same would have been taken for
consideration of the rejection of all the candidates who have
participated in the process of selection conducted by different
railway recruitment boards, i.e., Guwahati and Bilaspur.
(iii) It has been contended that the specific pleading had been made in
the original application to the effect that the candidates who have
been the benefit of ex-serviceman category, have got the said
benefit, even though they have been separated from service after
31.03.2020, by the Guwahati and Bilaspur Railway Recruitment
Board but the aforesaid parameter has not been adopted so far as the
case of the present petitioner is concerned.
(iv) It has been submitted that the specific plea since has been taken to
the effect of hostile discrimination by treating discriminately the
case of the petitioner to that of the other candidates who have
participated in the process of selection which fact has not been
disputed but even then, there is no consideration by the learned
Tribunal of the said issue as would be evident from the face of the
order impugned herein.
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(v) Learned counsel for the petitioner has further submitted that the fact
about subjecting the petitioner with discrimination has been
considered by this Court while passing the order dated 24.07.2025
and based upon that the supplementary counter affidavit has been
filed herein since the respondent has made out a new case by
applying the condition as stipulated under condition no.10.4 of the
notice inviting application even though the other ground was not
available before the learned Tribunal.
(vi) Learned counsel for the petitioner, therefore, has submitted that it
is not available for the respondent to make out absolutely a new case
by improving the finding even though no such finding is available
in the reasoned order.
(vii) It has been submitted that this Court since has passed an order on
24.07.2025 during pendency of the instant writ petition by which
the respondent has only been directed to come out with the
instructions regarding the issue of acceptance of candidature of the
candidates namely, Mukesh Anand, Nayak and other identical
placed candidates who have participated in the process of selection
conducted by the railway recruitment board of Guwahati and
Bilaspur and while answering the said issue, the case has been
moulded in different directions by taking the ground that in the
meanwhile, the petitioner since has joined his service in Delhi
Police, as such, No Objection Certificate is required to be submitted
as per the condition stipulated under condition no.10.4 but the
respondent cannot be allowed to travel beyond the pleading which
was there before the tribunal in the written statement but herein, the
entire case has been tried to be moulded in a case where the
respondents are defending the order passed by the learned Tribunal
which is not available to do so far as the case herein in concerned.
13. Learned counsel for the petitioner, based upon the aforesaid grounds, has
submitted that the impugned order, therefore, needs interference.
Submission of the learned counsel for the respondent:
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14. Per contra, Mr. Prashant Pallav, learned ASGI appearing for the
respondent-Railway has taken the following grounds:
(i) It has been argued that the issue of consideration of the candidature
of the other candidates whose candidature has been considered by
the railway recruitment board of Guwahati and Bilaspur and their
candidatures have been accepted even though they have been
separated from service after 31.03.2020 but as per the reason
assigned in the reasoned order dated 22.03.2023 the petitioner has
not furnished his actual position of separation from service,
therefore, the respondent while passing the order by negating the
claim of the petitioner has come out with the reason that the fact of
separation from service has been suppressed.
(ii) However, learned counsel for the respondent has admitted the fact
that the separation from service after 31.03.2020 of the candidates
who have participated in the process of selection conducted by
Guwahati and Bilaspur Railway Recruitment Board have also not
been disclosed and as such, virtually he has admitted the fact to this
extent that the case of the petitioner is identical to that of the
candidates who have participated in the process of selection
conducted by Guwahati and Bilaspur Railway Recruitment Board
including the case of Mukesh Anand, Nayak.
(iii) It has been submitted by referring to the order passed by this Court
dated 24.07.2025 and while examining the issue, the respondents
have passed that the petitioner is to be looked into on the basis of
the criteria as stipulated under condition no.10.4 of the
advertisement in the backdrop of the fact that the petitioner after
being separated from of the armed forces has joined the service in
Delhi Police and in such circumstances, he ought to have placed the
NOC. Learned counsel, therefore, has submitted that the condition
as provided under condition no.10.4 of the advertisement being not
followed is also against the criteria of the candidature of the
petitioner.
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15. Learned counsel for the respondents, based upon the aforesaid grounds
has submitted that the order passed by the learned Tribunal, therefore,
needs no interference.
Response:
16. In response, learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the
ground which is now being taken for applicability of the condition
stipulated under condition no.10.4 that cannot be allowed to be made out
only on the garb of the order passed by this Court dated 24.07.2025 since
the object and intent of the order passed by this Court was to come out
with the instructions based upon the admitted fact before the Tribunal as
to what is the basic difference in between the candidature of the present
petitioner and other candidates who have participated in the process of
selection conducted by Guwahati and Bilaspur Railway Recruitment
Board. But herein, the respondents have tried to mould the issue entirely
contrary to the pleading made in the original application.
17. Learned counsel, therefore, has submitted that the legality and propriety
of the order impugned is to be assessed only on the basis of the material
put forth before the Tribunal on the issue of discrimination as per the
specific pleading made before the Tribunal and the same has not been
disputed in the written statement.
Analysis
18. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the
finding recorded by the learned Tribunal in the impugned order.
19. This Court, before proceeding to deal with the aforesaid ground to
consider the legality and propriety of the order passed by the Tribunal,
needs to first discuss the power which is to be exercised by this Court
under Article 226 of the Constitution of India as held by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in the case of L. Chandra Kumar vs. Union of India and
Ors., (1997) 3 SCC 261.
20. The power which is to be exercised as per the position of law is to look
into the legality and propriety of the order passed by the learned Tribunal
only in a case error apparent on the face of the order or in a case of
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perversity of finding in exercise of power conferred under the power of
judicial review as has been held by the Hon’ble Apex Court at paragraph-
99 in the aforesaid judgment. The said paragraph is being referred as
under:
“99. In view of the reasoning adopted by us, we hold that clause 2(d) of
Article 323-A and clause 3(d) of Article 323-B, to the extent they exclude
the jurisdiction of the High Courts and the Supreme Court under Articles
226/227 and 32 of the Constitution, are unconstitutional. Section 28 of the
Act and the “exclusion of jurisdiction” clauses in all other legislations
enacted under the aegis of Articles 323-A and 323-B would, to the same
extent, be unconstitutional. The jurisdiction conferred upon the High
Courts under Articles 226/227 and upon the Supreme Court under Article
32 of the Constitution is a part of the inviolable basic structure of our
Constitution. While this jurisdiction cannot be ousted, other courts and
Tribunals may perform a supplemental role in discharging the powers
conferred by Articles 226/227 and 32 of the Constitution. The Tribunals
created under Article 323-A and Article 323- B of the Constitution are
possessed of the competence to test the constitutional validity of statutory
provisions and rules. All decisions of these Tribunals will, however, be
subject to scrutiny before a Division Bench of the High Court within whose
jurisdiction the Tribunal concerned falls. The Tribunals will, nevertheless,
continue to act like courts of first instance in respect of the areas of law
for which they have been constituted. It will not, therefore, be open for
litigants to directly approach the High Courts even in cases where they
question the vires of statutory legislations (except where the legislation
which creates the particular Tribunal is challenged) by overlooking the
jurisdiction of the Tribunal concerned. Section 5(6) of the Act is valid and
constitutional and is to be interpreted in the manner we have indicated.”
21. This Court, in order to assess as to whether two grounds placed before this
Court, i.e., error apparent on the face of the order or element of perversity,
has thought it proper to refer the power of judicial review which has also
been deliberated by the Hon’ble Apex Court, which is to be considered
while exercising the said power only to the extent that if any order is being
passed found to be having error on the face of the order or without
jurisdiction or suffers from perversity. The error apparent on the face of
the order means that if the order appears on its face having with error, then
only the power of judicial review is to be exercised.
22. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of West Bengal Central School
Service Commission vs. Abdul Halim, (2019) 18 SCC 39, has held at
paragraph-30 that the power of judicial review must be exercised by the
Court after determining that the impugned is vitiated by an error apparent
on the face of the record and not the same has been established by a
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process of reasoning. Paragraph-30 of the aforesaid judgment is being
referred as under:
“30. In exercise of its power of judicial review, the Court is to see whether
the decision impugned is vitiated by an apparent error of law. The test to
determine whether a decision is vitiated by error apparent on the face of
the record is whether the error is self-evident on the face of the record or
whether the error requires examination or argument to establish it. If an
error has to be established by a process of reasoning, on points where
there may reasonably be two opinions, it cannot be said to be an error on
the face of the record, as held by this Court in Satyanarayan
Laxminarayan Hegde v. Millikarjun Bhavanappa Tirumale [Satyanarayan
Laxminarayan Hegde v. Millikarjun Bhavanappa Tirumale, AIR 1960 SC
137] . —.”
23. In the case of T.C. Basappa vs. T. Nagappa and Anr., (1955) 1 SCR 250,
their Lordship have held that the patent error in a decision can be corrected
when it is manifested by the error apparent on the face of the proceedings.
The relevant portion of the aforesaid judgment is quoted hereunder:
“11. … An error in the decision or determination itself may also be
amenable to a writ of certiorari but it must be a manifest error apparent
on the face of the proceedings e.g. when it is based on clear ignorance or
disregard of the provisions of law. In other words, it is a patent error which
can be corrected by certiorari but not a mere wrong decision. ….”
24. Thus, on the basis of the aforesaid settled legal position it is evident that
the power of judicial review can be exercised, if error on the face of the
order impugned, challenged under the Article 226 of Constitution of
India, appears to be there.
25. The Tribunal since has also been conferred with the power to exercise
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and as such, the
adjudication is to be made as a court of equity having extraordinary
jurisdiction therein also as a court of first instance under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India to follow the principle of strict pleading as per the
mandate as propounded in the case of Shivaji Balaram Haibatti vs.
Avinash Maruthi Pawar, (2018) 11 SCC 652 wherein at paragraph-26 it
has been held which is being reproduced as under:
“26. … It is a settled principle of law that the parties to the suit cannot
travel beyond the pleadings so also the court cannot record any finding on
the issues which are not part of pleadings. In other words, the court has to
record the findings only on the issues which are part of the pleadings on
which parties are contesting the case. Any finding recorded on an
issue dehors the pleadings is without jurisdiction. Such is the case here.”
26. The admitted case herein is that in pursuance of the advertisement, the
petitioner claiming to be a member of ex-serviceman has made application
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for consideration of his candidature as per the condition stipulated under
condition no.10.2. The said condition is being reproduced as under:
“10.2 Persons serving in the Armed Forces of the Union, who on
retirement from service would come under the category of Ex-Servicemen
are eligible to apply for re-employment one year before the completion of
the specific terms of engagement and avail themselves of all concessions
available to Ex-Servicemen but such persons shall not be permitted to
leave the uniform until they complete the specific terms of engagement in
the Armed Forces of the Union.
Accordingly, such serving Defence personnel to be released within one
year from the closing date of ONLINE Registration of applications for the
CEN (i.e. on or before 31.03.2020) can also apply, both for vacancies
earmarked for Ex-Servicemen and for posts not reserved for them.
However, they should possess the prescribed educational qualifications as
on the closing date of registration of online applications for this CEN i.e.
31.03.2019.”
27. It is evident from the aforesaid condition that the benefit of ex-servicemen
category is to be obtained by one or the other candidates under this
category if separated from the service of the armed forces up to
31.03.2020. The writ petitioner has made the application but he was not
separated till 31.03.2020 rather he got separated from service of the armed
forces on 30.04.2020.
28. The reference of the decision so taken by the respondent as on 07.02.2023
has been taken, appended as Annexure-8, that the period of separation
from service of the armed forces has been decided to be accepted if not
relieved up to the cut-off date of 31.03.2020. Subsequently, the aforesaid
letter after lapse of about two weeks, the decision so taken was recalled
with the decision that the RRBs should follow the procedure they have
been following before issuing of these instructions.
29. It is thus evident that the issue of extension as per the policy decision dated
07.02.2023 since has been recalled, hence, the condition stipulated under
condition no.10.2 was strictly to be adhered to.
30. The case of the petitioner has been rejected to be considered under the
category of ex-servicemen on the ground that he has not been separated
from service of the armed forces by 31.03.2020 rather on 30.04.2020.
31. The candidature of the petitioner was orally rejected which led the
petitioner to approach the tribunal by filing O.A. No. 16 of 2023. The said
original application was disposed of directing the respondents to
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considered and pass a reasoned order. The reasoned order was passed on
22.03.2023 and again the candidature of the petitioner to be considered
under the category of ex-servicemen was rejected by citing the following
reason(s):
“4. While verifying your documents produced on the date of Document
Verification it is found that your original date of discharge was
30.04.2020, which has been admitted by you also, which means that you
have been discharged after the cut off date of discharge i.e. 31.03.2020 as
mentioned at Para 10.2 which interalia states that “such serving Defence
personnel to be released within one year from the closing date of ONLINE
Registration of applications for the CEN (i.e. on or before 31.03.2020) can
also apply, both for vacancies earmarked for Ex-Servicemen and for posts
not reserved for them. However, they should possess the prescribed
educational qualifications as on the closing date of registration of online
applications for this CEN i.e. 31.03.2019.” Further, you have mislead the
Railway Administration regarding the date of your discharge as
20.03.2020 in your Online Application.
Since, your date of discharge was 30.04.2020 which was beyond the
cut off date of 31.03.2020, your candidature could not be considered in
terms of Para 10.2 and 15.3 (h) of CEN No. 01/2019 and also Railway
Board’s letter No. 2023/E(RRB)/06/01 dated 21.02.2023″
32. The same has again been assailed before the learned Tribunal by filing OA
No. OA/051/00265/2023. The written statement was filed.
33. The specific pleading was taken before the learned Tribunal that the
petitioner has been subjected to hostile discrimination since the other
regional recruitment board have accepted the candidature of such
candidates under the ex-servicemen category who even got separated from
service after 31.03.2020. The specific name of such candidate has also
been given. For ready reference, the pleading to that effect as made under
para-17 is being reproduced as under:
“2. … Applicant has also referred to a similar case of one Mukesh Anand,
Nayak in the defence Forces, who was relieved from services w.e.f.
31.05.2020 but his candidature was considered and he was appointed in
Guwahati, RRB. ….”
34. The written statement was filed on behalf of the respondent. The fact about
subjecting the petitioner with hostile discrimination has not been disputed
as would be evident from the response furnished on behalf of the
respondent in the written statement in response to the statement made by
the petitioner in the original application.
35. The learned tribunal has decided the issue against the petitioner by
considering the non-compliance of the condition stipulated under
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condition no.10.2 of the advertisement, i.e., the ground of taking the
benefit of ex-servicemen even though he has not been separated from
service of the armed forces up to 31.03.2020 rather he got separated from
service on 30.04.2020. The tribunal has also taken the ground that the
aforesaid fact has been suppressed by the petitioner.
36. The question of hostile discrimination was the specific issue raised before
the tribunal subjecting the petitioner of violation of Article 14 of the
Constitution of India.
37. The Article 14 is having two contexts, i.e., based upon the classification.
One is reasonable classification and other is unreasonable classification.
If the classification is based upon rationality said to be reasonable one then
Article 14 will not be of any aid but certainly if the classification is
unreasonable, then Article 14 will of aid to the litigant concerned to
protect his fundamental right. Reference in this regard be made to the
judgment rendered in the case of State of West Bengal Vs. Anwar Ali
Sarkar [AIR 1952 SC 75] wherein it has been held that differentia
between the basis of classification and the object of the things are two
different things. It is important that there must be nexus between the basis
of classification with the object of the Act.
38. In Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia & Ors Vs. Shri Justice S.R. Tendolkar &
Ors [AIR 1958 SC 538], the Hon’ble Apex Court, taking into
consideration catena of judgments rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court, has
held that Article 14 forbids class legislation, it does not forbid reasonable
classification for the purposes of legislation. In order, however, to pass the
test of permissible classification two conditions must be fulfilled, namely,
(i) that the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia
which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from
others left out of the group, and (ii) that differentia must have a rational
relation to the object sought to be achieved by the statute in question. The
classification may be founded on different bases, namely, geographical, or
according to objects or occupations or the like. What is necessary is that
there must be a nexus between the basis of classification and the object of
the Act under consideration. It is also well established by the decisions of
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this Court that Article 14 condemns discrimination not only by a
substantive law but also by a law of procedure. Paragraph 11 of the said
judgment is quoted as under:
“11. …
(a). That a law may be constitutional even though it relates to a single
individual if, on account of some special circumstances or reasons
applicable to him and not applicable to others, that single individual may
be treated as a class by himself;
(b). That there is always a presumption in favour of the constitutionality
of an enactment and the burden is upon him who attacks it to show that
there has been a clear transgression of the constitutional principles;
(c). That it must be presumed that the legislature understands and
correctly appreciates the need of its own people, that its laws are directed
to problems made manifest by experience and that its discriminations are
based on adequate grounds;
(d). That the legislature is free to recognise degrees of harm and may
confine its restrictions to those cases where the need is deemed to be the
clearest;
(e). That in order to sustain the presumption of constitutionality the court
may take into consideration matters of common knowledge, matters of
common report, the history of the times and may assume every state of
facts which can be conceived existing at the time of legislation; and
(f). That while good faith and knowledge of the existing conditions on the
part of a legislature are to be presumed, if there is nothing on the face of
the law or the surrounding circumstances brought to the notice of the court
on which the classification may reasonably be regarded as based, the
presumption of constitutionality cannot be carried to the extent of always
holding that there must be some undisclosed and un-known reasons for
subjecting certain individuals or corporations to hostile or discriminating
legislation….”
39. The aforesaid principle can further be found in RE The Special Courts
Bill, 1978, which contains that:
➢ The basic principle of Article 14 is that the persons in similar
circumstances shall be treated similarly both in privileges conferred and
liability imposed.
➢ The State shall have the power to determine with regard to the process
of classification, which should be regarded as a class for the purpose of
legislation and in relation to a law enacted on a particular subject.
➢ The classification does not mean arbitrary application of law to certain
person instead it means segregation in classes which had a systematic
relation, usually found common property and characteristics.
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[2026:JHHC:9828-DB]➢ The law can make and set apart the classes according to the needs and
exigencies of the society and suggested by experience. It can even
recognize ‘degrees of evil’ but the classification should never be arbitrary,
or artificial.
40. In R.K. Garg Vs. Union of India & Ors [(1981) 4 SCC 675], the Hon’ble
Apex Court has held that Article 14 forbids class legislation but does not
forbid reasonable classification.
41. It is, thus, evident that Article 14 prohibits discriminatory legislation
against an individual or against a class of individual but it does not prohibit
reasonable classification. Reference in this regard be made to the
judgment rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court in D.S. Nakara & Ors. v.
Union of India [(1983) 1 SCC 305], wherein at paragraph 11, it has been
held as under:-
“11. The decisions clearly lay down that though Article 14 forbids class
legislation, it does not forbid reasonable classification for the purpose of
legislation. In order, however, to pass the test of permissible classification,
two conditions must be fulfilled viz. (i) that the classification must be
founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things
that are grouped together from those that are left out of the group; and (ii)
that that differentia must have a rational relation to the objects sought to
be achieved by the statute in question (see Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Justice
S.R. Tendolkar [AIR 1958 SC 538 : 1959 SCR 279, 296 : 1959 SCJ 147]
). The classification may be founded on differential basis according to
objects sought to be achieved but what is implicit in it is that there ought
to be a nexus i.e. causal connection between the basis of classification and
object of the statute under consideration. It is equally well settled by the
decisions of this Court that Article 14 condemns discrimination not only
by a substantive law but also by a law of procedure.”
42. This Court is now proceeding to examine as to whether the issue of
discrimination which has been raised on behalf of the petitioner is under
reasonable or unreasonable criteria.
43. The fact regarding the condition as available under condition no.10.2 of
the advertisement floated by the Ranchi Railway Recruitment Board is
admitted to be the same advertisement floated by the Guwahati and
Bilaspur Railway Recruitment Board. The candidates who have sought for
the benefit of ex-servicemen category in the railway recruitment of
Guwahati and Bilaspur have been given the benefit of ex-servicemen even
thought they have been separated from service of the armed forces after
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31.03.2020. The name of one of the candidates has also been disclosed,
i.e., Mukesh Kumar, Nayak.
44. The fact about the identical condition to consider the candidature of one
or the other candidates under the ex-servicemen category in all the
advertisement issued by the railway recruitment board either it is
Guwahati or Bilaspur or Ranchi, have not been disputed.
45. The question would be that when the ex-servicemen category is being
considered for one or the other candidates as per the condition stipulated
under condition no.10.2 on the basis of separation from service of armed
forces up to 31.03.2020 then it should have been restricted to the said
condition strictly without giving any premium to any other candidate who
have made application to other regional railway recruitment board having
the same conditions in the advertisement floated.
46. The aforesaid consideration of the candidature by two regional railway
recruitment board and no consideration of the candidature of the present
petitioner is admittedly not under the reasonable classification rather it is
under the fold of unreasonable classification since the nodal body said to
be the apex body of all the recruitment is the Railway Board under the
Ministry of Railways.
47. This Court, therefore, is of the view that whatever recruitment has been
allowed to be made by the regional recruitment board that is under the
authority of the Railway Board controlled by the ministry of railways and
as such, all the parameters of the appointments is required to be followed
uniformly and it cannot be allowed to be based on the basis of the region
as the facts of the present case is.
48. The aforesaid pleading has specifically been made before the tribunal but
the aforesaid fact has not been answered by the tribunal.
49. Before appreciating the aforesaid issue, it needs to be considered by this
Court that the additional ground has been taken by the respondent with
respect to the condition no.10.4 as available in the advertisement.
50. The condition no.10.4 is with respect to such candidates who after getting
the status of ex-servicemen and before appointment in terms of the
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advertisement got the appointment which is civil in nature then in such
circumstances, declaration is to be furnished along with NOC from the
civil employer during the document verification failing which they will
not get the benefit of ex-servicemen category. For ready reference,
condition no.10.4 is being reproduced as under:
“10.4 If an Ex-Serviceman applies for various vacancies before joining
any civil employment, he/she can avail the benefit of reservation as Ex-
Serviceman for any subsequent employment, subject to the condition that
an Ex-Serviceman as soon as he/she joins any civil employment, should
give self-declaration/undertaking to the concerned employer about the
date wise details of application for various vacancies, including this CEN,
for which he/she had applied for, before joining the initial civil
employment. The acknowledged copy of this declaration along with no
objection certificate (NOC) from the civil employer should be produced
during document verification, failing which they will not get benefit of
reservation for Ex-Servicemen. Further, this benefit would be available
only in respect of vacancies which are filled on direct recruitment and
wherever reservation is applicable to the Ex-Servicemen.”
51. The admitted fact as has been admitted by the learned ASGI is that the
rejection of the candidature of the present petitioner for consideration
under the ex-servicemen category as per the reasoned order is totally based
upon the applicability of the condition no.10.2 and there is no reference of
the applicability of the condition no.10.4.
52. It is also admitted position as has been admitted by the learned ASGI that
the applicability of the condition no.10.4 has also not been pleaded by the
respondent in the written statement before the Tribunal.
53. Further, it has been submitted that the applicability of the condition
no.10.4 has been taken into consideration in the light of the order passed
by this Court on 24.07.2025 and in course of delving with the issue, it has
been found that the petitioner has got appointment in Delhi Police and in
view of the examination, condition no.10.4 is required to be considered,
i.e., NOC from the civil employer to be placed at the time of document
verification.
54. This Court after going through the condition no.10.4 and making out an
additional ground as per the decision taken by the authority in the reasoned
order dated 22.03.2023 which has been passed in pursuance of the order
of command issued by the learned Tribunal in exercise of power conferred
under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and if the applicability of
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the condition as contained under condition no.10.4 was at all there, then it
should have been referred in the said reasoned order while rejecting the
candidature of the petitioner for consideration of his case under the ex-
servicemen category.
55. But the same has not been done as per the admitted case as has been
referred hereinabove rather it has been submitted that the applicability of
the condition as under condition no.10.4 has been considered in the light
of the interim order passed by this Court and hence, the same cannot be
said to be a reasoned consideration. But this Court, is not in agreement
with the same reason being that whatever order has been passed by this
Court, the same is in the pretext of the fact that the argument was advanced
on behalf of the petitioner that the petitioner has been subjected to hostile
discrimination by not giving the said benefit as was given to Mukesh
Anand, Nayak who was relieved from service w.e.f. 31.05.2020 and he
has been appointed. For ready reference, the order dated 24.07.2020 is
being reproduced as under:
“1. Heard.
2. It is a specific case of the petitioner that a similar situated employee
namely Sri Mukesh Anand, Nayak, who was relieved from service with
effect from 31.05.2000 was not only considered but thereafter appointed
in Guwahati Railway Recruitment Board whereas, the petitioner alone
was singled out since 10 other similarly situated persons have been
appointed in Railway Recruitment Board, Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh vide
order dated 03.11.2023.
3. It needs to be noticed that the contention of Sri Anand being appointed
was already considered before the learned Tribunal as is evident from
perusal of para-2 of the order passed by the learned Tribunal, but this
question was not at all dealt with by the learned Tribunal.
4. In the given circumstances, we deem it appropriate to direct the
respondents to file a supplementary affidavit regarding the appointment
given to Sri Mukesh Anand and how his case is different from the
petitioner. We further direct the respondents to file an affidavit explaining
how the cases of 10 other ex-servicemen, who have been given
appointment vide order dated 03.11.2023, is different from that of the
petitioner.
5. List after two weeks.”
56. This Court is of the view that the context of passing the order on
24.07.2025 by this Court was in the context of the issue of discrimination
and therefore, this Court has passed an order that how the case of Mukesh
Anand, Nayak is different to that of the case of the present petitioner. As
also, it is the admitted case that the NOC has subsequently been furnished
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on behalf of the petitioner to the appointing authority and as such, there is
no element of misrepresentation on the part of the petitioner.
57. Further, the respondent has been directed to file an affidavit explaining
how the case of 10 other ex-servicemen who have been appointed in
Railway Recruitment Board, Bilaspur, Chattisgarh vide order dated
03.11.2023 is different to that of the petitioner.
58. The aforesaid intent of the said order cannot be considered that the
respondent have been given further liberty to make improvement in the
decision already taken in the reasoned order rather the intend of the order
is to disclose the issue of discrimination by assigning the reason.
59. The fact about the case of the petitioner along with Mukesh Anand, Nayak
and other 10 candidates who have been considered in the ex-servicemen
category has been admitted to be not different to that of the case of the
present petitioner.
60. This Court in the aforesaid since is to be consider as to whether the
respondents have got any right to improve the reasoned order which has
already been taken on the basis of the order of passed by the learned
Tribunal. This Court is further of the view that if the respondent will be
allowed to improve the impugned order will it not amount to improving
the order during pendency of the lis. Further will it not be contrary to the
law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Mohinder Singh
Gill and another v. The Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi and
others, reported in (1978) 1 SCC 405. Relevant paragraph of the said
judgment is being reproduced as under:
“8. The second equally relevant matter is that when a statutory functionary
makes an order based on certain grounds, its validity must be judged by the
reasons so mentioned and cannot be supplemented by fresh reasons in the
shape of affidavit or otherwise. Otherwise, an order bad in the beginning
may, by the time it comes to Court on account of a challenge, get validated
by additional grounds later brought out. We may here draw attention to the
observations of Bose, J. in Gordhandas Bhanji:
“Public orders, publicly made, in exercise of a statutory authority cannot
be construed in the light of explanations subsequently given by the officer
making the order of what he meant, or of what was in his mind, or what
he intended to do. Public orders made by public authorities are meant to
have public effect and are intended to affect the actings and conduct of
those to whom they are addressed and must be construed objectively with
reference to the language used in the order itself.”
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Orders are not like old wine becoming better as they grow older.”
61. It is evident from the aforesaid pronouncement as rendered by the Hon’ble
Apex Court in the case of Mohinder Singh Gill and another v. The Chief
Election Commissioner, New Delhi and others (supra) that the order
passed by the authority cannot be allowed to be improved by way of
counter affidavit and exactly the case herein is. The reason which has been
assigned in the impugned is being sought to be improved by inserting
another reason in the garb of the order passed by this Court.
62. This Court has passed the order with the intend to seek justification of the
decision so taken as contained in the reasoned order dated 22.03.2023. The
fact about discriminatory attitude although has been pleaded but has not
been taken into consideration by the learned Tribunal, hence, this Court is
of the view that the order passed by the learned Tribunal suffers from
perversity.
63. This Court needs to refer herein the interpretation of the word “perverse”
as has been interpreted by the Hon’ble Apex Court which means that there
is no evidence or erroneous consideration of the evidence. The Hon’ble
Apex Court in Arulvelu and Anr. vs. State [Represented by the Public
Prosecutor] and Anr., (2009) 10 SCC 206 while elaborately discussing
the word perverse has held that it is, no doubt, true that if a finding of fact
is arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking into
consideration irrelevant material or if the finding so outrageously defies
logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality incurring the blame of being
perverse, then, the finding is rendered infirm in law. Relevant paragraphs,
i.e., paras-24, 25, 26 and 27 of the said judgment reads as under:
“24. The expression “perverse” has been dealt with in a number of
cases. In Gaya Din v. Hanuman Prasad [(2001) 1 SCC 501] this Court
observed that the expression “perverse” means that the findings of the
subordinate authority are not supported by the evidence brought on
record or they are against the law or suffer from the vice of procedural
irregularity.
25. In Parry’s (Calcutta) Employees’ Union v. Parry & Co. Ltd. [AIR
1966 Cal 31] the Court observed that “perverse finding” means a
finding which is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether
against the evidence itself. In Triveni Rubber & Plastics v. CCE [1994
Supp (3) SCC 665 : AIR 1994 SC 1341] the Court observed that this is
not a case where it can be said that the findings of the authorities are
based on no evidence or that they are so perverse that no reasonable
person would have arrived at those findings.
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26. In M.S. Narayanagouda v. Girijamma [AIR 1977 Kant 58] the
Court observed that any order made in conscious violation of pleading
and law is a perverse order. In Moffett v. Gough [(1878) 1 LR 1r 331]
the Court observed that a “perverse verdict” may probably be defined
as one that is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether
against the evidence. In Godfrey v. Godfrey [106 NW 814] the Court
defined “perverse” as turned the wrong way, not right; distorted from
the right; turned away or deviating from what is right, proper, correct,
etc.
27. The expression “perverse” has been defined by various dictionaries
in the following manner:
1. Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary of Current English, 6th
Edn.
“Perverse.–Showing deliberate determination to behave in a way
that most people think is wrong, unacceptable or unreasonable.”
2. Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English, International
Edn.
Perverse.–Deliberately departing from what is normal and
reasonable.
3. The New Oxford Dictionary of English, 1998 Edn.
Perverse.–Law (of a verdict) against the weight of evidence or the
direction of the judge on a point of law.
4. The New Lexicon Webster’s Dictionary of the English
Language (Deluxe Encyclopedic Edn.)
Perverse.–Purposely deviating from accepted or expected
behavior or opinion; wicked or wayward; stubborn; cross or petulant.
5. Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary of Words & Phrases, 4th Edn.
“Perverse.–A perverse verdict may probably be defined as one that is
not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the
evidence.””
64. Thus, a perverse verdict may probably be defined as one that is not only
against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence.
Further “perverse” means that the findings of the subordinate authority are
not supported by the evidence brought on record or they are against the
law or suffer from the vice of procedural irregularity.
65. The consideration on the issue of parity with the case of Mukesh Anand,
Nayak and other identical placed candidates who have participated in the
process of selection conducted by the railway recruitment board of
Guwahati and Bilaspur since has not been considered even though the
same has been taken note in the impugned order passed by the Tribunal,
as such, according to our considered view, the aforesaid non-consideration
of the issue of parity comes under the fold of perversity.
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66. This Court in view of the aforesaid after having exercising the power of
judicial review in view of the law laid down in the case of L. Chandra
Kumar vs. Union of India and Ors. (supra) is of the view that the
impugned order passed by the learned Tribunal needs interference.
67. Accordingly, the order dated 23.10.2024 passed in O.A.
No.OA/051/00265/2023 by the learned Central Administrative Tribunal,
Patna Bench, Circuit Bench, Ranchi is hereby quashed and set aside.
68. In consequence thereof, the instant writ petition stands allowed.
69. This Court intends to remit the matter before the learned Tribunal but no
purpose would be served as it is a matter of recruitment and further if the
fact about the discrimination would have been disputed then the matter
would have been remitted to the Tribunal to adjudicate the issue but that
is not the fact herein, rather the fact about discrimination has been
admitted as has been referred hereinabove, then, the question is that for
what purpose the matter is to be remitted.
70. This Court, therefore, is of the view that it is not a case where the case is
to be remitted rather this Court is of the view that the command is to be
issued upon the respondents in exercise of power under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India to come out with the appointment letter in favour of
the petitioner.
71. Accordingly, the concerned respondent is directed to issue appointment
letter in favour of the petitioner within a period of four weeks from the
date of receipt/production of the order.
72. Pending interlocutory application(s), if any, also stands disposed of.
(Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.)
I agree,
(Deepak Roshan, J.) (Deepak Roshan, J.)
06th April, 2026
Saurabh/-
A.F.R.
Uploaded on: 07.04.2026
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