Calcutta High Court (Appellete Side)
Ramlal vs State Of West Bengal & Ors on 6 April, 2026
IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
CRIMINAL REVISIONAL JURISDICTION
APPELLATE SIDE
PRESENT:
THE HON'BLE JUSTICE UDAY KUMAR
CRR 3455 OF 2017
RAMLAL
-VS-
STATE OF WEST BENGAL & ORS.
For the Petitioner : Mr. Arnab Chatterjee,
Mr. Avik Ghosh
Mrs. Debolina Ray
For the NCB : Mr. Kallol Kumar Basu
Mr. Priyankar Ganguly
Hearing concluded on : 01.04.2026
Judgment on : 06.04.2026
UDAY KUMAR, J.: -
1.
INTRODUCTION
1.1. This is an application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973, preferred by the petitioner, Ramlal, a resident of
the Kullu district in Himachal Pradesh. The petitioner seeks the
quashing of the criminal proceedings in Special Case No. 3(12) of
2012 (arising out of Tiljala P.S. Case No. 274 of 2012), presently
pending before the Learned Special Judge, Alipore. The petitioner
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CRR 3455 OF 2017
stands implicated by way of a supplementary complaint filed by the
Narcotics Control Bureau (NCB) for the alleged commission of
offences punishable under Sections 20(b)(ii)(C), 25, 27, 27A, and
29 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (NDPS) Act,
1985.
1.2. The core of the challenge rests on the legality of a “further
investigation” that resulted in the petitioner’s impleadment as an
accused nearly five years after the initial seizure of contraband. The
fundamental issue before this Court is whether the prosecution can
be permitted to proceed when the incriminating material consists
solely of confessional statements recorded under Section 67 of the
NDPS Act, in the total absence of physical, digital, or financial
corroboration. This Court is called upon to determine if the
continuation of such a trial, fourteen years after the alleged offence,
constitutes a manifest abuse of the process of law.
2. THE FACTUAL MATRIX
2.1. Genesis: The 2012 Tiljala Seizure
2.1.1. The factual matrix of the case dates back to July 9, 2012.
Acting on a secret intelligence report, the Narcotic Cell of the
Detective Department, Kolkata Police, intercepted one Melvin Smith
near Tiljala High School. A search conducted under the statutory
rigours of the NDPS Act led to the recovery of 1.050 kg of Charas
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(classified as a “commercial quantity”) from his conscious
possession.
2.1.2. Consequently, Tiljala P.S. Case No. 274 of 2012 was
registered. The initial investigation identified a local network
involving one Rajeev Mohta, alleged to be a financier and organizer
of rave parties. On December 5, 2012, the local police submitted a
charge sheet against Smith and Mohta. It is a matter of record that
at this primary stage, the petitioner was neither named in the FIR
nor was his involvement even remotely suspected by the
investigating agency.
2.2. Judicial Intervention and Transfer of Probe
2.2.1. The trajectory of the prosecution shifted fundamentally due
to judicial intervention in a collateral proceeding, being CRR 1730 of
2013. During the monitoring of that investigation, this Court
expressed grave dissatisfaction with the Kolkata Police’s failure to
identify the “source” or “upstream supplier” of the seized narcotics.
2.2.2. Observing that the investigation was “far from reality,” this
Court, by an order dated September 29, 2016, directed the transfer
of the investigation to the Narcotics Control Bureau (NCB), Kolkata
Zonal Unit. The NCB was mandated to conduct a “further
investigation” to unearth the inter-state supply chain that fuelled
the narcotics trade in Kolkata.
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2.3. The NCB Investigation and “The Himachal Connection”
2.3.1. Upon assuming the investigation in October 2016, the NCB
recorded several voluntary statements under Section 67 of the
NDPS Act. Through these statements–specifically those of Melvin
Smith and a deceased intermediary, Andre Douglas Feol @ Ginger–
the name of the petitioner emerged as the alleged “kingpin
supplier” based in Himachal Pradesh.
2.3.2. The NCB’s theory posits a sophisticated logistics chain where
the petitioner allegedly dispatched Charas consignments from Kullu
to Kolkata via the rail route. The agency further fortified its
suspicion by linking the petitioner to a separate seizure in NCB
Crime No. 07/2012, thereby categorizing him as a habitual offender
within the narcotics trade.
2.4. Procedural Delay and the Supplementary Complaint
2.4.1. The impleadment of the petitioner in 2017–five years post-
incident–was marked by further procedural hurdles. The NCB
attributed the delay in serving notice to the petitioner to severe
climatic conditions and heavy snowfall in the Mandi and Kullu sub-
zones during January 2017.
2.4.2. Following the service of notice, the petitioner appeared
before the Investigating Officer on February 8, 2017, where his
voluntary statement was recorded. Subsequently, the NCB filed a
formal Prosecution Complaint on March 9, 2017, naming Ramlal as
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CRR 3455 OF 2017Accused No. 5. The prosecution contends that this delay was
“sufficiently explained” by the judicial transfer of the case and the
inherent complexities of tracing inter-state drug syndicates.
3. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER
3.1. Mr. Arnab Chatterjee, Learned Advocate appearing for the
Petitioner has mounted a multi-pronged challenge, contending that
the Petitioner has been victimized by a “manufactured and delayed”
investigation. It was argued with considerable vehemence that the
entire Prosecution Complaint, insofar as it relates to the Petitioner,
is built upon a foundation of sand, as it relies exclusively on
voluntary statements recorded under Section 67 of the NDPS Act.
3.2. Heavy reliance was placed upon the landmark judgement in
Tofan Singh vs. State of Tamil Nadu [(2021) 4 SCC 1], wherein the
Hon’ble Apex Court held that NCB officers are “police officers” within
the meaning of the Evidence Act. Consequently, any confession
made to them is hit by the exclusionary rule of Section 25. It was
emphasized that in the absence of independent corroboration,
neither the Petitioner’s own purported admission nor the statements
of co-accused Melvin Smith can be elevated to the status of
substantive evidence.
3.3. Highlighting an “evidential vacuum,” Learned Counsel pointed
out several “missing links” that, in his submission, are fatal to the
prosecution. It was highlighted that there was no physical recovery
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CRR 3455 OF 2017of any contraband from the Petitioner in the instant case, nor has
the agency produced any Call Detail Records (CDRs) or tower
location data to establish a telephonic nexus between the Petitioner
in Kullu and the distributors in Kolkata during the relevant period of
2012. Furthermore, the absence of any monetary trail, such as bank
transfers or cash receipts, severely undermines the allegation of a
commercial drug syndicate.
3.4. Addressing the death of the alleged primary link, Andre
Douglas @ Ginger, in 2015, Counsel argued that the NCB exploited
this demise to plant a narrative that cannot be tested through
cross-examination, thereby causing irreparable prejudice to the
Petitioner’s defence. Finally, it was submitted that forcing the
Petitioner to face trial fourteen years after the alleged offence,
based on “stale” and “inadmissible” material, constitutes a gross
violation of the Right to a Speedy Trial under Article 21 and a clear
abuse of the process of law.
4. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE OPPOSITE PARTY NO. 2
(NCB)
4.1. Mr. Kallol Kumar Basu, Learned Advocate appearing for the
Narcotics Control Bureau (NCB) has strongly opposed the revisional
application, contending that the present petition is a premature
attempt to stifle a legitimate prosecution involving an organized
inter-state narcotics syndicate. It was submitted that the gravity of
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the offence, involving the trafficking of commercial quantities of
Charas, outweighs the procedural grievances raised by the
Petitioner.
4.2. Addressing the primary challenge regarding the delay in
impleadment, Learned Counsel for the NCB argued that such delay
was neither intentional nor a result of laches. It was submitted that
the initial investigation by the local police was found to be “far from
reality” by this Hon’ble Court, which necessitated the transfer of the
probe to a specialized agency in late 2016. The “further
investigation” conducted by the NCB was a direct consequence of a
judicial mandate to unearth the “source” of the contraband. Counsel
emphasized that in complex narcotics networks, the identity of the
“upstream supplier” often emerges only after a deep-dive inquiry
into the supply chain, and as such, the timing of the Petitioner’s
impleadment is “sufficiently explained” by the change in
investigating agencies.
4.3. On the issue of admissibility of evidence, the NCB’s counsel
argued that the ratio of Tofan Singh vs. State of Tamil Nadu should
not be applied at this preliminary stage to quash the entire
proceedings. It was contended that the statements recorded under
Section 67 of the NDPS Act provide a vital “prima facie” link that
must be tested during a full-fledged trial. Learned Counsel
submitted that “corroboration” is a matter of evidence to be
appreciated by the Trial Court after the examination of witnesses,
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CRR 3455 OF 2017
and the Revisional Court should loathe conducting a “mini-trial” to
determine the weight of the material at the stage of framing
charges.
4.4. Regarding the “evidential nexus,” the prosecution highlighted
that the Petitioner is not a stranger to the trade. Reliance was
placed on the criminal antecedents of the Petitioner, specifically his
involvement in NCB Crime No. 07/2012 involving 2.9 kg of Charas.
It was argued that the consistency between the statements of co-
accused Melvin Smith and the Petitioner’s own purported
admissions creates a “chain of circumstances” that clearly points
toward a conspiracy under Section 29 of the NDPS Act. The NCB
maintained that the Petitioner acted as the “root” of the supply
chain, and his role in “financing” or “abetting” the trade attracts the
rigors of Section 27A and Section 25 of the Act.
4.5. Finally, responding to the Petitioner’s claim of “violation of
Article 21,” Learned Counsel for the NCB argued that the trial has
remained stalled primarily due to the revisional stay obtained by the
Petitioner himself since 2018. It was submitted that a person
accused of organized drug trafficking cannot take advantage of a
“self-created” delay to seek the quashing of a case. The prosecution
urged the Court to consider that the materials on record are
sufficient to show a prima facie involvement, and any “disputed
questions of fact” regarding telephonic records or monetary trails
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CRR 3455 OF 2017
are matters for the Trial Court to determine upon the conclusion of
the evidence.
4.6. In conclusion, the Narcotics Control Bureau has prayed for the
outright dismissal of the revisional application. It was submitted
that the interest of justice and the safety of the society at large
demand that the Petitioner be made to stand trial. The Agency
further prayed for a direction to the Learned Special Judge, Alipore,
to expedite the trial and conclude the proceedings within a fixed
timeframe, asserting that “quashing” at this juncture would grant
an underserved immunity to a habitual offender involved in the illicit
trafficking of commercial quantities of narcotics.
5. POINTS FOR DETERMINATION
5.1. Whether the “further investigation” conducted by the
Narcotics Control Bureau (NCB) between 2016 and 2017–resulting
in the impleadment of the Petitioner five years after the initial
seizure–is “sufficiently explained” by the judicial order of this
Hon’ble Court in CRR 1730 of 2013, or whether such a delayed
prosecution constitutes an “afterthought” that vitiates the
proceedings against the Petitioner.
5.2. Whether, in light of the landmark judgment of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Tofan Singh vs. State of Tamil Nadu (2021), the
Prosecution Complaint against the Petitioner can be sustained when
the prima facie material consists almost exclusively of
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CRR 3455 OF 2017
“confessional” statements recorded under Section 67 of the NDPS
Act by the NCB officers.
5.3. Whether the total absence of physical recovery from the
Petitioner, coupled with the lack of a telephonic nexus (CDRs) or a
financial trail (bank transactions), renders the charge of “Criminal
Conspiracy” under Section 29 and “Financing Illicit Traffic” under
Section 27A legally unsustainable at the stage of framing of
charges.
5.4. Whether the death of the primary intermediary, Andre
Douglas @ Ginger, prior to the Petitioner’s impleadment, has
caused such “irreparable prejudice” to the Petitioner’s right to cross-
examination and defense that the continuation of the trial would
amount to a violation of the principles of natural justice.
5.5. Whether the pendency of this criminal proceeding for over
fourteen years (2012-2026) violates the Petitioner’s Fundamental
Right to a Speedy Trial under Article 21 of the Constitution of India,
particularly where the delay is a composite result of judicial
transfer, agency transitions, and revisional stays.
5.6. Whether the present case falls within the “rarest of rare”
categories as defined in State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal, where the
allegations in the complaint, even if taken at their face value, do not
prima facie constitute a legal offence against the Petitioner, thereby
justifying the exercise of this Court’s inherent power to quash the
proceedings to prevent an abuse of the process of law.
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CRR 3455 OF 2017
6. DISCUSSIONON THE LEGALITY OF “FURTHER
INVESTIGATION” AND DELAYED IMPLEADMENT
6.1. The first and perhaps most fundamental question that falls for
the consideration of this Court is whether the impleadment of the
Petitioner in the year 2017, arising out of a seizure occurring as far
back as July 2012, is legally sustainable, or whether such a hiatus
vitiates the very foundation of the prosecution against him.
6.2. It is a matter of record, as noted in the factual matrix
hereinabove, that the initial investigation conducted by the Narcotic
Cell of the Kolkata Police concluded with a charge sheet in
December 2012, wherein the Petitioner’s name was conspicuously
absent. The Petitioner’s involvement surfaced only after the
investigation was transferred to the Narcotics Control Bureau (NCB)
by a judicial mandate of this Court on September 29, 2016. The
NCB, invoking its powers of “further investigation,” contends that
this delay was a procedural necessity born out of the previous
agency’s failure to identify the “source” of the contraband.
6.3. To test the legality of this “further investigation,” I must first
refer to Section 173(8) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973,
which explicitly permits the investigating agency to conduct further
probe and submit a supplementary report even after the Magistrate
has taken cognizance of the primary offense. The Hon’ble Supreme
Court has consistently held that the statutory right of the police to
conduct a further investigation is not exhausted by the filing of a
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CRR 3455 OF 2017
single charge sheet. However, such a power must be exercised with
“due diligence” and cannot be used as a tool to fill up gaps in a
“stale” prosecution.
6.4. In the instant case, the NCB justifies the five-year delay by
relying on the specific circumstances of the transfer. Learned
Counsel for the NCB argued that the “Himachal Connection” was a
latent fact that only a specialized federal agency could unearth. Per
contra, the Petitioner argues that this is a case of “intentional
padding.” He relies on the ratio of State of Andhra Pradesh vs. A.S.
Peter [(2008) 2 SCC 383], where the Apex Court observed that
while further investigation is permissible, it cannot be a “re-
investigation” or a “fresh investigation” started ab initio to satisfy a
different theory.
6.5. Upon a careful perusal of the Case Diary and the Prosecution
Complaint, this Court finds that the NCB’s entry into the matter was
not a voluntary act but was triggered by a specific direction of this
Court in CRR 1730 of 2013. In that proceeding, this Court had
observed:
“The investigation conducted by the State Police appears to
be far from reality… it is a fit case where the investigating
agency should be changed to unearth the true source.”
6.6. Therefore, strictly on the point of procedure, the delay in
naming the Petitioner cannot be termed as “unexplained laches” on
the part of the NCB. The agency took over a “cold case” in October
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CRR 3455 OF 2017
2016 and submitted its complaint in March 2017. Within the context
of the NCB’s timeline, the investigation moved with reasonable
dispatch. The delay from 2012 to 2016 was a systemic delay caused
by the “dissatisfactory” probe of the local police, which was
subsequently corrected by judicial intervention.
6.7. However, the mere fact that the delay is “explained” does not
automatically validate the quality of the evidence discovered during
such a delayed probe. The Petitioner has rightly relied on the spirit
of the Bhajan Lal ratio, arguing that if a further investigation,
conducted after a gap of five years, produces no “new” physical
evidence but relies solely on the “re-statement” of old accused
persons, such a probe becomes suspect.
6.8. In this context, we must examine the “inter-agency” link. The
NCB discovered the Petitioner’s name while he was already in
custody for NCB Crime No. 07/2012. While the NCB argues this
shows a “pattern of conduct,” the Petitioner contends it shows a
“pattern of convenience”–that the agency simply picked a known
offender from their records to satisfy the High Court’s demand for a
“source.”
6.9. Consequently, while this Court answers Point No. 1 by holding
that the “further investigation” was procedurally valid under Section
173(8) Cr.P.C. and sufficiently explained by the judicial order of
2016, this validity is subject to a vital caveat: The delay, though
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CRR 3455 OF 2017
explained, places a heavier burden on the prosecution to produce
“independent corroborative material” that survives the test of time.
6.10. Having established that the NCB had the legal authority to
implead the Petitioner at a later stage, I must now move to the
more substantial question: Whether the material discovered during
this legally valid “further investigation” is admissible in the eyes of
the law? This leads me naturally to the discussion on Point No. 2,
involving the impact of the Tofan Singh judgment on the Section 67
statements which form the bedrock of this delayed prosecution.
7. DISCUSSION ON ADMISSIBILITY OF SECTION 67
STATEMENTS POST-TOFAN SINGH
7.1. Having held that the “further investigation” by the NCB was
procedurally sanctioned under Section 173(8) of the Code, this
Court now address the more substantial challenge: the legal quality
of the material discovered during that period. The Petitioner’s
primary contention is that the entire Prosecution Complaint, insofar
as it impleads him as Accused No. 5, is built upon a “house of
cards” consisting solely of statements recorded under Section 67 of
the NDPS Act, 1985.
7.2. The law governing the admissibility of such statements has
undergone a tectonic shift during the pendency of this revision. The
Learned Advocate for the Petitioner has placed heavy reliance on
the landmark judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Tofan
Singh vs. State of Tamil Nadu [(2021) 4 SCC 1]. In that case, the
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CRR 3455 OF 2017
Majority Opinion of the Full Bench effectively dismantled the long-
standing practice of treating confessions made to NCB officers as
substantive evidence.
7.3. The Hon’ble Apex Court, in Paragraph 158 of the Tofan Singh
judgment, categorically held:
“We hold that the officers who are invested with powers
under Section 53 of the NDPS Act are ‘police officers’
within the meaning of Section 25 of the Evidence Act, as a
result of which any confessional statement made to them
would be hit by the provisions of Section 25 of the
Evidence Act, and cannot be taken into consideration by
the Court to convict an accused under the NDPS Act.”
7.4. Applying this ratio to the present facts, this Court notes that
the “prima facie material” cited by the NCB against Ramlal consists
of:
i. The statement of co-accused Melvin Smith;
ii. The statement of the deceased Andre Douglas @
Ginger; and
iii. The purported voluntary confession of the Petitioner
himself, recorded on February 8, 2017.
7.5. Under the mandate of Tofan Singh, all three categories of
statements are rendered inadmissible as substantive evidence. The
statement of a co-accused cannot be used to “marshal” a case
against another, and the Petitioner’s own statement, being a
confession to a “police officer” (as defined by the Apex Court for the
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CRR 3455 OF 2017purposes of the NDPS Act), is hit by the exclusionary rule of the
7.6. The NCB has argued that these statements should still be
considered at the stage of “framing of charges” to show a prima
facie case. However, this Court must refer to the subsequent
clarification by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State by (NCB)
Bengaluru vs. Pallulabid Ahmad Arimutta [(2022) 12 SCC 633],
where it was observed that:
“The trial court as well as the High Court were quite right
in holding that a confession recorded under Section 67 of
the NDPS Act will remain inadmissible and cannot be used
as a substantive piece of evidence… even for the purpose
of justifying the continued custody of the accused.
7.7. “It logically follows that if such material cannot justify
“custody,” it certainly cannot justify the prolongation of a criminal
trial that has already been delayed by fourteen years. A trial cannot
be a “fishing expedition” where the prosecution hopes to stumble
upon evidence that it failed to secure during the investigation.
7.8. Furthermore, the death of Andre Douglas @ Ginger in 2015
creates a unique evidentiary vacuum. Even if, for the sake of
argument, his statement was treated as a “statement of a deceased
person” under Section 32 of the Evidence Act, it would still fail the
test of reliability because it was recorded by a police officer under
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CRR 3455 OF 2017the coercive atmosphere of an NDPS investigation, without the
safeguard of cross-examination.
7.9. Consequently, this Court finds that the “further investigation”
conducted by the NCB, while procedurally valid, has failed to
produce any legally admissible material that could survive the
scrutiny of a trial. The reliance on Section 67 statements–in the
absence of any “recovery” or “independent corroboration”–renders
the prosecution’s case against the Petitioner legally “dead on
arrival.”
7.10. This finding on the inadmissibility of the core evidence
naturally necessitates an inquiry into whether there exists any
independent corroborative material–such as digital footprints or
financial trails–that could bypass the Tofan Singh hurdle. This leads
me to the discussion on Point No. 3, where I shall examine the
“missing links” in the alleged conspiracy.
8. DISCUSSION ON ABSENCE OF INDEPENDENT
CORROBORATIVE EVIDENCE
8.1. The conclusion reached in the preceding point that Section 67
statements are inadmissible ordinarily marks the end of a
prosecution under the NDPS Act unless the Agency can demonstrate
the existence of independent corroborative material. In the present
case, the NCB contends that the Petitioner was the “source” of a
commercial quantity of Charas. However, a “source” in a criminal
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conspiracy under Section 29 cannot be identified by mere verbal
assertions of co-accused; there must be a “nexus” established
through tangible evidence.
8.2. Upon a meticulous examination of the Prosecution Complaint
and the records of the “further investigation,” this Court finds a
glaring “evidential vacuum” regarding the following three pillars of a
narcotics conspiracy, the Absence of Physical Recovery, the Lack of
Telephonic Nexus (CDRs) and the Absence of a Financial Trail.
8.3. It is undisputed that no contraband was recovered from the
person, premises, or conscious possession of the Petitioner in
connection with the Tiljala seizure of July 2012. While Section 29 of
the NDPS Act punishes the “abettor” and “conspirator” even in the
absence of recovery, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Punjab
vs. Baldev Singh [(1999) 6 SCC 172] has emphasized that the
rigors of the Act demand a higher standard of proof when the liberty
of a citizen is at stake. Without a “recovery” to link the Petitioner to
the specific batch of 1.050 kg of Charas, the prosecution relies
entirely on a “ghost trail.”
8.4. In modern narcotics jurisprudence, Call Detail Records (CDRs)
often serve as the “digital glue” that binds a conspiracy. The Ld.
Advocate for the Petitioner has rightly pointed out that the NCB has
failed to produce any CDRs, tower location data, or subscriber
details to show that the Petitioner in Himachal Pradesh was in
communication with Melvin Smith or Rajeev Mohta in Kolkata during
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the relevant period of 2011-2012. In Karan Talwar vs. State (2024),
it was observed that:
“In the absence of any recovery, the telephonic contact
between the accused persons becomes the primary link to
establish a meeting of minds. If that link is missing, the
charge of conspiracy fails.” In the instant case, the five-
year delay in the NCB’s entry has resulted in the
“evaporation” of this digital evidence, a lapse that cannot
be held against the Petitioner.
8.5. The NCB alleges that the Petitioner sold Charas for a profit of
Rs. 5,000 per kg. However, the “further investigation” has not
yielded a single bank statement, wire transfer, or ledger entry to
show that money flowed from the “organizers” in Kolkata to the
“supplier” in Kullu. To sustain a charge under Section 27A
(Financing Illicit Traffic), the prosecution must show the actual
“financing” or “harboring.” A mere statement of an accused that
“money was paid” is not a substitute for the financial audit required
by law.
8.6. The NCB has urged this Court to consider the “Criminal
Antecedents” of the Petitioner as a corroborative factor. While the
Petitioner’s involvement in NCB Crime No. 07/2012 may paint him
as a person of interest, it is a settled principle of criminal law that
an accused cannot be convicted in “Case B” simply because he is an
accused in “Case A.” Each case must stand on its own legs. The
“bad character” of the Petitioner is not a substitute for “prima facie
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CRR 3455 OF 2017evidence” of his involvement in this specific seizure of 1.050 kg of
Charas.
8.7. Consequently, this Court finds that the “further investigation”
has failed to unearth any independent, scientific, or documentary
evidence to corroborate the inadmissible statements recorded under
Section 67. The “chain of circumstances” is not just broken; its links
were never forged.
8.8. The cumulative effect of the findings on Points 1, 2, and 3
leads to an inescapable conclusion that the Petitioner has been
impleaded after a five-year delay based on material that is legally
inadmissible and factually uncorroborated. This brings me to the
final consideration that whether, in light of these failures, the
continuation of the trial constitutes a violation of the Petitioner’s
fundamental rights. This court shall now address Point Nos. 4 and 5
regarding the prejudice caused by the death of a witness and the
violation of the Right to a Speedy Trial.
9. DISCUSSION ON IMPACT OF THE DEATH OF A CRUCIAL
LINK AND THE RESULTANT PREJUDICE
9.1. Even if one were to momentarily set aside the rigors of the
Tofan Singh doctrine, a “just and proper” adjudication of this
revision requires this Court to examine the practicality of a trial
after a lapse of fourteen years, specifically in light of the death of
the alleged kingpin intermediary, Andre Douglas Feol @ Ginger.
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CRR 3455 OF 2017
9.2. The prosecution’s narrative is that the Petitioner, based in
Himachal Pradesh, had no direct contact with the distributors in
Kolkata; the entire “bridge” of the conspiracy was built upon the
person of “Ginger,” who purportedly collected the contraband from
the Petitioner and transported it to the co-accused. It is a matter of
record that the said “Ginger” died in the year 2015–two years
before the NCB formally impleaded the Petitioner and five years
before any trial could realistically commence against him.
9.3. This Court finds that the death of the solitary link between the
“Source” (the Petitioner) and the “Seizure” (in Kolkata) creates a
constitutional crisis for the defense. Under Article 21 of the
Constitution of India, the right to a “Fair Trial” is an inalienable
component of the Right to Life. A fair trial necessarily includes the
right of an accused to cross-examine the person whose statements
or actions form the primary basis of the charge against him.
9.4. The Learned Advocate for the Petitioner has argued, with
significant merit, that by naming the Petitioner only after the death
of “Ginger,” the NCB has effectively stripped the Petitioner of his
“Shield of Defense.” There is no living witness who can testify to the
alleged “meeting of minds” between the Petitioner and the deceased
middleman. The Petitioner is now asked to defend himself against a
“ghostly” allegation that cannot be corroborated or refuted by the
only person who could have spoken to the truth of the transaction.
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CRR 3455 OF 2017
9.5. In this context, I refer to the principle that “Justice must not
only be done but must be seen to be done.” If a trial proceeds
under these circumstances, the Petitioner would be forced into a
“blind trial” where the primary evidence against him is a dead man’s
statement, a statement that was recorded by a police officer while
the deceased himself was an accused under the threat of
prosecution. This Court holds that such a scenario violates the
fundamental principle of Natural Justice and the “Right to
Confrontation” which is a hallmark of an adversarial criminal justice
system.
9.6. Furthermore, the delay in impleading the Petitioner (2012-
2017) and the subsequent delay in the trial (2017-2026) has led to
the “fading of memory” of other official witnesses. It is highly
improbable that seizure witnesses or investigating officers could
reliably recall the nuances of a 2012 transaction to provide a fair
opportunity for cross-examination.
9.7. Consequently, this Court finds that the death of the primary
intermediary, coupled with the systemic delay, has caused
irreparable prejudice to the Petitioner. The “bridge” of the
conspiracy having collapsed with the demise of Andre Douglas @
Ginger, any attempt to reconstruct it through the inadmissible
statements of other co-accused would be a legal fallacy.
9.8. This leads me to the final and cumulative consideration of
Point No. 5: Whether this structural prejudice, combined with the
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fourteen-year timeline, constitutes a terminal violation of the Right
to a Speedy Trial. I shall now address the constitutional mandate of
Article 21 in the concluding phase of our discussion.
10. DISCUSSION ON VIOLATION OF THE RIGHT TO A
SPEEDY TRIAL AND THE EXERCISE OF INHERENT POWERS
UNDER SECTION 482 CR.P.C.
10.1. The final and perhaps most overarching questions before me
are whether the fourteen-year pendency of this proceeding
constitutes a terminal violation of the Petitioner’s Fundamental Right
to a Speedy Trial, and whether this is a fit case for the exercise of
this Court’s Inherent Powers to quash the prosecution.
10.2. It is a settled legal proposition that the right to a speedy trial
is an inalienable component of the “Right to Life and Liberty”
enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution of India. In the seminal
case of P. Ramachandra Rao vs. State of Karnataka [(2002) 4 SCC
578], the Hon’ble Supreme Court reaffirmed that the State is under
a constitutional obligation to provide a speedy trial, and the “sword
of Damocles” cannot be permitted to hang over the head of an
accused indefinitely.
10.3. In the present case, the timeline is staggering. The alleged
offence occurred in July 2012. The Petitioner was impleaded in
March 2017. We are now in the year 2026. This fourteen-year delay
is a composite result of an initially “ineffective” investigation by the
24
CRR 3455 OF 2017local police, a subsequent transition to the NCB, and a protracted
revisional stay. While the NCB argues that the delay is “procedural,”
this Court must look at the prejudice caused to the accused. As
observed in Abdul Rehman Antulay vs. R.S. Nayak [(1992) 1 SCC
225], the “Right to a Speedy Trial” is not a mere soft-hearted
sentiment but a constitutional mandate to protect an accused from
the mental agony and social infamy of a never-ending prosecution.
10.4. This brings me to Point No. 6; the exercise of inherent powers
under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (now applicable
under the relevant provisions of the BNSS). The Hon’ble Supreme
Court in State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal [1992 Supp (1) SCC 335]
laid down the categories where the High Court should exercise its
power to quash. Category (1) and (3) are squarely applicable here:
“Where the allegations made in the first information report
or the complaint… even if they are taken at their face
value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie
constitute any offence…”
10.5. Having already held in Point Nos. 2 and 3 that the core
evidence (Section 67 statements) is legally inadmissible per Tofan
Singh and that there is a total absence of corroborative material (no
recovery, no CDRs, no financial trail), the continuation of the trial
would be nothing short of a “judicial charade.” To force the Petitioner
to stand trial after fourteen years–where the primary link (Andre
Douglas @ Ginger) is dead and the evidentiary foundation is non-
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CRR 3455 OF 2017
existent–would be a classic instance of the abuse of the process of
law.
10.6. This Court is mindful that narcotics offences are “crimes
against society.” However, the graver the offence, the stricter must
be the adherence to procedural and constitutional safeguards. In
Vakil Prasad Singh vs. State of Bihar [(2009) 3 SCC 355], the Apex
Court held that if the right to a speedy trial is infringed, the only
“just and proper” direction is to quash the proceedings. To allow this
“stale” prosecution to proceed would be a futile exercise, consuming
precious judicial time without any possibility of a legal conviction.
10.7. Consequently, this Court holds that the cumulative delay, the
death of a key intermediary, and the lack of admissible material
have collectively resulted in a terminal violation of the Petitioner’s
constitutional rights. This is a fit case where the inherent power of
the High Court must be invoked to secure the ends of justice and to
prevent the Petitioner from being subjected to further vexatious
litigation.
11. FINAL CONCLUSION ON FACTS AND LAW
11.1 Having meticulously appraised the factual matrix and the rival
legal contentions as delineated in the preceding paragraphs, this
Court arrives at a definite conclusion based on the following
synthesized findings:
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CRR 3455 OF 2017
11.2 While the “further investigation” by the NCB was procedurally
sanctioned under Section 173(8) Cr.P.C. and triggered by a judicial
mandate, it remains a fact that the Petitioner was impleaded after a
five-year hiatus. This Court finds that while the delay was
“explained” by the change in investigating agencies, the
investigative output failed to bridge the gap between the 2012
seizure and the Petitioner’s residence in Himachal Pradesh with any
tangible or contemporaneous material.
11.3 This Court concludes as a matter of law that the “prima facie
material” relied upon by the NCB is legally non-existent. Following
the ratio in Tofan Singh (2021), the Section 67 statements of the
Petitioner and the co-accused are inadmissible. Furthermore, the
total absence of corroborative evidence–specifically the lack of Call
Detail Records (CDRs) and a Financial/Bank trail–renders the
charge of “Criminal Conspiracy” under Section 29 of the NDPS Act
an unsustainable legal fiction. The prosecution’s case rests entirely
on the “confessions” of accused persons, which the law has now
categorically rejected as substantive evidence.
11.4 On facts, the death of the primary intermediary, Andre
Douglas @ Ginger, in 2015, has created an incurable “evidentiary
void.” Since the Petitioner’s alleged involvement was exclusively
through this deceased middleman, the Petitioner has been stripped
of his Right to Confrontation and his ability to mount an effective
defense. This Court concludes that forcing a trial where the primary
27
CRR 3455 OF 2017link is deceased and the evidence is inadmissible would result in a
“trial by ambush,” violating the principles of Natural Justice.
11.5 In view of the fourteen-year timeline (2012-2026), this Court
concludes that the Petitioner’s Fundamental Right to a Speedy Trial
under Article 21 has been terminally infringed. A trial that has not
even commenced its substantive stage after a decade and a half is,
by definition, a “failed prosecution.” Consequently, this is a fit case
for the exercise of the Inherent Powers of the High Court under
Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (and the
corresponding provisions of the BNSS) to prevent the continued
abuse of the judicial process.
12. CONSEQUENTIAL ORDERS AND DIRECTIONS
12.1. In view of the findings on the questions of law and fact
recorded hereinabove, and for the purpose of the final and complete
disposal of this revisional application, the following consequential
orders and directions are hereby issued:
a) In the result, the revisional application being C.R.R.
3455 of 2017 is hereby allowed.
b) The proceedings in connection with the Prosecution
Complaint filed by the Narcotics Control Bureau (NCB)
arising out of Tiljala P.S. Case No. 274 of 2012
(corresponding to Special Case No. 138/2012), including
all subsequent supplementary charges or materials
28
CRR 3455 OF 2017submitted thereunder, presently pending before the
Learned Special Judge, NDPS Act, Alipore, are hereby
quashed and set aside insofar as they relate to the
Petitioner, Ramlal.
c) The Petitioner is discharged from the rigors of the
criminal prosecution in this case.
i. If the Petitioner is currently in custody in
connection with this specific case, he shall be
released forthwith, unless his detention is
required in connection with any other legal
matter.
ii. If the Petitioner is on bail, the underlying Bail
Bonds and sureties shall stand cancelled and
discharged, and
12.2. All connected applications, if any, also stand disposed of.
12.3. The interim stay granted earlier by this Court in this matter
stands vacated in light of the final quashing of the proceedings
against the Petitioner.
12.4. The Learned Special Judge, NDPS Act, Alipore, is directed to
immediately recall and vacate any outstanding Warrant of Arrest
(W.B.A./N.B.W.), Proclamation and Attachment orders (u/s 82/83
Cr.P.C. or corresponding BNSS provisions), or “Look Out Circulars”
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CRR 3455 OF 2017
(LOC) issued against the Petitioner in connection with this
proceeding.
12.5. Any personal documents, identification papers, or financial
securities belonging to the Petitioner that were seized by the NCB or
deposited with the Learned Trial Court as a condition of bail or
investigation shall be returned to the Petitioner or his authorized
representative upon proper identification and application, within a
period of four weeks from the date of this order.
12.6. Since this order of quashing is based on the specific “lack of
link” and “inadmissibility of evidence” pertaining to the Petitioner
(Accused No. 5), the Learned Trial Court is at liberty to proceed
with the trial against the remaining accused persons (specifically
Accused Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 4), if they are surviving and available for
trial.
12.7. The Learned Trial Court is directed to take note of this order
and proceed with the trial against the remaining accused persons, if
any, with utmost expedition without granting unnecessary
adjournments to either party.
13. There shall be no order as to costs.
14. Let a copy of this judgment be sent down to the Learned Trial
Court immediately for information and necessary compliance.
15. Urgent photostat certified copies of this judgment, if applied
for, be supplied to the parties upon compliance with all requisite
formalities.
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CRR 3455 OF 2017
16. The Department is directed to send down the LCR (Lower
Court Records), if brought to this Court, along with a copy of this
Judgement and Order to the Learned Special Judge, NDPS Act,
Alipore, within seven working days from today.
(Uday Kumar, J.)
