Madhya Pradesh High Court
Ramesh Chand Batham vs General Manager on 10 April, 2026
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:11925
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT GWALIOR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE ANAND SINGH BAHRAWAT
ON THE 10th OF APRIL, 2026
WRIT PETITION No. 8648 of 2016
RAMESH CHAND BATHAM
Versus
GENERAL MANAGER AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri Sunil Kumar Jain, Advocate for petitioner.
Shri Mahesh Prasad Agrawal, Advocate for respondents No.1 & 2.
ORDER
This petition under Article 226 of Constitution of India has been filed
seeking for following reliefs :-
“i. Orders vide Annexure P-2 dated 31-12-
2008, Annexure P-1 dated 06-04-2009 may
kindly be quashed and petitioner may kindly
be allowed to get consequential benefit.
ii. Respondents may kindly be directed to
allow to permit to work to petitioner as per
postings.
iii. Cost of petition may kindly be allowed.”
2. Learned counsel for petitioner submitted that petitioner was
appointed as Single Window Operator in Viaypur Branch of State Bank of
Indore. During the period of 2006-07 a complaint has been filed by certain
persons with regard to illegal withdrawal of amount from their accounts.
Thereafter, petitioner has been suspended and subsequently a charge-sheet
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has been issued and thereafter enquiry has been conducted by Enquiry
Officer and thereafter Disciplinary Authority has issued show cause notice to
the petitioner. Petitioner submitted detailed reply to show cause notice.
Without considering the reply of petitioner, punishment order dated
31.12.2008 has been issued by respondents by which petitioner has been
removed from service. Thereafter, petitioner preferred a detailed appeal
before Appellate Authority and Appellate Authority has also not considered
the facts and grounds mentioned in the appeal and by non-speaking an
unreasoned order appeal has been rejected by Appellate Authority. Being
aggrieved by the aforesaid, petitioner has preferred this petition.
3. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents raised a preliminary
objection regarding maintainability of the present writ petition. It is
submitted that petitioner has an efficacious, adequate alternative statutory
remedy available under the relevant provisions of law. To strengthen his
plea, learned counsel for respondents relied upon order dated 17.05.2017
passed in W.P. No. 3479/2005 (Jitendra Kumar v. State of M.P. and Others).
Thus, it is submitted that this Court had directed petitioners to verify as to
whether the present case is covered by the order passed in Jitendra Kumar
(supra) or not? However, without exhausting such remedy, petitioner has
directly approached this Court. Hence, it is contended that the writ petition is
liable to be dismissed on the ground of availability of alternative remedy
alone.
4. Heard the learned counsel for parties and perused the record.
5. Now the only question for consideration is as to whether this Court
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can dismiss the petition on the ground of availability of alternative remedy
or not?
6. The Supreme Court in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh and another
v. Uttar Pradesh Rajya Khanij Vikas Nigam Sangharsh Samiti and another ,
reported in (2008) 12 SCC 675 has held as under:
“37. We have given most anxious and thoughtful consideration to
the rival contentions of the parties. So far as preliminary objection
raised by the Corporation before the High Court is concerned, in
our considered view, the same was well founded and ought to have
been upheld. It was urged before the High Court on behalf of the
Corporation and the State Government that the writ petition was
premature inasmuch as no retrenchment had been affected.
Several disputed questions of fact were involved in the petition. If
the contention of the Samiti was that there was illegal closure of
undertaking or there was non-payment of wages by the employer,
appropriate proceedings could have been initiated under industrial
law. In fact, one of the Judges of the Division Bench upheld the
contention and observed that the employees could have claimed
closure compensation under Section 25- FFF of the Act or could
have approached prescribed authority under the Payment of Wages
Act relying upon Section 33-C(2) of the Act or Section 6-H(2) of
the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act. The other Single Judge of the
Division Bench, however, held that the writ petition had been
entertained and interim orders were also passed. Relying upon
Suresh Chandra Tewari [AIR 1992 All 331], the learned Judge
held that “the petition cannot be dismissed on the ground of
alternative remedy if the same has been entertained and interim
order has been passed”.
(emphasis supplied)
38. With respect to the learned Judge, it is neither the legal
position nor such a proposition has been laid down in Suresh
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Chandra Tewari [AIR 1992 All 331] that once a petition is
admitted, it cannot be dismissed on the ground of alternative
remedy. It is no doubt correct that in the headnote of All India
Reporter (p. 331), it is stated that “petition cannot be rejected on
the ground of availability of alternative remedy of filing appeal”.
But it has not been so held in the actual decision of the Court. The
relevant para 2 of the decision reads thus:(Suresh Chandra Tewari
case [AIR 1992 All 331], AIR p. 331)
“2. At the time of hearing of this petition a threshold
question, as to its maintainability was raised on the
ground that the impugned order was an appealable one
and, therefore, before approaching this Court the
petitioner should have approached the appellate
authority. Though there is much substance in the above
contention, we do not feel inclined to reject this petition
on the ground of alternative remedy having regard to
the fact that the petition has been entertained and an
interim order passed.”
(emphasis supplied)
Even otherwise, the learned Judge was not right in law. True it is
that issuance of rule nisi or passing of interim orders is a relevant
consideration for not dismissing a petition if it appears to the High
Court that the matter could be decided by a writ court. It has been
so held even by this Court in several cases that even if alternative
remedy is available, it cannot be held that a writ petition is not
maintainable. In our judgment, however, it cannot be laid down as
a proposition of law that once a petition is admitted, it could never
be dismissed on the ground of alternative remedy. If such bald
contention is upheld, even this Court cannot order dismissal of a
writ petition which ought not to have been entertained by the High
Court under Article 226 of the Constitution in view of availability
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of alternative and equally efficacious remedy to the aggrieved
party, once the High Court has entertained a writ petition albeit
wrongly and granted the relief to the petitioner.”
7. The Supreme Court in the case of Genpact India Private Limited v.
Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax and another , reported in 2019 SCC
Online SC 1500 decided on 22.11.2019 in Civil Appeal No.8945/2019 has
held as under:
“23. We now turn to the question whether the High Court was
justified in refusing to entertain the writ petition because of
availability of adequate appellate remedy. The law on the point is
very clear and was summarised in Commissioner of Income Tax
v. Chhabil Dass Agarwal AIR (2014) 1 SCC 603] as under:–
“11. Before discussing the fact proposition, we would
notice the principle of law as laid down by this Court. It
is settled law that non-entertainment of petitions under
writ jurisdiction by the High Court when an efficacious
alternative remedy is available is a rule of self-imposed
limitation. It is essentially a rule of policy, convenience
and discretion rather than a rule of law. Undoubtedly, it
is within the discretion of the High Court to grant relief
under Article 226 despite the existence of an alternative
remedy. However, the High Court must not interfere if
there is an adequate efficacious alternative remedy
available to the petitioner and he has approached the
High Court without availing the same unless he has
made out an exceptional case warranting such
interference or there exist sufficient grounds to invoke
the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226. (See
State of U.P. v. Mohd. Nooh [AIR 1958 SC
86], Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of OrissaSignature Not Verified
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[(1983) 2 SCC 433 : 1983 SCC (Tax) 131], Harbanslal
Sahnia v. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. [(1983) 2 SCC 433 :
1983 SCC (Tax) 131] and State of H.P. v. Gujarat
Ambuja Cement Ltd. [(2005) 6 SCC 499])
12. The Constitution Benches of this Court in K.S.
Rashid and Son v. Income Tax Investigation
Commission [AIR 1954 SC 207], Sangram Singh v.
Election Tribunal [AIR 1955 SC 425], Union of India v.
T.R. Varma [AIR 1957 SC 882], State of U.P. v. Mohd.
Nooh [AIR 1958 SC 86] and K.S. Venkataraman and
Co. (P) Ltd. v. State of Madras [AIR 1966 SC 1089]
have held that though Article 226 confers very wide
powers in the matter of issuing writs on the High Court,
the remedy of writ is absolutely discretionary in
character. If the High Court is satisfied that the
aggrieved party can have an adequate or suitable relief
elsewhere, it can refuse to exercise its jurisdiction. The
Court, in extraordinary circumstances, may exercise the
power if it comes to the conclusion that there has been a
breach of the principles of natural justice or the
procedure required for decision has not been adopted.
[See N.T. Veluswami Thevar v. G. Raja Nainar [AIR
1959 SC 422], Municipal Council, Khurai v. Kamal
Kumar [AIR 1965 SC 1321 : (1965) 2 SCR 653],
Siliguri Municipality v. Amalendu Das [(1984) 2 SCC
436 : 1984 SCC (Tax) 133], S.T. Muthusami v. K.
Natarajan [(1988) 1 SCC 572], Rajasthan SRTC v.
Krishna Kant [(1995) 5 SCC 75 : 1995 SCC (L&S)
1207 : (1955) 31 ATC 110], Kerala SEB v. Kurien E.
Kalathil [(2000) 6 SCC 293], A. Venkatasubbiah Naidu
v. S. Chellappan [(2000) 7 SCC 695], L.L. Sudhakar
Reddy v. State of A.P. [(2001) 6 SCC 634], Shri Sant
Sadguru Janardan Swami (Moingiri Maharaj) SahakariSignature Not Verified
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Dugdha Utpadak Sanstha v. State of Maharashtra
[(2001) 8 SCC 509], Pratap Singh v. State of Haryana
[(2002) 7 SCC 484 : 2002 SCC (L&S) 1207 : (1995) 31
ATC 110] and GKN Driveshafts (India) Ltd. v. ITO21
[(2003) 1 SCC 72]] …
15. Thus, while it can be said that this Court has
recognised some exceptions to the rule of alternative
remedy i.e. where the statutory authority has not acted
in accordance with the provisions of the enactment in
question, or in defiance of the fundamental principles of
judicial procedure, or has resorted to invoke the
provisions which are repealed, or when an order has
been passed in total violation of the principles of natural
justice, the proposition laid down in Thansingh Nathmal
case [AIR 1964 SC 1419], Titaghur Paper Mills case
[(1983) 2 SCC 433 : 1983 SCC (Tax) 131] and other
similar judgments that the High Court will not entertain
a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution if an
effective alternative remedy is available to the
aggrieved person or the statute under which the action
complained of has been taken itself contains a
mechanism for redressal of grievance still holds the
field. Therefore, when a statutory forum is created by
law for redressal of grievances, a writ petition should
not be entertained ignoring the statutory dispensation.”
24. Recently, in Authorised Officer, State Bank of Travancore v.
Mathew K.C. [(2018) 3 SCC 85], the principles laid down in
Chhabil Dass Agarwal [(2014) 1 SCC 603] were reiterated as
under:
“The discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 is not
absolute but has to be exercised judiciously in the given
facts of a case and in accordance with law. The normal
rule is that a writ petition under Article 226 of theSignature Not Verified
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Constitution ought not to be entertained if alternate
statutory remedies are available, except in cases falling
within the well-defined exceptions as observed in CIT
v. Chhabil Dass Agarwal [(2014) 1 SCC 603]…”
25. We do not, therefore, find any infirmity in the approach
adopted by the High Court in refusing to entertain the Writ
Petition. The submission that once the threshold was crossed
despite the preliminary objection being raised, the High Court
ought not to have considered the issue regarding alternate remedy,
may not be correct. The first order dated 25.01.2017 passed by the
High Court did record the preliminary objection but was prima
facie of the view that the transactions defined in Section 115QA
were initially confined only to those covered by Section 77A of
the Companies Act. Therefore, without rejecting the preliminary
objection, notice was issued in the matter. The subsequent order
undoubtedly made the earlier interim order absolute. However, the
preliminary objection having not been dealt with and disposed of,
the matter was still at large.
26. In State of U.P. v. U.P. Rajya Khanij Vikas Nigam Sangharsh
Samiti [(2008) 12 SCC 675] this Court dealt with an issue
whether after admission, the Writ Petition could not be dismissed
on the ground of alternate remedy. The submission was considered
by this Court as under:
“38. With respect to the learned Judge, it is neither the
legal position nor such a proposition has been laid down
in Suresh Chandra Tewari [AIR 1992 All 331] that once
a petition is admitted, it cannot be dismissed on the
ground of alternative remedy. It is no doubt correct that
in the headnote of All India Reporter (p. 331), it is
stated that “petition cannot be rejected on the ground of
availability of alternative remedy of filing appeal”. But
it has not been so held in the actual decision of the
Court.The relevant para 2 of the decision reads thus:
(Suresh Chandra Tewari case, AIR p. 331)
“2. At the time of hearing of this petition aSignature Not Verified
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threshold question, as to its maintainability
was raised on the ground that the impugned
order was an appealable one and, therefore,
before approaching this Court the petitioner
should have approached the appellate
authority. Though there is much substance in
the above contention, we do not feel inclined
to reject this petition on the ground of
alternative remedy having regard to the fact
that the petition has been entertained and an
interim order passed.”
(emphasis supplied)
Even otherwise, the learned Judge was not right in law.
True it is that issuance of rule nisi or passing of interim
orders is a relevant consideration for not dismissing a
petition if it appears to the High Court that the matter
could be decided by a writ court. It has been so held
even by this Court in several cases that even if
alternative remedy is available, it cannot be held that a
writ petition is not maintainable. In our judgment,
however, it cannot be laid down as a proposition of law
that once a petition is admitted, it could never be
dismissed on the ground of alternative remedy. If such
bald contention is upheld, even this Court cannot order
dismissal of a writ petition which ought not to have
been entertained by the High Court under Article 226 of
the Constitution in view of availability of alternative
and equally efficacious remedy to the aggrieved party,
once the High Court has entertained a writ petition
albeit wrongly and granted the relief to the petitioner.
27. We do not, therefore, find any error in the approach
of and conclusion arrived at by the High Court. It is
relevant to mention that the concessions given on behalf
of the Revenue as recorded in the directions issued by
the High Court also take care of matters of prejudice, if
any. Consequently, the appellant, as a matter of fact,
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will have a fuller, adequate and efficacious remedy by
way of appeal before the appellate authority.
28. Certain issues raised during the course of hearing
touching upon the aspects whether the appellant is liable
under Section 115QA of the Act or whether the
transaction of buy back of shares in the present matter
would come within the statutory contours of said
Section 115QA or not, are issues which will be gone
into at the appropriate stages by the concerned
authorities; and as such we have refrained from dealing
with those issues.”
8 . By placing reliance on the order dated 17.05.2017 passed in W.P.
No. 3479/2005 (Jitendra Kumar v. State of M.P. and Others), the respondents
raised the issue of availability of an alternative remedy. The Co-ordinate
Bench of this Court in Jintendra Kumar Supra has held as under for ready
reference and convenience:
After arguing for some time, Shri M.P. Agarwal
submits that in the writ appeal No. 36/12 (State Bank of
India and Ors Vs. Vikram Sharma) vide judgment dated
19.07.2012 Division Bench of this High Court has held
that respondent employee working in a clerical cadre is
amenable to the jurisdiction of Industrial Dispute Act
and he has liberty to raise Industrial dispute in
accordance with the Provisions of Industrial Disputes
Act,1947.
In view of this submission, Shri B.B. Shukla fairly
submits that this writ petition be disposed of with
liberty to the petitioner to approach machinery under
the Industrial Dispute Act for adjudication of his
grievance and a direction be issued to the concerned
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labour Court to adjudicate this dispute within a time
bound manner.
Shri M.P. Agarwal has no objection to such prayer
being granted.
Accordingly, this petition is disposed of with liberty in
favour of petitioner to raise the dispute of his
termination and any other dispute associated with order
of termination before CGIT within two months from
today under the Provision contained in the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 and CGIT shall make an endeavor
to decide the dispute within a further period of six
months from the date of receiving the dispute.
It is made clear that if parties so desire, they can use the
pleadings advanced before this Court, before the CGIT
so to cutshort the time for adjudication of the dispute
inasmuch as petition, return and additional return are on
record.
It is also clarified that issue of limitation shall not come
in the way of the petitioner as this Court at the request
of Bank has relegated him to avail the remedy available
under the Industrial Disputes Act.
9. Under these circumstances, it is clear that even if petition has been
pending since 2016, still it can be dismissed on the ground of availability of
alternative remedy.
10. Learned counsel for petitioner relied on W.A. No.240/2018
Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. And another vs. Kailash Chandra
where petition was not relegated back due to availability of alternative
remedy but the facts of W.A. 240/2018 is different as in that petition there
was no disputed question of facts involved. Learned counsel for petitioner
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has not denied that petitioner has an alternative remedy of filing an appeal
before the CGIT. Since multiple disputed questions of facts are involved,
therefore, this Court is not inclined to entertain this writ petition specifically
when petitioner has an efficacious remedy of approaching CGIT.
11. In view of the foregoing discussion and the facts and
circumstances of the present case in their entirety, the present petition is
disposed of with liberty to petitioner to raise the dispute of his
termination and any other dispute associated with order of
termination/ Removal and Appeal rejection order before CGIT within period
one month from today under the Provision contained in the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 and CGIT shall make an endeavor to decide the dispute
within a further period of three months from the date of receiving the dispute
by passing a reasoned and speaking order in accordance with law on merits
of the case ignoring the delay, if any.
(ANAND SINGH BAHRAWAT)
JUDGE
“R”
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