Bombay High Court
Rajesh Tarachand Bansod vs State Of Maharashtra Thr Pso Sitabuldi … on 5 March, 2026
2026:BHC-NAG:3653
1 REVN.215-2025.JUDGMENT.odt
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
NAGPUR BENCH : NAGPUR
CRIMINAL REVISION APPLICATION NO. 215 OF 2025
Rajesh S/o. Tarachand Bansod,
Aged about 45 years, Occ: Business,
R/o. Flat No. 1302, Royal Christ
Apartments, Dhantoli, Nagpur. APPLICANT
Versus
State of Maharashtra,
Through Police Station Officer,
Sitabuldi Police Station, Nagpur. NON-APPLICANT
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Mr. A.A. Naik, Senior Advocate a/b Mr. S.P. Bodalkar &
Mr. G.S. Gour, Advocates for the Applicant.
Mr. A.M. Joshi, APP for the Non-applicant/State.
-----------------------------------------------
CORAM : URMILA JOSHI PHALKE, J.
RESERVED ON : 18th FEBRUARY, 2026.
PRONOUNCED ON : 05th MARCH, 2026.
ORAL JUDGMENT :-
1. By this Revision, the Applicant challenges the order
passed by the Special Court Additional Sessions Judge, Nagpur
2 REVN.215-2025.JUDGMENT.odt
below Exh. 29 in Spl. Case No. 411/2024 dated 12.12.2025 by
which the Application for discharge is rejected.
2. Brief facts which are necessary for the disposal of
the present Revision are as under:
2(i). The present Applicant Rajesh Bansod is the owner of
several companies namely Fortune Fisheries, Vision Fisheries
and Fortune Aqua, purportedly engaged in fish farming
operations. In July 2017, the Complainant Mr. Dhruv Saksena
was informed about the Applicant’s business venture by his
friend Rajnishkumar from Ghaziabad. The Applicant is also
operating a website promoting his business. By seeing the said
website and by hearing from Rajnishkumar the Complainant
came to Nagpur and met the Applicant in his office. As per the
allegations, the Applicant presented an elaborate business
model involving fish farming through cage culture and promised
substantial returns on investment.
2(ii). On 28.06.2012, The Assistant Commissioner of
Fisheries, Nagpur granted fishing rights contract at Umri Water
Tank to Adarsh Matsya Vyavsaya Sanstha Maryadit for a period
3 REVN.215-2025.JUDGMENT.odt
of 4 years. On 12.01.2015, the partnership deed was executed
between Adarsh Matsya Vyavsaya Sanstha Maryadit and the
Applicant for development and management of Umri Water
Tank. On 09.09.2016, another agreement entered between
Adarsh Matsya Vyavsaya Sanstha Maryadit and the Applicant
through Fortune Fisheries for cultivation of Zinga (Lobster)
seeds on 34 Hectares of water body at Mouza Khandala. On
21.12.2016, Maharashtra Fisheries Development Corporation
Ltd., awarded tender bearing No.69 for cage culture fish
farming at Pench Water Body to the Applicant’s proprietorship
firm i.e. Fortune Fisheries for a period of 7 years. On
15.02.2017, Maharashtra Fisheries Development Corporation
Ltd., awarded another tender bearing No.22 for cage culture
fish farming at Pench Water Body to the Applicant’s
proprietorship firm Fortune Fisheries for a period of 7 years. On
26.03.2017, the agreement executed between Maharashtra
Fisheries Development Corporation Ltd., and the Applicant for
fish cultivation at Pench Water Body for 7 years. During the
period of May-November 2017, the Applicant has expanded
fisheries business by procuring cages and infrastructure.
4 REVN.215-2025.JUDGMENT.odt
2(iii). It is alleged that, the Applicant outlined an
investment scheme with graduated returns ranging from 1.5 to
6 times the invested amount depending on the investment tier.
The Applicant showed the Complainant various ponds and dams
supposedly leased for 15 years and claimed to have installed
1200 cages for fish farming with Government subsidies. Based
on the said representation and particularly trusting the
Government involvement in the said project, the Complainant
and his wife invested a total amount of Rs. 48.85 Lakhs in the
Applicant’s venture between August and November 2017
through multiple Bank transaction to accounts allegedly
controlled by the Applicant. Like the Complainant, various
persons have invested considering the returns in the scheme of
the present Applicant. Subsequently, it reveals that the Applicant
had allegedly misappropriated the invested funds using only a
small fraction for the actual business and the majority to acquire
personal assets. On demand, the Applicant has given the post
dated cheques of Rs. 26,28,245/- to the Complainant and
Rs.9,45,925/- to his wife. The cheques returned dishonoured,
and therefore, the proceeding was initiated against the
Applicant under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act
5 REVN.215-2025.JUDGMENT.odt
(for short “N.I. Act“). Similar complaints have been filed against
the present Applicant in Kolkata, Uttar Pradesh and other
locations in Mumbai. Thus, it was alleged that the present
Applicant by misrepresentation obtained the investments from
various investors and thereby committed an offence punishable
under Sections 420, 406 and 409 read with Section 34 of the
Indian Penal Code (for short “IPC“) and under Section 3 of the
Maharashtra Protection of Interest of Depositors (In Financial
Establishments) Act, 1999 (for short “MPID Act“) and under
Section 45 of the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934.
2(iv). During investigation the Investigating Officer has
collected various documents and recorded relevant statements
of the witnesses and after completion of the investigation
submitted charge-sheet against the present Applicant.
2(v). The present Applicant has preferred an application
below Exh.29 before the Special Court under the MPID Act for
discharge on the ground that by no stretch of imagination it can
be said that the amount which was collected is “deposit”. The
said investment was by the investors in the business, and
therefore, it cannot be termed as a “deposit” in view of Section
6 REVN.215-2025.JUDGMENT.odt
3 of the MPID Act, and therefore, no prima facie case is made
out against the present Applicant. In view of that, the Applicant
be discharged. The said contention is rejected by the Special
Court. Hence this Revision.
3. Heard Mr. Naik, learned Senior Counsel for the
Applicant, who submitted that the Applicant is a Director. He
has obtained the tender for cultivation of Lobsters seeds. The
Maharashtra Fisheries Development Corporation Ltd., awarded
tender bearing No.69 for cage culture fish farming at Pench
Water Body on 21.12.2016 as well as on 15.02.2017 vide tender
bearing No.22. The agreement was also executed between the
Maharashtra Fisheries Development Corporation Ltd., and the
Applicant for fish cultivation at Pench Water Body for 7 years, as
the Applicant wanted to expand his business, and therefore, he
canvassed his business through his website. As the Complainant
came to know about the said business, he met the Applicant and
thereafter the agreement was executed in the nature of
Memorandum of Understanding (for short “MoU”) between the
present Applicant and the Complainant. As per the MoU, the
Complainant agreed to invest the amount in his business. As per
7 REVN.215-2025.JUDGMENT.odt
the MoU, on investment for 2 years, the Complainant or the
investors are not permitted to withdraw the amount and on
completion of 2 years they shall entitled for the profits. Thus, he
submitted that, by understanding the terms and conditions, the
Complainant has invested the amount.
4. He further invited my attention towards the
statements of the witnesses, which shows that, on
representation by the present Applicant that investors would get
handsome returns, the investors have invested the amount in
the business. He also pointed out from the notice which is
issued by the Complainant through his Counsel and submitted
that, the said notice also shows that the amount was invested in
the business, therefore by no stretch of imagination it can be
said that it is a “deposit” within the definition of Section 3 of the
MPID Act. He also invited my attention towards the letter issued
by the Maharashtra Fisheries Development Corporation Ltd., to
the Investigating Agency stating that the present Applicant has
already purchased the cages to run the business. Therefore, he
submitted that there was no intention since inception, and
therefore, the offence punishable under Section 420 of IPC is
8 REVN.215-2025.JUDGMENT.odt
also not made out. The agreement between the present
Applicant and the Maharashtra Fisheries Development
Corporation Ltd., also shows that the Applicant entered into an
agreement with the said Corporation for cultivation of Lobsters
seeds which substantially states that there was intention to run
business and the Complainant and other investors have invested
the amount in the business. Therefore, the amount which is
obtained is at the most is the loan, and therefore, it is not the
“deposit” in view of Section 3 of the MPID Act, and therefore,
no prima facie offence is made out against the present
Applicant.
5. In support of his contention he placed reliance on
the judgments: Dr. Anand Rai Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh &
Anr. Criminal Appeal arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 10711/2025,
decided on 10.02.2026; Satishchandra Ratanlal Shah Vs. State
of Gujarat & Anr. (2019) 9 SCC 148; C. Subbiah Alias
Kadambur Jayaraj & Ors., Vs. Superintendent of Police & Ors.,
(2024) 20 SCC 171; Tuhin Kumar Biswas alias Bumba Vs. State
of West Bengal, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2604; Criminal
Application (APL) No. 1209/2024 decided on 03.12.2025;
9 REVN.215-2025.JUDGMENT.odt
Criminal Revision Application No.64/2024, decided on
14.08.2025 and State of Maharashtra Vs. 63 Moons
Technologies Limited, (2022) 9 SCC 457.
6. Per contra, learned APP for the Non-applicant/State,
strongly opposed the said contention and submitted that, the
Applicant has floated the scheme and under the said scheme he
has obtained deposits from various investors and thereafter
investors are duped. Considering the statements of various
witnesses, it is crystal clear that, they have invested the amount
under the scheme of fisheries. The scheme was floated by the
present Applicant to expand the business and thereby accepted
the amount, and therefore, it is within the definition of
“deposit”. In view of the entire investigation prima facie offence
is made out against the present Applicant, and therefore, the
Revision deserves to be rejected.
7. Before entering into merits of the case, it is
necessary to see what are the considerations for considering the
application for discharge.
10 REVN.215-2025.JUDGMENT.odt
8. It is a settled principle of law that at the stage of
considering an application for discharge, the Court must
proceed on the assumption that the material which has been
brought on record by the prosecution is true and evaluate the
material in order to determine whether the facts emerging from
the material, taken on its face value, disclose the existence of
the ingredients necessary of the offence alleged.
9. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of State of
Gujarat Vs. Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao, MANU/SC/1113 2023,
adverting to the earlier propositions of law in its earlier
decisions in the cases of State of Tamil Nadu Vs. N.Suresh Rajan
& Ors., (2014) 11 SCC 709, The State of Maharashtra Vs. Som
Nath Thapa, (1996) 4 SCC 659 & The State of MP Vs. Mohan
Lal Soni, (2000) 6 SCC 338, has held as under:
“10. It is settled principle of law that at the stage of
considering an application for discharge the court must
proceed on an assumption that the material which has
been brought on record by the prosecution is true and
evaluate said material in order to determine whether the
facts emerging from the material taken on its face value,
disclose the existence of the ingredients necessary of the
offence alleged. This Court in State of Tamil Nadu vs.
N.Suresh Rajan and ors, (2014) 11 SCC 709 adverting to
the earlier propositions of law laid down on this subject
has held:
11 REVN.215-2025.JUDGMENT.odt
“29. We have bestowed our consideration to the rival
submissions and the submissions made by Mr. Ranjit
Kumar commend us. True it is that at the time of
consideration of the applications for discharge, the
court cannot act as a mouthpiece of the prosecution or
act as a post office and may sift evidence in order to
find out whether or not the allegations made are
groundless so as to pass an order of discharge. It is
trite that at the stage of consideration of an
application for discharge, the court has to proceed
with an assumption that the materials brought on
record by the prosecution are true and evaluate the
said materials and documents with a view to find out
whether the facts emerging therefrom taken at their
face value disclose the existence of all the ingredients
constituting the alleged offence. At this stage,
probative value of the materials has to be gone into
and the court is not expected to go deep into the
matter and hold that the materials would not warrant
a conviction. In our opinion, what needs to be
considered is whether there is a ground for presuming
that the offence has been committed and not whether
a ground for convicting the accused has been made
out. To put it differently, if the court thinks that the
accused might have committed the offence on the
basis of the materials on record on its probative value,
it can frame the charge; though for conviction, the
court has to come to the conclusion that the accused
has committed the offence. The law does not permit a
mini trial at this stage.”
10. Thus, the defence of the accused is not to be looked
into at this stage when the application is filed for discharge. The
expression “the record of the case” used in Section 227 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure is to be understood as the
documents and materials, if any, produced by the prosecution.
The provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure does not give
12 REVN.215-2025.JUDGMENT.odt
any right to the accused to produce any document at the stage
of framing of the charge. The submission of the accused is to be
confined to the material produced by the investigating agency.
The primary consideration at the stage of framing of charge is
the test of existence of a prima facie case, and at this stage, the
probative value of materials on record need not be gone into.
At the stage of entertaining the application for discharge under
Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Court
cannot analyze or direct the evidence of the prosecution and
defence or the points or possible cross examination of the
defence. The case of the prosecution is to be accepted as it is.
11. In the case of Union of India Vs. Prafulla Kumar
Samal & Anr., (1973) 3 SCC 4 , the Hon’ble Apex Court
considered the scope of Section 227 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure. After adverting to the various decisions, the Hon’ble
Apex Court has enumerated the following principles:
“(1) That the Judge while considering the question of
framing the charges under section 227 of the Code has the
undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the
limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie
case against the accused has been made out.
(2) Where the materials placed before the Court disclose
grave suspicion against the accused which has not been
13 REVN.215-2025.JUDGMENT.odtproperly explained the Court will be, fully justified in
framing a charge and proceeding with the trial.
(3) The test to determine a prima facie case would
naturally depend upon the facts of each case and it is
difficult to lay down a rule of universal application. By and
large however if two views are equally possible and the
Judge is satisfied that the evidence produced before him
while giving rise to some suspicion but not grave suspicion
against the accused, he will be fully within his right to
discharge the accused.
(4) That in exercising his jurisdiction under section 227 of
the Code the Judge which under the present Code is a
senior and experienced Judge cannot act merely as a Post
office or a mouth-piece of the prosecution, but has to
consider the broad probabilities of the case, the total effect
of the evidence and the documents produced before the
Court, any basic infirmities appearing in the case and so
on. This however does not mean that the Judge should
make a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter
and weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a trial.”
12. In the case of Dr. Anand Rai (supra), wherein also
the Hon’ble Apex Court has considered the consideration for
discharge application and observed that:
“the established jurisprudence developed under the Cr.P.C.
on the scope and limits of consideration at the stages of
discharge and framing of charge continues to hold the field
under the BNSS. The statutory language supports the
conclusion that the Legislature has retained the same
substantive balance between the rights of the accused and
the interest of prosecution, while seeking to impose greater
procedural discipline and expedition.”
13. It is further held by referring the earlier decision in
para 12, which reads as under:
14 REVN.215-2025.JUDGMENT.odt
“12. Sajjan Kumar v. CBI, (2010) 9 SCC 368, which has
been relied upon a bench of three judges in Ghulam
Hassan Beigh v. Mohd. Maqbool Magrey, (2022) 12 SCC
657, formulated the following principles regarding the
scope of the above quoted sections:
21..
(i) The Judge while considering the question of
framing the charges under Section 227 CrPC has
the undoubted power to sift and weigh the
evidence for the limited purpose of finding out
whether or not a prima facie case against the
accused has been made out. The test to determine
prima facie case would depend upon the facts of
each case.
(ii) Where the materials placed before the court
disclose grave suspicion against the accused which
has not been properly explained, the court will be
fully justified in framing a charge and proceeding
with the trial.
(iii) The court cannot act merely as a post office or
a mouthpiece of the prosecution but has to consider
the broad probabilities of the case, the total effect
of the evidence and the documents produced before
the court, any basic infirmities, etc. However, at this
stage, there cannot be a roving enquiry into the
pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence
as if he was conducting a trial.
(iv) If on the basis of the material on record, the
court could form an opinion that the accused might
have committed offence, it can frame the charge,
though for conviction the conclusion is required to
be proved beyond reasonable doubt that the
accused has committed the offence.
(v) At the time of framing of the charges, the
probative value of the material on record cannot be
gone into but before framing a charge the court
must apply its judicial mind on the material placed
on record and must be satisfied that the
commission of offence by the accused was possible.
(vi) At the stage of Sections 227 and 228, the court
is required to evaluate the material and documents
15 REVN.215-2025.JUDGMENT.odton record with a view to find out if the facts
emerging therefrom taken at their face value
disclose the existence of all the ingredients
constituting the alleged offence. For this limited
purpose, sift the evidence as it cannot be expected
even at that initial stage to accept all that the
prosecution states as gospel truth even if it is
opposed to common sense or the broad
probabilities of the case.
(vii) If two views are possible and one of them
gives rise to suspicion only, as distinguished from
grave suspicion, the trial Judge will be empowered
to discharge the accused and at this stage, he is not
to see whether the trial will end in conviction or
acquittal.”
14. With the above principles, if the material in the
present case collected during the investigation is discussed there
is no dispute to the fact that the present Applicant was involved
in the fisheries business. He entered into the agreement with
Adarsh Matsya Vyavsaya Sanstha Maryadit for the development
and management of Umri Water Tank dated 12.01.2025.
Another agreement he entered with the said Sanstha through
Fortune Fisheries for cultivation of Lobsters seeds on 34
Hectares of water body at Mouza Khandala. There is no dispute
that, Maharashtra Fisheries Development Corporation Ltd.,
awarded him the tender bearing Nos.69 and 22 dated
21.12.2016 and 15.02.2017 respectively. He also entered into
an agreement with the Maharashtra Fisheries Development
16 REVN.215-2025.JUDGMENT.odt
Corporation Ltd., for fish cultivation at Pench water bodies for 7
years. As he wants to expand his business he also attempted to
receive the investment from the individuals. In response to the
said attempt, the Complainant entered into an agreement with
him as MoU. As per the terms and conditions of the said MoU, it
was mentioned that, the Complainant is willing to invest in the
business with the intention to earn handsome profit as
committed by the party No.1 i.e. the Applicant, and therefore,
part No.2 i.e. Complainant approached and shows interest in
the business of party No.1 and offered investment of funds in
the said business. The investigation papers further shows that,
as per the agreement, the Applicant could not fulfilled the
contract though he has purchased some cages but due to some
reasons, the said agreement could not be fulfilled and he failed
to give returns to the investors, and therefore, investors
demanded the amount and he issued the cheques, the cheques
were not honoured, and therefore, he is facing prosecution at
various places under the provisions of N.I. Act.
15. In the light of the above admitted position, now
question is whether the amount invested by the various
investors comes within the definition of “deposit”.
17 REVN.215-2025.JUDGMENT.odt
16. Now, only question is, whether the allegations
levelled against the Applicant establish offence under Section 3
of the MPID Act.
17. Before referring Section 3 of the MPID Act, it is
necessary to refer Section 2(c) of the said Act, which provides
for definition of term “deposit”, which reads as under :
“2(c) “deposit” includes and shall be deemed always to
have included any receipt of money or acceptance of any
valuable commodity by any Financial Establishment to be
returned after a specified period or otherwise, either in
cash or in kind or in the form of a specified service with or
without any benefit in the form of interest, bonus, profit or
in any other form, but does not include —
(i) amount raised by way of share capital or by way
of debenture, bond or any other instrument
covered under the guidelines given, and regulations
made, by the SEBI, established under the Securities
and Exchange Board of India Act, 1992 ;
(ii) amounts contributed as capital by partners of a
firm;
(iii) amounts received from a scheduled bank or a
co-operative bank or any other banking company as
defined in clause (c) of section 5 of the Banking
Regulation Act, 1949 ;
(iv) any amount received from,–
(a) the Industrial Development Bank of India,
(b) a State Financial Corporation,
(c) any financial institution specified in or
under section 6A of the Industrial
Development Bank of India Act, 1964, or
18 REVN.215-2025.JUDGMENT.odt
(d) any other institution that may be specified
by the Government in this behalf ;
(v) amounts received in the ordinary course of
business by way of,–
(a) security deposit,
(b) dealership deposit,
(c) earnest money,
(d) advance against order for goods or services;
(vi) any amount received from an individual or a
firm or an association of individuals not being a
body corporate, registered under any enactment
relating to money lending which is for the time
being in force in the State ; and
(vii) any amount received by way of subscriptions
in respect of a Chit.
Explanation I.–“Chit” has the meaning as assigned
to it in clause (b) of section 2 of the Chit Funds Act,
1982;
Explanation II.– Any credit given by a seller to a
buyer on the sale of any property (whether
movable or immovable) shall not be deemed to be
deposit for the purposes of this clause.”
18. At the same time, definition given under Section
2(d) of “Financial Establishment” is also required to be perused,
which states that “Financial Establishment” means any person
accepting deposit under any scheme or arrangement or in any
other manner but does not include a corporation or a
co-operative society owned or controlled by any State
Government or the Central Government or a banking company
19 REVN.215-2025.JUDGMENT.odt
as defined under clause (c) of section 5 of the Banking
Regulation Act,1949.
19. In the light of the above well settled legal position, if
the facts of the present case is taken into consideration, it shows
that, as per the allegations against the present Applicant, he has
obtained money from various investors as an investment in the
business. The MoU executed between the present Applicant and
the Complainant shows that, the party No.1 i.e. the Applicant is
in the business of fisheries under the name and style as
M/s Fortune Fisheries, which is a proprietary concern and he is
the sole proprietor of the said business. It further shows that, he
is willing to expand the fishery business to en-cash the
opportunity of handsome profit from the said business and party
no.2 i.e. the Complainant is willing to invest in this business
with the intention to earn handsome profit as committed by the
party No.1. Hence, party No.2 i.e. the Complainant approached
him and shown interest in the business and offered investment
of funds in the said business. The agreement further shows that,
party No.1 shall provide the net profit of 50% production of
every crop till the cessation / closure of the agreement without
20 REVN.215-2025.JUDGMENT.odt
fail. It is further agreed that, party No.1 to take the
responsibility of running the business successfully and profitably
and it was further undertaken by the party No.1 that he shall
adhere all compliance which are required for smooth
functioning of the said business. Thus, it is apparent from the
wording used in the MoU that, under the scheme of expansion
of business and on the promise of giving handsome returns, the
amount was obtained.
20. On a plain reading of Section 3 of the MPID Act, it is
clear that any money received by a financial establishment
under any scheme or arrangement, which promises return in
cash or in kind, qualifies as a “deposit”. The Section itself carves
out specific exceptions, such as amounts received from banks,
financial institutions, or as share capital. Apart from these
exceptions, all other monies received with an assurance of
returns fall within the mischief of the section.
21. In the present case, the prosecution material shows
that, several investors were induced to part with their money is
under an assurance of handsome returns by the investors. Such
promises, made at the time of collecting the money, bring the
21 REVN.215-2025.JUDGMENT.odt
transaction squarely within the ambit of “deposit” as understood
under the MPID Act.
22. In the present case, the statements of investors and
the agreement executed clearly indicate that the investors were
lured into handing over their money on the assurance of share
in the profits and handsome returns. The nature of the
transaction was not that of a genuine commercial business
transaction where profits and risks are shared, but rather a
unilateral promise of fixed returns irrespective of any actual
performance. Such arrangements are exactly what the
Legislature intended to include within the definition of “deposit”
under the MPID Act, in order to prevent exploitation of small
and unsuspecting depositors.
23. The learned Senior Counsel for the Applicant, relied
upon judgment in the case of 63 Moons Technologies Limited
(supra), wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court dealt with the scope
and ambit of “deposit” and “financial establishment” and held as
under:
“(i) the expression ‘deposit’ is conspicuously broad in its
width and ambit for it includes, not only any receipt of
money but also the acceptance of any valuable commodity
22 REVN.215-2025.JUDGMENT.odtby a financial establishment under any scheme or
arrangement;
(ii) the money or commodity must be liable to be returned.
However, such return need not necessarily be in the form
of cash or kind but also in the form of a service, with or
without any benefit such as interest;
(iii) it is not necessary that the return should be with the
benefit of interest, bonus or profit. Therefore, if the
financial establishment is obligated to return the deposit
without any increments, it shall still fall within the purview
of Section 2(c) of the MPID Act, provided that the deposit
does not fall within any of the exceptions;
(iv) the phrase ‘valuable commodity’ cannot be restricted
to only mean precious metals. Agricultural commodities
which NSEL trades in will fall within the purview of the
term, and
(v) the definition is broadly worded to include even the
possession of the commodities for a limited purpose.”
24. Thus, the expression “deposit” is conspicuously
broad in its width and ambit for it includes, not only any receipt
of money but also the acceptance of any valuable commodity by
a financial establishment under any scheme or arrangement.
The expression ‘any’ is used in the substantive part of the
definition of the expression ‘deposit’ on five occasions namely;
(i) Any receipt of money;
(ii) Any valuable commodities;
(iii) By any financial establishment;
(iv) With or without any benefit; and
(v) In any other form.
23 REVN.215-2025.JUDGMENT.odt
25. The Hon’ble Apex Court further explains that, there
is nothing in the definition of the term “deposit” to mean that
the acceptance of the commodity should be accompanied by a
transfer of title to the commodity. Even if, the financial
establishment is only in “custody” of the commodity, it would
still fall within the purview of the phrase “acceptance of
commodity”.
26. According to the second ingredient of Section 2(c),
the money or commodity must be liable to be returned.
However, such return need not necessarily be in the form of
cash or kind but also in the form of a service, with or without
any benefit such as interest. It needs to be recalled that clause
(v) of Section 2(c) states that a deposit of money or commodity
made as a security deposit, dealership deposit or an advance
amount is excluded from the definition of the phrase “deposit”.
27. On going through the entire record and
investigation papers, the prosecution case, on the basis of
statements of witnesses, revolves around the facts that the
Applicant has obtained the investment from various investors to
expand the business on promise of giving handsome returns.
24 REVN.215-2025.JUDGMENT.odt
The amount which is obtained is not coming under the
explanation given under Section 3 of the MPID Act, and
therefore, at this stage there is sufficient evidence to attract the
offence punishable under Section 3 of the MPID Act.
28. The Applicant is also charged with Section 409 of
IPC. Section 409 of IPC specifically deals with criminal breach of
trust when committed by a persons who occupy positions of
trust such as a public servant, banker, merchant, factor, broker
attorney or agent. The essential ingredients of this offence are
threefold; (i) there must be entrustment of property or
dominion over property to the accused, (ii) the accused must be
acting in the capacity of a banker, merchant, broker, attorney or
agent, and (iii) there must be dishonest misappropriation or
conversion of such property for his own use, or disposal of it in
violation of law or the contract governing such entrustment.
29. Coming to the facts of the present case, the record
clearly shows that the Complainant and various investors
entrusted their money to the Applicant through the scheme
under the expansion of the business by luring them for the
handsome returns. This entrustment was made on the specific
25 REVN.215-2025.JUDGMENT.odt
representation that they would get the handsome returns on
investing the said amount. Such an arrangement created a
relationship beyond a simple commercial contract. The investors
handed over their money to the Applicant and thereby returns
were promised which were not given. This aspect is sufficient to
attract the offence punishable under Section 409 of IPC.
30. Thus, the entire investigation papers shows that, the
amounts are obtained by way of investment in the business on
promise of handsome returns, would come under the definition
of “deposit” within the meaning and for the purpose of MPID
Act.
31. Considering the principles laid down and as far as
the discharge application is concerned, the learned Special
Court after application of mind rejected the application, I do not
find any illegality or error committed by the learned Special
Court. After going through the entire investigation papers and
material on record, at this stage there is sufficient material to
attract Section 3 of the MPID Act. In view of that, the Revision
Application deserves to be rejected. Accordingly, I proceed to
pass the following order.
26 REVN.215-2025.JUDGMENT.odt
ORDER
i. Criminal Revision Application is rejected.
32. Pending application/s, if any, shall stand disposed of
accordingly.
(URMILA JOSHI PHALKE, J.)
S.D.Bhimte
Signed by: Mr.S.D.Bhimte
Designation: PA To Honourable Judge
Date: 05/03/2026 16:47:25