Delhi High Court – Orders
Rajesh & Ors vs The State Govt. Of Nct Of Delhi And Anr on 10 February, 2026
Author: Prateek Jalan
Bench: Prateek Jalan
$~74
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ CRL.M.C. 118/2026
RAJESH & ORS. .....Petitioners
Through: Mr. Amardeep Singh, Mr.
Davinder Hora and Ms. Monika,
Advocates.
versus
THE STATE GOVT. OF NCT
OF DELHI AND ANR. .....Respondents
Through: Mr. Hitesh Vali, APP for State
with SI Ajay, ASI Johrilal, PS
Prasad Nagar.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PRATEEK JALAN
ORDER
% 10.02.2026
1. The petitioners have filed this petition under Section 528 of the
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 [“BNSS”] (corresponding to
Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 [“CrPC“]), seeking
quashing of FIR No. 132/2025 dated 07.03.2025, registered at Police
Station Prasad Nagar, District Central, New Delhi, under Section 124(1)
of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 [“BNS”] (corresponding to Section
326A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860), on the ground of settlement.
2. Pursuant to the orders dated 07.01.2026 and 09.02.2026, Mr.
Hitesh Vali, learned Additional Public Prosecutor, has handed over a
status report in Court, which is taken on record.
3. The allegations, as emerging from the impugned FIR, are that, on
06.03.2025, a Police Control Room call was received with regard to an
CRL.M.C. 118/2026 Page 1 of 7
This is a digitally signed order.
The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above.
The Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 12/02/2026 at 21:31:51
acid attack on the caller [respondent No. 2]. She was taken to Lady
Hardinge Medical College, New Delhi, for treatment, and her statement
was recorded to the effect that an altercation took place between
petitioner No. 1 and her husband, who are neighbours. Petitioner No. 1
has been alleged to have threatened respondent No. 2 with an acid attack,
and thereafter thrown an acidic substance from the terrace of his house
into the window of respondent No. 2’s house.
4. It is stated in the status report that, in the course of investigation,
the statement of respondent No. 2 was recorded under Section 183 of the
BNSS [corresponding to Section 164 of the CrPC], and she reiterated the
aforesaid allegation. It was also stated therein that petitioner Nos. 2 and 3
had instigated petitioner No. 1 into committing the alleged offence.
5. The ground upon which quashing is sought is that, the parties have
entered into a Memorandum of Understanding dated 27.11.2025, under
which the petitioners and the victim [respondent No. 2 herein] have
agreed that the criminal proceedings be quashed upon payment of an
amount of Rs. 3,00,000/- by the petitioners to respondent No. 2.
6. I have heard Mr. Amardeep Singh, learned counsel for the
petitioners, and Mr. Vali, learned Additional Public Prosecutor.
7. Mr. Singh submits that the parties are neighbours, and that the
Courts have consistently held that criminal proceedings arising out of
neighbourhood quarrels should be set at rest, upon a compromise having
been achieved. He submits that continuation of proceedings would lead to
continued disharmony, and would not be to the benefit of any of the
parties.
8. Mr. Vali, on the other hand, opposes the quashing of the present
CRL.M.C. 118/2026 Page 2 of 7
This is a digitally signed order.
The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above.
The Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 12/02/2026 at 21:31:51
proceedings, having regard to the nature of the offence and the
seriousness of the charges against the petitioners. He also draws my
attention to the Medico-Legal Certificate of respondent No. 2, in which
the injuries have been characterised as grievous.
9. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, I am of the view that,
even though the allegation arises out of a neighbourhood quarrel, the
impugned FIR is not liable to be quashed on the basis of the settlement.
The Supreme Court has considered the jurisdiction of the High Court to
quash criminal proceedings in respect of non-compoundable offences in
several judgments. In Gian Singh v. State of Punjab and Anr.1, and
Narinder Singh and Ors. v. State of Punjab and Anr.2, an exception has
been carved out in the case of heinous offences which implicate public
interest and cannot be regarded as merely private grievances. The
Supreme Court, in Gian Singh, has held as follows:
“61. The position that emerges from the above discussion can be
summarised thus : the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal
proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction
is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for
compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent
power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be
exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz. : (i)
to secure the ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of
any court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or
complaint or FIR may be exercised where the offender and the victim
have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances
of each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before
exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the
nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of
mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot
be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim’s family and the
offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in1
(2012) 10 SCC 303 [hereinafter, “Gian Singh”].
2
(2014) 6 SCC 466 [hereinafter, “Narinder Singh”].
CRL.M.C. 118/2026 Page 3 of 7
This is a digitally signed order.
The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above.
The Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 12/02/2026 at 21:31:51
nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, any
compromise between the victim and the offender in relation to the
offences under special statutes like the Prevention of Corruption Act or
the offences committed by public servants while working in that
capacity, etc.; cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal
proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having
overwhelmingly and predominatingly civil flavour stand on a different
footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising
from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like
transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to
dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private
or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire
dispute. In this category of cases, the High Court may quash the
criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between
the offender and the victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and
bleak and continuation of the criminal case would put the accused to
great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused
to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete
settlement and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High
Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the
interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or
continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of
process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim
and the wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is
appropriate that the criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to
the above question(s) is in the affirmative, the High Court shall be well
within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding.”
[Emphasis supplied.
The aforesaid observations were reiterated by the Supreme Court in
Narinder Singh as follows:
“29.1. Power conferred under Section 482 of the Code is to be
distinguished from the power which lies in the Court to compound the
offences under Section 320 of the Code. No doubt, under Section 482
of the Code, the High Court has inherent power to quash the criminal
proceedings even in those cases which are not compoundable, where
the parties have settled the matter between themselves. However, this
power is to be exercised sparingly and with caution.
xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx
29.3. Such a power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which
involve heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences
like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private inCRL.M.C. 118/2026 Page 4 of 7
This is a digitally signed order.
The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above.
The Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 12/02/2026 at 21:31:51
nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, for the
offences alleged to have been committed under special statute like the
Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public
servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely
on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender.
xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx
29.6. Offences under Section 307 IPC would fall in the category of
heinous and serious offences and therefore are to be generally treated
as crime against the society and not against the individual alone.
However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because
there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is
framed under this provision. It would be open to the High Court to
examine as to whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for
the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence,
which if proved, would lead to proving the charge under Section 307
IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the
nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the
vital/delicate parts of the body, nature of weapons used, etc. Medical
report in respect of injuries suffered by the victim can generally be the
guiding factor. On the basis of this prima facie analysis, the High
Court can examine as to whether there is a strong possibility of
conviction or the chances of conviction are remote and bleak. In the
former case it can refuse to accept the settlement and quash the
criminal proceedings whereas in the latter case it would be permissible
for the High Court to accept the plea compounding the offence based
on complete settlement between the parties. At this stage, the Court
can also be swayed by the fact that the settlement between the parties
is going to result in harmony between them which may improve their
future relationship.
29.7. While deciding whether to exercise its power under Section 482
of the Code or not, timings of settlement play a crucial role. Those
cases where the settlement is arrived at immediately after the alleged
commission of offence and the matter is still under investigation, the
High Court may be liberal in accepting the settlement to quash the
criminal proceedings/investigation. It is because of the reason that at
this stage the investigation is still on and even the charge-sheet has not
been filed. Likewise, those cases where the charge is framed but the
evidence is yet to start or the evidence is still at infancy stage, the High
Court can show benevolence in exercising its powers favourably, but
after prima facie assessment of the circumstances/material mentioned
above. On the other hand, where the prosecution evidence is almost
complete or after the conclusion of the evidence the matter is at the
stage of argument, normally the High Court should refrain from
exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code, as in such casesCRL.M.C. 118/2026 Page 5 of 7
This is a digitally signed order.
The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above.
The Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 12/02/2026 at 21:31:51
the trial court would be in a position to decide the case finally on
merits and to come to a conclusion as to whether the offence under
Section 307 IPC is committed or not. Similarly, in those cases where
the conviction is already recorded by the trial court and the matter is
at the appellate stage before the High Court, mere compromise
between the parties would not be a ground to accept the same resulting
in acquittal of the offender who has already been convicted by the trial
court. Here charge is proved under Section 307 IPC and conviction is
already recorded of a heinous crime and, therefore, there is no
question of sparing a convict found guilty of such a crime.”
[Emphasis supplied.]
10. In State of Madhya Pradesh v. Laxmi Narayan3 also, a three-Judge
Bench of the Supreme Court explained the position thus:
“15.1. That the power conferred under Section 482 of the Code to
quash the criminal proceedings for the non-compoundable offences
under Section 320 of the Code can be exercised having
overwhelmingly and predominantly the civil character, particularly
those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of
matrimonial relationship or family disputes and when the parties have
resolved the entire dispute amongst themselves;
15.2. Such power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which
involved heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or
offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private
in nature and have a serious impact on society;”
[Emphasis supplied.]
11. Applying these principles to the facts of the present case, I find that
the allegations are serious in nature. Petitioner No. 1 is alleged to have
thrown acid on respondent No. 2, while she was in the safety of her own
home. The Medico-Legal Certificate of respondent No. 2, which has been
placed on record with the status report, shows that she reported the
incident when she was taken to the hospital, and was found to have pain
and a burning sensation over the left side of her face and body, and had
burn marks. As noted above, her injuries were characterised as grievous.
CRL.M.C. 118/2026 Page 6 of 7
This is a digitally signed order.
The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above.
The Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 12/02/2026 at 21:31:51
The status report also contains details of the Forensic Science Laboratory
report, which shows that samples of the liquid allegedly thrown by
petitioner No. 1 have also been found to contain Hydrochloric Acid.
While no straitjacket formula can be devised in such cases. I am of the
view that a case of acid attack represents the sort of heinous criminality,
in which the Supreme Court proscribes quashing on settlement. These are
offences which do affect society at large, as indicated by the fact that a
separate offence has been incorporated in the statute.
12. In the facts and circumstances narrated above, I am of the view that
it would not be appropriate to exercise the inherent jurisdiction of this
Court to quash the criminal proceedings, in the present case.
13. The petition is, therefore, dismissed.
14. Needless to say, the present order is intended only for disposal of
the present petition, and not to prejudice the case of the parties before the
learned Trial Court.
PRATEEK JALAN, J
FEBRUARY 10, 2026
‘pv/KA’/
3
(2019) 5 SCC 688.
CRL.M.C. 118/2026 Page 7 of 7
This is a digitally signed order.
The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above.
The Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 12/02/2026 at 21:31:51