Punjab-Haryana High Court
Rajender Singh And Others vs State Of Haryana And Others on 7 April, 2026
RA-CW-559-2025 in --1--
CWP-23474-2023
173 IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT
CHANDIGARH
RA-CW-559-2025 in
CWP-23474-2023
Decided on:-07.04.2026
Rajender Singh and others ....Petitioners...
vs.
State of Haryana and others ....Respondents.
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARKESH MANUJA
Present: Mr. B.K. Bagri, Advocate,
for review applicants-petitioners.
Ms. Komal Sharma, DAG, Haryana.
Mr. Chanderhas Yadav, Advocate,
for respondent No.3.
*****
HARKESH MANUJA J. (Oral)
CM-17909-CWP-2025
Application is allowed as prayed for.
CM-2202-CWP-2026
Application is allowed as prayed for. Reply filed on behalf of
respondent No.3 along with Annexures R-3/1 to Annexure R-3/14, is taken
on record.
RA-CW-559-2025
1. By way of the present application, a prayer has been made for
review of the judgment dated 16.10.2023 passed by this Court, vide which
the writ petition preferred by the applicants-petitioners came to be dismissed
with grant of liberty to avail their remedies in accordance with law.
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2. Briefly stating, in the given facts, certain land owned by the
applicants-petitioners forming part of the revenue estate of Village Goria,
Tehsil Matanhail, District Jhajjar, came to be acquired vide notifications
dated 16.01.2007 and 12.04.2007 issued under Sections 4 & 6 respectively
of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short, “1894 Act”), followed by an
award dated 04.06.2007, whereby, the market value was assessed by the
Land Acquisition Collector (herein after referred to as “LAC”) @ Rs.16.00
lakhs per acre.
3. Being aggrieved, some of the other landowners filed objections
under Section 18 of the 1894 Act, which were dismissed by the then
Additional District Judge, Jhajjar-cum-Reference Court vide decision dated
01.10.2011. Aggrieved of the Reference Court award dated 01.10.2011,
Regular First Appeals were preferred before this Court by those landowners
and the same were partly accepted vide decision dated 04.02.2016 passed in
RFA-266-2012, titled as “Joginder Singh Tokash vs. State of Haryana and
others” whereby the market value was re-assessed @ Rs.29,00,400/- per
acre along with grant of other statutory benefits. Finally, the Hon’ble Apex
Court modified the decision dated 04.02.2016 passed by this Court, vide its
order dated 05.09.2017 and the market value was reduced to Rs.25.00 lakhs
per acre from Rs.29,00,400/- per acre. Thereafter, on 04.12.2017, the
applicants-petitioners who did not file objections under Section 18 preferred
application under Section 28-A of the 1894 Act, claiming parity in the
amount of compensation as awarded by the Hon’ble Apex Court to the other
similarly placed landowners vide it’s decision dated 05.09.2017 . The said
application was dismissed by the then DRO-cum-LAC, Jhajjar, vide its order
dated 11.01.2019 on the ground that the same was filed much beyond three
months of the date of adjudication by the learned Reference Court and thus,
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was barred by limitation.
3.1 Aggrieved thereof, the present writ petition was filed, which
was dismissed vide order dated 16.10.2023 in terms of decision dated
24.01.2019 passed in the case of Mahabir and another versus State of
Haryana and others (CWP No. 1199 of 2019) with liberty to the landowners
to seek their remedy in accordance with law. In pursuance of the said liberty,
the applicants-petitioners preferred execution application bearing EXE-553-
2023 dated 18.12.2023, which was finally dismissed on 31.07.2025.
4. Soon thereafter, the applicants-petitioners preferred an intra-
court appeal bearing LPA-2477-2025, titled as ” Rajender Singh and others
vs. State of Haryana and others” assailing the decision dated 16.10.2023
rendered by this Court in CWP-23474-2023, which came to be disposed of
vide order dated 30.10.2025 and the relevant extract therefrom is reproduced
hereunder:-
“Learned counsel for the parties agree that the judgment on the
implementation of Section 28-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 has
been rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Banwari and
others vs. HSIIDC Ltd. and another, 2025(1) RCR (Civil) 232, which
will govern the issue hence, the dismissal of the writ petitions vide
impugned order(s) by the learned Single Judge of this Court by placing
reliance upon the decision of the Single Bench of this Court in CWP-
1199-2019 titled as Mahabir and another vs. State of Haryana and
others decided on 24.01.2019 needs reconsideration.
2. Learned counsel for the appellant(s) submits that present bunch
of appeals may kindly be disposed of having been not pressed any
further with the liberty to the appellant(s) to file a review petition
before the learned Single Judge of this Court in view of the judgment of
the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Banwari‘s case (supra).
3. Ordered accordingly.
4. Civil miscellaneous application pending, if any, is also disposed
of.
5. A photocopy of this order be placed on the files of connected
cases.”
5. In view of the aforesaid, the present application seeking review
of the decision dated 16.10.2023 came to be preferred.
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5.1 Notice of the application was issued to the respondents. Reply
on behalf of respondent No.3 already stands filed.
6. Learned counsel for the applicants-petitioners submits that in
view of the decision of Hon’ble Apex Court in Banwari‘s case (supra), the
application preferred at the instance of applicants-petitioners having invoked
Section 28-A of the 1894 Act, could not have been dismissed being barred
by limitation as the same was filed within three months of the adjudication
made by the Hon’ble Apex Court on 05.09.2017 and thus, the application
preferred at their instance on 04.12.2017 was within 90 days therefrom. He
thus, submits that the order dated 16.10.2023 passed by this Court was liable
to be reviewed and recalled and the applicants-petitioners were liable to be
granted the similar benefit of enhancement of market value as assessed in
favour of the other similarly placed landowners pertaining to the same
acquisition proceedings.
7. On the other hand, learned counsel representing respondent
No.3 submits that there was an inordinate delay on the part of applicants-
petitioners in invoking the review jurisdiction with respect to the decision
dated 16.10.2023 passed by this Court. He thus, submits that the application
for review was liable to be outrightly rejected as no application seeking
condonation of delay was preferred at the instance of applicants-petitioners.
He further submits that even, the review application was not maintainable on
merits, as any subsequent change in law, in terms of Banwari‘s case
(supra), was not to be considered as a ground for review of the decision. He
also contends that once the applicants-petitioners had already availed benefit
of the order passed by the Writ Court, having preferred execution
application, they were now estopped from assailing its validity through
filing of present review application and thus, the same was liable to be
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dismissed.
8. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and gone through
the paper book. I find substance in the submissions made on behalf of the
learned counsel for the applicants-petitioners.
9. In the given facts and circumstances, this Court vide decision
dated 04.02.2016 passed in RFA-266-2012, enhanced the market value
assessed by LAC @ Rs.16 lakh to Rs.29,00,400/- per acre along with all
other statutory benefits. Thereafter, the Hon’ble Apex Court vide it decision
dated 05.09.2017, modified the determination dated 04.02.2016 and the
market value was finally assessed @ Rs.25.00 lakhs per acre. The
applicants-petitioners preferred application under Section 28-A of the 1894
Act, however, the same was dismissed by DRO-cum-LAC, Jhajjar, being
barred by limitation vide order dated 11.01.2019. The writ petition assailing
the said order was dismissed by this Court vide order dated 16.10.2023,
albeit while granting liberty to the applicants-petitioners to avail their
remedy in accordance with law. It is however, pertinent to note that in terms
of the latest decision by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Banwari‘s case (supra),
the limitation period for filing an application under Section 28-A of the 1894
Act even commences from the date of passing of the final judgment with
respect to the re-determination of compensation amount. Relevant paragraph
Nos.15 & 16 of the aforementioned judgment are extracted hereunder:-
“15. In the present case, it is not in dispute that the First Appeal which
was allowed by the High Court vide judgment and order dated 2nd May
2016 was in respect of the land which was covered by the same
notification under which notification the appellants’ land is also covered.
It is also not in dispute that the amount awarded by the High Court in the
said First Appeal is in excess of the amount awarded by the Collector
under Section 11 of the 1894 Act in the case of the land of the appellants.
It is also not in dispute that the appellants had not made an application
to the Collector under Section 18 of the 1894 Act. It is also not in dispute
that the application made by the appellants under Section 28-A of the
SONIKA 1894 Act to the Collector was within a period of three months from the
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date of the judgment and order of the High Court.
16. From the perusal of the judgment of this Court in the case of
Pradeep Kumari (supra), it is clear that the limitation for moving the
application under Section 28-A of the 1894 Act will begin to run only
from the date of the award on the basis of which redetermination of the
compensation is sought. The appellants are seeking redetermination of
the compensation on the basis of the judgment and order of the High
Court in First Appeal No. 429 of 2023 dated 2nd May 2016. It is not
disputed that the application of the appellants under Section 28-A of the
1894 Act is within a period of three months from 2nd May 2016.”
Further, the decision made in the case of Banwari‘s case
(supra) has also been followed by the Division Bench of this Court in case
of ‘Union of India and another v. The Special Land Acquisition Collector-
cum-Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Pathankot and others, 2025(3) RCR
(Civil) 786.
10. In the present case, the final assessment as regards the market
value was made by the Hon’ble Apex Court vide decision dated 05.09.2017.
Since the applicant-petitioners/landowners sought redetermination of
compensation within 90 days from the said date while claiming parity; in
view of the law laid down in Banwari‘s case (supra), the limitation period
for filing the application under Section 28-A commenced on 05.09.2017 and
expired on 03.09.2017. However, since 03.09.2017 was a Sunday, the
application was preferred on 04.09.2017 and even then by virtue of Section
4 of the Limitation Act, the prescribed period of 90 days been extended to
the next working day, the application under Section 28-A was to be treated
within the prescribed period of limitation.
11 In view of the aforesaid facts and exposition of law by the
Hon’ble Apex Court, it was highly unfair and unjustified on the part of this
Court to non-suit the applicants-petitioners on the ground that their
application under Section 28-A of the 1894 Act was barred by limitation
merely by recording that the same was not preferred within 90 days of the
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adjudication made by the ld. Reference Court on 01.10.2011. Pertinently, in
the given facts, the ld. Reference Court vide its decision dated 01.10.2011
rejected the reference petition preferred under Section 18 of the 1894 Act on
behalf of the other identically placed landowners and thus, the applicants-
petitioners could not have even claimed any parity of compensation in terms
of Section 28-A of the 1894 Act. Admittedly, the enhancement by way of re-
assessment of market value was done by this Court for the first time with
respect to the acquisition in hand, vide its decision dated 04.02.2016 passed
in RFA-266-2012, which, at best for the first time, conferred upon the
applicants-petitioners the right to invoke the provisions of Section 28-A of
the 1894 Act. However, thereafter, the Hon’ble Apex Court modified the
decision dated 04.02.2016 passed by this Court, vide its decision dated
05.09.2017 and the market value was finally reassessed @ Rs.25.00 lakhs
per acre. The applicants-petitioners/landowners sought parity in respect of
the compensation as finally assessed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in favor of
identically placed landowners. In such circumstances, the LAC could not
have rejected the application preferred by the applicants-petitioners under
Section 28-A of the 1894 Act to be barred by limitation, and was thus
required to decide the same on merits by treating it to be within limitation by
awarding the benefit of similar compensation as assessed in favour of the
other similarly placed landowners pertaining to the same acquisition
proceedings.
12. In the humble opinion of this Court, with respect to the issue of
maintainability of the present review application, it is pertinent to note that
vide order dated 16.10.2023, the writ petitions preferred on behalf of
applicants-petitioners came to be dismissed in terms of the judgment dated
24.01.2019 passed in the case of Mahabir and another versus State of
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Haryana and others (CWP No.1199 of 2019). In the said case, while
dismissing the writ petition, this court placed reliance upon the decision
rendered in Ramsingbhai (Ramsangbhai) Jerambhai v. State of Gujarat
and another [2018(3)RCR(Civil)114]. The relevant extract of the order
dated 24.01.2019 is reproduced hereunder:
“Bolstered by the decision of this Court, application under
Section 28-A was filed and the same had been dismissed. The Apex
Court in Ramsinghbhai (supra) has restated the earlier judgments
and framed the following question:
“2. Whether an application under Section 28A of the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short “the Act”) for redetermination
of the compensation can be filed within a period of 3 months
from the date of judgment of the High Court or Supreme Court
passed in appeal under Section 54 of the Act is the question
that arises for consideration in this case.”
Resultantly, it was held that the appellant is only entitled for the
relief in terms of Section 28-A passed on the award of the Reference
Court and not any enhancement which has been passed in the appeal.
Relevant para reads as under:
“5. What the appellant seeks is redetermination of
compensation under the Act in terms of the judgment of the
High Court passed under Section 54 of the Act. In view of the
settled legal position which we have explained above, the
appellant is not entitled to such a relief; his entitlement, if any,
is only in terms of Section 28A of the Act based on the award of
the Reference Court.
6. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. Pending application
(s), if any, shall stand disposed of. No costs.”
Resultantly, the order passed by the LAC does not suffer from
any infirmity, which would warrant interference by this Court and
accordingly, the present appeal is dismissed in limine”
However, as per the latest exposition of law in Banwari‘s case
(supra), which forms the basis of the present review, the Hon’ble Supreme
Court has comprehensively examined the legal position emerging from
Ramsingbhai‘s case (supra) as well as the case of Union of India versus
Pradeep Kumari [1995(2)SCC736]. In the said decision, the Hon’ble Court
not only reaffirmed the principle laid down in Pradeep Kumari‘s case but
also held the view taken in Ramsingbhai‘s case to be per incuriam in the
light of the earlier judgment. Relevant paragraphs thereof are extracted
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hereunder:
“18. It is further to be noted that the cases of Pradeep Kumari and Others (supra)
and Ramsingbhai (Ramsangbhai) Jerambhai (supra), both have been decided by a
Bench strength of three learned Judges of this Court. The case of Pradeep Kumari
and Others (supra) is decided on 10th March 1995, whereas Ramsingbhai
(Ramsangbhai) Jerambhai (supra), has been decided on 24th April 2018.
19. A perusal of the judgment rendered in Ramsingbhai (Ramsangbhai) Jerambhai
(supra), would reveal that the said case does not take note of the earlier view taken
by three learned judges of this Court in the case of Pradeep Kumari and Others
(supra).
20. In this respect, we may gainfully refer to the observations of a Constitution
Bench of this Court in the case of National Insurance Company Limited v. Pranay
Sethi and Others (2017) 16 SCC 680 : 2017 INSC 1068. The relevant paragraphs of
the judgment read as under:
“27. We are compelled to state here that in Munna Lal Jain, the three-Judge
Bench should have been guided by the principle stated in Reshma Kumari
which has concurred with the view expressed in Sarla Verma or in case of
disagreement, it should have been well advised to refer the case to a larger
Bench. We say so, as we have already expressed the opinion that the dicta laid
down in Reshma Kumari being earlier in point of time would be a binding
precedent and not the decision in Rajesh.
28. In this context, we may also refer to Sundeep Kumar Bafna v. State of
Maharashtra [Sundeep Kumar Bafna v. State of Maharashtra, (2014) 16
SCC 623 : (2015) 3 SCC (Cri) 558] which correctly lays down the principle
that discipline demanded by a precedent or the disqualification or diminution of
a decision on the application of the per incuriam rule is of great importance,
since without it, certainty of law, consistency of rulings and comity of courts
would become a costly casualty. A decision or judgment can be per incuriam
any provision in a statute, rule or regulation, which was not brought to the
notice of the court. A decision or judgment can also be per incuriam if it is not
possible to reconcile its ratio with that of a previously pronounced judgment of
a co-equal or larger Bench. There can be no scintilla of doubt that an earlier
decision of co equal Bench binds the Bench of same strength. Though the
judgment in Rajesh case was delivered on a later date, it had not apprised itself
of the law stated in Reshma Kumari but had been guided by Santosh Devi . We
have no hesitation that it is not a binding precedent on the co-equal Bench.”
21. It can thus be seen that, this Court in unequivocal terms has held that an
earlier decision of a Bench of particular strength would be binding on the
subsequent Benches of this Court having the same or lesser number of judges.
22. While considering the rule of per incuriam, the Constitution Bench of this
Court has held that a decision or judgment can be said to be per incuriam if it is not
possible to reconcile its ratio with that of a previously pronounced judgment of a co
equal or larger Bench.
23. In any case, the judgment in Pradeep Kumari and Others (supra) has been
rendered by three learned Judges of this Court after considering the relevant
provisions of the Statute and the principles of interpretation. However, the judgment
in the case of Ramsingbhai (Ramsangbhai) Jerambhai (supra) is a short judgment
only referring to the text of Section 28A(1) of the 1894 Act.
24. As already discussed hereinabove, the provisions of Section 28A(1) of the 1894
Act have been elaborately considered by a three Judges Bench of this Court in the case
of Pradeep Kumari and Others (supra). In the said case, it has been held that the
Statement of Objects and Reasons of Section 28A would reveal that the object
underlying the enactment of the said provision is to remove inequality in the payment of
compensation for same or similar quality of land. It has been held that the said
provision is for giving benefit to inarticulate and poor people not being able to take
advantage of the right of reference to the civil court under Section 18 of the Act. It has
been held that this is sought to be achieved by providing an opportunity to all aggrieved
parties whose land is covered by the same notification to seek redetermination once any
of them has obtained orders for payment of higher compensation from the reference
court under Section 18 of the Act. The same benefit would be available to the other
SONIKA landholders under Section 28A. It has been held that Section 28A being a beneficent
legislation enacted in order to give relief to the inarticulate and poor people, the
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principle of interpretation which would be required to be adopted is the one which
advances the policy of the legislation to extend the benefit rather than a construction
which has the effect of curtailing the benefit conferred by it.
25. We are, therefore, inclined to allow the appeal. The impugned judgment and order
of the High Court dated 25th November 2021 is quashed and set aside and the order of
the LAC dated 15th September 2020 is upheld.
In view of the aforesaid, it is apparent that the legal basis on
which the order dated 16.10.2023 was passed does not survive in view of the
subsequent judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Banwari’s
case (supra). Furthermore, with regard to retrospective operation of a
decision, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Directorate of Revenue
Intelligence Versus Raj Kumar Arora & Ors. reported as 2026(2)SCC 401
held as under:
“94. While addressing the issue of the temporal and retrospective
effect of a judicial decision and declaring that a tribunal or court is
bound by a higher court’s decision on the point in issue, irrespective
of whether it is declared either prior to or subsequent to the order
which is sought to be called into question by a party, this Court
in Assistant Commissioner, Income Tax, Rajkot v. Saurashtra Kutch
Stick Exchange Limited reported in (2008) 14 SCC 171 stated that a
judicial decision acts retrospectively by placing reliance on the
Blackstonian theory. According to this theory, it is not the function of
the court to pronounce a “new rule” but to maintain and expound the
“old one”. Therefore, if the subsequent decision alters or overrules the
earlier one, it cannot be said to have made a new law. The correct
principle of law is just discovered and applied retrospectively. In
other words, if in a given situation an earlier decision of the court
operated for quite some time and it is overruled by a subsequent
decision, the decision rendered subsequently would have retrospective
effect and would serve to clarify the legal position which was not
clearly understood earlier. Any transaction would then be covered by
the law declared by the overruling decision. The overruling is
generally retrospective with the only caveat being that matters that
are res judicatae or accounts that have been settled in the meantime
would not be disturbed.
……………….
122. On a conspectus of the aforesaid discussion on the
doctrine of prospective overruling, the following can be summarised:
i. The default rule is that the overruling of a decision generally
operates retrospectively. This is because a judgement which interprets
a statute or provision declares the meaning of the statute as it should
have been construed from the date of its enactment and what has been
declared to be the law of the land must be held to have always been
the law of the land. This rationale also stems from the Blackstonian
rule that the duty of the court is not to “pronounce a new law but to
maintain and expound the old one”. The judge rather than being the
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decision alters or overrules the earlier one, it cannot be said to have
made a new law. The correct principle of law is just discovered and
applied retrospectively.
ii. Since resorting to the doctrine of “prospective overruling” is an
exception to the normal rule that a judgement or decision applies
retrospectively and to the general rule of doctrine of precedent, an
express declaration by the court that its decision is prospectively
applicable is absolutely necessary. Prospectivity as a concept cannot
be considered to be inhered in situations since the intention to
attribute prospectivity to a decision must be limpid and clear.
……………………
134. The Blackstonian theory also lends great support to our
conclusion since it underscores the principle that it is not the function
of the court to pronounce a “new rule” but to maintain and expound
the “old one”. Therefore, the overruling of a decision cannot be
equated to the creation of a new law. The correct principle of law is
merely clarified and applied retrospectively…..”
In view of the aforesaid, this Court is of the considered opinion
that the decision rendered in Banwari‘s case (supra) needs to be given
retrospective effect in order to extends the benefits of section 28-A as
interpreted by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the said judgment. Even otherwise,
it is not in dispute that certain similarly situated landowners have already
been extended the benefit of enhanced compensation by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court vide order dated 05.09.2017. Consequently, denial of the
same relief to the present applicants-petitioners would result in hostile
discrimination and offend the mandate of Article 14 of the Constitution of
India, which guarantees equality before law and equal protection of laws. In
such circumstances, this Court is of the considered view that the present
review application deserves to be entertained in order to secure the ends of
justice by rectifying the order dated 16.10.2023.
13. Further, with respect to the issue of limitation for filing review
application in a writ petition, the point of limitation already stands
adjudicated upon by the Full Bench of this Court in “Teja Singh vs. The
Union Territory of Chandigarh and others“, reported as 1982 P.L.R. 160,
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wherein, it has been held that there is no limitation for filing review
application in a writ petition. Relevant paras are extracted hereunder:-
27. As a result of my aforesaid discussion, I come to the following
conclusions :-
1) That in the matters which have not been specifically dealt with by the
Writ Rules, the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code, so far as they
can be made applicable, would apply to the proceedings under Article
226 of the Constitution.
2) That the explanation added to Section 141 of the Civil Procedure Code,
by Amendment Act, does not in any way nullify the effect of rule 32 of the
Writ Rules.
3) Then when a writ petition is dismissed after contest by passing a
speaking order, then such decision would operate as res judicata in any
other proceeding such as suit, a petition under Article 32 etc.
4) That if a petition is dismissed only on the ground of laches or the
availability of an alternate remedy or on a ground analogous thereto, then
any other proceeding will not be barred on principle of res judicata.
5) That even in cases where a petition is dismissed on the ground of
alternate remedy or on a ground analogous thereto, a second petition on
the same cause of action under Article 226 would be barred.
6) That there is an exception to proposition (5) that where the first petition
is dismissed on the ground that alternate remedy under the Act has not been
availed of, then after availing of the statutory remedy under the Act, a
second petition may be maintainable on the principle that the same has
been filed on a cause of action which has arisen after the decision of the
appropriate authority under the Act.
7) That a second petition on similar facts and in respect of the same cause
of action by the same party would not be maintainable even if his earlier
petition has been disposed of by one word ‘Dismissed’.
8) That the provisions of Order 22, Civil Procedure Code would apply to
the proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution.
9) That provisions of Order 23, Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code would
apply to the writ proceedings and that a petition which has simply been got
dismissed as withdrawn would be a bar to the filing of a second petition on
the same facts and in respect of the same cause of action.
10) That the provisions of the Limitation Act are not applicable to the
writ proceedings or the miscellaneous applications filed in the writ
proceedings.”
(Emphasis supplied)
14. In view of the aforesaid exposition of law, there was no
requirement for the applicants-petitioners to have preferred any application
for seeking condonation of delay in filing the review application.
15. Accordingly, the present review application is allowed and the
SONIKA order dated 16.10.2023 is recalled and the main writ petition is disposed of
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by observing that the appellants-petitioners shall be entitled for award of
benefit of similar amount of compensation as assessed in favour of the other
similarly placed landowners pertaining to the same acquisition proceedings;
as finally assessed by the Hon’ble Apex Court vide judgment dated
05.09.2017 i.e. @ Rs.25 lakhs per acre with all other statutory benefits.
07.04.2026 (HARKESH MANUJA)
sonika JUDGE
Whether speaking/reasoned: Yes
Whether reportable: Yes
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