Madhya Pradesh High Court
Rairu Gramothan Vikas Samiti Gwalior … vs Keshar Singh Rai (Dead) Through Lrs (I) … on 2 July, 2025
Author: Gurpal Singh Ahluwalia
Bench: G. S. Ahluwalia
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:14382
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT GWALIOR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE G. S. AHLUWALIA
ON THE 2 nd OF JULY, 2025
SECOND APPEAL No. 632 of 2025
RAIRU GRAMOTHAN VIKAS SAMITI GWALIOR THROUGH
SECRETARY PRAMOD SHARMA AND ANOTHER
Versus
KESHAR SINGH RAI (DEAD) THROUGH LRS (I) EKAM SINGH S/O
LATE SHRI DEVENDRA SINGH AGE 17 YRS MINOR U/G AND
OTHERS
Appearance:
Mr. Rohit Bansal - Advocate for appellants.
Mr. Vinod Kumar Bhardwaj - Senior Advocate, assisted by Mr. Rohit
Batham - Advocate for respondents.
JUDGMENT
This second appeal under Section 100 of CPC has been filed against
judgment and decree dated 31.01.2025 passed by XIV District Judge,
District Gwalior in RCA No.100/2023 as well as judgment and decree dated
18.04.2023 passed by III Civil Judge, Junior Division, District Gwalior in
RCSA No.277/2016.
2. Appellants are the defendants, who have lost their case from both
the Courts below.
3. The facts necessary for disposal of present appeal, in short, are that
original plaintiff, namely, Keshar Singh, who is being represented by his
legal representatives / respondents, had filed a suit for eviction and recovery
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of arrears of rent. It is the case of original plaintiff that disputed
building belonging to original plaintiff is situated on Survey No. 58. Ten
rooms, which are situated on the ground floor, and an open playground were
let out to appellants/defendants on 06.12.2005 on a monthly rent of Rs.
2500/-, which was not inclusive of water and electricity charges.
Appellants/defendants are running the school in the name of Dr.
Radhakrishnan Vidya Mandir High School. On the first floor of the building,
plaintiff is residing. Plaintiff and his daughter, namely, Smt. Parvindarjeet
Kaur was earlier residing in Canada and were occasionally visiting Gwalior.
In the year 2013, they came to Gwalior and found that defendant has
constructed two halls and a room without permission of the plaintiff.
Defendants have not paid the rent to the plaintiff since 06.12.2005. In spite
of that, on 25.04.2016, defendant sent a notice to the plaintiff, which was
duly replied by the plaintiff by his reply dated 09.05.2016, and rent @ Rs.
2500/- per month was demanded with effect from 06.12.2005. In spite of
receipt of notice, defendant has not paid the rent, and accordingly, it was
prayed that defendant is liable to be evicted on the ground of arrears of rent,
i.e., under Section 12 (1) (a) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act. It was
further pleaded that after death of Devendrajeet, who was the son of original
plaintiff, his son Ekam Singh, who is the grandson of original plaintiff, is
residing with him. In near future, original plaintiff is intending to come back
to India and wants to do social work in the educational and social field, for
which suit premises is required for bona fide need, and original plaintiff has
no other accommodation or place in the city of Gwalior. It was further
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pleaded that defendant has created a forged rent note dated 24.10.2009,
whereas Devendrajeet had no ownership over the property in dispute.
Property in dispute is situated on Survey No. 58. On multiple occasions,
plaintiff has requested the defendant to vacate the premises. A Civil Suit
No.40A/2016 was filed on false grounds, as a result defendant has also
created nuisance against the original plaintiff. Accordingly, suit was filed for
eviction under Sections 12 (1) (a), 12 (1) (c), and 12 (1) (o) of the M.P.
Accommodation Control Act, as well as for recovery of arrears of rent to the
tune of Rs.90,000/-, as well as means profit @ Rs.2,500/- per month.
4. Defendants filed their written statement and denied the plaint
averments. It was claimed that suit premises is not situated on Survey No.
58. It was claimed that suit premises is situated on Suvey Nos. 50, 52, 62, 63,
64, and 65, which was let out by Devendrajeet Singh. A false report has been
prepared to show that the school is situated on Survey No. 58. It was further
pleaded that defendants had never taken disputed property on rent from the
original plaintiff. In fact, Late Devendrajeet Singh had executed a rent note
on 17.12.2004, which was got notarized on 03.01.2005, and since then
defendants are in possession of the suit premises as a tenant of Devendrajeet
Singh, and they are running a school as per the norms of Board of Secondary
Education, Bhopal. Defendants had constructed six rooms and a hall out of
their own money. Since the rent note was not a registered one, and it was
required for the building permission, therefore, registered rent note was
executed on 24.01.2009 for a period of 30 years, and thereafter, defendants
had also constructed four rooms, one corridor, latrine-bathroom, as well as
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six rooms by the side of canteen. Son of original plantiff, Devendrajeet
Singh, was residing in a bunglow situated near the school. However, he
expired on 13.12.2013. Thereafter, Parvindar Kaur, who is the daughter of
original plaintiff, came back to India and started residing in the said house.
Original plaintiff came to India for the first time on 16.12.2013, and since
they were intending to alienate the bunglow, which was in possession of
Devendrajeet Singh, therefore, they requested the defendants that since they
want to shift to Canada after selling out their entire property, therefore, they
may be permitted to reside in six rooms, which have been constructed on the
first floor of the premises. Accordingly, four rooms, one latrine-bathroom,
situated on the first floor of the building, were given to the plaintiffs.
However, it was denied that relationship of landlord-tenant had ever existed
between the original plaintiff and defendants. Ekam Singh is the sole legal
representative of Devendrajeet Singh, and accordingly, original plaintiff was
appointed as guardian of Ekam Singh by order dated 01.08.2014 passed by
Fourth Additional District Judge, Gwalior. Accordingly, original plaintiff
insisted that defendants should pay rent of Rs. 2500/- in place of Rs. 500/-,
otherwise he would withhold the facilities. Accordingly, with an intention to
save the possession of school, defendants paid Rs.2500/- by rent for Ekam
Singh. Original plaintiff did not give the receipt of rent received by him, and
gave his bank account to defendants with instructions that the rent be
deposited in his account, and accordingly, defendants had deposited the rent,
which was meant for Ekam Sngh. Defendants had never received any notice,
purportedly issued under Section 12 (1) (a) of M.P. Accommodation Control
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Act. Notice dated 30.03.2015 has been forgedly created. Original plaintiff
has no intention to shift to India and to indulge himself into educational and
social activities. Original plaintiff is having 45 bigha of land adjoining to
land in dispute, therefore, he does not require suit premises in dispute for
bona fide need. Legal representative of Devendrajeet Singh, namely, Manjeet
Kaur, had filed a suit for eviction and recovery of arrears of rent against
defendants, which was compromised by order dated 11.09.2021, and a
compromise decree was passed. Accordingly, it was prayed that the suit be
dismissed.
5. Trial Court, after framing issues and recording evidence, decreed the
suit, and a decree for eviction was passed along with payment of arrears of
rent to the tune of Rs.90,000/-, and it was also directed that original plaintiff
is entitled for means profit @ Rs.2500/- from the date of institution of civil
suit till the actual possession is obtained.
6. Being aggrieved by judgment and decree passed by the trial Court,
appellants preferred an appeal, which too has been dismissed by the appellate
Court.
7. Challenging the judgments and decrees passed by Courts below, it is
submitted by counsel for appellants that appellants were not the tenant of
original plaintiff. It is submitted that, in fact property in dispute was let out
by Devendrajeet Singh by a notarized rent note dated 03.01.2005, but it is
fairly conceded by counsel for appellants that aforesaid rent note was never
placed on record. It appears that defendants have also relied upon a
registered rent note dated 24.01.2009.
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8. However, it is fairly conceded by counsel for appellants that
appellants are running the school from the year 1999. Accordingly, counsel
for appellants was directed to explain that if suit property was let out to
appellants by Devendrajeet Singh in the year 2005, then how the appellants
came into possession of the same from the year 1999. Counsel for appellants
could not give any explanation in this regard. Even otherwise, the
explanation given by the defendants that since original plaintiff and his
children were intending to alienate the property and were intending to
permanently settle down in Canada, therefore, they prayed for occupying
some rooms in the suit premises, and therefore, four rooms, and latrine-
bathroom, which were constructed on the first floor of the school, were given
to them, also appears to be misconceived. Nothing in writing has been filed
by defendants to show that four rooms and a latrine-bathroom, which were
situated on the first floor of the suit premises in which school is being run by
defendants, were given by them to the original plaintiff by way of temporary
arrangement.
9. Both the Courts below have given concurrent findings of fact that
suit premises was owned by original plaintiff, Keshar Singh, and defendants
have not paid the arrears of rent, and therefore, are liable to be evicted under
Section 12 (1) (a) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act.
10. So far as the question as to whether, original plaintiff Keshar
Singh was the owner or not will loose its effect in view of the admission
made by defendant No. 2 that he had paid rent to original plaintiff Keshar
Singh, but claimed that said rent was meant for Ekam Singh, who is the
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grandson of original plaintiff Keshar Singh. Even if a person collects rent on
behalf of true owner, still he would be a landlord and can maintain a suit.
Therefore, the question of title of original plaintiff, Keshar Singh, will not
have much effect on the outcome of this appeal because defendants
themselves have admitted that they have paid rent to original plaintiff Keshar
Singh.
11. So far as the suit for eviction filed by widow of Devendrajeet
Singh is concerned, it is submitted by counsel for appellants that first wife of
Devendrajeet Singh was Manjot Kaur, and second wife of Devendrajeet
Singh was Manjeet Kaur. Defendants have relied upon the judgment passed
by the Civil Court as Exh. D-8, according to which a suit was filed by
Manjeet Kaur @ Manjot Kaur. According to counsel for appellants himself,
Manjeet and Manjot are two different women. Then why the suit was filed in
the name of Manjeet @ Manjot could not be explained by counsel for
appellants. Thus, the contention of counsel for respondents that the suit filed
by Manjeet @ Manjot Kaur was a camouflage done by defendants appears to
be more convincing and plausible.
12. In paragraph 18 of his cross-examination, DW-2 Pramod Sharma,
who is appellant No. 2 in the present case, has admitted that counsel of
Manjot as well as of this witness is the same, although this witness had
denied the suggestion that in fact it was this witness who had got the suit
instituted by Manjot Kaur.
13. Be that whatever it may.
14. One thing is clear that counsel for appellants has admitted that
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Manjeet and Manjot Kaur are two different ladies, and he could not explain
as to why the civil suit was filed in the name of Manjeet @ Manjot Kaur.
Thus, it is clear that the suit was filed with some malafide intention by
projecting that Manjeet and Manjot Kaur are one and the same lady.
15. Furthermore, arrogant attitude of the defendants is writ large from
paragraph 26 of his cross-examination. It appears that an FIR was lodged by
defendants against Keshar Singh, Sukhveer Singh, and Parvindar Kaur,
alleging breaking open of lock, committing theft, etc. Parvindar Kaur had
challenged the said FIR before the High Court, and FIR against Parvindar
Kaur was quashed. However, this witness, on his own, scolded the High
Court by saying that once a cross-FIR was lodged by both the parties against
each other, then how the High Court can quash the FIR which was registered
against Parvindar Kaur, and alleged that the order passed by the High Court
was wrong, but he admitted that he did not challenge the order passed by the
High Court before the Supreme Court.
16. Both the Courts below have given concurrent findings of fact that
defendants/appellants are tenants of original plaintiff Keshar Singh and have
passed the decrees of eviction against the appellants. It is a well-established
principle of law that even if the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the
Courts below are erroneous, still the same cannot be interfered with by the
High Court in exercise of power under Section 100 of CPC.
17. The Supreme Court in the case of Dinesh Kumar v. Yusuf Ali
reported in (2010) 12 SCC 740 has held as under:-
“13. A second appeal does not lie on the ground of erroneous
findings of facts based on appreciation of the relevant evidence.
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The High Court should not entertain a second appeal unless it
raises a substantial question of law. It is the obligation on the court
of law to further the clear intendment of the legislature and not to
frustrate it by ignoring the same.
14. In Ram Prasad Rajak v. Nand Kumar & Bros. [(1998) 6 SCC
748 : AIR 1998 SC 2730], this Court held that existence of the
substantial question of law is a sine qua non for the exercise of
jurisdiction under Section 100 of the Code and entering into the
question as to whether the need of the landlord was bona fide or
not, was beyond the jurisdiction of the High Court as the issue can
be decided only by appreciating the evidence on record.
15. There may be a question, which may be a “question of fact”,
“question of law”, “mixed question of fact and law” and
“substantial question of law”. Question means anything inquired;
an issue to be decided. The “question of fact” is whether a
particular factual situation exists or not. A question of fact, in
the realm of jurisprudence, has been explained as under:
“A question of fact is one capable of being answered by way
of demonstration–a question of opinion is one that cannot be
so answered. The answer to it is a matter of speculation
which cannot be proved by any available evidence to be right
or wrong.”
(Vide Salmond on Jurisprudence, 12th Edn., p. 69, cited in
Gadakh Yashwantrao Kankarrao v. Balasaheb Vikhe Patil
[(1994) 1 SCC 682], at SCC p. 705, para 34.)
16. In RBI v. Ramakrishna Govind Morey [(1976) 1 SCC 803 :
AIR 1976 SC 830] this Court held that whether the trial court
should not have exercised its jurisdiction differently, is not a
question of law or a substantial question of law and, therefore, the
second appeal cannot be entertained by the High Court on this
ground.
17. In Kulwant Kaur v. Gurdial Singh Mann [(2001) 4 SCC 262]
this Court held that the question whether the lower court’s finding
is perverse may come within the ambit of substantial question of
law. However, there must be a clear finding in the judgment of the
High Court as to perversity in order to show compliance with the
provisions of Section 100 CPC. Thus, this Court rejected the
proposition that scrutiny of evidence is totally prohibited in the
second appeal.
18. In Sheel Chand v. Prakash Chand [(1998) 6 SCC 683 : AIR
1998 SC 3063] , this Court held that question of reappreciation of
evidence and framing the substantial question as to whether the
findings relating to the factual matrix by the court below could
vitiate due to irrelevant consideration and not under law, being
question of fact cannot be framed.
19. In Rajappa Hanamantha Ranoji v. Mahadev Channabasappa
[(2000) 6 SCC 120] this Court held that it is not permissible for
the High Court to decide the second appeal by reappreciating the
evidence as if it was deciding the first appeal unless it comes to the
conclusion that the findings recorded by the court below were
perverse.
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20. In Jai Singh v. Shakuntala [(2002) 3 SCC 634 : AIR 2002 SC
1428] this Court held that it is permissible to interfere even on
question of fact but it has to be done only in exceptional
circumstances. The Court observed as under : (SCC pp. 637-38,
para 6)
“6. … While scrutiny of evidence does not stand out to be
totally prohibited in the matter of exercise of jurisdiction in
the second appeal and that would in our view be too broad a
proposition and too rigid an interpretation of law not worthy
of acceptance but that does not also clothe the superior courts
within jurisdiction to intervene and interfere in any and every
matter–it is only in very exceptional cases and on extreme
perversity that the authority to examine the same in extenso
stands permissible–it is a rarity rather than a regularity and
thus in fine it can be safely concluded that while there is no
prohibition as such, but the power to scrutiny can only be had
in very exceptional circumstances and upon proper
circumspection.”
21. In P. Chandrasekharan v. S. Kanakarajan [(2007) 5 SCC 669]
this Court reiterated the principle that interference in the second
appeal is permissible only when the findings are based on
misreading of evidence or are so perverse that no person of
ordinary prudence could take the said view. More so, the Court
must be conscious that intervention is permissible provided the
case involves a substantial question of law which is altogether
different from the question of law. Interpretation of a document
which goes to the root of title of a party may give rise to a
substantial question of law.
22. In Shakuntala Chandrakant Shreshti v. Prabhakar Maruti
Garvali [(2007) 11 SCC 668 : (2008) 1 SCC (L&S) 964] this
Court considered the scope of appeal under Section 30 of the
Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923 and held as under : (SCC pp.
679-80, paras 39-40 & 42)
“39. Section 30 of the said Act postulates an appeal directly
to the High Court if a substantial question of law is involved
in the appeal.
40. A jurisdictional question will involve a substantial
question of law. A finding of fact arrived at without there
being any evidence would also give rise to a substantial
question of law. …
***
42. A question of law would arise when the same is not
dependent upon examination of evidence, which may not
require any fresh investigation of fact. A question of law
would, however, arise when the finding is perverse in the
sense that no legal evidence was brought on record or
jurisdictional facts were not brought on record.”
Similar view has been reiterated by this Court in Anathula
Sudhakar v. P. Buchi Reddy [(2008) 4 SCC 594] .
23. In Rishi Kumar Govil v. Maqsoodan [(2007) 4 SCC 465] this
Court while dealing with the provisions of Section 21(1)(a) of the
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U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction)
Act, 1972 and Rule 16 of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of
Letting, Rent and Eviction) Rules, 1972, held that the bona fide
personal need of the landlord is a question of fact and should not
be normally interfered with.
24. There is no prohibition to entertain a second appeal even on
question of fact provided the Court is satisfied that the findings of
the courts below were vitiated by non-consideration of relevant
evidence or by showing erroneous approach to the matter.
[Vide Jagdish Singh v. Natthu Singh [(1992) 1 SCC 647 : AIR
1992 SC 1604] , Prativa Devi v. T.V. Krishnan [(1996) 5 SCC
353] , Satya Gupta v. Brijesh Kumar [(1998) 6 SCC 423] ,
Ragavendra Kumar v. Prem Machinery & Co. [(2000) 1 SCC 679
: AIR 2000 SC 534] and Molar Mal v. Kay Iron Works (P) Ltd.
[(2000) 4 SCC 285] ]25 [Ed. : Para 25 corrected vide Official
Corrigendum No. F.3/Ed.B.J./68/2010 dated 9-7-2010.] . Thus, the
law on the subject emerges to the effect that second appeal under
Section 100 CPC is maintainable basically on a substantial
question of law and not on facts. However, if the High Court
comes to the conclusion that the findings of fact recorded by the
courts below are perverse being based on no evidence or based on
irrelevant material, the appeal can be entertained and it is
permissible for the Court to reappreciate the evidence. The
landlord is the best judge of his need, however, it should be real,
genuine and the need may not be a pretext to evict the tenant only
for increasing the rent.”
18. Since no perversity could be pointed out by counsel for appellants,
accordingly this Court is of considered opinion that no case is made out
warranting interference and no substantial question of law arises in the
present appeal.
19. Ex-consesquentia, judgment and decree dated 31.01.2025 passed
by XIV District Judge, District Gwalior in Civil Appeal No.100/2023 as well
as judgment and decree dated 18.04.2023 passed by III Civil Judge, Junior
Division, Gwalior in Civil Suit No.277-A/2016 are hereby affirmed..
20. Appeal fails and is hereby dismissed.
(G. S. AHLUWALIA)
JUDGE
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AKS
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Signed by: ALOK KUMAR
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