Andhra Pradesh High Court – Amravati
Pushpam Appala Naidu vs The State Of Andhra Pradesh on 15 April, 2026
APHC010198272026
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
AT AMARAVATI [3521]
(Special Original Jurisdiction)
WEDNESDAY,THE FIFTEENTH DAY OF APRIL
TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY SIX
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE DR JUSTICE Y. LAKSHMANA RAO
CRIMINAL PETITION Nos: 3072, 3073 & 3083 of 2026
Crl.P.No.3072 of 2026
Between:
1.PUSHPAM APPALA NAIDU, D/O. APPALA NAIDU AGED 62 YEARS,
MANAGING DIRECTOR, M/S. QUEST NET ENTERPRISES INDIA
PVT. LTD. NO.7 RAIN TREE PALACE, 9TH FLOOR, MC NICHOLS
ROAD CHET PET, CHENNAI-31, TAMIL NADU.
...PETITIONER/ACCUSED
AND
1.THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH, Rep by its Public Prosecutor,
High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Amaravati. through Deputy
Superintendent of Police CID, RO, Nellore.
...RESPONDENT/COMPLAINANT
Counsel for the Petitioner/accused:
1.K V ADITYA CHOWDARY
Counsel for the Respondent/complainant:
1.PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
Crl.P.No.3073 of 2026
Between:
1.AUGUSTINE JOSEPH @ AUGUSTINE, S/O. JOSEPH, 45 YEARS.
DIRECTOR, M/S. QUEST NET ENTERPRISES INDIA PVT. LTD., 91
BLOCK, 4TH MAIN ROAD, ANNA NAGAR, CHENNAI, R/O. D.NO. 33,
2
HALLS ROAD EGMORE, CHENNAI AND NO.7, BAKIYATHOMMAN
NAGAR, MAGAPPAIAN, CHENNAI.
...PETITIONER/ACCUSED
AND
1.THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH, Rep by its Public Prosecutor,
High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Amaravati. through Deputy
Superintendent of Police CID, RO, Nellore.
...RESPONDENT/COMPLAINANT
Counsel for the Petitioner/accused:
1.K V ADITYA CHOWDARY
Counsel for the Respondent/complainant:
1.PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
Crl.P.No.3083 of 2026
Between:
1.R KAMAKSHI RANGANATHAN, W/O.RAVI MANI,
D/O.RANGANATHAN, AGED 56 YEARS, R/O.NO.58/2, 1ST MAIN
ROAD, BESANT NAGAR, CHENNA-600090, PRESENTLY RESIDING
AT H.NO.110/3, 7TH AVENUE, BESANT NAGAR, CHENNAI-600090
...PETITIONER/ACCUSED
AND
1.THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH, through Deputy superintendent of
Police, CID, RO, Nellore, rep.by Public Prosecutor, High Court of
Judicature of Amaravathi
...RESPONDENT/COMPLAINANT
Counsel for the Petitioner/accused:
1.HABIBULLA SHAIK
Counsel for the Respondent/complainant:
1.PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
The Court made the following:
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COMMON ORDER:
These three Criminal Petitions, though instituted separately by different
accused persons, arise from a common substratum of facts, assail orders
passed in analogous proceedings, and raise identical questions of law
pertaining to the jurisdiction and conduct of the learned Trial Court in
implementing appellate bail orders. Inasmuch as the facts and circumstances
governing these three matters are substantially similar and the legal issues
raised are common, this Court has deemed it expedient and appropriate to
hear and dispose of all three petitions by way of this common order.
2. Criminal Petition No.3072 of 2026 has been filed under Section 528 of
the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita Act, 2023 (for brevity ‘the BNSS’) by
the Petitioner/Accused No.2, seeking to quash the proceedings against him in
Crl.M.P.No.444 of 2026 in C.C.No.11 of 2022 on the file of the learned
Principal Sessions Judge-cum-Special Judge under A.P.P.D.F.E.Act, Nellore.
3. Criminal Petition No.3073 of 2026 has been filed under Section 528 of
‘the BNSS’ by the Petitioner/Accused No.4, seeking to quash the proceedings
against him in Crl.M.P.No.443 of 2026 in C.C.No.5 of 2017 on the file of the
learned Principal Sessions Judge-cum-Special Judge under A.P.P.D.F.E.Act,
Nellore.
4. Criminal Petition No.3083 of 2026 has been filed under Section 528 of
‘the BNSS’ by the Petitioner/Accused No.6, seeking to quash the proceedings
against him in Crl.M.P.No.442 of 2026 in C.C.No.5 of 2017 on the file of the
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learned Principal Sessions Judge-cum-Special Judge under A.P.P.D.F.E.Act,
Nellore.
5. Sri K.S. Murthy, learned Senior Counsel, appearing on behalf of Sri K.V.
Aditya Chowdary, learned Counsel on record, represented the Petitioners in
Crl.P.Nos.3072 and 3073 of 2026. Sri Habibulla Shaik, learned Counsel,
appeared and advanced arguments on behalf of the Petitioner in
Crl.P.No.3083 of 2026. This Court has heard the learned counsel at length
and has carefully considered the submissions advanced before it.
6. The genesis of the present petitions lies in a judgment rendered by the
learned Principal Sessions Judge-cum-Special Judge, Nellore, on 30.03.2026
in C.C.Nos.5 of 2017, 10 of 2022, 11 of 2022, and 14 of 2022. By the said
elaborate judgment, the learned Sessions Judge, after due trial, recorded a
finding that the accused persons before him were not guilty of the charge
framed under Section 5 of the Andhra Pradesh Protection of Depositors of
Financial Establishments Act, 1999 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’). The
accused were, however, convicted for the offences punishable under Sections
420 and 406 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as the
I.P.C.,’) and sentenced accordingly.
7. Being aggrieved by the said judgment of conviction and sentence, the
respective accused persons preferred Criminal Appeals before this Court. This
Court, upon consideration of the appeals, was pleased to suspend the
sentences awarded to the respective accused and enlarged them on bail
subject to specific conditions, including the execution of a personal bond of
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Rs.50,000/- with two sureties of like amount each, surrender of passports to
the custody of the court, and a condition prohibiting departure from the country
without prior permission of this Court. The aforesaid orders of suspension of
sentence and grant of bail were passed by a learned Single Judge of this
Court in I.A.No.1 of 2026 in Crl.A.No.204 of 2026 (in respect of Accused No.2),
in Crl.A.No.205 of 2026 (in respect of Accused No.4), and in Crl.A.No.207 of
2026 (in respect of Accused No.6).
8. In implementation of the aforesaid appellate orders, the respective
accused persons presented themselves before the learned Trial Court and
sought to furnish sureties in terms of the conditions stipulated by this Court.
However, the learned Sessions Judge, instead of giving effect to the appellate
mandate in its letter and spirit, proceeded to scrutinise and cross-examine the
tendered sureties on matters entirely alien to the legitimate inquiry of verifying
solvency, ultimately rejecting the sureties on grounds neither legally valid nor
judicially sustainable. The accused persons, being thereby deprived of the
liberty secured to them by the express order of this Court, were constrained to
approach this Court by way of the present petitions.
9. Sri K.S.Murthy, learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner/Accused No.2
in Crl.P.No.3072 of 2026 submits that the learned Trial Court, in declining to
accept the sureties tendered pursuant to the explicit directions of this Court in
Crl.A.No.204 of 2026, has acted in derogation of binding appellate authority
and in excess of jurisdiction. The insistence upon sureties commensurate with
an alleged figure of Rs.500 crores, unsupported by record or conviction,
6
constitutes a manifest miscarriage of justice and a clear departure from the
order of suspension of sentence already granted. The Petitioner was acquitted
under Section 5 of the Andhra Pradesh Protection of Depositors of Financial
Establishments Act, 1999 (for brevity ‘the Act.,’) and convicted only under
Sections 420 and 406 of ‘the I.P.C.,’ and this Court has already safeguarded
against flight risk by directing that the Petitioner shall not leave the country
without permission, while the passport remains in judicial custody. The
Petitioner, who was on bail throughout the trial and cooperated with
proceedings, cannot be subjected to arbitrary rejection of sureties or denial of
liberty contrary to the appellate mandate.
10. Learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner/Accused No.4 in
Crl.P.No.3073 of 2026 submits that the Learned Trial Court, in refusing to
honour the bail conditions stipulated by this Court in Crl.A.No.205 of 2026, has
transgressed the limits of its authority and rendered an order contrary to law
and record. The reliance upon speculative figures of Rs.500 crores and 1600
victims, neither proved nor forming part of the conviction, is wholly irrelevant
when the Petitioner stands acquitted under Section 5 of ‘the Act.,’ and
convicted only under Sections 420 and 406 of ‘the I.P.C.’ The Petitioner, a
practising lawyer at the Madras High Court who resigned from the company
as early as 2009, has been wrongly treated as a continuing director and
subjected to onerous surety requirements far beyond the Rs.50,000/- bond
mandated by this Court. The passport being in judicial custody, and the
condition against leaving the country already imposed, the apprehension of
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abscondence is illusory. The Petitioner’s cooperation throughout trial and
compliance with judicial directions entitle him to the benefit of bail, and the
rejection of sureties by the learned Trial Court is arbitrary, capricious, and
violative of the appellate order.
11. Sri Habibulla Shaik, learned Counsel for the Petitioner/Accused No.6 in
Crl.P.No.3083 of 2026 submits that the learned Trial Court, in dismissing
Crl.M.P.No.442 of 2026 and refusing to accept either the sureties tendered or
the cash deposit offered under Section 445 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ has acted wholly
without jurisdiction and in derogation of the binding order of this Court in
Crl.A.No.207 of 2026. Once the learned Appellate Court has suspended the
sentence and directed release on bail upon execution of a bond of Rs.50,000/-
with two sureties, the role of the learned Trial Court is purely ministerial,
confined to implementing the appellate mandate. By re‑evaluating the gravity
of the offence, invoking speculative figures of Rs.500 crores and 1600 victims,
and imputing a risk of abscondence despite the surrender of passport and the
condition against leaving the country, the learned Trial Court has exceeded its
remit and virtually nullified the order of this Court. Such insistence on local
sureties and rejection of cash deposit is arbitrary, capricious, and violative of
the statutory discretion under Section 445 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ which expressly
permits deposit of money in lieu of sureties, particularly where the accused is
a resident of another state.
12. Sri Habibulla Shaik, learned Counsel for the Petitioner/Accused No.6
further submits that the Petitioner was acquitted under Section 5 of ‘the Act.,’
8
and convicted only under Sections 420 and 406 of ‘the I.P.C.,’ reliance upon
the acquitted charge to deny bail is legally unsustainable. The Petitioner has
already surrendered her passport, furnished responsible sureties in the form
of her husband and brother (an advocate at Chennai), and demonstrated
cooperation throughout trial. The apprehension of abscondence is thus illusory
and unfounded. The learned Trial Court’s order, by imposing onerous and
impracticable conditions, defeats the very purpose of suspension of sentence
and amounts to abuse of process. It is requested that this Court be pleased to
set aside the order dated 13.04.2026 of the learned Principal District
Judge‑cum‑Special Judge, Nellore, and direct acceptance of cash surety in
lieu of local sureties, thereby effectuating the bail granted by this Court and
securing the ends of justice.
13. Upon careful consideration of the submissions advanced by the learned
Counsel on both sides, a perusal of the impugned order, and an examination
of the record placed before this Court, this Court is of the considered opinion
that the learned Sessions Judge has, in the circumstances of the present case,
acted in a manner that is inconsistent with the nature and scope of his
jurisdiction in the matter of implementing an appellate bail order.
14. The position of law in this regard admits of no ambiguity. When a
superior appellate court, having applied its judicial mind to the facts and
circumstances of the case, suspends a sentence of conviction and directs
release of the convicted accused on bail upon execution of a bond of a
specified sum with sureties, the learned Court below to which the matter is
9
remitted for implementation of that order is vested with no independent
discretion to traverse beyond the boundaries of the appellate order. The role
of the executing court, in such circumstances, is essentially administrative and
ministerial in character. It is confined to verifying, in accordance with the rules
governing the taking of bail, whether the sureties offered are solvent and
otherwise fit and proper persons to stand as surety, and upon being so
satisfied, to accept the bail and issue the release warrant forthwith. The
learned Court below possesses no jurisdiction whatsoever to re-examine the
merits of the case, to assess independently the gravity of the offence, to
invoke considerations of public interest or the magnitude of the alleged crime,
or to impose additional conditions of its own making over and above those
expressly stipulated by the learned Appellate Court. Any such exercise of
power by the learned Court below would be a transgression of jurisdiction and,
in substance, a collateral challenge to the order of the learned Appellate Court,
which is impermissible in law.
15. In the present case, the learned Sessions Judge committed a serious
error of jurisdiction in interrogating the tendered sureties, namely Devadas
Sompalli, School Assistant (Telugu), and Mallela Vijay Kanth, on matters
pertaining to the magnitude of the case, the quantum of the alleged fraud, the
number of victims, and other extraneous considerations bearing no relevance
whatsoever to the legitimate inquiry of assessing the financial solvency and
fitness of the sureties. The endorsement made by the learned Sessions Judge
on the salary slip of the surety Devadas Sompalli reads thus: “The surety does
10
not know the particulars of the amount, hence surety is rejected.” This
endorsement is conspicuously and fundamentally deficient in that it fails to
disclose with any degree of clarity or precision the nature of the “particulars of
the amount” to which it refers. It leaves entirely undetermined whether the
rejection proceeds on the ground that the surety was unaware of the quantum
of the bond for which he was standing surety, which would be a matter
capable of being readily explained and rectified, or whether it proceeds on the
ground that the surety lacked knowledge of the amount allegedly involved in
the commission of the offence itself, which would be a wholly irrelevant and
legally extraneous consideration. Either way, the order of rejection is arbitrary
in its reasoning and unsustainable in law.
16. This Court finds it necessary to observe, with considerable emphasis,
the fundamental incongruity in the approach adopted by the learned Sessions
Judge. The very court which, by its own elaborate and considered judgment
dated 30.03.2026, had expressly returned a finding of not guilty against the
accused in respect of the charge under Section 5 of ‘the Act.,’ and which had
accordingly acquitted them of the said charge, proceeded in the impugned
order to invoke that very acquitted charge as the foundation for imposing
onerous and disproportionate surety requirements. There is no rational or
legal basis for a court, having itself recorded an acquittal on a particular
charge, to subsequently deploy that charge, or the factual allegations
underlying it, as a ground for denying to the accused the benefit of bail
granted by the learned Appellate Court. The conviction before the court, at the
11
relevant point of time, was only in respect of the offences punishable under
Sections 420 and 406 of ‘the I.P.C.’ The references to Rs.500 crores and
1,600 victims, figures referable exclusively to the acquitted charge under ‘the
Act.,’ were entirely alien to the lawful exercise of the Court’s ministerial
function in the matter of implementing the appellate bail order.
17. With regard specifically to the grievance of the Petitioner/Accused No.6,
who is a resident of the city of Chennai and who was unable to furnish local
sureties from within the territorial jurisdiction of the learned Sessions Court at
Nellore, this Court deems it appropriate to recall and reiterate the authoritative
pronouncements of the Hon’ble Supreme Court on this question.
18. The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India, in the decision in Moti Ram v.
State of Madhya Pradesh1, categorically and unequivocally held that the
insistence by any court upon the production of local sureties, to the exclusion
of sureties who may otherwise be solvent and responsible persons residing
elsewhere, constitutes a violation of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of
India. The imposition of such a condition strikes at the fundamental right to
equality before the law and the right to personal liberty, for it operates in a
discriminatory and oppressive manner against accused persons who happen
to be residents of a place other than the jurisdiction of the court in question.
Such a practice strikes hardest at persons of limited means, who lack the
social connections necessary to procure local sureties in a distant jurisdiction,
1
(1978) 4 SCC 47
12
and it is therefore inconsistent with the constitutional mandate of equal
protection of the law.
19. This Court further takes note of the subsequent decision of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Ramachandra Thangappan Aachari v. State of M.P2
wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court observed that an accused person shall be
enlarged on bail on a personal bond, without insisting on the production of a
local surety, in order to ensure meaningful compliance with the directions
issued in its bail order. This exposition of the law reinforces the principle that
the procedural mechanism of bail must not be allowed to become an
instrument of incarceration by the imposition of technically burdensome and
practically infeasible conditions.
20. Applying these authoritative principles to the facts of the present case,
the insistence of the learned Sessions Judge that the Petitioner/Accused No.6,
being a resident of Chennai, procure local sureties from Nellore, was wholly
contrary to the settled constitutional and legal position. The Petitioner having
tendered her husband and her brother, who is a practising Advocate at the
Madras High Court, as sureties, the learned Sessions Judge was duty-bound
to examine those sureties for the purpose of satisfying himself as to their
solvency and fitness, and upon being so satisfied, to accept them and release
the accused.
21. This Court also observes that the applications filed by the accused
persons before the learned Sessions Judge were styled under Section 445 of
2
Spl(Crl).No.3363/2024 on 18.09.2024
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‘the Cr.P.C.,’ seeking permission to deposit cash in lieu of sureties. It would
have been open to the learned Sessions Judge, had he been of the view that
only this Court was competent to grant any relaxation or modification of the
conditions of bail imposed by the appellate order, to have returned the
applications for want of jurisdiction, with a direction to the applicants to
approach the appropriate forum. However, the learned Sessions Judge,
entertained the applications and to adjudicate upon them on merits, was
obligated to do so in conformity with the law governing such applications and
not to decide them on grounds that were legally untenable. Having assumed
jurisdiction to entertain the applications, the dismissal of those applications on
the irrelevant and unsustainable grounds adverted to in the impugned order
cannot be countenanced by this Court.
22. In the light of the foregoing analysis and for the reasons set out
hereinabove, this Court is of the opinion that the impugned orders of the
learned Principal Sessions Judge-cum-Special Judge, Nellore, declining to
accept the sureties tendered by the respective accused persons are legally
unsustainable, being in excess of jurisdiction, contrary to the binding
directions of this Court, inconsistent with the constitutional principles
enunciated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, and bereft of any legally valid
rationale.
23. Accordingly, the three Criminal Petitions are allowed and disposed of in
the following terms:
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In so far as Crl.P.No.3072 of 2026 is concerned, the proceedings in
Crl.M.P.No.444 of 2026 in C.C.No.11 of 2022 on the file of the learned
Principal Sessions Judge-cum-Special Judge under the A.P.P.D.F.E. Act,
Nellore are hereby quashed. The learned Sessions Judge is directed to
forthwith accept the sureties submitted by the Petitioner/Accused No.2, to
satisfy himself as to their solvency in the ordinary course, and upon being
satisfied that the sureties are otherwise in order, to accept the same and issue
a release warrant in favour of the Petitioner/Accused No.2, without subjecting
the sureties to any interrogation touching upon the magnitude of the offence or
the amounts alleged to have been involved in the case.
In so far as Crl.P.No.3073 of 2026 is concerned, the proceedings in
Crl.M.P.No.443 of 2026 in C.C.No.5 of 2017 on the file of the learned Principal
Sessions Judge-cum-Special Judge under the A.P.P.D.F.E. Act, Nellore are
hereby quashed. The learned Sessions Judge is directed to consider the
sureties submitted by the Petitioner/Accused No.4 in accordance with law and,
upon being satisfied as to their solvency and fitness, to accept the same and
issue a release warrant without delay.
In so far as Crl.P.No.3083 of 2026 is concerned, the proceedings in
Crl.M.P.No.442 of 2026 in C.C.No.5 of 2017 on the file of the learned Principal
Sessions Judge-cum-Special Judge under the A.P.P.D.F.E. Act, Nellore are
hereby quashed. The learned Sessions Judge is directed to accept the
sureties of the husband and the brother of the Petitioner/Accused No.6, both
15residents of Chennai, or any other sureties of any persons provided the same
are otherwise found to be in order upon due verification.
24. All other conditions imposed by this Court in the respective bail orders
passed in Crl.A.Nos.204, 205, and 207 of 2026 shall remain operative in their
entirety and shall be strictly complied with by the respective accused persons.
25. The learned Sessions Judge is directed to give effect to this order and
issue the release warrants as directed herein with all practicable expedition.
26. The Criminal Petitions are accordingly allowed and disposed of in the
aforesaid terms.
As a sequel thereto, miscellaneous petitions pending, if any, shall stand
closed.
__________________________
Dr. Y. LAKSHMANA RAO,J
Date: 15.04.2026
VTS