Punjab-Haryana High Court
Punjab Agro Foodgrains Corporation … vs Harshit Rice And General Mills And … on 27 February, 2026
Author: Jasgurpreet Singh Puri
Bench: Jasgurpreet Singh Puri
CR-1423-2026 -1-
113
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH
CR-1423-2026
Date of decision: 27.02.2026
PUNJAB AGRO FOODGRAINS CORPORATION LIMITED
...Petitioner(s)
VERSUS
M/S HARSHIT RICE AND GENERAL MILLS AND ANOTHER
...Respondent(s)
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE JASGURPREET SINGH PURI
Present:- Mr. Somesh Gupta, Advocate
for the petitioner.
****
JASGURPREET SINGH PURI, J. (Oral)
1. The present Civil Revision Petition has been filed under Article
227 of the Constitution of India for setting aside the order dated 31.01.2026
(Annexure P-8) passed by the learned Sole Arbitrator, vide which the
application of the petitioner seeking permission to lead additional evidence has
been dismissed being not maintainable.
2. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the dispute
between the parties is pending before the learned Sole Arbitrator and the
petitioner, who is the claimant in the arbitral proceedings had filed an
application seeking permission to lead additional evidence by taking various
grounds but the same has been dismissed by the learned Sole Arbitrator vide
impugned order dated 31.01.2026 (Annexure P-8). He further submitted that
there was a necessity to lead additional evidence because the grounds which
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were taken relate to the core controversy involved in the dispute pending before
the learned Sole Arbitrator. He further submitted that the relevant record is with
the third Agency i.e. the Food Corporation of India (FCI) and since the said
record is directly connected with the controversy involved, the application
seeking permission to lead additional evidence was required to have been
allowed by the learned Sole Arbitrator and therefore, the aforesaid impugned
order passed by the learned Sole Arbitrator is erroneous. He also submitted that
since the impugned order has been passed by the learned Sole Arbitrator before
whom the arbitral proceedings are pending, the petitioner has preferred the
present petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India seeking setting
aside of the said order.
3. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner.
4. The petitioner seeks to invoke the supervisory jurisdiction of this
Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India by filing the present Civil
Revision Petition. The dispute between the parties is already pending
adjudication before the learned Sole Arbitrator, wherein an application filed by
the petitioner/claimant seeking permission to lead additional evidence was
dismissed. A perusal of the aforesaid impugned order shows that the same is a
detailed order passed by the learned Sole Arbitrator.
5. During the course of arguments, a query was raised to the learned
counsel for the petitioner as to how the present petition under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India would be maintainable or entertainable before this Court,
to which he could not offer any answer. Therefore, this Court would proceed on
the basis of the settled law in this regard.
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6. A Seven Judge Constitution Bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court in
M/s SBP & Co. versus Patel Engineering Ltd. & Another, (2005) 8 SCC 618
while dealing with the nature of the orders passed under Section 11 of the
Arbitration Act discussed the scope of judicial intervention in paras No.45, 46
& 47(vi) of the judgment. It was so observed that Arbitral Tribunal is a creation
of an Agreement between the parties even though it is constituted on the basis
of order passed by the Chief Justice/High Court if any occasion arises but the
parties submit themselves to the Arbitrator on the basis of Agreement between
the parties which is therefore contractual in nature. Rationale and objective of
minimising the judicial intervention was also discussed. In the concluding part,
it was so observed that once the matter reaches Arbitral Tribunal or Sole
Arbitrator then the High Court would not interfere with the order passed by
Arbitrator or Arbitral Tribunal during the course of the arbitration proceedings
and the parties could approach the Court only in terms of Section 37 of the
Arbitration Act or in terms of Section 34 of the Arbitration Act. Paras No.45, 46
& 47(vi) are reproduced as under:-
“45. It is seen that some High Courts have proceeded on the
basis that any order passed by an Arbitral Tribunal during
arbitration, would be capable of being challenged under Article
226 or 227 of the Constitution. We see no warrant for such an
approach. Section 37 makes certain orders of the Arbitral Tribunal
appealable. Under Section 34, the aggrieved party has an avenue
for ventilating its grievances against the award including any in-
between orders that might have been passed by the Arbitral
Tribunal acting under Section 16 of the Act. The party aggrieved
by any order of the Arbitral Tribunal, unless has a right of appeal
under Section 37 of the Act, has to wait until the award is passed3 of 18
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CR-1423-2026 -4-by the Tribunal. This appears to be the scheme of the Act. The
Arbitral Tribunal is, after all, a creature of a contract between the
parties, the arbitration agreement, even though, if the occasion
arises, the Chief Justice may constitute it based on the contract
between the parties. But that would not alter the status of the
Arbitral Tribunal. It will still be a forum chosen by the parties by
agreement. We, therefore, disapprove of the stand adopted by some
of the High Courts that any order passed by the Arbitral Tribunal
is capable of being corrected by the High Court under Article 226
or 227 of the Constitution. Such an intervention by the High
Courts is not permissible.
46. The object of minimising judicial intervention while the
matter is in the process of being arbitrated upon, will certainly be
defeated if the High Court could be approached under Article 227
or under Article 226 of the Constitution against every order made
by the Arbitral Tribunal. Therefore, it is necessary to indicate that
once the arbitration has commenced in the Arbitral Tribunal,
parties have to wait until the award is pronounced unless, of
course, a right of appeal is available to them under Section 37 of
the Act even at an earlier stage.
47. We, therefore, sum up our conclusions as follows:
(i) to (v) xx xx xx xx
(vi) Once the matter reaches the Arbitral Tribunal or the sole
arbitrator, the High Court would not interfere with the orders
passed by the arbitrator or the Arbitral Tribunal during the course
of the arbitration proceedings and the parties could approach the
Court only in terms of Section 37 of the Act or in terms of Section
34 of the Act. (vii) to (xii) xx xx xx xx”
7. In M/s Deep Industries Limited versus Oil and Natural Gas
Corporation Limited and another, 2020 (15) SCC 706 order passed by the
learned Arbitral Tribunal under Section 17 of the Arbitration Act for staying the
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black-listing order was challenged before the learned City Civil Court which
dismissed the appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act. This order under
Section 37 of the Arbitration Act was challenged under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India and it was allowed by the High Court and the order of the
City Civil Court was set aside. Thereafter, the Contractor assailed the same
before Hon’ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid judgment. Argument was raised
regarding the maintainability of filing the said petition under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India by referring to Section 5 of the Arbitration Act as well as
the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in M/s SBP & Company versus Patel
Engineering Ltd. & Another’s case (Supra). Another argument was also raised
by the appellant that it was not a case of lack of jurisdiction. Hon’ble Supreme
Court held that against the order of Section 37 of the Arbitration Act, no petition
under Article 226 & 227 of the Constitution of India can be filed. It was further
held that although Article 227 of the Constitution of India remained untouched
by the provisions of Section 5 of the Arbitration Act but it is only when the
orders that lack patent inherent jurisdiction that the provisions of Article 227 of
the Constitution of India can be invoked. It was also discussed that the
legislative policy pertaining to general revisional jurisdiction under Section 115
of the Code of Civil Procedure that revision under Section 115 of the Code of
Civil Procedure lies only against the final order and not against the
interlocutory orders, is also relevant. In the present petition as well, the
impugned orders are not the final orders and are only interlocutory or
procedural orders. Para Nos.16, 17 & 24 are reproduced as under:-
“16. Most significant of all is the non-obstante clause
contained in Section 5 which states that notwithstanding anything
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contained in any other law, in matters that arise under Part I of the
Arbitration Act, no judicial authority shall intervene except where
so provided in this Part. Section 37 grants a constricted right of
first appeal against certain judgments and orders and no others.
Further, the statutory mandate also provides for one bite at the
cherry, and interdicts a second appeal being filed (See Section
37(2) of the Act)
17. This being the case, there is no doubt whatsoever that if
petitions were to be filed under Articles 226/227 of the
Constitution against orders passed in appeals under Section 37,
the entire arbitral process would be derailed and would not come
to fruition for many years. At the same time, we cannot forget that
Article 227 is a constitutional provision which remains untouched
by the non-obstante clause of Section 5 of the Act. In these
circumstances, what is important to note is that though petitions
can be filed under Article 227 against judgments allowing or
dismissing first appeals under Section 37 of the Act, yet the High
Court would be extremely circumspect in interfering with the same,
taking into account the statutory policy as adumbrated by us
herein above so that interference is restricted to orders that are
passed which are patently lacking in inherent jurisdiction.
xx xx xx xx
24. Mr Rohatgi is also correct in pointing out that the
legislative policy qua the general revisional jurisdiction that is
contained by the amendments made to Section 115 CPC should
also be kept in mind when the High Courts dispose of petitions
filed under Article 227. The legislative policy is that no revision
lies if an alternative remedy of appeal is available. Further, even
when a revision does lie, it lies only against a final disposal of the
entire matter and not against interlocutory orders. These
amendments were considered in Tek Singh v. Shashi Verma 18 in
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which this Court adverted to these amendments and then stated:
(SCC p. 681, paras 5-6)
“5. ……A reading of this proviso will show that, after 1999,
revision petitions filed under Section 115 CPC are not
maintainable against interlocutory orders.
6. …..Even otherwise, it is well settled that the revisional
jurisdiction under Section 115 CPC is to be exercised to
correct jurisdictional errors only. This is well settled. In
DLF Housing & Construction Co. (P) Ltd. v. Sarup Singh 19
this Court held: (SCC pp. 811-12, para 5)
“5. …The position thus seems to be firmly established that
while exercising the jurisdiction under Section 115, it is not
competent to the High Court to correct errors of fact
however gross or even errors of law unless the said errors
have relation to the jurisdiction of the Court to try the
dispute itself. Clauses (a) and (b) of this section on their
plain reading quite clearly do not cover the present case. It
was not contended, as indeed it was not possible to contend,
that the learned Additional District Judge had either
exercised a jurisdiction not vested in him by law or had
failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested in him, in
recording the order that the proceedings under reference be
stayed till the decision of the appeal by the High Court in the
proceedings for specific performance of the agreement in
question. Clause (c) also does not seem to apply to the case
in hand. The words “illegally” and “with material
irregularity” as used in this clause do not cover either errors
of fact or of law; they do not refer to the decision arrived at
but merely to the manner in which it is reached. The errors
contemplated by this clause may, in our view, relate either to
breach of some provision of law or to material defects of
procedure affecting the ultimate decision. and not to errors
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either of fact or of law, after the prescribed formalities have
been complied with. The High Court does not seem to have
adverted to the limitation imposed on its power under
Section 115 of the Code. Merely because the High Court
would have felt inclined, had it dealt with the matter
initially, to come to a different conclusion on the question of
continuing stay of the reference proceedings pending
decision of the appeal, could hardly justify interference on
revision under Section 115 of the Code when there was no
illegality or material irregularity committed by the learned
Additional District Judge in his manner of dealing with this
question. It seems to us that in this matter the High Court
treated the revision virtually as if it was an appeal.”
8. In Bhaven Construction through Authorized Signatory Premji
Bhai K. Shah versus Executive Engineers, Sardar Sarovar Narmada Nigam
Limited and another, (2022) 1 SCC 75 an application was filed before learned
Arbitrator under Section 16 of the Arbitration Act disputing the appointment of
Sole Arbitrator. Against the aforesaid order in the application of Section 16 of
the Arbitration Act, a petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of
India was filed in the High Court and the learned Single Judge dismissed the
same. However, on assailing the same by filing a Letter Patent Appeal, it was
allowed and thereafter, an SLP was filed, wherein it was observed that in
exceptional rarity when a party is left remediless under a statute or there is a
clear bad faith then the provisions of Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of
India can be resorted. Para Nos.11, 12, 13, 14, 18, 19 & 20 are reproduced as
under:-
11. Having heard both the parties and perusing the material
available on record, the question which needs to be8 of 18
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CR-1423-2026 -9-answered is whether the arbitral process could be interfered
under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution, and under what
circumstance?
12. We need to note that the Arbitration Act is a code in
itself. This phrase is not merely perfunctory, but has definite
legal consequences. One such consequence is spelled out
under section 5 of the Arbitration Act, which reads as under
“5. Extent of judicial intervention.- Notwithstanding
anything contained in any other law for the time being
in force, in matters governed by this Part, no judicial
authority shall intervene except where so provided in
this Part.”
(emphasis supplied)
The non-obstante clause is provided to uphold the
intention of the legislature as provided in the Preamble to
adopt UNCITRAL Model Law and Rules, to reduce excessive
judicial interference which is not contemplated under the
Arbitration Act.
13. The Arbitration Act itself gives various procedures
and forums to challenge the appointment of an arbitrator.
The framework clearly portrays an intention to address most
of the issues within the ambit of the Act itself, without there
being scope for any extra statutory mechanism to provide
just and fair solutions.
14. Any party can enter into an arbitration agreement
for resolving any disputes capable of being arbitrable.
Parties, while entering into such agreements, need to fulfil
the basic ingredients provided under Section 7 of the
Arbitration Act. Arbitration being a creature of contract,
gives a flexible framework for the parties to agree for their
own procedure with minimalistic stipulations under the
Arbitration Act.
xx xx xx xx
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18. In any case, the hierarchy in our legal framework,
mandates that a legislative enactment cannot curtail a
Constitutional right. In Nivedita Sharma v. Cellular
Operators Association of India, (2011) 14 SCC 337, this
Court referred to several judgments and held:
“11. We have considered the respective
arguments/submissions. There cannot be any dispute
that the power of the High Courts to issue directions,
orders or writs including writs in the nature of habeas
corpus, certiorari, mandamus, quo warranto and
prohibition under Article 226 of the Constitution is a
basic feature of the Constitution and cannot be
curtailed by parliamentary legislation – L. Chandra
Kumar v. Union of India, (1997) 3 SCC 261. However,
it is one thing to say that in exercise of the power
vested in it under Article 226 of the Constitution, the
High Court can entertain a writ petition against any
order passed by or action taken by the State and/or its
agency/instrumentality or any public authority or
order passed by a quasi-judicial body/authority, and it
is an altogether different thing to say that each and
every petition filed under Article 226 of the
Constitution must be entertained by the High Court as
a matter of course ignoring the fact that the aggrieved
person has an effective alternative remedy. Rather, it
is settled law that when a statutory forum is created by
law for redressal of grievances, a writ petition should
not be entertained ignoring the statutory
dispensation.”
(emphasis supplied)
It is therefore, prudent for a Judge to not exercise
discretion to allow judicial interference beyond the
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procedure established under the enactment. This
power needs to be exercised in exceptional rarity,
wherein one party is left remediless under the statute
or a clear ‘bad faith’ shown by one of the parties. This
high standard set by this Court is in terms of the
legislative intention to make the arbitration fair and
efficient.
19. In this context we may observe Deep Industries Ltd. v. ONGC
wherein interplay of Section 5 of the Arbitration Act and Article
227 of the Constitution was analysed as under: (SCC p. 714, paras
16-17)
“16. Most significant of all is the non obstante clause
contained in Section 5 which states that
notwithstanding anything contained in any other law,
in matters that arise under Part I of the Arbitration
Act, no judicial authority shall intervene except where
so provided in this Part. Section 37 grants a
constricted right of first appeal against certain
judgments and orders and no others. Further, the
statutory mandate also provides for one bite at the
cherry, and interdicts a second appeal being filed [see
Section 37(2) of the Act].
17. This being the case, there is no doubt whatsoever
that if petitions were to be filed under Articles 226/227
of the Constitution against orders passed in appeals
under Section 37, the entire arbitral process would be
derailed and would not come to fruition for many
years. At the same time, we cannot forget that Article
227 is a constitutional provision which remains
untouched by the non obstante clause of Section 5 of
the Act. In these circumstances, what is important to
note is that though petitions can be filed under Article
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227 against judgments allowing or dismissing first
appeals under Section 37 of the Act, yet the High
Court would be extremely circumspect in interfering
with the same, taking into account the statutory policy
as adumbrated by us hereinabove so that interference
is restricted to orders that are passed which are
patently lacking in inherent jurisdiction.”
(emphasis supplied)
20. In the instant case, Respondent 1 has not been able to show
exceptional circumstance or “bad faith” on the part of the
appellant, to invoke the remedy under Article 227 of the
Constitution. No doubt the ambit of Article 227 is broad and
pervasive, however, the High Court should not have used its
inherent power to interject the arbitral process at this stage. It is
brought to our notice that subsequent to the impugned order of the
sole arbitrator, a final award was rendered by him on merits,
which is challenged by Respondent 1 in a separate Section 34
application, which is pending.”
9. Another Seven Judges Constitution Bench of Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Interplay Between Arbitration Agreements Under
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and Stamp Act, 1899, in Re:, (2024) 6
SCC 1 again while largely dealing with provisions of Section 11 of the
Arbitration Act also discussed the provision of Section 5 of the Arbitration Act.
It was observed that one of the objectives of the Arbitration Act was to
minimize the supervisory role of Courts in the arbitration proceedings. The
principle of minimum judicial interference was also discussed and it was so
observed that the principle of judicial non-interference in arbitration
proceedings respects the autonomy of the parties to determine the arbitral
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procedures and this principle has also been incorporated in international
instruments, including the New York Convention and the Model Law. Hon’ble
Supreme Court observed that one of the main objectives of the Arbitration Act
is to minimize the supervisory role of Courts in the arbitral process and party
autonomy and settlement of disputes by an arbitral tribunal are the hallmarks of
arbitration law. Section 5 gives effect to the true intention of the parties to have
their disputes resolved through arbitration in a quick, efficient, and effective
manner by minimizing judicial interference in the arbitral proceedings and the
Parliament has enacted Section 5 to minimize the supervisory role of Courts in
the arbitral process to the bare minimum and only to the extent “so provided”
under the Part-I of Arbitration Act. Para Nos.76, 81, 82 and 186 of the aforesaid
judgment are reproduced as under:-
“76. The principle of judicial non-interference in arbitral
proceedings is fundamental to both domestic as well as
international commercial arbitration. The principle entails
that the arbitral proceedings are carried out pursuant to the
agreement of the parties or under the direction of the
tribunal without unnecessary interference by the national
courts.61 This principle serves to proscribe judicial
interference in arbitral proceedings, which would undermine
the objective of the parties in agreeing to arbitrate their
disputes, their desire for less formal and more flexible
procedures, and their desire for neutral and expert arbitral
procedures.62 The principle of judicial non- interference in
arbitral proceedings respects the autonomy of the parties to
determine the arbitral procedures. This principle has also
been incorporated in international instruments, including
the New York Convention and the Model Law.
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xx xx xx xx
81. One of the main objectives of the Arbitration Act is to
minimize the supervisory role of courts in the arbitral
process. Party autonomy and settlement of disputes by an
arbitral tribunal are the hallmarks of arbitration law.
Section 5 gives effect to the true intention of the parties to
have their disputes resolved through arbitration in a quick,
efficient, and effective manner by minimizing judicial
interference in the arbitral proceedings. Parliament enacted
Section 5 to minimize the supervisory role of courts in the
arbitral process to the bare minimum, and only to the extent
so provided” under the Part I of Arbitration. In doing so, the
legislature did not altogether exclude the role of courts or
judicial authorities in arbitral proceedings, but limited it to
circumstances where the support of judicial authorities is
required for the successful implementation and enforcement
of the arbitral process. The Arbitration Act envisages the
role of courts to “support arbitration process” by providing
necessary aid and assistance when required by law in
certain situations.
82. Section 5 begins with the expression “notwithstanding
anything contained in any other law for the time being in
force.” The non-obstante clause is Parliament’s addition to
the Article 5 of the Model Law. It is of a wide amplitude and
sets forth the legislative intent of limiting judicial
intervention during the arbitral process. In the context of
Section 5, this means that the provisions contained in Part I
of the Arbitration Act ought to be given full effect and
operation irrespective of any other law for the time being in
force. It is now an established proposition of law that the
legislature uses non-obstante clauses to remove all
obstructions which might arise out of the provisions of any
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other law, which stand in the way of the operation of the
legislation which incorporates the non-obstante clause.
xx xx xx xx
186. Section 5 is effectively rendered otiose by the
interpretation given to it in N.N. Global (2). The Court failed
to provide a reason for holding that Section 5 of the
Arbitration Act does not have the effect of excluding the
operation of Sections 33 and 35 of the Stamp Act in
proceedings under Section 11 of the Arbitration Act. The non
obstante clause in Section 5 does precisely this. In addition
to the effect of the non obstante clause, the Arbitration Act is
a special law. We must also be cognizant of the fact that one
of objectives of the Arbitration Act was to minimise the
supervisory role of Courts in the arbitral process.”
10. The doctrine of minimal judicial intervention is not only a well-
accepted principle but is also a statutory provision under Section 5 of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The said principle of minimal judicial
intervention has been acknowledged and well-accepted by Hon’ble Supreme
Court as discussed above.
11. Section 5 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, is
reproduced as under:-
“5. Extent of judicial intervention.–Notwithstanding
anything contained in any other law for the time being in
force, in matters governed by this Part, no judicial authority
shall intervene except where so provided in this Part.”
12. This Court also had an occasion to deal with the aforesaid
proposition of law in Jalandhar Improvement Trust and others versus
Shourya Towers Private Limited, CR-6014-2025, decided on 06.11.2025. The
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relevant portion of the aforesaid judgment passed by this Court is also
reproduced as under:-
“42. Hon’ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid
judgments has given large impetus to the provision of
Section 5 of the Arbitration Act which provides for a non
obstante clause. This is so clear from both the judgments
passed by Seven-Judges Constitution Bench of Hon’ble
Supreme Court in M/s SBP & Company Vs. Patel
Engineering Ltd. & Another’s case (Supra) and Interplay
Between Arbitration Agreements Under Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996 and Stamp Act, 1899, in Re:
(Supra). On the proposition of law with regard to the
judicial interference, both the learned Senior Counsels for
the parties have not disputed that the jurisdiction of the High
Court under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India
cannot be taken away even if there is a contrary provision in
any statute. However, it was the submission of the learned
Senior Counsel for the respondent that it was not a case of
maintainability of the present revision but it is a case of
entertainability of the present petition in the facts and
circumstances of the present case because with the operation
of the provisions of Section 23(4) of the Arbitration Act, the
aforesaid right had to be forfeited by the operation of law
and this was precisely what was done by learned Arbitral
Tribunal.
43. In M/s Deep Industries Limited‘s case (Supra) which
was referred to by both the learned Senior Counsels for the
parties, it was a case of an order being passed under Section
17 of the Arbitration Act by the learned Arbitral Tribunal
against which an appeal was filed under Section 37 of the
Arbitration Act and that order under Section 37 of the
Arbitration Act was challenged under Article 227 of the
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Constitution of India which was allowed by the High Court
and the order of the City Civil Court was set aside. It was
held by Hon’ble Supreme Court that Article 227 of the
Constitution of India remained untouched by Section 5 of the
Arbitration Act but the provision of Article 227 of the
Constitution of India can be invoked only when there is
patent lack of inherent jurisdiction. Similarly, in Bhaven
Construction‘s case (Supra), again it was so held that it is
only in exceptional rarity that the party is left remediless or
there is clear bad faith only then intervention can be done
under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.”
13. The facts and circumstances of the present case would show that
the petitioner/claimant had filed an application seeking permission to lead
additional evidence, which was dismissed by the learned Sole Arbitrator and
thereafter, the petitioner has straightaway filed the present petition before this
Court. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, this Court is of the
considered view that none of the aforementioned parameters are fulfilled as
neither has any jurisdictional error been committed by the learned Sole
Arbitrator nor does the matter fall within the category of exceptional rarity and
therefore, entertaining such a petition would be contrary to the basic spirit of
the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 relating to minimal judicial
intervention and the law laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court as aforesaid.
14. Consequently, the present Civil Revision Petition is dismissed with
costs of Rs.10,000/- (Rupees Ten Thousand). The petitioner is hereby directed
to deposit the aforesaid costs with the High Court Legal Services Committee,
within a period of three months from today and thereafter, furnish the receipt of
such deposit to the Registry of the Court. In case the aforesaid costs are not
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deposited by the petitioner within the stipulated period, then this Court will
further proceed in accordance with law, including recovery of the same as
arrears of land revenue and if the receipt of the aforesaid costs is not furnished
by the petitioner to the Registry of the Court within three months, then the
Registry shall list this case for compliance purposes after three months.
(JASGURPREET SINGH PURI)
27.02.2026 JUDGE
Chetan Thakur
Whether speaking/reasoned : Yes/No
Whether reportable : Yes/No
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