Delhi District Court
Priti Saraf vs Ratna Saraf on 23 February, 2026
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Cr Appeal 112/2024
Priti Saraf
Vs.
Ratna Saraf
IN THE COURT OF ADDITIONAL SESSIONS JUDGE-05
NEW DELHI DISTRICT : PATIALA HOUSE COURTS : NEW DELHI
Criminal Appeal No. 112/2024
In the matter of :-
Priti Saraf
W/o Shri Umesh Saraf,
R/o 27 A, Green Avenue Lane,
Vasant Kunj, New Delhi - 110070
........Appellant/Petitioner
(represented by Ld. Counsels Sh. Mudit Jain,
Ms. Garima Singh & Ms. Mahima Malhotra)
VERSUS
Ratna Saraf
W/o Late Shri Radhe Shyam Saraf,
R/o Red House, Lal Durbar,
Kathmandu, Nepal
Also at:
R/o 27 A, Green Avenue Lane,
Vasant Kunj, New Delhi - 110070
........Respondent
(represented by Ld. Sr. Counsel Ms. Geeta Luthra along with
Ms. Kamakshi Gupta, Sh. Manas Aggarwal &
Sh. Rishabh Dahiya, Ld. Counsels)
SAURABH Digitally
by SAURABH
signed
PARTAP PARTAP SINGH
LALER
SINGH Date: 2026.02.23
LALER 17:29:08 +0530
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Priti Saraf
Vs.
Ratna Saraf
CRIMINAL APPEAL UNDER SECTION 29 OF DV ACT
Date of institution : 10.05.2024
Date when judgment reserved : 15.01.2026
Date of Judgment : 23.02.2026
JUDGMENT
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1. The present Criminal Appeal has been preferred by the Appellant/wife,
Priti Saraf, under Section 29 of the Protection of Women from Domestic
Violence Act, 2005 (hereinafter referred to as “the DV Act“) against the
impugned order dated 14.02.2024 passed by the Learned Metropolitan
Magistrate, Mahila Court-01, Patiala House Courts, New Delhi (hereinafter
referred to as “the Ld. MM”), whereby the Ld. MM, while adjudicating the
application for interim maintenance filed by the Appellant under Section 23
of the DV Act, declined to summon the Respondent herein — who is the
mother-in-law of the Appellant — recording that there was no sufficient
prima facie material to hold that the Respondent/mother-in-law had
committed domestic violence upon the Appellant/wife, and accordingly
dropped the proceedings against her.
1.2. An Application under Order VI Rule 17 read with Section 151 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter “CPC“) has been filed by the
Appellant, seeking amendment of the present appeal so as to also impugn an
earlier order dated 14.02.2023 passed by the Ld. MM, by which too the
Respondent/mother-in-law had not been summoned. Crucially, the said
SAURABH Digitally
by SAURABH
signed
PARTAP PARTAP SINGH
LALER
SINGH Date: 2026.02.23
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amendment application was filed only after this Court had heard arguments
at length from both parties on the questions of maintainability and merits,
and after the matter had been reserved for orders.
1.3. Both the appeal as well as the amendment application are strenuously
opposed on behalf of the Respondent/Non-Applicant (mother-in-law).
2. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
2.1. Before proceeding to determine the issues arising in the present matter, it
is necessary to trace the procedural history of the proceedings in some detail,
as the procedural backdrop is intimately connected with the questions of law
that fall for determination.
2.2. The Appellant/wife filed a complaint under Section 12 of the DV Act
before the Ld. MM bearing CC No. 237/2023, inter alia, against her husband
Umesh Saraf as Respondent No. 1 and her mother-in-law Ratna Saraf — the
Respondent herein — as Respondent No. 2. The complaint alleged various
acts of domestic violence, the particulars of which shall be adverted to in
greater detail while addressing the merits of the appeal.
2.3. Vide the first order dated 14.02.2023, the Ld. MM, upon hearing the
Appellant/complainant at the stage of issuance of process, summoned only
Respondent No. 1/husband Umesh Saraf and did not issue any summons or
notice to Respondent No. 2/Ratna Saraf/the Respondent herein. The
rationale for not summoning the mother-in-law was considered and applied
at that very stage. This order dated 14.02.2023 was never challenged by the
Appellant by way of an appeal under Section 29 of the DV Act, within the
SAURABH Digitally
by SAURABH
signed
PARTAP PARTAP SINGH
LALER
SINGH Date: 2026.02.23
LALER 17:29:47 +0530
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Ratna Saraf
prescribed period of 30 days — i.e., on or before 16.03.2023 — or at any
point of time thereafter. The limitation to challenge the said order
accordingly expired without the Appellant availing of the remedy open to
her in law.
2.4. Thereafter, the Appellant filed an Application dated 12.07.2023 before
the Ld. MM, seeking issuance of process/summons against the
Respondent/mother-in-law. This application was filed approximately four
months after the limitation to challenge the first summoning order dated
14.02.2023 had expired.
2.5. Subsequently, arguments were heard on the Appellant’s application for
interim maintenance under Section 23 of the DV Act. Vide the second order
dated 14.02.2024 — which is the impugned order in the present appeal —
the Ld. MM passed a detailed, composite order by which it (a) granted
interim maintenance to the Appellant/wife, and (b) in Paragraph 14 thereof,
disposed of the application dated 12.07.2023 filed by the Appellant for
summoning of the Respondent/mother-in-law, declining to summon her on
the ground that there was insufficient prima facie material to hold that the
Respondent had committed domestic violence upon the Appellant.
2.6. Against the very order dated 14.02.2024, the husband Umesh Saraf
preferred an appeal before the Ld. ASJ, Patiala House Courts, registered as
CA No. 83/2024, before the Court of Ld. ASJ Smt. Kiran Gupta, challenging
the grant of maintenance. The Appellant/wife also filed an appeal against
the very same order dated 14.02.2024 before the very same court of Ld. ASJ
Smt. Kiran Gupta, challenging the maintenance aspect and other reliefs
SAURABH Digitally
by SAURABH
signed
PARTAP PARTAP SINGH
LALER
SINGH Date: 2026.02.23
LALER 17:30:01 +0530
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pertaining to the husband. The said appeals were heard and decided on
merits vide order dated 09.09.2024 by Ld. ASJ Smt. Kiran Gupta. The
maintenance issue arising from that order is stated to be presently pending
before the Hon’ble High Court of Delhi in CRL.REV.P. No. 1246/2024.
2.7. The Appellant filed the present appeal — CA No. 112/2024 — before this
Court, once again against the very same composite order dated 14.02.2024,
this time challenging specifically the non-summoning of the
Respondent/mother-in-law. This appeal was accompanied by an application
seeking condonation of delay of 35 days.
3. ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION
Upon a careful consideration of the arguments addressed at length by the
learned counsel for both parties, and of the written submissions filed by both
sides, the following issues arise for determination in the present matter:
3.1. Issue I: Whether the present appeal is maintainable in law, being a second
appeal preferred under Section 29 of the DV Act against the same impugned
order dated 14.02.2024, when an earlier appeal against the very same order
had already been preferred before a co-ordinate court and disposed of?
3.2. Issue II: Whether, in any event, the challenge to the non-summoning of
the Respondent/mother-in-law is maintainable in the present appeal,
inasmuch as the first order dated 14.02.2023 — by which the Ld. MM had,
at the threshold stage itself, declined to issue process to the Respondent —
had attained finality, never having been challenged?
SAURABH Digitally
by SAURABH
signed
PARTAP PARTAP SINGH
LALER
SINGH Date: 2026.02.23
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3.3. Issue III: Whether the Application under Order VI Rule 17 CPC, filed
after the matter had been reserved for orders, seeking amendment of the
present appeal to also challenge the earlier order dated 14.02.2023, is
maintainable and deserves to be allowed?
3.4. Issue IV: Even if the present appeal were to be held maintainable,
whether the impugned order dated 14.02.2024 declining to summon the
Respondent/mother-in-law is defective and merits interference?
The Court shall address each issue in the order in which they arise, before
arriving at a final conclusion.
4. ISSUE I: MAINTAINABILITY — THE SECOND APPEAL BAR UNDER
SECTION 29 OF THE DV ACT
4.1. This Court shall first take up the threshold question of maintainability,
which goes to the very root of this Court’s jurisdiction to entertain the present
appeal.
4.2. Section 29 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act,
2005 reads as follows:
“29. Appeal. — There shall lie an appeal to the Court of Session within thirty days
from the date on which the order made by the Magistrate is served on the aggrieved
person or the respondent, as the case may be, whichever is later.”
4.3. The language of Section 29 of the DV Act admits of no ambiguity. The
statute provides for “an appeal” — using the indefinite article “an” in its
singular form — against an order made by the Magistrate under the DV Act.
The deliberate use of the words “an appeal” in the singular, as opposed to
“appeals” in the plural, is unmistakably indicative of the legislative intent to
SAURABH Digitally signed by
SAURABH
PARTAP PARTAP SINGH
LALER
SINGH Date: 2026.02.23
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confine the appellate remedy to a single appeal against a single order. The
provision does not contemplate, permit, or sanction the fragmentation of a
composite order into multiple issues and the filing of separate appeals
against each such fragment, whether before the same court or before
different co-ordinate courts.
4.4. This position is entirely consistent with the foundational principles of
appellate jurisprudence and procedural law. An order is a judicial
pronouncement in its entirety. When a court passes a composite order
disposing of multiple applications or deciding multiple issues, a party
aggrieved by any part of that order is expected to challenge the entire order
— or such parts thereof as it seeks to challenge — in a single appeal. The
law does not countenance a piecemeal, incremental assault upon a single
order through successive or parallel appeals. Such a practice would be
antithetical to the very purpose of having a defined appellate procedure and
a law of limitation, which are designed to bring finality and certainty to
judicial decisions.
4.5. In the instant case, the undisputed facts speak for themselves. The
Appellant had already preferred an appeal against the very same order dated
14.02.2024 before the Court of Ld. ASJ Smt. Kiran Gupta. That appeal,
challenging the maintenance aspect of the same composite order, was heard
on merits and disposed of vide order dated 09.09.2024. The present appeal
before this Court is the second appeal against the very same order dated
14.02.2024, this time challenging the non-summoning portion of the same
SAURABH Digitally
by SAURABH
signed
PARTAP PARTAP SINGH
LALER
SINGH Date: 2026.02.23
LALER 17:30:54 +0530
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order. The impugned order in both appeals is one and the same — dated
14.02.2024, passed by the same Ld. MM in the same complaint case.
4.6. The argument of the Appellant that since the two appeals are directed
against different portions of the same order and involve different
respondents, there is no multiplicity of proceedings, is an argument that
cannot be accepted. The identity of an order does not change with the portion
or aspect thereof that is sought to be challenged. The order dated 14.02.2024
is one order and one order only. Whether one challenges it on the ground of
quantum of maintenance, or on the ground of non-summoning of a party, the
challenge is to the same order. Section 29 of the DV Act uses the words “the
order made by the Magistrate” — it speaks of the order as a whole, not of
portions thereof. A party cannot be heard to say that since it is challenging a
different “portion” of the order, a separate appeal is permissible. Such an
interpretation would drive a coach and four through the clear mandate of
Section 29.
4.7. Consequences Of Multiplicity Of Proceedings
a) The consequences of allowing such a practice are graphically illustrated
by the facts of the present case itself. The appeal concerning maintenance
— the first appeal against the order dated 14.02.2024 — went before Ld.
ASJ Smt. Kiran Gupta at Patiala House Courts. The present appeal
concerning the non-summoning of the mother-in-law — the second
appeal against the very same order — came before this Court. Two co-
ordinate courts were thus simultaneously seized of appeals arising from
one and the same order, compelling the parties to engage in simultaneous,
SAURABH Digitally
by SAURABH
signed
PARTAP PARTAP SINGH
LALER
SINGH Date: 2026.02.23
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parallel litigation before different courts — incurring duplication of
effort, multiplied costs of litigation, avoidable inconvenience and
harassment, and, most significantly, resulting in a waste of precious and
irreplaceable judicial time.
b) The prospect of conflicting or inconsistent orders being passed by two
co-ordinate courts on aspects of the very same impugned order, though
perhaps averted in the present case by the sequence of events, is not a
theoretical concern — it is a real and present danger that follows
inevitably from permitting multiple appeals against the same order.
When two co-ordinate courts of equal jurisdiction are simultaneously
hearing appeals arising from the same order, the potential for conflicting
findings and observations is manifest. Even if the specific reliefs sought
are different, the findings recorded by one court on questions of fact or
mixed questions of law and fact may have a material bearing on the other
appeal. The coordination of such parallel proceedings becomes a
logistical and judicial nightmare, consuming precious time and resources
that could be better deployed in the administration of justice.
c) This Court, in its over two decades of presiding over matters — civil,
criminal, and those touching upon the delicate intersection of both, such
as proceedings under the DV Act — has consistently observed that
multiplicity of proceedings is one of the most insidious sources of
avoidable burden upon courts and upon parties alike. There is no reason
in law, in equity, or in common sense, to permit an aggrieved party to file
two appeals against one order, before two different courts. The remedy
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is clear and unambiguous: the aggrieved party must consolidate all its
grievances against an order into a single, comprehensive appeal under
Section 29 of the DV Act. No more, and no less, is what the law
provides.
4.8. Judicial pronouncements on piecemeal litigation
a) The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in a catena of judgments, has deprecated
piecemeal litigation and forum shopping with the firmness that such
abuses of process deserve. In Udyami Evam Khadi Gramodyog Welfare
Sanstha v. State of U.P., (2008) 1 SCC 560, the Supreme Court held that
a litigant cannot be permitted to fragment its cause and re-agitate issues
before different forums by circumventing settled legal processes. The
Court observed that allowing such fragmented litigation would amount
to an abuse of the process of law and would defeat the very purpose of
having a structured and time-bound appellate mechanism.
b) The submission of the Ld. Counsel for the Appellant that the filing of
two separate appeals does not constitute multiplicity since the two
appeals arise from different cause of action — one being maintenance
and the other being summoning — is a submission that obfuscates more
than it illuminates. A “cause of action” in the context of an appeal is the
order against which the appeal is preferred. Both the first appeal and the
present appeal arise from the same order dated 14.02.2024. Whatever be
the grounds of challenge, whatever be the relief sought, whatever be the
respondent arrayed — the impugned order is one. The cause of action for
SAURABH Digitally
by SAURABH
signed
PARTAP PARTAP SINGH
LALER
SINGH Date: 2026.02.23
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the appeal is the same order, and it is that cause of action which cannot
be split.
4.9. Policy Considerations
a) The policy underlying Section 29 of the DV Act is clear and
unambiguous. The DV Act is a welfare and remedial legislation designed
to provide speedy relief to aggrieved women facing domestic violence.
The provision for a single appeal with a short limitation period of 30 days
is designed to ensure that matters under the DV Act — which often
involve urgent questions of maintenance, residence orders, and
protection orders — are not allowed to fester in the appellate courts for
prolonged periods. The object is to provide swift justice, while ensuring
that there is one opportunity for appellate scrutiny of the Magistrate’s
order. This object would be entirely defeated if parties were permitted to
file multiple appeals against the same order, each challenging a different
aspect thereof, before different co-ordinate courts, thereby prolonging the
litigation indefinitely and frustrating the very purpose of the DV Act.
b) The proper course, if an aggrieved party is dissatisfied with multiple
aspects of a composite order, is to file a single appeal challenging all such
aspects, arraying all necessary parties, and seeking all reliefs in one
proceeding. If, for any reason, a party fails to challenge a particular aspect
of an order in the first appeal, that party cannot be permitted to file a
second appeal against the same order to challenge the aspect that was not
raised in the first appeal. Such a party is bound by the consequences of
SAURABH Digitally
by SAURABH
signed
PARTAP PARTAP SINGH
LALER
SINGH Date: 2026.02.23
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its election and cannot be heard to say that it is entitled to a second bite
at the cherry.
c) For all the foregoing reasons, this Court holds that the present appeal —
being a second appeal under Section 29 of the DV Act against the same
impugned order dated 14.02.2024, against which an earlier appeal had
already been preferred and decided — is not maintainable in law. The
present appeal is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.
5. ISSUE II: THE FIRST ORDER DATED 14.02.2023 HAVING ATTAINED
FINALITY
5.1. Without prejudice to the finding on Issue I above, and proceeding
independently on each ground of challenge to maintainability, this Court
shall now address the second limb of the objection to maintainability.
5.2. It is a matter beyond dispute that the first occasion on which the Ld. MM
declined to summon the Respondent/mother-in-law was vide the
summoning/process-issuance order dated 14.02.2023. On that date, the Ld.
MM, having applied its mind to the complaint under Section 12 of the DV
Act and having heard the Appellant/complainant, issued notice/process only
to Respondent No. 1/husband Umesh Saraf, and specifically did not issue
any summons to Respondent No. 2/Ratna Saraf/the Respondent herein. The
order dated 14.02.2023 was thus, in substance and in effect, an order
declining to summon the mother-in-law at the very threshold stage of the
proceedings.
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5.3. Non-Challenge of the Order Dated 14.02.2023
a) The Appellant never challenged the order dated 14.02.2023 by way of an
appeal under Section 29 of the DV Act. The period of limitation for
challenging the said order — 30 days from the date of the order or its
service — expired on or about 16.03.2023. The Appellant allowed this
limitation to lapse without availing of the appellate remedy. By this
omission, the order dated 14.02.2023 attained finality. An order which
has attained finality is binding upon the parties and cannot be disturbed,
assailed, or circumvented — whether directly or collaterally — by way
of a subsequent appeal against a later order. This principle is foundational
to the rule of law and to the doctrine of finality of judicial decisions,
which is as important as justice itself. Finality protects parties from the
harassment of being subjected to endless litigation, and it is the very
foundation upon which the law of limitation rests.
b) The Appellant was not unaware of the non-summoning of the
Respondent/mother-in-law by virtue of the order dated 14.02.2023. Even
on the Appellant’s own case, she was made aware of the non-summoning
in July 2023 — when her counsel changed and the files were perused —
upon which she immediately filed the application dated 12.07.2023 for
re-summoning of the Respondent. Yet, she did not challenge the order
dated 14.02.2023 by way of an appeal. Instead, she sought, through the
application under Section 25(2) of the DV Act, to persuade the Ld. MM
to re-summon the Respondent — effectively seeking a review of the
order dated 14.02.2023 without framing it as such. When that application
SAURABH Digitally signed
by SAURABH
PARTAP PARTAP SINGH
LALER
SINGH Date: 2026.02.23
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was declined vide the impugned order dated 14.02.2024, the Appellant
preferred the present appeal.
5.4. Attempt to Circumvent Finality
a) It is, therefore, crystal clear that the Appellant’s strategy has been to use
the application dated 12.07.2023 and the subsequent appeal against its
dismissal as an indirect mechanism to re-open and re-agitate the question
of summoning of the Respondent/mother-in-law — a question that had
been conclusively decided by the order dated 14.02.2023, which had
attained finality. This is precisely the mischief against which the law of
finality of orders and the law of limitation are directed.
b) In The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. v. Rajmati Singh (Civil Appeal No.
9329 of 2022), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that a litigant is expected
to assert her rights before an appropriate forum within a reasonable time
and that repeated spurious attempts cannot give rise to, nor revive, an
already dead cause of action. The cause of action arising from the order
dated 14.02.2023 having died with the expiry of limitation, no
resurrection of the same can be permitted through the circuitous route of
the present appeal.
c) The law on finality of orders is well-settled. Once a judicial order is
passed and the period for challenging it by way of appeal or revision has
expired, the order becomes final and binding upon all parties. It merges
into the record of the case and becomes part of the substratum upon which
the subsequent proceedings are conducted. A party cannot be permitted
to re-open a final order by filing a fresh application seeking the same
Digitally signed
SAURABH by SAURABH
PARTAP SINGH
PARTAP LALER
SINGH Date:
LALER 2026.02.23
17:32:09 +0530
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the earlier order. To permit such a course would be to render the law of
limitation a dead letter and to expose parties to endless litigation.
5.5. Misuse of Section 25(2) of the DV Act
a) The reliance placed by the Appellant upon Section 25(2) of the DV Act
to contend that the Ld. MM had jurisdiction to entertain the application
for re-summoning of the Respondent/mother-in-law is also not well-
founded. Section 25(2) of the DV Act provides as follows:
“25(2). The Magistrate may, if he considers it necessary or expedient so to do,
review, alter, modify or revoke any order made by him on an application made
by the aggrieved person or the respondent or any person acting on their behalf.”
b) The enabling condition for invoking Section 25(2) is a material change
of circumstances warranting the alteration, modification or revocation of
the earlier order. The provision is not designed to permit a party to seek
a review or reconsideration of an order merely because the party is
dissatisfied with it, or because the party has belatedly realized that the
order ought to have been challenged. Section 25(2) is not a substitute for
an appeal under Section 29, nor is it a device to circumvent the law of
limitation.
c) In the present case, no change of circumstances warranting the fresh
summoning of the Respondent has been pleaded, alleged or established.
The application dated 12.07.2023 was filed simply to re-raise the issue
of summoning that had already been decided on 14.02.2023 — four
months after the limitation to challenge that order had expired. This was
a thinly veiled attempt to circumvent the finality of the order dated
SAURABH Digitally
by SAURABH
signed
PARTAP PARTAP SINGH
LALER
SINGH Date: 2026.02.23
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14.02.2023 by resort to Section 25(2), which was clearly not designed
for such a purpose. The Ld. MM was fully justified in declining to
entertain the said application and in affirming the earlier position that the
Respondent need not be summoned.
5.6. Principle of Waiver and Estoppel
a) Furthermore, the Appellant, having failed to challenge the order dated
14.02.2023 within the period of limitation, is now estopped from
challenging the non-summoning of the Respondent/mother-in-law. The
omission to challenge the order dated 14.02.2023 amounts to a waiver of
the right to challenge the non-summoning. The Appellant cannot now be
heard to say, after the limitation has expired and after the order has
attained finality, that the order ought to be reconsidered or that the
Respondent ought to be summoned. The principle of estoppel by conduct
applies with full force. A party cannot approbate and reprobate; having
accepted the order dated 14.02.2023 by not challenging it, the Appellant
cannot now seek to challenge its consequences.
b) On this ground also, the present appeal is not maintainable, as the real
challenge — i.e., the non-summoning of the Respondent/mother-in-law
— had been conclusively determined by the order dated 14.02.2023,
which had attained finality, having never been challenged.
6. ISSUE III: APPLICATION UNDER ORDER VI RULE 17 CPC — THE
AMENDMENT APPLICATION
6.1. Having returned the findings on Issues I and II above, this Court shall
now address the Application under Order VI Rule 17 read with Section 151
SAURABH Digitally
by SAURABH
signed
PARTAP PARTAP SINGH
LALER
SINGH Date: 2026.02.23
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CPC, filed on 08.08.2025, whereby the Appellant seeks to amend the present
appeal so as to additionally challenge the order dated 14.02.2023, by
incorporating that order also as an impugned order in the present appeal.
6.2. Timing of the Amendment Application
a) At the outset, the Court cannot but notice with considerable displeasure
the circumstances and the timing of the filing of this amendment
application. This Court had, after hearing arguments at considerable
length from both sides on the maintainability and merits of the present
appeal, reserved the matter for orders. It was at this stage — after
arguments had concluded and the matter stood reserved for judgment —
that the Appellant chose to file the present amendment application.
b) The practice of filing applications after a matter has been reserved for
orders is one that is firmly deprecated by courts at all levels. When
arguments have been concluded and a Court has already applied its
judicial mind to the questions presented before it, the filing of an
application seeking to alter or expand the scope of the proceedings is
calculated to reopen matters that have already been argued and heard. It
is an attempt to secure a second innings after the innings has already been
played and the time to bat has elapsed. No legitimate excuse has been
offered for why this amendment application could not have been filed
during the pendency of the hearing, if the Appellant genuinely believed
it to be necessary. The manner and the timing of the filing of the
amendment application is itself a ground for its rejection.
SAURABH Digitally
by SAURABH
signed
PARTAP PARTAP SINGH
LALER
SINGH Date: 2026.02.23
LALER 17:32:33 +0530
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c) The amendment application was filed specifically in response to the
Respondent’s pointed argument — raised during the hearing of the
present appeal — that the first order dated 14.02.2023 had attained
finality and had never been challenged. The amendment application was
thus conceived and filed as a tactical counter-move to the Respondent’s
maintainability argument, rather than as a genuine and timely exercise of
the right of amendment. Such tactical amendments, filed at the eleventh
hour after arguments have concluded, do not deserve the grace of
liberality that courts ordinarily extend to genuinely necessitated
amendments filed at appropriate stages.
6.3. Substantive Objections to the Amendment
a) Proceeding beyond the procedural objection, this Court is of the
considered opinion that the amendment application is also not
maintainable on substantive legal grounds.
b) The present appeal, CA No. 112/2024, challenges the order dated
14.02.2024. By the proposed amendment, the Appellant seeks to also
challenge the order dated 14.02.2023 — an entirely different order,
passed approximately one year earlier, by the same court in the same
case, but at a completely different stage of the proceedings. These two
orders are distinct judicial pronouncements, passed in different contexts,
deciding different questions at different stages, and having different
connotations and consequences in law. The order dated 14.02.2023 was
a first-stage process/summoning order; the order dated 14.02.2024 was a
detailed order on interim maintenance with an incidental observation on
Digitally signed
SAURABH by SAURABH
PARTAP SINGH
PARTAP LALER
SINGH Date:
LALER 2026.02.23
17:32:41 +0530
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Vs.
Ratna Sarafsummoning. Each order has its own independent legal existence, its own
period of limitation for appeal, and its own cause of action.
6.4. Whether Amendment Changes the Nature of the Proceeding
a) The question that arises is: whether an amendment under Order VI Rule
17 CPC can be permitted to convert an appeal against Order A into an
appeal against both Order A and Order B, where Order B is a completely
different and independent judicial order passed at a different time?
b) The answer, in this Court’s considered view, must be an emphatic
negative. Order VI Rule 17 CPC is a provision designed to permit the
amendment of pleadings to clarify, elaborate, or modify the existing
claim or challenge — it is not a device to introduce an entirely new and
distinct cause of action, or to challenge an entirely different order, under
the guise of an amendment. The fundamental test for the permissibility
of an amendment is whether it changes the nature of the proceeding. If
allowing the amendment would change the very nature and character of
the suit or appeal, the amendment ought not to be permitted.
c) In the present case, if the proposed amendment were allowed, the present
appeal — which is an appeal against the order dated 14.02.2024 — would
metamorphose into an appeal against two entirely different orders: the
order dated 14.02.2024 and the order dated 14.02.2023. This would
fundamentally alter the nature of the present appeal; it would convert a
proceeding arising from one order into a proceeding arising from two
orders passed approximately one year apart. This is not an amendment
— it is a conversion of the proceeding into something qualitatively and
SAURABH Digitally
by SAURABH
signed
PARTAP PARTAP SINGH
LALER
SINGH Date: 2026.02.23
LALER 17:32:49 +0530
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Ratna Saraf
substantively different. Such a conversion cannot be permitted under
Order VI Rule 17 CPC.
6.5. Amendment as a Device to Bypass Limitation
a) More critically, the order dated 14.02.2023 could only have been
challenged by a separate appeal under Section 29 of the DV Act filed
within 30 days from its date or service. The limitation to challenge that
order expired on or about 16.03.2023 — well over two years before the
present amendment application was filed. The amendment application is,
in substance, a request to permit the Appellant to challenge the order
dated 14.02.2023 in a proceeding filed almost two years after the
limitation to challenge it had expired. The law does not permit the
amendment provision to be used as a conduit to bypass the law of
limitation and to challenge, by way of amendment, an entirely different
order against which the limitation has long since expired. Such a use of
Order VI Rule 17 CPC would render the law of limitation — which is
founded on the sound public policy of finality of proceedings — wholly
illusory.
6.6. Inapplicability of Judgments Cited by the Appellant
a) The judgments cited by the Appellant — including Uday Shankar Triyar
v. Ram Kalewar Prasad Singh, AIR 2006 SC 269, and Varun Pahwa v.
Renu Chaudhary, (2019) 15 SCC 628 — for the proposition that
procedural defects should not defeat substantive rights and that
amendments should be liberally allowed, are not applicable to the facts
of the present case. Those judgments deal with situations where an
SAURABH Digitally signed by
SAURABH
PARTAP PARTAP SINGH
LALER
SINGH Date: 2026.02.23
LALER 17:32:59 +0530
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Vs.
Ratna Saraf
existing cause of action is sought to be better articulated or where a
curable procedural defect in the pleadings is to be rectified — not with
situations where an amendment is sought to challenge an altogether
different and independent judicial order against which the limitation has
expired.
b) In Uday Shankar Triyar (supra) itself, the Supreme Court carved out the
well-recognized exception that where the amendment would affect the
case on merits or affect the jurisdiction of the court, it need not be
permitted. The Supreme Court observed:
“17. Non-compliance with any procedural requirement relating to a pleading,
memorandum of appeal or application or petition for relief should not entail
automatic dismissal or rejection, unless the relevant statute or rule so
mandates. Procedural defects and irregularities which are curable should not
be allowed to defeat substantive rights or to cause injustice. Procedure, a
handmaiden to justice, should never be made a tool to deny justice or
perpetuate injustice, by any oppressive or punitive use. The well-recognised
exceptions to this principle are:
(i) where the statute prescribing the procedure, also prescribes specifically
the consequence of non-compliance;
(ii) where the procedural defect is not rectified, even after it is pointed out
and due opportunity is given for rectifying it;
(iii)where the non-compliance or violation is proved to be deliberate or
mischievous;
(iv) where the rectification of defect would affect the case on merits or will
affect the jurisdiction of the court;
(v) in case of memorandum of appeal, there is complete absence of
authority and the appeal is presented without the knowledge, consent
and authority of the appellant.”
c) In the present case, the proposed amendment would clearly and
fundamentally alter the scope of the impugned order(s). The amendment
SAURABH Digitally
by SAURABH
signed
PARTAP PARTAP SINGH
LALER
SINGH Date: 2026.02.23
LALER 17:33:21 +0530
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Ratna Saraf
falls squarely within exception (iv) carved out by the Supreme Court in
Uday Shankar Triyar (supra).
6.7. Amendment to Challenge an Order that has Attained Finality
a) Furthermore, the order against which the amendment seeks to direct an
additional challenge — i.e., the order dated 14.02.2023 — had, in fact,
attained finality, as held by this Court in Issue II above. Permitting the
amendment would, in effect, be permitting a challenge to an order that
has already attained finality. This is clearly impermissible, regardless of
whether the challenge is mounted directly by a separate appeal or
indirectly by an amendment to an existing appeal.
b) The principle is well-settled that an amendment cannot be permitted to
resurrect a dead cause of action or to challenge an order that has become
final and binding. The law of limitation is based on public policy and is
designed to ensure that litigation comes to an end within a reasonable
time. To permit an amendment to challenge an order against which the
limitation has expired would be to subvert the very purpose of the law of
limitation and to open the floodgates to endless litigation.
6.8. For all the reasons aforesaid, the Application under Order VI Rule 17
CPC filed by the Appellant is rejected. The present appeal cannot be
permitted to challenge the order dated 14.02.2023 by way of an amendment,
and the prayer in the amendment application is declined.
SAURABH Digitally
by SAURABH
signed
PARTAP PARTAP SINGH
LALER
SINGH Date: 2026.02.23
LALER 17:33:30 +0530
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Ratna Saraf
7. ISSUE IV: MERITS — CORRECTNESS OF THE IMPUGNED ORDER ON
THE QUESTION OF NON-SUMMONING OF THE
RESPONDENT/MOTHER-IN-LAW
7.1. Having returned the findings on Issues I, II and III above — each
independently establishing the non-maintainability of the present appeal and
the non-allowability of the amendment application — this Court considers
it appropriate to also address the merits of the challenge to the impugned
order, so as to leave no aspect of the matter unaddressed, and to make
complete and comprehensive adjudication.
7.2. Even if one were to assume, purely for the purpose of argument and
without in any manner detracting from the findings on the earlier issues, that
the present appeal were maintainable and that the challenge to the non-
summoning of the Respondent/mother-in-law were properly before this
Court — this Court finds that the impugned order dated 14.02.2024, by
which the Ld. MM declined to summon Ratna Saraf, is legally correct, well-
reasoned, and does not warrant any interference.
7.3. Allegations Against the Respondent/Mother-in-Law: For the purpose of
examining the merits, this Court has carefully perused the DV complaint
filed by the Appellant and the specific allegations levelled against the
Respondent/mother-in-law, Ratna Saraf. The allegations against the
Respondent — as distinct from those against the husband/Respondent No. 1
Umesh Saraf — may be summarized as follows:
a) January 1993: The Respondent witnessed the husband physically
slapping the Appellant but remained silent. On the Appellant’s requestSAURABH Digitally
by SAURABH
signedPARTAP PARTAP SINGH
LALER
SINGH Date: 2026.02.23
LALER 17:33:38 +0530
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Ratna Saraffor intervention, the Respondent argued that it is a wife’s moral duty to
adjust to her husband’s behaviour, and that it was in the family’s interest
for the Appellant to move on. (Para II of Schedule A)
b) Regarding extra-marital relationship: When the Appellant revealed her
husband’s illicit relationship to the parents-in-law, the Respondent —
along with the late father-in-law — advised suppression of the incident
in the interest of family reputation. The Respondent’s concern was the
family’s image and her son’s honour, not the Appellant’s suffering. (Paras
XI & XII of Schedule A)
c) Regarding conjugal misconduct: When the Appellant approached the
Respondent complaining of her husband’s inappropriate conduct, the
Respondent responded dismissively with the words “wo tumko chuhyaa
hi toh tha, kaunsa laat maara tha”, causing the Appellant disgust and
mental trauma. (Paras XIX & XX of Schedule A)
d) September 2019 — Illness of Appellant: When the Appellant fell
critically ill while her husband was travelling with Ms. Lisa Sherpa, the
Respondent did not extend any help despite repeated pleas. It is alleged
that this constituted total neglect. (Para XXI of Schedule A)
e) January 2020 — Kolkata family function: The Appellant alleges that
after a family function, while the rest of the family went to the ancestral
home at Jatinder Mohan Avenue, Kolkata, the Respondent
communicated to the Appellant that an alternate accommodation was
being arranged for her. This is alleged to be an attempt to oust the
Appellant from the family. (Page XXV of Schedule A)
SAURABH Digitally
by SAURABH
signed
PARTAP PARTAP SINGH
LALER
SINGH Date: 2026.02.23
LALER 17:33:47 +0530
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Ratna Saraf
f) April 2021 — Room locked in Kathmandu: When the Appellant visited
Kathmandu for her second dose of COVID-19 vaccination, her room in
the ancestral home was locked by her husband. The Appellant alleges
that the Respondent had complete knowledge of the same and yet
continued to support her son. After insistence, the Respondent opened
the room with duplicate keys. (Page XXVI of Schedule A)
g) May 2021 — Chest pain and health issues: When the Appellant started
experiencing chest pain and anxiety attacks, the Respondent refused to
extend help and support, and told the Appellant ” yeh tumhari takdeer
hai”. (Para XXVIII of Schedule A)
h) November 2021 — Phone call to son: When the Appellant informed the
Respondent about Ms. Lisa Sherpa visiting her husband’s hotel daily in
Kathmandu, the Respondent, as soon as the Appellant left the room,
made a call to her son and said, “wo tera jasoosi karne hotel hi gayi tu
teri nigar rakhiye bas”, which the Appellant overheard and recorded.
(Para XXXI of Schedule A)
7.4. Nature of the Allegations — Omnibus and Vague: Upon a careful
analysis of the aforesaid allegations, this Court finds that the allegations
against the Respondent/mother-in-law are primarily omnibus and vague in
nature. The allegations do not disclose specific, direct acts of domestic
violence committed by the Respondent herself upon the Appellant. Rather,
the allegations are in the nature of:
a) Passive conduct: Remaining silent when the husband committed
violence; not intervening; not extending help or support;
SAURABH Digitally
by SAURABH
signed
PARTAP PARTAP SINGH
LALER
SINGH Date: 2026.02.23
LALER 17:33:56 +0530
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Ratna Saraf
b) Advice: Advising the Appellant to adjust, to suppress incidents in the
interest of family reputation;
c) Indifference: Not responding to the Appellant’s complaints; not caring
for the Appellant’s health;
These are allegations of omissions, of passive acquiescence, of
family dynamics, and of moral or emotional support to the husband — but
they do not, even when taken at their highest, constitute direct, specific, and
overt acts of domestic violence committed by the Respondent herself upon
the Appellant.
7.5. Nature of Reliefs Claimed: More significantly, the reliefs claimed by
the Appellant in the DV complaint are primarily against the husband, and
not against the mother-in-law. The principal reliefs sought are:
a) Protection order against the husband;
b) Residence order allowing the Appellant to continue residing in the
matrimonial home;
c) Monetary relief/maintenance from the husband;
d) Compensation from the husband.
7.6. There is no specific relief claimed qua the Respondent/mother-in-law.
The mother-in-law has been arrayed as a party, but the substantive reliefs
are all directed against the husband. This is a strong indicator that the real
domestic violence — if any — was committed by the husband, and that the
mother-in-law has been arrayed as a party more in the nature of an additional
respondent rather than as a primary perpetrator of domestic violence.
SAURABH Digitally
by SAURABH
signed
PARTAP PARTAP SINGH
LALER
SINGH Date: 2026.02.23
LALER 17:34:07 +0530
DLND010040212024 Page 27 of 40
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Vs.
Ratna Saraf
7.7. The Legal Test for Summoning Under the DV Act
a) The legal position is well-settled that at the stage of summoning or
issuance of process under the DV Act, the Magistrate is required to apply
its mind to the complaint and to form a prima facie opinion as to whether
the allegations, if proved, would constitute domestic violence under
Section 3 of the DV Act. The Magistrate is not required to hold a mini-
trial or to examine the evidence in detail at this stage. However, the
Magistrate is equally not required to issue summons mechanically
without application of mind. If the allegations in the complaint, even
when taken at face value, do not disclose a prima facie case of domestic
violence, the Magistrate is fully justified in declining to issue summons.
b) In the present case, the Ld. MM applied its mind to the allegations against
the Respondent/mother-in-law and came to the conclusion that there was
no sufficient prima facie material to hold that the Respondent had
committed domestic violence upon the Appellant. This finding is fully
justified and is in consonance with the nature of the allegations, which
are primarily omnibus, vague, and in the nature of passive conduct or
omissions, rather than direct acts of violence.
7.8. The Poonam Gandhi Judgment of the Hon’ble Delhi High Court
a) The position in law on this issue has been authoritatively settled by the
Hon’ble High Court of Delhi in the judgment in Poonam Gandhi vs. State
(NCT) of Delhi & Ors., Crl. M.C. No. 1916/2025, decided on
03.07.2025. This judgment, which is directly on point, deserves to be
reproduced and analyzed in detail.
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b) In Poonam Gandhi (supra), the petitioner was the widow of a deceased
son who had filed a DV complaint against her elderly in-laws and other
family members. The Hon’ble High Court quashed the proceedings
against the in-laws, holding that the allegations were omnibus and vague,
and did not disclose any specific acts of domestic violence committed by
the in-laws. The Hon’ble High Court made the following significant
observations:
7.9. Para 15 to 24 of the judgment is reproduced as under :
“15. It is relevant to note that in the facts of this case, the complaint
alleging domestic violence has been filed after 21 years of marriage and
after 9 years since Petitioner last resided with Respondent Nos. 3, 5 and
6.
The marriage was solemnized in 2001 and the complaint has
been filed in 2022 (i.e., after 21 years). The earliest date of incident of
alleged domestic violence is of 2001 and the last allegation of incident
of alleged domestic violence against Respondent Nos. 3 is of the year
2020 and for Respondent No. 5 is of 2017. These allegations in addition
to being stale appear to have been made with an intent to rope in the
relatives to exert pressure on Respondent No. 2/husband to provide
Petitioner and her daughter with maintenance and alternate residence.
16. In the complaint there are bald allegations that Respondent nos. 3 to
6 demanded gifts; however, there are no specific averments in the
complaint qua the said demands vis-Ã -vis the deleted Respondents.
17. It would be relevant to refer to a recent judgment passed by the
Supreme Court in Geddam Jhansi v. State of Telangana 5 wherein the
Supreme Court has observed that Courts must exercise caution and be
judicious in entertaining criminal proceedings arising out of domestic
disputes against relatives and observed that such proceedings should
only be entertained when specific allegations are made with credible
material to support the same. The relevant portion of the judgment reads
as under:
“31. Invoking criminal process is a serious matter with penal
consequences involving coercive measures, which can beSAURABH Digitally
by SAURABH
signedPARTAP PARTAP SINGH
LALER
SINGH Date: 2026.02.23
LALER 17:34:17 +0530
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Vs.
Ratna Sarafpermitted only when specific act(s) which constitute offences
punishable under the Penal Code or any other penal statute are
alleged or attributed to the accused and a prima facie case is
made out. It applies with equal force when criminal laws are
invoked in domestic disputes. Criminalising domestic disputes
without specific allegations and credible materials to support
the same may have disastrous consequences for the institution
of family, which is built on the premise of love, affection,
cordiality and mutual trust. Institution of family constitutes the
core of human society. Domestic relationships, such as those
between family members, are guided by deeply ingrained
social values and cultural expectations. These relationships are
often viewed as sacred, demanding a higher level of respect,
commitment, and emotional investment compared to other
social or professional associations. For the aforesaid reason,
preservation of family relationship has always been
emphasised upon. Thus, when family relationships are
sought to be brought within the ambit of criminal proceedings
rupturing the family bond, courts should be circumspect and
judicious, and should allow invocation of criminal process
only when there are specific allegations with supporting
materials which clearly constitute criminal offences.
32. We have to keep in mind that in the context of matrimonial
disputes, emotions run high, and as such in the complaints
filed alleging harassment or domestic violence, there may be a
tendency to implicate other members of the family who do not
come to the rescue of the complainant or remain mute
spectators to any alleged incident of harassment, which in
our view 2025 SCC OnLine SC 263 cannot by itself
constitute a criminal act without there being specific acts
attributed to them. Further, when tempers run high and
relationships turn bitter, there is also a propensity to
exaggerate the allegations, which does not necessarily mean
that such domestic disputes should be given the colour of
criminality.
33. It goes without saying that genuine cases of cruelty and
violence in domestic sphere, which do happen, ought to be
handled with utmost sensitivity. Domestic violence typically
happens within the four walls of the house and not in the
public gaze. Therefore, such violence is not noticed by public
at large, except perhaps by the immediate neighbours. Thus,SAURABH Digitally
by SAURABH
signedPARTAP PARTAP SINGH
LALER
SINGH Date: 2026.02.23
LALER 17:34:25 +0530
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Vs.
Ratna Sarafproviding visible evidence by the victim of domestic
violence may not be easily forthcoming and producing direct
evidence may be hard and arduous, which does not necessarily
mean that domestic violence does not occur. In fact, to deal
with this pernicious phenomenon, stringent statutes
like Protection from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, have been
enacted with very expansive meaning and scope of what
amounts to domestic violence. Since, violence perpetrated
within the domestic sphere by close relatives is now
criminalised entailing serious consequences on the
perpetrators, the courts have to be careful while dealing with
such cases by examining whether there are specific allegations
with instances against the perpetrators and not generalised
allegations. The purpose and mandate of the law to protect the
victims of domestic violence is of paramount importance,
and as such, a balance has to be struck by ensuring that while
perpetrators are brought to book, all the family members or
relatives are not indiscriminately brought within the criminal
net in a sweeping manner.
…….
35. We are, thus, of the view that in criminal cases relating to
domestic violence, the complaints and charges should be
specific, as far as possible, as against each and every member
of the family who are accused of such offences and sought to
be prosecuted, as otherwise, it may amount to misuse of the
stringent criminal process by indiscriminately dragging all the
members of the family. There may be situations where some
of the family members or relatives may turn a blind eye to
the violence or harassment perpetrated to the victim, and may
not extend any helping hand to the victim, which does not
necessarily mean that they are also perpetrators of domestic
violence, unless the circumstances clearly indicate their
involvement and instigation. Hence, implicating all such
relatives without making specific allegations and attributing
offending acts to them and proceeding against them without
prima facie evidence that they were complicit and had actively
collaborated with the perpetrators of domestic violence, would
amount to abuse of the process of law.”
18. The Trial Court and the Appellate Court after examining the
allegations in the complaint against the alleged acts of Respondent Nos.
SAURABH Digitally
by SAURABH
signed
PARTAP PARTAP SINGH
LALER
SINGH Date: 2026.02.23
LALER 17:34:41 +0530
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Ratna Saraf
3, 5 and 6, who lived separately from the Petitioner since 2013, have
held that the said allegations fail to justify initiation of criminal
proceedings against them.
19. In the complaint, the Petitioner has alleged that Respondent No. 3
used to persistently level taunts at her since early days of the
marriage. In this regard, it would be relevant to refer the recent decision
of Supreme Court in Kamal & Ors. vs. State of Gujarat6, wherein while
quashing an FIR filed under Section 498-A IPC, the Court held that
such allegations of taunts cannot justify initiation of criminal
proceedings against the relatives including parent-in-laws in a
matrimonial discord. The relevant paragraphs of the judgment read as
under:-
“11. What is important, for the purposes of deciding this
case, is that in the FIR there is no specific allegation of demand
of dowry by the accused. Further, the allegation of harassment
of the complainant at the instance of the parents in law is
limited to extending taunts and custody related issues of minor
children. However, there is no disclosure about the nature of
those taunts. Admittedly, the second respondent was married
to the first appellant in the year 2005 and for last several years
since before lodging the FIR, the complainant had been
working and staying in rented accommodations at different
places. Besides that, the FIR was lodged on 20.07.2019, just
three days after service of summons of the divorce
proceedings initiated by the first appellant. In these
circumstances, we will have to consider whether the impugned
proceedings are vexatious and mala fide, particularly in the
context of a matrimonial dispute where time and again
Courts have been cautioned to be circumspect to obviate
malicious prosecution of family members of the main
accused.
12. Even if we assume that there are some allegations of
assault and of physical and mental torture of the complainant,
but they are against the husband. As against the parents in law,
the allegations are only of extending taunts and of not parting
with the money for managing 2025 INSC 504 household
expenses. Specific details in respect of those taunts have not
been disclosed. Moreover, a few taunts here and there is a part
of everyday life which for happiness of the family are usually
ignored. Interestingly, as per own allegations in the FIR, theSAURABH Digitally
by SAURABH
signedPARTAP PARTAP SINGH
LALER
SINGH Date: 2026.02.23
LALER 17:34:52 +0530
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Ratna Sarafcomplainant admits that when she reported those issues to
her parents and uncle, she was counselled to bear patience. In
the circumstances, in our considered view, no case to
proceed against the parents in law, namely, the second and
third appellant is made out. In so far as the first appellant is
concerned, there are allegations of physical and mental torture
of the complainant at his behest. Consequently, the case may
proceed qua the first appellant.
13. Before parting, we would like to observe that the High
adopted an extremely pedantic approach while dealing with
the quashing petition of the appellants. No doubt, in ordinary
course, while exercising power under Section 482 of the
CrPC, the Court is not required to test the correctness of the
allegations, but in matters arising from matrimonial disputes,
particularly where the allegations are levelled after many years
of marriage and, that too, after one party initiates divorce
proceeding against the other, the Court must be circumspect in
taking the allegations at their face value. Rather, it must
examine, where allegations of mala fides are there, whether
those allegations have been levelled with an oblique purpose.
More so, while considering the prayer of the relatives of the
husband.”
Applying the law laid down in the aforesaid judgment, the order of
the Trial Court and the Appellate Court deleting Respondent No. 3 from
the array of the parties is justified. Moreover, the submission of the
Respondent nos. 2 to 6 that Respondent No. 3 is on her death bed has
also not been contested during arguments. Therefore, in these facts,
the order of the Trial court and Appellate Court in declining to initiate
criminal proceedings against Respondent No. 3 does not merit
interference.
20. There are no specific incidents of domestic violence against
Respondent No. 6 in the complaint. Respondent No. 6 has been residing
in a separate household since 2013. Thus, keeping in view the
judgments of the Supreme Court in Geddam Jhansi (supra) as well
as Kamal v. State of Gujarat (supra), the order of the Trial Court and
the Appellate Court deleting Respondent No. 6 from the array of parties
does not merit any interference.
21. The specific incidents qua Respondent Nos. 3 and 5 averred in the
complaint fail to justify initiating criminal proceedings against
SAURABH Digitally
by SAURABH
signed
PARTAP PARTAP SINGH
LALER
SINGH Date: 2026.02.23
LALER 17:35:03 +0530
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Ratna Saraf
Respondent Nos. 3 and 5. So also the unspecific allegations against
Respondent No. 6 in the complaint does not justify initiation of specific
proceedings. As observed by Supreme Court in Geddam Jhansi (supra)
the criminal process in domestic violence disputes ought not to be
initiated lightly.
22. The Petitioner while not disputing that she has set up a separate
household with Respondent No. 2 since 2013, has relied upon the
judgment of Supreme Court in Prabha Tyagi vs. Kamlesh Devi (supra)
to maintain the complaint against Respondent Nos. 3, 5 and 6.
Admittedly, in the complaint, the Petitioner is not seeking enforcement
of right of residence in the shared household with Respondent Nos. 3, 5
and 6. The Supreme Court in Prabha Tyagi vs. Kamlesh Devi (supra)
adjudicated upon the identity of the respondent against whom a
complainant can enforce her right to reside in the shared household. In
this context, the Supreme Court held that such a right can also be
enforced by a complainant against a person/respondent with whom she
had resided in the past or a person/respondent against whom she can
enforce the right to live in a shared household.
However, in the subject complaint, Petitioner herein has prayed for a
direction to Respondent nos. 2 to 6 to provide her and her daughter an
‘alternate residence’ in the same neighbourhood; and the said right is
being perused against Respondent No. 2/husband. The Petitioner in this
complaint is not seeking to enforce her right to reside in the shared
household with either Respondent No. 3 or Respondent Nos. 5 and 6.
Respondent No. 3 has a separate household. Respondent Nos. 5 and 6
have a separate household. Petitioner along with Respondent No. 2 has
a separate household. However, as noted above the Petitioner is not
seeking to enforce her right to reside in the shared household with either
Respondent No. 3 or Respondent Nos. 5 and 6. Thus, the reliance placed
on the judgment of Prabha Tyagi vs. Kamlesh Devi (supra) by the
Petitioner is misplaced.
23. Pertinently, the Appellate Court after perusing the averments in the
complaint held that since Petitioner and Respondent Nos. 3 to 6 are
residing separately, there was no present and continuing threat of
domestic violence. This finding of the Appellate Court is not disputed
by the Petitioner during the course of arguments and in the opinion of
this Court, this is a relevant consideration justifying non-issuance of
summons to Respondent Nos. 3 to 6.
SAURABH Digitally
by SAURABH
signed
PARTAP PARTAP SINGH
LALER
SINGH Date: 2026.02.23
LALER 17:35:12 +0530
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Vs.
Ratna Saraf
24. In the facts of this case, the Petitioner has failed to show any
infirmity in the impugned orders. The specific incidents pleaded in the
complaint against Respondent No. 2 has already resulted in initiation of
criminal proceedings against him and the reliefs sought in the complaint
are being pursued against Respondent No. 2/husband and being heard
by the Trial Court. Thus, the impugned orders deleting Respondent Nos.
3, 5 and 6 requires no interference and the proceedings qua Respondent
No. 4 have already abated as noted above.”
7.10. Application of Poonam Gandhi to the Present Case
The ratio of Poonam Gandhi applies with full force to the facts of the
present case. Just as in Poonam Gandhi, the allegations in the present
case against the Respondent/mother-in-law are:
a) Omnibus and vague: The allegations do not specify overt acts of
domestic violence committed by the Respondent herself. They are
generalized assertions that she remained silent, did not intervene, advised
the Appellant to adjust, supported her son, etc.
b) Primarily by way of insinuation: Most of the allegations are in the nature
that the Respondent “was aware” of the husband’s conduct, or that she
“supported” the husband, or that she “did not help” the Appellant. These
are not allegations of direct acts of violence.
c) Reliefs primarily against the husband: Just as in Poonam Gandhi
(supra), the reliefs claimed by the Appellant in the present case are
primarily against the husband, with no specific relief claimed qua the
mother-in-law.
d) Lack of particulars: The allegations do not specify, with precision, when,
where and how the Respondent/mother-in-law committed any overt actSAURABH Digitally
by SAURABH
signedPARTAP PARTAP SINGH
LALER
SINGH Date: 2026.02.23
LALER 17:35:22 +0530
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Cr Appeal 112/2024
Priti Saraf
Vs.
Ratna Sarafof domestic violence upon the Appellant. The allegations are general,
sweeping, and lack particulars.
e) The observations of the Hon’ble High Court in Poonam Gandhi (supra)
that criminal law cannot be used as a tool to settle scores or to harass
elderly family members on account of matrimonial disputes are apposite
to the present case. The Respondent/mother-in-law is an elderly lady.
The real dispute is between the Appellant and her husband. The mother-
in-law has been arrayed as a respondent primarily because she is the
mother of the husband, and the allegations against her are in the nature
of passive conduct, omissions, and family dynamics — not overt acts of
domestic violence.
f) The Hon’ble High Court’s observation that omnibus, vague and sweeping
allegations, without particulars, do not suffice to drag elderly and infirm
persons into criminal proceedings applies with equal force to the present
case. The Ld. MM was fully justified in declining to summon the
Respondent/mother-in-law on the basis of such omnibus and vague
allegations.
7.11. Definition of Domestic Violence Under Section 3 of the DV Act
a) Section 3 of the DV Act defines “domestic violence” to include actual
abuse or threat of abuse, whether physical, sexual, verbal, emotional or
economic. The key word is “abuse” — which connotes active, overt
conduct directed at the aggrieved person. Passive conduct, omissions,
failure to intervene, or giving advice — without more — do not constitute
“abuse” within the meaning of Section 3 of the DV Act.
SAURABH Digitally
by SAURABH
signed
PARTAP PARTAP SINGH
LALER
SINGH Date: 2026.02.23
LALER 17:35:30 +0530
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Vs.
Ratna Saraf
b) In the present case, the allegations against the Respondent/mother-in-law
do not disclose active, overt abuse directed at the Appellant. At best, they
disclose passive conduct, omissions, and family dynamics. Such conduct,
while it may be morally or socially undesirable, does not constitute
domestic violence within the meaning of Section 3 of the DV Act.
7.12. Distinction Between Primary Perpetrators and Passive Bystanders
a) This Court is also conscious of the fact that the DV Act is a welfare and
remedial legislation designed to protect women from domestic violence.
However, the Act is not a charter to implead all members of the family
as respondents, irrespective of their role in the alleged domestic violence.
A distinction must be drawn between:
ï‚· Primary perpetrators: Those who directly and actively commit acts of
domestic violence upon the aggrieved person;
ï‚· Passive bystanders: Those who are aware of the violence, but do not
actively participate in it or commit any overt act of abuse
themselves.
b) The DV Act is primarily designed to provide relief against primary
perpetrators. Passive bystanders cannot be proceeded against under the
DV Act merely because they did not intervene or because they gave
advice or because they supported the primary perpetrator. To hold
otherwise would be to convert the DV Act into an instrument for
harassment of elderly family members and to expose them to criminal
proceedings for the sins of omission rather than commission.
7.13. Proportionality and Reasonableness
Digitally signed
SAURABH by SAURABH
PARTAP SINGH
PARTAP LALER
SINGH Date:
LALER 2026.02.23
17:35:40 +0530
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Priti Saraf
Vs.
Ratna Saraf
a) The exercise of jurisdiction under the DV Act must be informed by the
principles of proportionality and reasonableness. Not every family
dispute, not every allegation of lack of support or intervention, and not
every instance of advice to adjust or compromise, can be elevated to the
level of domestic violence warranting criminal proceedings. The
threshold for invoking the DV Act must be high enough to ensure that
genuine cases of domestic violence are addressed, while preventing the
misuse of the Act to settle family scores or to harass elderly relatives.
b) In the present case, the allegations against the Respondent/mother-in-
law, even when taken at their highest, do not cross the threshold of
domestic violence. They are allegations of family dynamics, of lack of
support, of advice to adjust — but not of overt, active abuse. The Ld.
MM was fully justified in declining to summon the Respondent on the
basis of such allegations.
7.14. Conclusion on Merits
a) For all the foregoing reasons, this Court holds that even if the present
appeal were to be held maintainable — which it is not, for the reasons
recorded in Issues I, II and III above — the impugned order dated
14.02.2024, by which the Ld. MM declined to summon the
Respondent/mother-in-law, is legally correct and does not warrant any
interference. The allegations against the Respondent are omnibus and
vague; the reliefs claimed are primarily against the husband; and the
conduct attributed to the Respondent does not constitute domestic
violence within the meaning of Section 3 of the DV Act. The Ld. MM
SAURABH Digitally
by SAURABH
signed
PARTAP PARTAP SINGH
LALER
SINGH Date: 2026.02.23
LALER 17:35:50 +0530
DLND010040212024 Page 38 of 40
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Vs.
Ratna Saraf
was fully justified in holding that there was no sufficient prima facie
material to summon the Respondent, and the said finding does not suffer
from any legal infirmity.
8. CONCLUSION
8.1. This Court has examined the present appeal from multiple perspectives
— maintainability, finality, amendment, and merits. The findings on each
aspect are clear and unambiguous:
a) On Issue I: The present appeal is not maintainable, being a second appeal
under Section 29 of the DV Act against the same impugned order dated
14.02.2024, against which an earlier appeal had already been preferred
and decided. Section 29 of the DV Act provides for “an appeal” in the
singular, not for multiple appeals against the same order. The filing of
two separate appeals against the same order — one before Ld. ASJ Smt.
Kiran Gupta and the present appeal before this Court — constitutes
impermissible piecemeal litigation, multiplicity of proceedings, and an
abuse of the process of law. The present appeal is liable to be dismissed
on this ground alone.
b) On Issue II: The first order dated 14.02.2023, by which the Ld. MM
declined to summon the Respondent/mother-in-law, was never
challenged by the Appellant within the prescribed period of limitation.
The said order has, therefore, attained finality. The present appeal, which
seeks to challenge the non-summoning of the Respondent by appealing
against a subsequent order dated 14.02.2024, is an indirect attempt to
circumvent the finality of the order dated 14.02.2023. Such an attempt is
SAURABH Digitally
by SAURABH
signed
PARTAP PARTAP SINGH
LALER
SINGH Date: 2026.02.23
LALER 17:36:00 +0530
DLND010040212024 Page 39 of 40
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Priti Saraf
Vs.
Ratna Saraf
impermissible in law. The present appeal is not maintainable on this
ground as well.
c) On Issue III: The Application under Order VI Rule 17 CPC, filed after
the matter had been reserved for orders, seeking amendment of the
present appeal to also challenge the order dated 14.02.2023, is not
maintainable. The proposed amendment would fundamentally change
the nature of the present appeal by converting it into an appeal against
two different orders passed approximately one year apart. More
critically, the order dated 14.02.2023 could only have been challenged
within 30 days from its date, and the limitation to challenge it has long
since expired. The amendment provision cannot be used as a device to
bypass the law of limitation and to challenge a different order against
which the limitation has expired. The amendment application is,
accordingly, rejected.
d) On Issue IV: Even on merits, the impugned order dated 14.02.2024 is
legally correct and does not warrant interference. The allegations against
the Respondent/mother-in-law are omnibus and vague in nature, and do
not disclose specific, overt acts of domestic violence committed by the
Respondent herself. The reliefs claimed are primarily against the
husband, with no specific relief claimed qua the mother-in-law. The ratio
of the judgment of the Hon’ble High Court of Delhi in Poonam Gandhi
vs. State (NCT) of Delhi & Ors. (Crl. M.C. No. 1916/2025, decided on
03.07.2025) applies with full force to the facts of the present case. The
Ld. MM was fully justified in holding that there was no sufficient prima
SAURABH Digitally
by SAURABH
signed
PARTAP PARTAP SINGH
LALER
SINGH Date: 2026.02.23
LALER 17:36:09 +0530
DLND010040212024 Page 40 of 40
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Priti Saraf
Vs.
Ratna Saraf
facie material to summon the Respondent/mother-in-law, and the said
finding is upheld.
9. FINAL ORDER
9.1. In view of the detailed discussion and the findings recorded above, this
Court passes the following order:
a) The Criminal Appeal No. 112/2024 is hereby dismissed as not
maintainable, for the reasons recorded in Issues I and II above.
b) The Application under Order VI Rule 17 CPC read with Section 151
CPC, filed on 08.08.2025, is hereby rejected for the reasons recorded in
Issue III above.
c) The impugned order dated 14.02.2024 passed by the Ld. Metropolitan
Magistrate, Mahila Court-01, Patiala House Courts, New Delhi,
declining to summon the Respondent/mother-in-law Ratna Saraf, is
hereby upheld and affirmed.
d) No order as to costs.
e) The Trial Court record, if any, summoned for the purposes of the present
appeal, shall be returned forthwith.
f) File be consigned to the Record Room after due compliance.
SAURABH Digitally signed
by SAURABH
Announced in the open Court PARTAP PARTAP SINGH
LALER
SINGH
on 23rd of February, 2026 LALER
Date: 2026.02.23
17:36:18 +0530
(Saurabh Partap Singh Laler)
ASJ-05 New Delhi
Patiala House Courts
Delhi/23.02.2026
