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Pritam Sinha Roy & Adrian Farnandez vs The State Of West Bengal on 8 April, 2026

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Calcutta High Court (Appellete Side)

Pritam Sinha Roy & Adrian Farnandez vs The State Of West Bengal on 8 April, 2026

Author: Arijit Banerjee

Bench: Arijit Banerjee

                IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
                CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
                            APPELLATE SIDE

                           CRA 574 OF 2019

                Pritam Sinha Roy & Adrian Farnandez
                                 Vs.
                      The State of West Bengal

Before: The Hon'ble Justice Arijit Banerjee
                       &
        The Hon'ble Justice Apurba Sinha Ray

For the Appellant   : Mr. Ayan Bhattacharyya, Adv.
No. 1                 Mr. A. Ghatak, Adv.
                      Mr. S. Roy, Adv.

For the Appellant     Mr. Fazlur Rahman, Adv.
No. 2                 Mr. Rahul Rahman, Adv.
                      Mr. Babul Hussain, Adv.
                      Ms. Dona Sanyal, Adv.

For the State       : Mr. Ranabir Roy Chowdhury, Adv.
                      Ms. Zareen Khan, Adv.
                      Ms. M. Sarkar, Adv.

Reserved on         : 27.02.2026

Judgment on         : 08.04.2026


Apurba Sinha Ray, J.:-
   1.

Needless to mention, there is no hard and fast rule that commission of

an offence by an accused cannot be proved unless there is direct

SPONSORED

evidence. There are instances galore when the commission of offence

was proved by the prosecution with the help of circumstantial

evidence. In other words, even in the absence of direct evidence, if the

Page 1 of 46
prosecution proves the complicity of an accused in committing the

crime, with the aid of circumstances in such a manner that there

would be hardly any doubt regarding his involvement in committing

the crime, the prosecution will succeed. The celebrated principle in

this regard is that an accused can be convicted on the basis of

circumstantial evidence if the circumstances are proved in such a

manner that chain of events is shown to be completed.

2. Let us see whether the prosecution has been able to bring home the

charges against the present appellants by completing the chain of

circumstances or events in such a manner that there would be no

alternative view except their involvement in murdering the deceased.

But before doing that it would be profitable if we discuss the factual

matrix and arguments of the learned counsel of the appellants.

Allegations: Denials: Narratives

3. The case of prosecution is that one Albert John Khare being the

brother-in-law of the deceased victim namely Kevin Alfred D’Silva,

submitted a letter of complaint dated 27.12.2015, wherein he had

stated that the deceased victim had not returned home since 26/27th

December, 2015. Subsequently, his wife, namely Geraldino Khare,

who, at the time was at her mother’s home at Picnic Garden, was

shown a picture of the deceased victim by two police personnel and

upon her confirmation with regard to the victim’s identity she was

instructed to accompany the two police personnel. In the meantime,

Page 2 of 46
owing to her information, the defacto complainant also came to the

place and upon reaching the under construction building situated at

43 D/1A/1C, CN Roy Road, Kolkata-39, they found that the deceased

victim was lying on the floor with his back rested on the wall and his

hands and legs were tied with coconut rope. The victim was wearing a

red coloured T-shirt and blackish blue pants with white socks. There

were some visible injuries to his face. The victim was found in a room

on the 1st floor of the said under construction building. Tiljala P.S.

case No. 684 dated 27.12.2015 was started under Section 302 IPC

against unknown accused persons.

4. Mr. Bhattacharyya, learned Senior advocate who appeared for the

appellant no. 1 Pritam Sinha Roy has submitted that the present case

is based on circumstantial evidence and conviction was pronounced

only on the basis of last seen together theory. The theory of last seen

together is a weak piece of evidence but unfortunately the last seen

together theory which is nothing but a corroborative piece of evidence

was made the basis for convicting the appellant no. 1. It is alleged by

the sister of the deceased that the deceased left her house on

26.12.2015 with the appellant no. 2 Adrian Farnandez and it is also

found from the materials on record that the deceased was in

rehabilitation centre for de-addiction till 21.12.2015. He was released

from the said centre on 22.12.2015 and the date of incident was

26.12.2015/27.12.2015. In the Post Mortem Report there was no

mention when the deceased died. It is also evident from the depositions

Page 3 of 46
of the witnesses that the victim went to a drug peddler, PW-9 Bablu

Gupta, who handed over brown sugar to the victim. However, PW-9 had

mentioned about 4 persons including one Sumit but there was no

investigation done by the Investigating Officer to ascertain who was the

person named Sumit. There is no evidence to show that actually PW 9

came back from the spot at about 10.30 a.m.

5. Mr. Bhattacharyya has also argued that there are two chance

witnesses and they are PW-11 Somnath Halder and PW-14 Md.

Rahaman. PW-11 deposed at the relevant time he saw 4 persons in the

vicinity of the place of occurrence whereas PW-14 saw 3 persons

quarrelling with each other. According to Mr. Bhattacharyya, even the

last seen together theory, has not been proved by the prosecution.

6. PW-5 Khagen Mal saw two persons and in the identification parade he

identified one person that is the appellant no. 2 being Adrian

Farnandez.

7. PW-6 Bablu Haldar identified both the appellants. Similarly, PW 11

and PW 14 also identified both the appellants. However, the Judicial

Magistrate who conducted the test identification parade was not

examined. The accused persons were not given an opportunity to

cross-examine the said Magistrate.

8. It is not conceivable as to why PW 9 who deposed that he was present

at the beginning of the dispute and departed from the place of

occurrence before the incident took place, was not made an accused.

No forensic test was done over the seized items, no fingerprints were

Page 4 of 46
taken from the left out wine bottles. The prosecution has failed to

prove any motive since there is no reason for the cousins to murder

another cousin. In the case of circumstantial evidence, proof of motive

is relevant. Last seen together cannot be the fulcrum of proving the

case. Recovery of shoes from PW-7 Abdul Gaffar was not proved in

accordance with law. Evidence of PW-8 Md. Samim is also not reliable,

although both of them identified the appellants. The recovery

statement under Section 27 of the Evidence Act cannot be relied upon.

The Test Identification Parade sheet was exhibited through the

Investigating Officer and the same is not acceptable in the eye of law.

9. Mr. Bhattacharyya has strenuously argued that a police officer is not

permitted to enter the place where the test identification parade is held

and therefore, marking the test identification parade sheet as exhibit

through the Investigating Officer is a serious irregularity committed

during trial, and, therefore, Exhibit-13 is not admissible at all. The

purchase receipt of the shoes was not proved. It is also argued that the

appellants had access to shoes of the victim since they were residing

with the victim. Therefore, recovery of shoes has no relevance.

10. Mr. Bhattacharyya has further submitted that the Last Seen Together

Theory which is an aberration of burden of proof, hinges on two

principles, viz., firstly, paucity of time and secondly exclusivity of

association so that presence of a third person becomes empirically

impossible. Given the presence of PW-9 Bablu Gupta who was treated

as a witness by the Police, the aforesaid doctrine falls flat. In support

Page 5 of 46
of his contention, he had relied upon several judgments which are as

follows:

i. Anjan Kumar Sarma and Ors. Vs State of Assam
reported in AIR 2017 SC 2617, Para 18 & 21
ii. Manoj alias Munna vs. State of Chhattisgarh reported
in AIR 2026 SC 241 para 10,24 to 33
iii.
Arjun Marik vs. State of Bihar reported in 1994 supp
(2) Scc 372
iv. Kanhaiya lal vs State of Rajasthan reported in 2013(3)
SCC (Cri) 498
v. Sabitri Samantaray vs State of Odisha reported in
(2023)11 SCC 813 (Para 18,19)
vi. Anees vs. State of Government of NCT, 2024 INSC 368
para 37
vii.
Smt. Gargi vs. State of Haryana reported in 2019 12
scale 617 (Para- 28, 28.1,28.3)
viii.
Umesh Chandra & Ors. Vs State of Uttrakhand reported
in 2021 9 Scale 359 Para 10
ix. Jafar vs State of Kerela reported in 2024 4 scale 1 para
7
x. Mustkeem alias Siarjudeen Vs. State of Rajasthan
reported in AIR 2011 Sc 2769, para 27
xi. Umedbhai Jadavbhai vs. State of Gujarat reported in
(1978) 1 SCC 228

11. Mr. Fazlur Rahman, learned Counsel of the appellant no. 2 Adrian

Farnandez submitted that the learned Trial Judge failed to appreciate

the evidence on record in its proper perspective and arrived at an

erroneous finding of guilt. According to him, the chain of circumstances

is incomplete and broken at several stages and therefore, the

prosecution has utterly failed to prove that the appellants were

responsible for the alleged offence.

Page 6 of 46

12. Mr. Rahman further argued that the learned trial judge relied upon

the evidence of PW-5 and PW-6 who stated that they had seen two

persons crossing the boundary wall of the under construction building

but Exhibit-9 shows that boundary wall was open at the relevant time

and therefore, question of crossing the boundary wall does not arise

and therefore the testimony of witness in this regard is doubtful.

13. It was further contended on behalf of the appellant no. 2 that the

prosecution failed to establish any motive or intention on the part of the

appellants for committing the alleged crime, yet the Trial Court

concluded that the death was caused by the appellants in furtherance

of their common intention. The alleged recovery of shoes of the

deceased from a shop was not proved in accordance with law and

therefore such evidence relating to recovery of shoes cannot be relied

upon. Although the deceased did not return home on 26.12.2015 no

missing diary was lodged by the relatives of the deceased and no

records were produced to support the claim that attempts were made to

contact the appellant no. 2. It was further argued that examination

under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was not

conducted properly. Several circumstances relied upon by the learned

Trial Court were not put to them for explanation and therefore, the

appellants were deprived of the statutory opportunity to explain the

incriminating circumstances appearing against them. Learned Counsel

had relied upon the following decisions:

Page 7 of 46

I. Nandu Singh vs State of Madhya Pradesh (Now Chattisgarh)
reported in (2021) 19 SCC 301 PARA 9
II. Shivaji Chintappa Patil vs. State of Maharashtra reported in
(2021) 5 SCC 626
III. Ravindra Singh vs state of Punjab reported in (2022) 7 SCC
581
IV. Syed Ibrahim vs. State of Andhra Pradesh reported in (2006)
10 SCC 601
V. Manoj Kumar Soni vs State of M.P reported in 2023 SCC
OnLine SC 984 Para 22
VI. Vinobhai Vs. State of Kerala reported in 2025 SCC Online SC
178 para 8
VII. Smt. Omwati Vs. Mahendra Singh & Ors. reported in (1998) 9
SCC 81 para 9,10
VIII.
State of UP vs. Wasif Haider and Ors. reported in 2019 2 SCC
303 Para 24-25
IX. Sunil Kumar Sambhudayal Gupta & ors. VS State of
Maharashtra reported in (2010) 13 SCC 657 para 33
X. Raja Ram vs. State of Rajasthan reported in (2005) 5 SCC
272
XI. Nazim & Ors. Vs State of Uttarakhand reported in 2025 SCC
Online 2117 Para 44 sub para C
XII.
Manoj Kumar Soni vs State of M.P reported in 2023 SCC
OnLine SC 984 Para 22
XIII.
Gireesan Nair & Ors. Vs State of Kerala reported in 2023 1
SCC 180 Para 31,55,
XIV.
Mausam Singha Rai & Ors. VS State of West Bengal
reported in (2003) 12 SCC 377 Para 27

XV. Sharad Birdhi Chand Sarda Vs. State of Maharashtra
reported in (1984) 4 SCC 116

Page 8 of 46

14. Mr. Fazlur Rahman, learned Counsel submitted that in a case based

on circumstantial evidence, motive assumes great significance. Motive

is required to be proved when the relation between the deceased and

accused was cordial. In this regard, he referred to the case laws of

Nandu Singh (supra), Shivaji Chintappa Patil (supra), Ravindra

Singh (supra). Mr. Rahman further submitted that disclosure

statement under section 27 of Indian Evidence Act cannot be the sole

ground for conviction of accused. In this regard, he relied upon the

decision of Manoj alias Munna (supra), Vinobhai (supra). He also

pointed out that the Investigating Officer in the case in hand did not

collect the finger prints on the wine bottles and other articles found at

the place of occurrence and such failure gives a fatal blow to the

prosecution case. In this regard, he referred to the judgment of Smt.

Omwati (supra). Learned Counsel also argued that in view of the case

law of Sunil Kumar Sambhudayal Gupta & Ors. (supra) if the

witnesses stated for first time about the incident before the Court, such

deposition which was not recorded under 161 Cr.P.C., lacks credence.

15. Mr. Rahman further submitted that in view of the judgment of Nazim

& Ors.(supra) it is settled that last seen theory is a weak kind of

evidence.

16. Mr. Rahman further argued that if the witnesses have had ample

opportunity to see the accused before identification is held, it may

adversely affect the trial and such Test Identification should not be

relied upon. In this regard, he placed the judgment of Gireesan Nair &

Page 9 of 46
Ors.
(supra). After referring to the judgment of Sharad Birdhi Chand

Sarda (supra), he submitted that when the evidence disclosed two

possibilities, the possibility which benefits the accused should be taken

into consideration. He also relied upon the judgment of Mausam

Singha Rai & Ors. (supra) to point out that mere conjecture or

suspicion alone cannot be the ground for punishing an accused.

17. Mr. Roy Chowdhury appearing for the State of West Bengal submitted

that the foundation of the prosecution case rests upon the well-

established principle of “last seen together”. The evidence on record

clearly proves that the deceased was last seen alive in the company of

both the appellants on the evening of 26.12.2015. This crucial

circumstance has been consistently and cogently proved by PW-6 Bablu

Haldar, PW-9 Bablu Gupta, PW-11 Somnath Haldar and PW-14 Md.

Rahaman, all of whom categorically placed the deceased in the

company of the appellants within close proximity of the place of

occurrence.

18. It was further submitted by the State Counsel that the time gap

between the last seen and the discovery of the dead body was extremely

short. The possibility of intervention by any third person is completely

ruled out. In this regard, reliance was placed on the Division Bench

judgment of this Court in Tapas Biswas vs. State of West Bengal,

CRA (DB) 44 of 2022, paras 35 to 36, wherein it has been held that

last seen evidence, when coupled with proximity of time and the failure

Page 10 of 46
of the accused to offer any explanation, constitutes a strong and

incriminating circumstance against the accused.

19. Mr. Roy Chowdhury has relied upon the observation of the Hon’ble

Supreme Court in Trimukh Maroti Kirkan v. State of Maharashtra,

(2006), 10 SCC 681, para 12, wherein it has been held that when the

accused was last seen with the deceased and fails to explain the

circumstances leading to the victim’s death, an adverse inference under

Section 106 of the Evidence Act is clearly attracted.

20. Mr. Roy Chowdhury has drawn our attention to the medical evidence

on record. PW 13, the post-mortem doctor, has opined that the cause of

death was smothering, which is a form of violent mechanical asphyxia,

and that the death was homicidal in nature. Moreover, the post-mortem

report discloses that the deceased had multiple ante mortem injuries

on his person and that his hands and legs were found tied, which is

wholly consistent with the manner in which the body was recovered

from the place of occurrence.

21. Mr. Roy Chowdhury has also drawn our attention to the decision

reported in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Satish, (2005) 3 SCC 114, para:

22 wherein it is held that when medical evidence supports the ocular

version and rules out accidental or natural death, such medical

evidence lends strong assurance to the prosecution case.

22. It was further argued that the crucial incriminating link in the chain

of circumstances is the recovery of the deceased’s shoes and the post-

offence conduct of the appellants.

Page 11 of 46

23. During police custody, both appellants led the police to Baithak

Khana Bazar, where the shoes belonging to the deceased were

recovered from PW-7 Abdul Gaffar, and the same has been fully

corroborated by PW-8 Md. Samim. The evidence clearly establishes that

the said shoes were sold by the appellants immediately after the death

of the deceased, thereby demonstrating a clear consciousness of guilt.

24. Mr. Roy Chowdhury further argued that criminal trials do not turn on

invoices or billing details, particularly when identification of the article

is proved through reliable oral evidence and surrounding

circumstances.

25. In this regard, he placed reliance upon the Division Bench judgment

of this Court in Mekail Mondal & Ors. vs State of West Bengal, CRA

704 of 2016 wherein it has been held that absence of a formal

memorandum under Section 27 of the Evidence Act is not fatal, and

that the conduct of the accused, both before and after the occurrence,

is a relevant fact under Section 8 of the Evidence Act.

26. According to Mr. Roy Chowdhury partial recovery is legally sufficient

and there is no requirement in law that all articles connected with the

offence must be recovered in order to sustain the prosecution case.

27. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Aghnoo Nagesia v. State of Bihar

reported in AIR 1966 SC 119, at paras 21 to 23, which was

reaffirmed in State of Maharashtra v. Damu reported in (2000) 6 SCC

269, at paras 35 and 36, has held that so much of the information

given by an accused in custody as distinctly relates to the discovery of a

Page 12 of 46
fact is admissible under Section 27 of the Evidence Act, and that

recovery of incriminating articles pursuant thereto, when read with

post-offence conduct under Section 8, constitutes a strong

incriminating circumstance pointing towards guilt. The accused failed

to explain facts which were especially within their knowledge. In spite

of presence of grave incriminating circumstances, the accused persons

during their examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C. maintained

complete silence and failed to offer any explanation whatsoever as to

how and under what circumstances the deceased met a homicidal

death.

28. In this regard, Mr. Roy Chowdhury relied upon the judgment of the

Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Rajasthan v. Kashi Ram, (2006)

12 SCC 254, at para 23, wherein it was held that when an accused

fails to explain facts which are within his special knowledge, such

failure becomes an additional incriminating circumstance against him.

Accordingly, the silence of the accused strengthens the prosecution

case and completes the chain of circumstances pointing towards their

guilt. By referring to the decision of Sharad Birdhi Chand Sarda V.

State of Maharashtra reported in (1984) 4 SCC 116, paras 152-153

and also Trimukh Maroti Kirkan (supra), Mr. Roy Chowdhury argued

that in the present case the chain is completely coherent and

consistent. According to him the chains are firstly, homicidal death by

smothering, secondly last seen together, thirdly, exclusive possession

and control, fourthly, recovery of belongings immediately after death,

Page 13 of 46
fifthly, failure of explanation under Section 106 of the Evidence Act.

Although shoes were produced the defence raised the issue of difference

in bill numbers, Mr. Roy Chowdhury argued that the bill is not

evidence but identification of the shoes is the evidence which the Court

should look into. The PW-2 and PW-4, being close relatives of the

deceased, identified the shoes as belonging to him. The personal

belongings are identified by appearance, wear, familiarity and long use,

not by invoice numbers.

29. In State of Rajasthan vs. Teja Ram reported in (1993) 3 SCC 507

para 9, it was held that identification of articles by relatives is

admissible even without production of bills or receipts.

30. Mr. Roy Chowdhury stated that the appellants have raised an issue

regarding Test Identification Parade but according to Mr. Roy

Chowdhury the said witnesses were not complete strangers. Moreover,

the accused were seen in the locality and they were seen entering the

premises. In this regard, legal decision was settled in Dana Yadav v.

State of Bihar reported in (2002) 7 SCC 295 para 38, wherein it has

been held that Test Identification Parade is corroborative in nature,

substantive evidence is identification in Court. Even assuming any

infirmity in TIP, dock identification remains unimpeached. Mr. Roy

Chowdhury further contended that motive is not a mandatory

requirement where direct or strong circumstantial evidence is available.

In this regard, he relied on the judgments of State of U.P. vs. Babu

Page 14 of 46
Ram
reported in (2000)4 SCC 515, para 16 and Nathuni Yadav vs.

State of Bihar reported in (1998) 9 SCC 238 para 11.

31. Mr. Roy Chowdhury pointed out that in the present case the manner

of killing itself demonstrates intention. The hands of the deceased were

tied, legs were also tied and thereafter smothering took place and

subsequently, the body was abandoned by the appellants. Therefore,

when the act itself speaks, motive fades into insignificance. Law does

not require complete recovery and in this regard he has relied upon the

judgment of the State of H.P. vs. Jeet Singh reported in (1999) 4 SCC

370 para 26 wherein it has been held that partial recovery is legally

sufficient and therefore, even if the jacket or belt of the deceased was

not recovered, the recovery of shoes is sufficient to show the

involvement of the present appellants. Therefore, the very act of selling

the shoes of the victim establishes post-offence conduct and guilty

conscience. Mr. Roy Chowdhury concluded his submission by

contending that the learned Trial Court has correctly appreciated both

ocular and medical evidence and further the learned Trial Judge

applied settled principles of criminal jurisprudence and returned

findings which are neither perverse, nor illegal nor based on conjecture.

He has drawn our attention to the observation of the Hon’ble Supreme

Court in Sarad Birdhi Chand Sarda (supra) wherein the Hon’ble

Supreme Court has been pleased to observe that “Circumstantial

evidence is not weaker than direct evidence. When the chain is complete,

it speaks with a certainty that no human testimony can rival.” The

Page 15 of 46
appeal according to him deserves dismissal and the conviction of the

appellant under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC deserves to be

affirmed.

Court’s View:-

32. From the above discussion it is found that the prosecution has relied

upon five chains of events to prove the case against the appellants.

Firstly, the homicidal death of Kevin Alfred D’silva. Secondly, the

deceased was last seen together with the appellants. Thirdly, the post

offence conduct of the appellants. Fourthly, the recovery of shoes at the

instance of the appellants and fifthly, the failure of the appellants to

explain incriminating circumstances against them under Section 106 of

the Indian Evidence Act.

33. The appellants on the other hand have contended, inter alia, firstly

that the last seen together theory cannot be the sole ground for

conviction of the appellants. Secondly, the identification of the

appellants before the Magistrate was not properly done, thirdly, the

recovery of shoes from the shop of PW-5 is doubtful and fourthly, the

depositions of witnesses who are nothing but chance witnesses do not

inspire confidence.

Last Seen Principle : Exclusivity of Association : Paucity of Time

34. It is a settled principle of law which continuously holds the field that

a conviction only on the basis of last seen together theory is not

sustainable in the eyes of law and in this regard, the judgment reported

in Anjan Kumar Sarma and Ors. (supra), Manoj alias Munna vs.

Page 16 of 46
State of Chhattisgarh
(supra), Arjun Marik (supra), Nazim & Ors.

(Supra) are very much relevant for consideration. It is settled by those

judgments that an accused cannot be convicted only on the basis of

last seen together theory, unless there are other materials on record to

support the guilt of the accused.

35. So far as this case is concerned, it appears that the prosecution did

not rely only upon the last seen together theory. The prosecution

has also relied upon several links which showed that the deceased’s

Adidas shoes were recovered from a shop owner who categorically

identified the appellants in TIP as well as on dock in the court stating

that the said two appellants sold the incriminating shoes of the

deceased. Therefore, in the case in hand the prosecution is not relying

upon only on the principle of last seen together but also upon other

links which include recovery of the victim’s shoes from the custody of

the shop owner who deposed before the Court that the appellants sold

the shoes to him. On this ground the present case is different from the

cited judgments as aforesaid.

36. However, the issues whether the appellants were last seen together

with the victim or whether the alleged shoes belonged to the deceased

or whether the appellants sold the shoes immediately after the death of

the deceased are to be examined and scrutinised with the help of

cogent and reliable evidence. Let us examine the question, whether the

principle of last seen together theory has been proved beyond doubt or

not. If we peruse the contents of the FIR we shall find that there is no

Page 17 of 46
whisper in this regard that the appellants were last seen together with

the deceased immediately before the incident nor there was any

mention regarding the recovery of the shoes of the deceased from the

concerned shop owner. It is true that the FIR cannot be an

encyclopaedia of events of a particular case. From the record it

transpires soon after getting the information, PW-4, the sister of the

deceased informed the defacto complainant that police Personnel

showed her some pictures of a motionless body of a male person and

being so informed by the police personnel PW 4 intimated the defacto

complainant, PW 2, and requested him to come over to the spot

immediately. After reaching the spot PW 2, PW 4 and other witnesses

found that the brother of PW 4 was lying at the place of occurrence

motionless and subsequently, he was declared dead. At the time of

seeing the dead body for the first time, PW 2 noticed that although the

victim had socks on his legs but there were no shoes on his feet.

Needless to mention each case has to be judged by its own merits.

Subsequent investigation reveals that the deceased left the house of PW

4’s mother in the early evening of 26.12.2015 with the appellant no. 2

Adrian Farnandez and in the night the victim did not return. It was

alleged that PW 4 tried to contact the appellant no. 2 Adrian over his

mobile time and again but there was no response from the side of the

appellant no. 2. The next morning the dead body of PW 4’s brother was

found in an under-construction building. On 28.12.2015 the present

appellants were arrested and as per their leading statements the

Page 18 of 46
alleged shoes of the victim were recovered from the shop of PW-5 and

subsequently, during Test Identification Parade PW-5 identified the

present appellants who came to his shop to sell the said shoes of the

victim.

37. It is true that there is no eye witness who saw the appellants to

commit the crime but there are witnesses who saw the appellants

alongwith the victim in close proximity to the place of occurrence at the

relevant time. Learned Counsel of the defence has challenged the

deposition of such witnesses as false and fabricated firstly on the

ground that they were chance witnesses and secondly, they were

planted by the Investigating Agency.

38. The place of occurrence, according to the appellants was not under

the exclusive control of the appellants at the relevant point of time and

there was opportunity for any person to intrude the place of occurrence

even after alleged departure of the appellants from the place of

occurrence. In other words, according to the learned counsel of the

appellants, the exclusivity of association of the appellants with the

victim was not proved. Now, if we consider the evidence of PW-5 we

shall find that PW 5- Khagen Mal, a masson by profession, has deposed

that on 26.12.2015 at 11 p.m. he and Bablu Halder were going to the

site of Bharpatty which was an under-construction building. He found

two boys were coming out after jumping walls from that building. On

27.12.2015 he heard about the incident at about 10 a.m. and

accordingly, he went to that house at Bharpatty. He found one boy tied

Page 19 of 46
on first floor. He also found that hands and legs of the boy were in tied

condition. He was interrogated by the Police. Subsequently, he was

taken to Alipore Correctional Home for identification of the accused and

he identified the convict being appellant no. 2 herein Adrian Farnandez.

He also identified several articles seized by the Police. During his cross-

examination he denied the suggestion that he identified the accused on

dock and in the Test Identification Parade as per identification by the

police. The PW 6 Bablu Halder has stated that on the relevant date at

about 10.00-10.30 p.m. he was going to Dilir Math from Bharpatty and

he found that two persons were crossing the boundary wall of a house

which was constructed by his brother -in-law. He used to look after the

work of his brother-in-law. On the next morning, he came there along

with laborers for opening lock. When he went to the first floor, he found

one boy lying in dead condition. He immediately informed the matter to

his brother-in-law who came there along with other people.

39. The PW 9 Bablu Gupta has deposed that he is a resident of 41 C.N.

Roy Road, Kolkata-39, Tiljala P.S. and he used to run one grocery shop.

The deceased used to reside next to his house. Ani was his friend and

Ani was also a friend of the deceased. On 26.12.2015 the deceased

came to him at noon with a demand for brown sugar. He did not have

brown sugar. The deceased went away and again came back between

8.00-8.30 pm. He alongwith the accused persons were there. He and

one Sumit had brown sugar. Then they carried it and went to the

Bharpatty building by jumping the wall of an under-construction

Page 20 of 46
building on the first floor. They were four in number. The deceased was

addicted and they had an altercation between themselves in English.

The PW 9 did not understand the English language. He came back after

seeing the dispute at about 10.00-10.30 P.M. On the next day he came

to know that Kevin died. Police visited the place and showed him the

photograph of Kevin and he stated to the Police that he knew the boy

and police interrogated him. In his cross-examination he has stated

that he used to supply brown sugar to the drug addicted boys who used

to come to him. He has further stated that local people might have seen

them when they used to take drugs. After coming back, he did not

inform anybody else about the addiction of the other three boys.

40. PW-11 Somnath Halder had deposed that he was a resident of

143/56 Picnic Garden Road, Kolkata-39 and in the year 2015, he was

at the same address. On 26.12.2015 at around 9.30-10.00 P.M. he was

on his way to his house from Tiljala Thana More through Bharpatty.

Near Bharpatty there was an under-construction building and when he

reached the site of the said construction, suddenly he found four

persons to enter into the construction after crossing the wall. Out of

them one was Bablu Gupta. There were Anglo-Indians boys. He has

further deposed that Bablu Gupta was all time in addiction to drugs.

He came to his home. On the next day on 27.12.2015 after finding a

gathering at that site, he reached the first floor of that under-

construction building and found one of the Anglo-Indian boys was there

and his hands were tied with a belt from the back portion and legs of

Page 21 of 46
that boy were tied with rope. He found him dead. Police interrogated

him and he disclosed all facts to the Police which he saw. He went to

Alipore Correctional Home for identification and he identified the

accused persons, in presence of the Magistrate, whom he saw at the

night of 26.12.2015. He had also identified the appellants in Court. He

denied the suggestion that Police showed him the appellants in the

Police Station before identifying them in the correctional Home.

41. From the above deposition of four witnesses, it transpires that the

place of occurrence where Kevin was murdered was an under-

construction building and from the deposition of PW 11 it is found that

on the relevant date around 9.30-10.00 p.m., four persons entered the

said under-construction building after crossing the boundary wall.

From the depositions of PW 5 and PW 6 it also transpires that they saw

two persons coming out from the said under-construction building after

jumping/crossing the boundary wall of that building around 10.30-

11.00 p.m. All the said three witnesses had identified Adrian Farnandez

in the Test Identification Parade as well as on dock. Pritam was also

identified by PW 6 and PW 11 in the Test Identification Parade as well

as on dock. PW 5 did not identify Pritam on dock. From the above

deposition as well as from the rough sketch map (Ext.-1) it is found

that there was a boundary wall in the under-construction building and

the present appellants entered the said building after crossing the

boundary wall along with PW 9 Bablu Gupta. From the deposition of

PW 9 it is found that he accompanied the deceased and the appellants

Page 22 of 46
to cross the boundary wall for going to the first floor of that under-

construction building for taking drugs. From the deposition of PW 6 it

also reveals that he used to look after the construction work of his

brother-in-law who was a promoter and on the next morning on

27.12.2015 he went to the said under-construction building along with

labourers for opening the lock. This goes to show that the under-

construction building was not only surrounded by a boundary wall but

the entrance of the said building was put under lock and key. The PW6

was not challenged in this regard. After opening the lock PW 6 went to

the first floor of the said building and found the deceased lying in tied

condition. He informed the matter to his brother-in-law.

42. Therefore, it is found from the above that there was a boundary wall

surrounding the said under-construction building and entrance was

kept under lock and key at the relevant point of time and further the

concerned persons including the appellants and the deceased entered

the said under- construction building after crossing or jumping the

boundary wall to go to first floor of that building. The general public

had no access to such building since the entrance of the said building

was kept under lock and key. The general public will not cross or jump

over the boundary wall of the building to secure entrance. Therefore, it

can be said that the place where the murder of Kevin took place was

not open to the public. The exclusivity of the place of occurrence and

the exclusivity of association of the deceased with the appellants and

the PW9 have been proved by the prosecution in this case. Therefore,

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the case law of Syed Ibrahim (supra) which held that the place of

occurrence is to be established beyond doubt, applies to the facts of

this case.

43. Admittedly, Kevin was murdered and his hands were tied from the

back side with a leather belt and his legs were tied with coconut string.

The deceased was aged about 29 years, and he was an abled bodied

person. Needless to mention, tying one’s hands from his back and also

tying his legs by coconut string could be done by at least two or more

persons. It is quite impossible for a single man to tie the hands of an

able bodied person from his back with a leather belt and thereafter to

tie his legs with coconut string without resistance. Therefore, there is

no doubt that there must be at least two or more persons to commit

such murder or to assist another to commit such murder.

44. Now, let us consider whether the witnesses being PW 5, PW 6 and PW

11 could be relied upon. From the deposition of PW 5 it is found that he

was a mason and was working in the said under-construction building.

It is also found that PW 6 was looking after the said construction of his

brother-in-law who was a promoter. His deposition was challenged on

the ground that he signed as Babu Halder. But if we peruse the entire

deposition of PW 6 we shall find that he has stated that he was an

illiterate person but was able to put his signature. In the first page of

his deposition, we have found that PW 6 Bablu Halder has signed in

capital letters as “Babu Halder” but in the second page of the said

deposition sheet he has signed as “Bablu Halder” in block letters.

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Therefore, there must be a mistake on the part of the PW 6 in signing

Bablu in the first page of the deposition but he was able to sign as

Bablu Halder in the second page of the deposition. As he is almost an

illiterate person, such a mistake should not give a fatal blow to the

prosecution case. Both the PW 5 Khagen Mal and PW 6, Bablu Halder

stood firm during their cross-examination. PW-11 was a resident of the

locality and he knew PW 9 and other anglo-Indian Christians of his

locality. He was returning to his home at the relevant point of time and

he found four people entering the under construction building after

crossing the wall. He has also stood firm during his cross-examination.

He identified both the appellants in the Test Identification Parade as

well as on dock. He stated there were four persons including one Bablu

Gupta. This goes to show that at the relevant point of time four persons

entered into the place of occurrence after crossing the boundary wall. It

also gives credence to the deposition of Bablu Gupta to some extent.

Now, if we go through the deposition of PW 9 (Bablu Gupta), he has

stated that they were four in number when they crossed the boundary

wall. However, his deposition was challenged since he had mentioned

the name of Sumit as one of the accompanying persons. But from the

deposition of PW 11 and also the deposition of PW 9 it is found that

there were four persons who crossed the boundary wall of the under-

construction building on the relevant date and time. The person who

was called as Sumit by the PW 9 was present in the Court on the date

of his deposition. He had identified the person Sumit who was in check

Page 25 of 46
Shirt at the Court. This was not clarified from the said witness during

his cross-examination. Therefore, in our considered view the four

persons crossed the boundary wall of the relevant under-construction

building on the relevant date and time and it was established by the

deposition of PW 11 that the appellants, the deceased and PW 9 entered

the said building after crossing the wall. In view of such firm deposition

of PW 11, the deposition of PW 9 has got some credence.

45. However, PW 9’s departure prior to the incident was not proved

beyond doubt. The allegation of the defence that the PWs 5, 6 and 11

are planted witnesses has no basis, since the PW 5 and 6 were present

at the place of occurrence soon after it was detected that one dead body

was found in the relevant building and the police interrogated them on

27.12.2015 at the spot and they became the seizure list witnesses. PW

11, being a local person, reached the spot after getting the information

and narrated the incident to the police. He was also interrogated at the

spot. It is difficult to believe that police had arranged such fabricated

evidence in such a short span of time. The presence of PW 5 and PW 6

at the spot on 27.12.2015 was very much possible since the place of

occurrence was their place of work and, therefore, it is reasonable to

believe that they would, in all probability, be present there after

occurrence of such an untoward incident in their place of work.

However it is not clear as to why PW 9 was kept beyond suspicion by

the investigating agency, particularly, when there was no one who

witnessed that PW9 returned from the place of occurrence leaving the

Page 26 of 46
appellants and the deceased in the said building. It is not clear as to

why the IO has considered such statements of PW 9 that as there was

an altercation between the concerned boys in English he came back, as

gospel truth? At this juncture, let us see the deposition of PW 14. He is

also a resident of the locality. According to him, on 26.12.2015, he

witnessed around 9 p.m three persons were abusing each other in

English. On the next day he came to know one of them was murdered.

He identified two appellants on dock and said that they were the two

persons out of three whom he saw on the night of 26.12.2015. He also

identified them in the TI Parade. Apart from his oral submission he had

no document to show at the time of his deposition that he was a

resident of the locality. From his deposition, it is clear that an

altercation was going on between the said three persons around 9 pm

on 26.12.2015. This also supports the portion of the deposition of PW 9

that there was an altercation between the deceased, and the appellants.

However, at 9 p.m., PW14 noticed the above three quarrelling with each

other, and PW 11 noticed four persons including PW 9 crossing the

boundary of the building around 9.30/10.00 pm. This time gap is

important to understand as to why there was a difference in number of

concerned persons as per depositions of PW14 and PW11. However,

even if PW 9 was present at the time of occurrence and he took part in

committing the crime, does it absolve the appellants from their overt

acts? Then, why didn’t they cooperate with IO at the time of

investigation on this point. However, in view of the deposition of PWs 5,

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6, 11 and 14, it is very difficult to say that the prosecution is unable to

prove the exclusivity of association of the victim and the appellants

immediately before the death of Kevin. It is true that no time is

mentioned in the PM Report as to when Kevin died. But such failure on

the part of the Doctor cannot be a fatal blow since the prosecution was

able to show that the death occurred after 10 p.m at the place of

occurrence which was not open to the general public and before such

death of Kevin, there was an altercation between Kevin and the

appellants. On the next morning around 10 a.m., after opening the lock

of the building, it was detected that Kevin was murdered. As the

exclusivity of association between the deceased and the appellants at

the relevant time is established, and the offence was committed at a

secluded place beyond the reach of the general public at night, and the

murder of Kevin was detected only after opening of the locked building,

the condition relating to paucity of time favours the prosecution in the

facts and circumstances of the case. In Smt. Gargi (Supra) time gap

between last seen together and the detection of deadbody was 2 to 3

days, whereas in the case in hand, the time gap was of a few hours and

deadbody was found in a surrounding place, not open to public.

MOTIVE: RECOVERY: IDENTIFICATION

46. The Counsel of the parties argued that generally motive is immaterial

in ascertaining the complicity of an accused in relation to offence

alleged to have been committed by him when direct evidence is

available. But such a principle is inapplicable where the case hinges

Page 28 of 46
purely on circumstantial evidence. In this regard they referred to

several judgements reported in Nandu Singh (supra), Shivaji

Chintappa Patil (supra), Rabindra Singh (supra).

47. In the case in hand, the factual matrix unfolds one after another

some darker sides of our society which include consumption of drugs

by some sections of the educated, young people; sale of drugs openly by

the drug peddlers; failure of the rehabilitation centre for de-addiction of

an addicted youth; market of smuggled or stolen goods; dissatisfaction

and unruly behaviour of such youth under addiction in the locality; the

failure of the guardians to guide their children in right direction of life;

unsympathetic and inhumane attitude of some of the youth of our

society under the influence of drugs and so on.

48. The addiction to drugs of the appellants and the deceased is palpable.

The evidence in this regard cannot be said to be meagre. PW 4, the

sister of the deceased, admitted that her brother Kevin was addicted to

drugs and he was under treatment in a rehabilitation centre for several

months. The evidence of PWs 9, 11, 14 and seized items from the place

of occurrence show that the deceased and his companions were

consuming drugs immediately before the incident. The motive of the

drug addicts to commit crimes may be diverse. It may be the quantity

or individual share of the drugs when the same is consumed by a group

of drug-addicts, or may be the brand new addidas foreign shoes of the

deceased which if sold in market of stolen goods (Chora market),

Page 29 of 46
fetches a good amount of money and the same may not be of little

importance for drug addicts.

49. The most unusual conduct of the appellants was that the appellant

no. 2 along with appellant no. 1 sold the Addidas shoes. No explanation

was given by the appellants as to whether the said shoes belonged to

any one of them and the reasons for selling them. On the other hand,

the body of Kevin showed that all though he wore socks, he did not

have shoes on both feet. It is almost impossible to hold that one would

walk or go for a stroll outside his home without any shoes although he

wears socks. Therefore, the absence of Addidas shoes on the feet of the

deceased and the evidence of the prosecution to the effect that the

appellant no. 2 along with appellant no.1 sold one pair of Addidas

shoes immediately after the incident of murder of Kevin strengthens the

prosecution case in the absence of any explanation from the side of the

appellants.

50. The recovery statement under section 27 of Indian Evidence Act was

proved before the learned Trial Judge and the portion of the statements

of the appellants that they would help the police to recover the shoes if

they are taken to the concerned shop, are admissible and acceptable

evidence, and pursuant to such leading statements the Adidas shoes

were recovered. Not only such statements were recorded but the same

were acted upon and the shoes were recovered from the shop of PW 7,

who not only told the investigating officer that the appellant no. 2 who

Page 30 of 46
was accompanied by the appellant no. 1, sold the shoes to him but also

handed over the relevant shoes under seizure list. Subsequently, he

commented such type of shoes is not available in Chora market (place

for buying and selling smuggled and stolen items). He identified the

appellants at the time of recovery of shoes, in the test identification

parade before the Magistrate and also on dock during trial. The defence

argued that the police helped the PW-7 to identify the accused before

commencement of test identification parade in correctional home at the

instance of the Judicial Magistrate, but such argument does not have

much force, since it appears that the appellants themselves led the

Investigating Officer to the shop where they sold the shoes. However,

the defence was unable to unearth any material showing that the PW-7

was antagonistic towards the appellants for any reason. Therefore, the

decision of Manoj Kumar Soni (supra) is not applicable in this case

since the prosecution has relied not only upon disclosure statement

under Section 27 of Evidence Act, but also upon the exclusivity of

association of the appellants with the deceased coupled with the

condition of paucity of time and further, their identification by the

disinterested witnesses.

51. The defence took the plea that the Judicial Magistrates who

conducted the Test Identification Parade through the witnesses

identifying the appellants were not called on witness box and the

defence was not given an opportunity to cross examine them and as a

result, the defence suffered a great prejudice. It is also contended by

Page 31 of 46
the appellants that marking of Test Identification Parade sheets

through the Investigating Officer during his deposition is an incurable

irregularity and such TIP record cannot be admissible evidence in the

eyes of law.

52. Marking of documents is nothing but giving a number for Exhibited

documents and the point of assessment of evidentiary value of such

marked documents is left open for the learned trial judge who decides

such issue at the time of final consideration of the case i.e. at the time

of writing judgment. In this case PW 16 tendered the Test Identification

Parade reports as Ext-18 & Ext-19 of five witnesses for consideration of

the Court. Let us see whether the Learned Trial Judge had duly

considered the evidentiary value of Test Identification Parade or not.

53. The nicety of holding and recording of Test Identification Parade in the

form is that the concerned Magistrate is to record each and every

minute details of the proceedings in the form, so that the learned Trial

Judge or the appellate forum, as the case may be, gets the opportunity

to ascertain whether the learned Magistrate had scrupulously complied

with the conditions in conducting such parade or not. The usual

conditions of a Test Identification Parade may be listed as follows:-

i) Such parade will be conducted inside the correctional home

compound beyond the gaze of the attending witness or witnesses and

also of any police officer.

Page 32 of 46

ii) Before commencement of such Parade the Controller or the

Deputy Controller of the correctional home brings the accused before

the concerned Magistrate at the place of such parade beyond the

view of any outsider including the attending witnesses and

introduces them to the Magistrate who will record the name and

other particulars of the said accused. The said officer also puts his

signature signifying that the accused is produced and identified by

him before the Magistrate at the very beginning of the process of Test

Identification Parade.

iii) Thereafter, the said accused will be asked to be mingled with

9/10 under-trial prisoners, having more or less similar look,

appearance, dress, height, stature etc. If the number of the accused

is more than one, the ratio of under-trial prisoners should be

increased by 1:10 approximately.

iv) After forming a queue of under-trial prisoners mingled with the

accused as aforesaid, in front of the Magistrate, the witness will be

called from a place of the correctional home wherefrom the place of

parade is not visible.

v) On arrival at the desk of the Magistrate, the particulars of the

witness are to be recorded in the relevant column of the form by the

Magistrate.

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vi) Thereafter the witness is asked to go near the queue of the

under-trial prisoners and identify the accused, if any, in connection

with the relevant case, from such queue.

vii) If such witness correctly identifies the accused, the Magistrate

should record in the relevant column that the witness identifies the

accused. In a case where witness fails to identify, same is also to be

recorded by the Magistrate.

viii) Irrespective of his success or failure in identifying the accused,

he shall be sent back outside of the precinct of the correctional home

from a place other than the place where other witnesses are waiting

for their turn.

ix) If there are other witnesses they shall be called one after

another, and similar process will be carried out by the Magistrate.

However, if there are spaces in the form after recording the process of

first witness, the Magistrate can use the said form for second witness

or subsequent witnesses provided they are produced on the same

day.

54. Let us see whether the Concerned Magistrate has scrupulously

followed the guidelines or not.

55. The relevant column in Ext-18 (by which three witnesses were

produced to identify) records as follows:-

Page 34 of 46

“The two suspects are mixed up with 20 other inmates

who have similar physical stature and are similarly

dressed as far as practicable. Suspects are given the

option to stand anywhere in the line as per their choice.

Witnesses are kept away from the venue of T.I.P and

outside the inner gate of ACCH from where neither the

sound nor any sight of T.I.P. could be heard or seen. T.I.P.

is held in broad day light. Witnesses are called one after

another to take part in T.I.P. and the witness having taken

part is kept away from the other witnesses yet to

participate in T.I.P. Suspects are given the liberty to

change their position after participation of each witness in

T.I.P. I am satisfied that the T.I.P. has been conducted

under conditions precluding any sort of collusion.”

56. The relevant column in Ext-19 (by which two witnesses were

produced to identify) records as follows:-

“Both the suspects are mixed up with other inmates at the

ratio of 1:10 and such other inmates are of similar

physical stature and are similarly dressed, as far as

practicable.

Suspects are given the liberty to stand anywhere in the

line as per their choice.

Page 35 of 46
Venue of the T.I.P. is away from the place where the

witnesses are kept and neither the sound nor the sight of

T.I.P. could be heard or seen therefrom T.I.P. is being held

in broad daylight.

Witnesses are called one after another to participate in

T.I.P. and the witness having taken part is kept away

from other witness yet to participate. Suspects are given

the option to change their position in the line after

participation of first witness.

I am satisfied that the T.I.P. has been conducted under

conditions precluding any sort of collusion.”

57. From the above it transpires that the Concerned Magistrate has

complied with the requisite conditions before recording that witnesses

identified the accused. Therefore even if the Judicial Magistrate was not

produced during trial, it cannot be said that the defence was seriously

prejudiced. The defence had challenged the Test Identification Parade

report on the ground that the police showed photos of the witnesses

before Test Identification Parade, but the same is not tenable since

nowhere it is brought on record that by which police officer or where

the accused were shown to the witnesses. There are several police

witnesses but not a single police witness was challenged on this point.

There were two IOs being PWs 15 and 16 but neither of them was

challenged that he or she showed the accused to the witnesses before

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they were placed in Test Identification Parade. No challenge was put to

them that they showed the photos of the appellants before their Test

Identification Parade.

58. Merely because a Magistrate was not brought as a witness to face the

cross-examination of the defence, the prosecution case fails does not

hold ground, particularly, when the appellants led the police to recover

the incriminating shoes from a shop-owner who used to sell and

purchase old shoes only and the said person identified the appellant

no. 2 who being accompanied by the appellant no.1, sold the shoes to

him. The I.O. was not an astrologer, unless the appellants led him to

the correct shop where they sold the shoes, how could he (PW 15) reach

the shop of PW 7 and seize the shoes of the deceased correctly.

Therefore, non- production of the Magistrate as a witness for facing

cross examination of the defence did not cause any tangible prejudice

to the appellants. The prosecution relied upon not only this

corroborative piece of evidence but also substantive evidence where

PWs 7, 5, 6, 11 and 14 identified the appellants before the court and

narrated their roles before the learned trial judge. In view of the above

discussion it appears that the decisions in Umesh Chandra (supra),

Gireesan Nair & Ors (supra), Jafar (supra) are not applicable in this

case, since there is no material to show that the appellants were shown

to the witnesses before T.I.P.

Page 37 of 46

59. However, a nice point was taken by the defence that the number and

code imprinted on the shoes do not match with the number and code in

the duplicate receipt. The said document was produced by the de facto

complainant suo moto during investigation but no seizure list was

prepared in his presence. The duplicate receipt was marked as Exhibit

no 25 (with objection). He has identified the shoes before the learned

trial court. In his cross-examination he admitted that although the

receipt disclosed the code and number of the shoes was ADFT – D6

9472, the shoes bore the code and number as ART D 69472. The

learned defence counsel strenuously argued that this goes to show the

much claimed recovery of Adidas shoes on the alleged leading

statements of the appellants falls flat. The appellants were framed.

60. An order of conviction cannot be set aside merely because there is a

discrepancy in the code and number imprinted on the shoes which

does not match with the code and number in the duplicate receipt. But

most interestingly, the same is not the case here. The shoes were

identified by the de facto complainant before the learned trial court as

the same which was purchased from Dubai, UAE. If we scrutinize

minutely we shall find that the learned Trial Judge recorded in re-

examination of PW 2 that the “Receipts bear bar Code number ADFT – D

6 9472”. However, in his cross examination he stated “the shoes bears

the number ART D 69472”. Needless to mention, bar code number of an

item in shops may differ with the specific item number. Therefore,

although the receipt indicated bar code ADFT D6 9472, actual number

Page 38 of 46
of the shoes was ART D 69472. Hence, there is no incongruity as

alleged by the learned defence Counsel.

Believe or Not to Believe

61. The defence Counsel has submitted that the prosecution case is not

believable since the prosecution failed to prove that the PW 4 was

working in Dubai UAE and came back to India for celebration of

Christmas in the year 2015. According to the defence Counsel a cousin

cannot commit murder of another cousin unless there is some

animosity between them. In this case it is found that the relationship

between the deceased and the appellants was very good. PW 4 being the

sister of the deceased did not state the alleged factual aspect before the

concerned Investigating Officer during investigation and the said PW 4

improved the prosecution case during trial. The learned defence

counsel has brought the contradiction taken during the cross-

examination of IO to the attention of this Court wherein the IO has

admitted that PW 4 did not state before him that on the relevant date

the deceased left the house with Adrian after wearing Adidas shoes and

so on.

62. Although the defence has taken the plea that PW 4 improved the

prosecution case we find that PW 4 has stated in her deposition that,

“Yes, I have stated to police that on 26.12.15 like other

days my brother came home with my cousin Adrian

Fernandez. Yes, I told the police that they were talking in

Page 39 of 46
the house. Yes, I stated to police that I told them that my

brother has improved. Yes, I stated to police that I stated

them that I take my brother to Dubai for another 2/3

months. I stated to police that both my cousin and brother

left home in the early evening. I stated to police that at

that time my brother also left house. I stated to police that

at that time my brother was wearing red T shirt with

leather jacket, blue blackish jeans pant, one jacket, white

socks and Adidas shoes. I stated to police that on that

day we had to go to party. I stated to police that so my

brother was supposed to come back on 26th Night so that

we can go to the party but he did not return that night I

stated to police that they showed me photographs in their

mobile. I stated to police that he was wearing T shirt, blue

blackish jeans pant and white socks. I stated to police

that I noticed that his jacket and shoes were not on his

body. I stated to police that I saw mark of injury over his

forehead. I stated to police that I saw sand, bottle, plastic

and papers, ropes. “.

63. Although PW 4 has stated that she stated everything to the Police, the

I.O. being PW 16 has stated that all these statements were not made to

him by PW 4. This Court is in a doubt as to why there is so much

deficiency. We have considered the deposition of PW 16 as well as the

deposition of PW 15 who was the intermediate I.O during official leave

Page 40 of 46
of PW 16. Neither PW 15 nor PW 16 has clearly stated that they

recorded any statement of PW 4. If the statement is not recorded there

is no question of allowing such contradiction. Therefore, the deposition

of PW 4 that she stated everything to the Police cannot be disbelieved

since there is no deposition from the side of PW 16 and PW 15 that they

ever recorded the statement of PW 4. What PW 4 had tried to say is that

she divulged everything to the Police Officer during investigation. As the

I.Os did not clearly say that any of them recorded the statement of PW

4 under Section 161 Cr.P.C. on this point alone, the case law of Sunil

Kumar Sambhudayal Gupta & Ors. (supra) is not applicable in this

case.

64. As regards the allegation that prosecution has failed to prove the

factum that PW 4 came from Dubai for celebration of Christmas, we

have to look into other materials on record and particularly Exts.-10

and 11. Ext.-10 (collectively)(14 pages) indicates the treatment of the

deceased in Rehabilitation Centre namely the Genesis Foundation (a

Therapeutic Healing Community For Marginalised), Kamalgazi (Bazar),

Purbapara, P.O.- Laskarpur, Kolkata-700153. It shows that the

deceased was in the rehabilitation Centre from 22.07.2015. Ext-11 is a

letter dated 22.12.2015 addressed to the Secretary, Genesis

Foundation by the deceased stating that he wanted to go for a holiday

on 22.12.2015 to meet his sister who came down from Dubai.

Moreover, he wanted to spend some time with his family during festival

season. He has further stated he will be coming back on 27.12.2015

Page 41 of 46
(Sunday). This letter was received and contained the signature of PW 12

Indrajit Ghosh, who has proved the said documents before this Court.

Ext.11 was dated on 22.12.2015 that means the said letter was written

by the deceased prior to the incident which occurred in the night of

26.12.2015. In the said letter being Ext.11 he has disclosed that his

sister i.e. PW 4 herein, came down from Dubai and he wanted to spend

some time with his family during festival season. It goes to show that

PW 4 actually lived at the relevant point of time in Dubai and the said

letter also supported the deposition of PW 4 in the sense that the said

letter was written prior to the happening of the incident on 26.12.2015.

Therefore, the said document being written prior to the incident cannot

be disbelieved nor the fact that the PW 4 came from Dubai during the

festival season to spend time with the members of her family in

Kolkata. It is not unusual that a sister will bring some gift for her loving

brother. Bringing of Adidas shoes from Dubai cannot be doubted

particularly when the prosecution has been able to produce at least one

duplicate receipt to that effect. Therefore, in overall assimilation of the

facts and evidence we have found that there is no reason to disbelieve

the deposition of PW 4 and also the deposition of the defacto

complainant. In other words we cannot say that the prosecution case

cannot be believed since no documentary evidence was produced from

the side of the prosecution to prove that PW 4 was residing at the

relevant point of time in Dubai, UAE.

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65. It was argued that as there was good relationship between cousins, a

cousin cannot cause death to another cousin. We have already

discussed that the cousins referred to above in this case are all drug

addicts and we have discussed that there might have been several

issues amongst the drug addicts which tempted one drug addict to

cause the murder of another drug addict. It is also found that two

cousins of the deceased took away the shoes from his feet and also the

leather jacket of the deceased soon after they found that the deceased

was no more. They threw the leather jacket but was very much

conscious about the worth of brand new Adidas shoes. They went to a

market and sold the same in exchange of money. No normal cousin can

do so. Therefore, argument of the defence does not impress this Court

on this point. However, Mr. Bhattacharyya has taken a nice plea that

as the deceased and appellants were living together the cousins had

access to the shoes and leather jacket and in that case at best the

appellants can be charged under Section 379 IPC. We appreciate the

arguments by the learned Counsel of the appellant no. 1 in this regard,

but so far as access to the shoes of the deceased is concerned, we

would like to say that access to the shoes of cousin means that another

cousin can use, wear shoes of another cousin, but it does not allow the

concerned cousin to sell off the said shoes after leaving the owner of the

shoes dead with socks on his feet. The cousin took the shoes from the

feet of another cousin because the former knew that latter did not

require the shoes anymore. They were very much apprehensive that if

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any of them used the said shoes of the deceased they might have been

apprehended, and therefore, it was better to dispose of the shoes by

selling the same at a price.

66. Therefore, considering all aspects we find that the following chains of

events are complete:

Firstly, the exclusivity of association of the deceased with the

appellants just before the incident.

Secondly, the witnesses who saw the entry of the appellants with the

deceased to a place which was not open to general public, and exit of

the appellants without the deceased from that place, deposed and

identified the appellants.

Thirdly, the depositions of witnesses are sufficient to show that the

appellants were present with the deceased at the time of occurrence

and they departed the place of occurrence leaving Kevin there.

Fourthly, the appellants fled away with the shoes of the deceased.

Fifthly, Kevin was found murdered with socks on his feet but without

any shoes.

Sixthly, the appellants sold the shoes in a market.

Seventhly, on the leading statements of the appellants, the shoes

were recovered from the concerned shop owner who deposed and

identified the appellants for selling the said shoes.

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Eighthly, the said shoes were identified by the defacto complainant.

Ninthly, the post mortem report and other materials on record show

that the death of Kevin was ante-mortem in nature due to smothering.

Tenthly, prosecution was able to prove that the shoes were brought

from Dubai by PW 4 and were gifted to the deceased on or about

22.12.2015.

Eleventhly, the absence of explanation from the appellants, which is

an additional link, as to when they left Kevin, if they were not the

offenders.

Twelfthly, the absence of explanation from the appellants, which is

also another additional link, as to how and when they got the brand

new Adidas shoes of the deceased.

67. Record shows that these circumstances were put before the

appellants during their examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C. but

there was no explanation from the side of the appellants in true sense.

68. In view of the above discussion the judgment of conviction and order

of sentence dated 14.08.2019 and 16.08.2019 passed by learned

Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track, 1st Court, Alipore, South 24

Parganas in Sessions Trial No. 04(09)2016 arising out of Sessions Case

no. 04(04)2016 convicting the appellants under Section 302/24 of the

Indian Penal Code is hereby affirmed.

69. The instant appeal being CRA 574 of 2019 is dismissed on contest.

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70. The Trial Court Records be sent back to the Learned Trial Court

immediately alongwith a copy of this judgment.

71. Urgent photostat certified copies of this judgment, if applied for, be

supplied to the parties on compliance of all necessary formalities.

I Agree.

(ARIJIT BANERJEE, J.)

(APURBA SINHA RAY, J.)

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