Karnataka High Court
Prabhugowda Patil vs State Of Karnataka on 21 February, 2026
Author: M.Nagaprasanna
Bench: M.Nagaprasanna
1
Reserved on : 27.11.2025
Pronounced on :21.02.2026
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 21ST DAY OF FEBRUARY, 2026
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M. NAGAPRASANNA
CRIMINAL PETITION No.5163 OF 2023
BETWEEN:
PRABHUGOWDA PATIL,
S/O SIDDANAGOWDA PATIL
AGED ABOUT 39 YEARS
RESIDING AT NO.16
MARASANAHALLI TALUKA
INDI, MARASANAHALLI
VIBHUTHALLI INDI,
VIJAYAPURA - 586 217.
... PETITIONER
(BY SRI TEJAS N., ADVOCATE)
AND:
1 . STATE OF KARNATAKA
BY LOKAYUKTA POLICE
M.S.BUILDING
DR.AMBEDKAR VEEDHI
BENGALURU - 560 001
REPRESENTED BY
SPECIAL PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA
BENGALURU - 560 001.
2
2 . SRI SHASHIDHAR G.,
S/O GANGADHAR G.,
AGED ABOUT 41 YEARS
NO.55, NO.1, 2ND FLOOR
THIMMAIAH CHAMBERS
1ST CROSS, GANDHINAGAR
BENGALURU - 560 009.
... RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI VENKATESH S.ARBATTI, ADVOCATE FOR R1;
SRI SURESH S., ADVOCATE FOR R2 )
THIS CRIMINAL PETITION IS FILED UNDER SECTION 482 OF
CR.P.C., PRAYING TO QUASH THE FIR IN CR.NO.45/2019 FOR THE
ALLEGED OFFENCES P/U/S 7A OF P.C. ACT REGISTERED BY THE
THEN ACB AND NOW BEING TRANSFERRED TO LOKAYUKTA POLICE
PURSUANT TO THE COMPLAINT LODGED BY THE RESPONDENT
NO.2 PENDING ON THE FILE OF THE XXIII ADDL.CITY CIVIL AND
SESSIONS JUDGE, BENGALURU.
THIS CRIMINAL PETITION HAVING BEEN HEARD AND
RESERVED FOR ORDERS ON 27.11.2025, COMING ON FOR
PRONOUNCEMENT THIS DAY, THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING:-
CORAM: THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA
CAV ORDER
The petitioner/accused No.2 in Crime No.45 of 2019 is at the
doors of this Court calling in question registration of a crime against
him for offence punishable under Section 7(a) of the Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1988 ('the Act' for short).
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2. Heard Sri Tejas N., learned counsel appearing for the
petitioner, Sri Venkatesh Arbatti, learned counsel appearing for
respondent No.1 and Sri Suresh. S, learned counsel appearing for
respondent No.2.
3. Facts, in brief, germane are as follows:-
The petitioner is the Sub-Inspector of Police and the 2nd
respondent is the complainant. Pursuant to a complaint made by
one Rajendra against the 2nd respondent, the petitioner investigated
the said case and filed the final report in respect of offence
punishable under Sections 341, 324, 506 r/w Section 34 of the IPC.
After the said registration of crime, the complainant appears before
the 1st respondent/Lokayukta Police alleging that the petitioner had
demanded ₹1,00,000/- for the purpose of filing a 'B' report in
respect of the case registered against him in Crime No.173 of 2019
and that accused No.1, one Ananda is said to have called the
complainant over phone and demanded ₹1,00,000/- for the
aforesaid purpose of filing of 'B' report, which would be shared by
himself and the petitioner. The complaint further alleges that
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accused No.2, the present petitioner, was brought before the
complainant in his chambers, wherein the complainant was
informed that after making payment of ₹1,00,000/-, the petitioner
would somehow get the case closed. It is based upon these
allegations, the crime is registered by the then Anti-Corruption
Bureau, the ACB in Crime No.45 of 2019. Registration of crime
leads to investigation. At the stage of investigation, the petitioner
approaches this Court in the subject petition.
4. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would
vehemently contend that no trap is laid against the petitioner. He
has neither demanded nor accepted any money. The complainant's
allegation itself is against accused No.1. The complaint is registered
only to wreak vengeance against the petitioner for having
registered the crime against the complainant. The learned counsel
would seek to placed reliance upon plethora of judgments of the
Apex Court and that of this Court to buttress his submission that
there is neither demand nor acceptance in the case at hand.
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5. Per contra, the learned counsel appearing for the
complainant would vehemently refute the submission contending
that the petitioner has deliberately registered a crime against the
complainant when the complainant was not even in the City. It is
alleged that he has indulged in voluntarily restraining another
person which led to serious dent on the image of the complainant.
The learned counsel submits that the petitioner had summoned the
complainant to file a 'B' report for which he had demanded bribe.
The learned counsel submits that it is a matter of investigation in
the least which should be permitted, as the crime registered is of
the year 2019 and the issue with regard to existence of ACB itself
was in doubt and, therefore, the investigation had not progressed
further despite four years having been passed, prior to filing of the
present petition.
6. The learned counsel appearing for the 1st respondent/
Lokayukta would again take this Court through the documents
appended to the petition to demonstrate that the petitioner had
demanded money and there is a recording with regard to demand
of money. No trap is laid, but there is clear demand. In the light of
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demand being there, the petition must not be entertained. It is for
the petitioner to prove that, he has neither demanded nor accepted
or demanded not accepted, accepted but never demanded, all
before the concerned Court in a full-blown trial. He would seek
dismissal of the petition.
7. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions
made by the respective learned counsel and have perused the
material on record.
8. The afore-narrated facts and link in the chain of events are
all a matter of record. Before embarking upon consideration of the
subject complaint, it is necessary to notice that a crime was
registered in Crime No.173 of 2019 against the complainant in
which the Investigating Officer was the present petitioner. The
investigation is conducted in the crime and charge sheet is filed by
the petitioner for offences punishable under Sections 341, 324, 506
r/w 34 of the IPC. The charge sheet is filed on 13-12-2019. A week
before filing of the charge sheet against the complainant, the
complainant registers a complaint before the Lokayukta. Since the
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entire issue in the subject petition has figured from registration of
the complaint, I deem it appropriate to notice the complaint. It
reads as follows:
"ರವ ೆ, ಾಂಕ: 04/12/2019
ಾನ ೕ ವ ಾ ಾ ಗಳ
ಭ ಾ ಾರ ಗ ಹ ದಳ,
ಖ ಜ ಭವನ, #ೇ ೋ % ರ&ೆ',
(ೆಂಗಳ)ರು.
ಇಂದ,
ಶ-ಧ/, 0
12. ಗಂ ಾಧ/ 0.
ವಯಸು5 : 38 ವಷ%
# S-5, ನಂ. 1, 2 ೇ ಮಹ9,
:ಮ;ಯ ೇಂಬ % 1 ೇ ಅಡ?ರ&ೆ', ಾಂ ನಗರ,
(ೆಂಗಳ)ರು - 560 009.
@: 9845933390
ಾನ #ೆ,
Aಷಯ : ಸುದುBಗುಂCೆDಾಳ ೕ EಾFೆಯ ಮುಖ DೇGೆ ಆನಂI, J.ಎ .ಐ.
ಪ ಭು ೌಡDಾOೕP Qಾಗೂ ಈರಣT ರವರುಗಳ @ಕದBU ಸಂVೆ : 173/19
ರ X ಕಲಂ 324 ಐ.J.Z. ಪ ಕರಣ ೆ[ 1. ಅಂ:ಮವರ ತ]ಾ ZದುB,
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ದುಬ%ಳ ೆ ಾ9 ೊಂಡು (ೆದ ೆ Qಾeರುವ ಬ ೆf ದೂರು.
***
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ನಂತರ ಾಂಕ: 13-11-2019 ರಂದು ಾನು ಾ ]ಾಲಯದ Xರ(ೇ ಾದ#ೆ ಸದ
ಆನಂI ರವರು @ ಸಂVೆ : 9900948352 ಂದ ನನ^ @. ಸಂVೆ . : 9845933390 ೆ
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ೊಟು 19. ನಂತರ ಇನೂ^ ೊಡ(ೇಕು ಅಂತ ಅ Zದ#ೆ ೊ9. ಇಲX ಅಂದ#ೆ ಾನು ಅದರzೆXೕ
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ೋ9 @ದzೆ ೕವh ವeೕಲರು. ೆಲಸ ಆದ Uೕzೆ ಈ ೕ: ಾಡು:'ೕರzಾX. ಾನು
ೕŒ% #ೆ9 ಾಡGೆ ೕವh ಹಣ ೊಟ Uೕzೆ ೕŒ% ತ]ಾ ಸ(ೇeತು'. ಈಗ ನನ ೆ
ಇದು (ೇecಾ' ಎಂದು ಏರುಧ• ಯ X ಾತ ಾಡಲು ಶುರು ಾ9ದರು. ಆಗ ಾನು ೋ9
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ಏನು ಾಡುcೆ'ೕ ೆ ೋ9 ಎಂದು ಅವರು ತ]ಾ ZದB 1 ಅಂ:ಮ ವರ ಯ EಾFಾ ಾ ಗಳ
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11
ನ_ಂತ ಾನು ಡಬP ಇGೆBೕ ೆ. ನನ^ ಮ ೆಯ ಯ
X ೂ ವeೕಲ GಾB#ೆ. ೕವh ಏನು (ೇ ಾದರೂ
ಾ9 ೊsg ಎಂದು QೇsದುB, ಆಗ ಾನು EಾFಾ ಾ ಗಳ ರೂp ೆ Qೋ_ ನkೆದ
A ಾರವನು^ :sZದುB, ಅದ ೆ[ ಸದ ಯವರು ೋ9 ಈ A ಾರ ೆ[ ಾನು ಎಂO ಆಗುವh ಲX.
ೕವh ಅವರು ಏನು ಾತ ಾ9 ೊಂ9 Bೕ#ೋ ೊ:'ಲX. ೕವh ಅವರ ಮೂಲಕ ಬ ೆಹ Z ೊsg.
ಈಗ ನನ ೆ ೆಲಸAGೆ cಾವh Qೊರಡಬಹುದು ಎಂದು :sZರುcಾ'#ೆ.
ನಂತರ ಾಂಕ : 26-11-2019 ರಂದು ನನ ೆ ಪ ಚಯAರುವ ಸಂಪ" ಮತು'
ಮಹGೇ" ರವರನು^ ಆನಂI ರವರ ಬs ಕಳ `Z ವeೕಲರು ಏನು ಾತ ಾ9GಾB#ೆ. ಅದನು^
ಮನZ5ನ X ಇಟು ೊಳg(ೇ9. ಸjಲw Qೆಚು• ಕ9U ಾ9 ೊಡುcಾ'#ೆ. Qೇ ೋ 1 ವರ
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ಅವ ೆ Qೇs ನನ ೆ ]ಾವhGೇ ಹಣ ೊಡುವhದು (ೇಡ J.ಐ. ರವರನು^ •ೇO ಾ9 ಅವರ
ಬs ಇರುವ •ೕ2 #ೆ ಾm% ಅನು^ 9 ೕŒ ಾ9 ನನ^ Aರುದ- ಅಥnಾ J.ಎ .ಐ. ಮತು'
ಈರಣT ರವರ AರುದB Uೕzಾ ಾ ಗs ೆ ದೂರು ೕಡುವh ಲX ಎಂದು ಮುಚ•s ೆ ಬ#ೆದು ೊಟ #ೆ
ಕೂಡzೇ ಇದನು^ ಮು_Z ೊಡುcೆ'ೕnೆ ಎಂದು :sZರುcಾ'#ೆ.
ಇದ ಂದ ನನ ೆ ಾನZಕnಾ_ ತುಂ(ಾ cೊಂದ#ೆ ೊಳ ಾ_ದುB, ಅಲXGೆ ನಮ; cಾತ
ಮೃತ#ಾ_ದುB, ಮೃತರ ೆಲಸ ಾಯ%ಗಳ ಇದುBದB ಂದ ಇಂದು ಬಂದು ತಡnಾ_ ದೂರು
ಸ Xಸು:'GೆBೕ ೆ. ಇದರ qೊcೆ ಸದ ಆನಂI ರವರು ನನ^ qೊcೆ ಾತ ಾ9ರುವ
ಸಂ•ಾಷFೆಯ 2 Z.9ಗಳನು^ ಈ ಅ0%~ಂ ೆ ಲಗ:'Zರುcೆ'ೕ ೆ.
ಆದುದ ಂದ ಸುದುBಗುಂCೆ Dಾಳ EಾFೆಯ EಾFಾ ಬರಹ ಾರ ಆನಂIರವರು ನನ ೆ
@ಕದBU ಸಂVೆ : 173/19 ರ X 1.ಅಂ:ಮ ವರ ಸ Xಸಲು ರೂ.1 ಲ˜ಷ ಲಂಚ ೊಡುವಂcೆ
(ೇ9 ೆ ಇಟು , ನನ ೆ ಅ ೌರವnಾ_ ಾತ ಾ9 (ೆದ ೆ Qಾe ತನ^ ಅ ಾರವನು^
ದುರುಪ~ೕಗಪ9Z ೊಂ9ರುವ ಸದ ಆನಂI, J.ಎ .ಐ. ಪ ಭು ೌಡ DಾOೕP Qಾಗೂ
ಈರಣT ರವರುಗಳ Aರುದ- ಸೂಕ' ಾನುನು ಕಮ ೈ ೊಂಡು ನನ ೆ ಾಯ
GೊರeZ ೊಡ(ೇ ೆಂದು ಈ ಮೂಲಕ Aನಂ:Z ೊಳ gcೆ'ೕ ೆ."
Based upon the said complaint there is no trap laid against the
petitioner. He is not caught accepting the bribe. The allegation is,
12
that he had demanded, in the complaint. Nonetheless, crime had
been registered in Crime No.45 of 2019 for offence punishable
under Section 7(a) of the Act. The 1st respondent/Lokayukta has
filed its statement of objections. The contention with regard to no
trap being laid and no acceptance of any amount has not been
controverted. Therefore, it is undoubtedly a case where there is a
demand as alleged by the complainant. But, there is no document
or evidence to prove that the petitioner had accepted.
9. It is an admitted fact that in the case at hand no pre-trap
mahazar is drawn, no demand and acceptance is proved even to its
prima facie sense, there is no recovery of money from the
petitioner and there is no conversation between the complainant
and the petitioner. The petitioner has also placed on record that on
20-11-2019 he was not even in the City of Bengaluru, he was at
Hyderabad. There are 9 cases registered against the complainant
before different police stations, one of which is registered by the
petitioner himself. The facts and contentions being thus, it becomes
necessary to notice the interpretation of Section 7(a) of the Act by
13
the Apex Court, both in the pre-amendment stage and post
amendment stage.
INTERPRETATION UNDER THE UN-AMENDED ACT:
10.1. The Apex Court in the case of B.JAYARAJ v. STATE
OF ANDHRA PRADESH1 interprets Section 7 of the Act and holds
as follows:
".... .... ....
7. Insofar as the offence under Section 7 is
concerned, it is a settled position in law that demand of
illegal gratification is sine qua non to constitute the said
offence and mere recovery of currency notes cannot
constitute the offence under Section 7 unless it is proved
beyond all reasonable doubt that the accused voluntarily
accepted the money knowing it to be a bribe. The above
position has been succinctly laid down in several judgments of
this Court. By way of illustration reference may be made to the
decision in C.M. Sharma v. State of A.P. [(2010) 15 SCC 1 :
(2013) 2 SCC (Cri) 89] and C.M. Girish
Babu v. CBI [(2009) 3 SCC 779: (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 1]."
(Emphasis supplied)
10.2. The Apex Court later, in the case of N.VIJAYAKUMAR
v. STATE OF TAMILNADU2 has held as follows:
1
(2014) 13 SCC 55
2
(2021) 3 SCC 687
14
".... .... ....
26. It is equally well settled that mere recovery by
itself cannot prove the charge of the prosecution against
the accused. Reference can be made to the judgments of
this Court in C.M. Girish Babu v. CBI [C.M. Girish
Babu v. CBI, (2009) 3 SCC 779 : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 1]
and in B. Jayaraj v. State of A.P. [B. Jayaraj v. State of
A.P., (2014) 13 SCC 55 : (2014) 5 SCC (Cri) 543] In the
aforesaid judgments of this Court while considering the
case under Sections 7, 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 it is reiterated that to
prove the charge, it has to be proved beyond reasonable doubt
that the accused voluntarily accepted money knowing it to be
bribe. Absence of proof of demand for illegal gratification and
mere possession or recovery of currency notes is not sufficient
to constitute such offence. In the said judgments it is also held
that even the presumption under Section 20 of the Act can be
drawn only after demand for and acceptance of illegal
gratification is proved. It is also fairly well settled that initial
presumption of innocence in the criminal jurisprudence gets
doubled by acquittal recorded by the trial court.
27. The relevant paras 7, 8 and 9 of the judgment
in B. Jayaraj [B. Jayaraj v. State of A.P., (2014) 13 SCC
55 : (2014) 5 SCC (Cri) 543] read as under: (SCC pp. 58-
59)
"7. Insofar as the offence under Section 7 is
concerned, it is a settled position in law that demand
of illegal gratification is sine qua non to constitute the
said offence and mere recovery of currency notes
cannot constitute the offence under Section 7 unless
it is proved beyond all reasonable doubt that the
accused voluntarily accepted the money knowing it to
be a bribe. The above position has been succinctly
laid down in several judgments of this Court. By way
of illustration, reference may be made to the decision
in C.M. Sharma v. State of A.P. [C.M. Sharma v. State
of A.P., (2010) 15 SCC 1 : (2013) 2 SCC (Cri) 89]
and C.M. Girish Babu v. CBI [C.M. Girish Babu v. CBI,
(2009) 3 SCC 779 : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 1] .
8. In the present case, the complainant did not
support the prosecution case insofar as demand by the
15
accused is concerned. The prosecution has not examined
any other witness, present at the time when the money was
allegedly handed over to the accused by the complainant, to
prove that the same was pursuant to any demand made by
the accused. When the complainant himself had disowned
what he had stated in the initial complaint (Ext. P-11)
before LW 9, and there is no other evidence to prove that
the accused had made any demand, the evidence of PW 1
and the contents of Ext. P-11 cannot be relied upon to come
to the conclusion that the above material furnishes proof of
the demand allegedly made by the accused. We are,
therefore, inclined to hold that the learned trial court as well
as the High Court was not correct in holding the demand
alleged to be made by the accused as proved. The only
other material available is the recovery of the tainted
currency notes from the possession of the accused. In fact
such possession is admitted by the accused himself. Mere
possession and recovery of the currency notes from
the accused without proof of demand will not bring
home the offence under Section 7. The above also will
be conclusive insofar as the offence under Sections
13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) is concerned as in the absence of any
proof of demand for illegal gratification, the use of corrupt
or illegal means or abuse of position as a public servant to
obtain any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage cannot be
held to be established.
9. Insofar as the presumption permissible to be
drawn under Section 20 of the Act is concerned, such
presumption can only be in respect of the offence under
Section 7 and not the offences under Sections 13(1)(d)(i)
and (ii) of the Act. In any event, it is only on proof of
acceptance of illegal gratification that presumption can be
drawn under Section 20 of the Act that such gratification
was received for doing or forbearing to do any official act.
Proof of acceptance of illegal gratification can follow only if
there is proof of demand. As the same is lacking in the
present case the primary facts on the basis of which the
legal presumption under Section 20 can be drawn are
wholly absent."
The abovesaid view taken by this Court fully supports the case
of the appellant. In view of the contradictions noticed by us
above in the depositions of key witnesses examined on behalf of
the prosecution, we are of the view that the demand for and
acceptance of bribe amount and cellphone by the appellant, is
16
not proved beyond reasonable doubt. Having regard to such
evidence on record the acquittal recorded by the trial court is a
"possible view" as such the judgment [State of T.N. v. N.
Vijayakumar, 2020 SCC OnLine Mad 7098] of the High Court is
fit to be set aside. Before recording conviction under the
provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act, the courts have
to take utmost care in scanning the evidence. Once conviction is
recorded under the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption
Act, it casts a social stigma on the person in the society apart
from serious consequences on the service rendered. At the
same time it is also to be noted that whether the view taken by
the trial court is a possible view or not, there cannot be any
definite proposition and each case has to be judged on its own
merits, having regard to evidence on record."
(Emphasis supplied)
10.3. The Apex Court in the case of K.SHANTHAMMA v.
STATE OF TELANGANA3 has held as follows:
".... .... ....
10. We have given careful consideration to the
submissions. We have perused the depositions of the
prosecution witnesses. The offence under Section 7 of the PC
Act relating to public servants taking bribe requires a demand of
illegal gratification and the acceptance thereof. The proof of
demand of bribe by a public servant and its acceptance by
him is sine qua non for establishing the offence under
Section 7 of the PC Act.
11. In P. Satyanarayana Murthy v. State of A.P. [P.
Satyanarayana Murthy v. State of A.P., (2015) 10 SCC 152 :
(2016) 1 SCC (Cri) 11] , this Court has summarised the well-
settled law on the subject in para 23 which reads thus : (SCC p.
159)
"23. The proof of demand of illegal gratification,
thus, is the gravamen of the offence under Sections 7 and
3
(2022) 4 SCC 574
17
13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act and in absence thereof,
unmistakably the charge therefor, would fail. Mere
acceptance of any amount allegedly by way of illegal
gratification or recovery thereof, dehors the proof of
demand, ipso facto, would thus not be sufficient to bring
home the charge under these two sections of the Act. As a
corollary, failure of the prosecution to prove the demand for
illegal gratification would be fatal and mere recovery of the
amount from the person accused of the offence under
Section 7 or 13 of the Act would not entail his conviction
thereunder."
(emphasis supplied)
12. The prosecution's case is that the appellant had kept
pending the return of commercial tax filed by the said Society
for the year 1996-97. The appellant had issued a notice dated
14-2-2000 to the said Society calling upon the said Society to
produce the record. Accordingly, the necessary books were
produced by the said Society. The case made out by PW 1 is
that when he repeatedly visited the office of the appellant in
February 2020, the demand of Rs.3000 by way of illegal
gratification was made by the appellant for passing the
assessment order. However, PW 1, in his cross-examination,
accepted that the notice dated 26-2-2000 issued by the
appellant was received by the said Society on 15-3-2000 in
which it was mentioned that after verification of the books of
accounts of the said Society, exemption from payment of
commercial tax as claimed by the said Society was allowed. PW
1 accepted that it was stated in the said notice that there was
no necessity for the said Society to pay any commercial tax for
Assessment Year 1996-97.
13. According to the case of PW 1, on 23-3-2000, he
visited the appellant's office to request her to issue final
assessment order. According to his case, at that time, initially,
the appellant reiterated her demand of Rs 3000. But she scaled
it down to Rs 2000. Admittedly, on 15-3-2000, the said Society
was served with a notice informing the said Society that an
exemption has been granted from payment of commercial tax to
the said Society. Therefore, the said Society was not liable to
pay any tax for the year 1996-97. The issue of the final
assessment order was only a procedural formality. Therefore,
the prosecution's case about the demand of bribe made on 23-
3-2000 by the appellant appears to be highly doubtful.
18
14. PW 1 described how the trap was laid. In the pre-trap
mediator report, it has been recorded that LW 8, Shri R. Hari
Kishan, was to accompany PW 1 -- complainant at the time of
offering the bribe. PW 7 Shri P.V.S.S.P. Raju deposed that PW 8
Shri U.V.S. Raju, the Deputy Superintendent of Police, ACB, had
instructed LW 8 to accompany PW 1 -- complainant inside the
chamber of the appellant. PW 8 has accepted this fact by stating
in the examination-in-chief that LW 8 was asked to accompany
PW 1 and observe what transpires between the appellant and
PW 1. PW 8, in his evidence, accepted that only PW 1 entered
the chamber of the appellant and LW 8 waited outside the
chamber. Even PW 7 admitted in the cross-examination that
when PW 1 entered the appellant's chamber, LW 8 remained
outside in the corridor. Thus, LW 8 was supposed to be an
independent witness accompanying PW 1. In breach of the
directions issued to him by PW 8, he did not accompany PW 1
inside the chamber of the appellant, and he waited outside the
chamber in the corridor. The prosecution offered no explanation
why LW 8 did not accompany PW 1 inside the chamber of the
appellant at the time of the trap.
15. Therefore, PW 1 is the only witness to the alleged
demand and acceptance. According to PW 1, firstly, the demand
was made of Rs.3000 by the appellant on 24-2-2000.
Thereafter, continuously for three days, she reiterated the
demand when he visited the appellant's office. Lastly, the
appellant made the demand on 29-2-2000 and 23-3-2000. On
this aspect, he was cross-examined in detail by the learned
Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant. His version about
the demand and acceptance is relevant which reads thus:
"In the vicinity of office of AO the jeep, in which we
went there was stopped and I was asked to go into the
office of AO and the trap party took vantage positions.
Accordingly, I went inside the office of AO. I wished AO. At
that time apart from AO some other person was found in
the office room of AO and he was talking to the AO. AO
offered me a chair. After discussion with the AO the said
other person left the room of AO. I informed AO that I
brought the bribe amount as demanded by her and also
asked her to issue the final assessment orders. Then I took
the said tainted currency notes from my shirt pocket and I
was about to give the same to the AO and on which instead
of taking the same amount directly by her with her hands
19
she took out a diary from her table drawer, opened the
diary and asked me to keep the said amount in the diary.
Accordingly, I kept the amount in the said diary. She closed
the said diary and again kept the same in her table drawer
and locked the drawer and kept the keys in her hand bag
which was hanging to her seat. She pressed the calling bell
and a lady attender came into the room of AO, then she
instructed the lady attender to call ACTO concerned to her
along with the society records concerned.
Accordingly, ACTO came to AO along with record. After going
through the ledger and cash book, etc. AO signed on the last
page of the said ledger and cash book mentioning 26-2-2000
below her signature in the said register though she signed on
27-3-2000 in my presence. AO directed her attender to affix
official rubber stamp below her signature in the ledger and cash
book and accordingly attender affixed the same. AO also signed
on the office note of final assessment orders at that time.
Thereafter, I collected the general ledger and cash book from
the attender after affixing the said rubber stamp thereon and
came out of the office of AO and relayed the pre-arranged signal
to the trap party."
(emphasis supplied)
16. Thus, PW 1 did not state that the appellant reiterated
her demand at the time of trap. His version is that on his own,
he told her that he had brought the amount. What is material is
the cross-examination on this aspect. In the cross-examination,
PW 1 accepted that his version regarding the demand made by
the appellant on various dates was an improvement. The
relevant part of the cross-examination of the appellant reads
thus:
"I did not state to ACB Inspector in Section 161 CrPC
statement that on the evening of 24-2-2000 I met the AO
and that she demanded the bribe. I did not mention in Ext.
P-3 complaint that continuously for 3 days after 24-2-2000
I met the AO and the AO reiterated her demand. I did not
mention in Ext. P-3 complaint that on 29-2-2000 I
approached the AO and the AO demanded bribe of Rs 3000
and that unless I pay the said bribe amount she will not
issue final assessment orders. I did not state in my Section
164 statement before the Magistrate that 13-3-2000 to 16-
3-2000 I was on leave and from 1-3-2000 to 12-3-2000, I
20
was engaged in recovering the dues of the society. It is not
true to suggest that I did not meet the AO continuously 3
days i.e. on 25-2-2000, 26-2-2000 and 27-2-2000 and that
27-2-2000 is Sunday. It is not true to suggest that I did not
meet the AO in the evening of 24-2-2000 and that AO did
not demand any money from me. I did not state in my
Section 161 CrPC statement to Inspector of ACB that before
I left the office of DSP on the date of trap I made a phone
call enquiring about the availability of AO and the AO was in
the office and informed me that she should be available in
the office from 6.00 to 7.00 p.m. on that day so also in my
Section 164 CrPC. I made such a phone call from the office
of the DSP, ACB. I do not remember as to from which phone
number I made phone call on that day. I cannot describe
office telephone number of the AO. It is not true to suggest
that I did not make any such phone call to AO and that she
did not give any such reply to me. I did not state to ACB
Inspector in my Section 161 CrPC statement or to the
Magistrate in my Section 164 CrPC statement that I went
inside the office of AO and I wished AO and at that time
apart from AO some other person was found in the office
room of AO and that he was talking to the AO and that the
AO offered me a chair and that after discussion with the AO
the said person left the room of AO and then I informed the
AO that I brought the bribe amount. I did not state that said
aspects to DSP during the post trap proceedings also."
(emphasis supplied)
17. Thus, the version of PW 1 in his examination-in-chief
about the demand made by the appellant from time to time is
an improvement. As stated earlier, LW 8 did not enter the
appellant's chamber at the time of trap. There is no other
evidence of the alleged demand. Thus, the evidence of PW 1
about the demand for bribe by the appellant is not at all
reliable. Hence, we conclude that the demand made by the
appellant has not been conclusively proved.
18. PW.2, Shri B.D.V. Ramakrishna had no personal
knowledge about the demand. However, he accepted that on
15-3-2000, the said Society received a communication
informing that the said Society need not pay any tax for the
year 1996-97. PW 3 Shri L. Madhusudhan was working as
Godown Incharge with the said Society. He stated that on 15-3-
2000, when he visited the appellant's office, ACTO served the
original notice dated 26-2-2000 in which it was mentioned that
21
the Society was not liable to pay any tax. It is his version that
when he met the appellant on the same day, she enquired
whether he had brought the demanded amount of Rs 3000.
However, PW 3 did not state that the appellant demanded the
said amount for granting any favour to the said society.
19. PW.4 Ahmed Moinuddin was ACTO at the relevant
time. He deposed that on 27-3-2000, the appellant instructed
him to prepare the final assessment order, which was kept
ready in the morning. He stated that he was called at 6 p.m. to
the chamber of the appellant along with books of the said
Society. At that time, PW 1 was sitting there. He stated that the
appellant subscribed her signature on a Register of the said
Society and put the date as 26-2-2000 below it. He was not a
witness to the alleged demand. However, in the cross-
examination, he admitted that the appellant had served a memo
dated 21-3-2000 to him alleging that he was careless in
performing his duties."
(Emphasis supplied)
The afore-quoted judgments were rendered interpreting Section 7
as it stood prior to amendment. The Apex Court holds that demand
and acceptance are sine qua non for an offence under Section 7 of
the Act.
INTERPRETATION POST AMENDMENT:
10.4. The Apex Court has further interpreted Section 7(a)
post amendment in the case of NEERAJ DUTTA v. STATE (GOVT.
OF NCT OF DELHI4 and holds as follows:
4
2023 SCC OnLine SC 280
22
".... .... ....
8. Before we analyze the evidence, we must note that we
are dealing with Sections 7 and 13 of the PC Act as they stood
prior to the amendment made by the Act 16 of 2018 with effect
from 26th July 2018. We are referring to Sections 7 and 13 as
they stood on the date of commission of the offence. Section 7,
as existed at the relevant time, reads thus:
"7. Public servant taking gratification other
than legal remuneration in respect of an official act.--
Whoever, being, or expecting to be a public servant,
accepts or obtains or agrees to accept or attempts to obtain
from any person, for himself or for any other person, any
gratification whatever, other than legal remuneration, as a
motive or reward for doing or forbearing to do any official
act or for showing or forbearing to show, in the exercise of
his official functions, favour or disfavour to any person or
for rendering or attempting to render any service or
disservice to any person, with the Central Government or
any State Government or Parliament or the Legislature of
any State or with any local authority, corporation or
Government company referred to in clause (c) of section 2,
or with any public servant, whether named or otherwise,
shall be punishable with imprisonment which shall be not
less than three years but which may extend to seven years
and shall also be liable to fine.
Explanations.-
(a) "Expecting to be a public servant"- If a person not
expecting to be in office obtains a gratification by
deceiving others into a belief that he is about to be
in office, and that he will then serve them, he may
be guilty of cheating, but he is not guilty of the
offence defined in this section.
(b) "Gratification". The word "gratification" is not
restricted to pecuniary gratifications or to
gratifications estimable in money.
(c) "Legal remuneration"- The words "legal
remuneration" are not restricted to remuneration
which a public servant can lawfully demand, but
include all remuneration which he is permitted by the
23
Government or the organisation, which he serves, to
accept.
(d) "A motive or reward for doing". A person who
receives a gratification as a motive or reward for
doing what he does not intend or is not in a position
to do, or has not done, comes within this expression.
(e) Where a public servant induces a person erroneously
to believe that his influence with the Government
has obtained a title for that person and thus induces
that person to give the public servant, money or any
other gratification as a reward for this service, the
public servant has committed an offence under this
section."
9. Section 13(1)(d), as existed at the relevant time,
reads thus:
"13. Criminal misconduct by a public servant.--
(1) A public servant is said to commit the offence of
criminal misconduct,-
(a) ....................................
(b) ....................................
(c) ....................................
(d) if he,-
(i) by corrupt or illegal means, obtains for himself or for
any other person any valuable thing or pecuniary
advantage; or
(ii) by abusing his position as a public servant, obtains
for himself or for any other person any valuable
thing or pecuniary advantage; or
(iii) while holding office as a public servant, obtains for
any person any valuable thing or pecuniary
advantage without any public interest; or
(e) ........................................"
24
10. The demand for gratification and the acceptance
thereof are sine qua non for the offence punishable under
Section 7 of the PC Act.
11. The Constitution Bench4 was called upon to decide
the question which we have quoted earlier. In paragraph 74, the
conclusions of the Constitution have been summarised, which
read thus:
"74. What emerges from the aforesaid discussion is
summarised as under:
(a) Proof of demand and acceptance of illegal
gratification by a public servant as a fact in
issue by the prosecution is a sine qua non in
order to establish the guilt of the accused
public servant under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d)(i)
and (ii) of the Act.
(b) In order to bring home the guilt of the accused,
the prosecution has to first prove the demand
of illegal gratification and the subsequent
acceptance as a matter of fact. This fact in
issue can be proved either by direct evidence
which can be in the nature of oral evidence or
documentary evidence.
(c) Further, the fact in issue, namely, the proof of
demand and acceptance of illegal gratification
can also be proved by circumstantial evidence
in the absence of direct oral and documentary
evidence.
(d) In order to prove the fact in issue, namely, the
demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by the
public servant, the following aspects have to be
borne in mind:
(i) if there is an offer to pay by the bribe
giver without there being any demand from the
public servant and the latter simply accepts the offer
and receives the illegal gratification, it is a case of
acceptance as per Section 7 of the Act. In such a
case, there need not be a prior demand by the public
servant.
25
(ii) On the other hand, if the public servant makes a
demand and the bribe giver accepts the demand
and tenders the demanded gratification which in turn
is received by the public servant, it is a case of
obtainment. In the case of obtainment, the prior
demand for illegal gratification emanates from the
public servant. This is an offence under Section
13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act.
(iii) In both cases of (i) and (ii) above, the offer by
the bribe giver and the demand by the public
servant respectively have to be proved by the
prosecution as a fact in issue. In other words,
mere acceptance or receipt of an illegal
gratification without anything more would not
make it an offence under Section 7 or Section
13(1)(d), (i) and (ii) respectively of the
Act. Therefore, under Section 7 of the Act, in order
to bring home the offence, there must be an offer
which emanates from the bribe giver which is
accepted by the public servant which would make it
an offence. Similarly, a prior demand by the
public servant when accepted by the bribe
giver and in turn there is a payment made
which is received by the public servant, would
be an offence of obtainment under Section
13(1)(d) and (i) and (ii) of the Act.
(e) The presumption of fact with regard to the
demand and acceptance or obtainment of an
illegal gratification may be made by a court of
law by way of an inference only when the
foundational facts have been proved by
relevant oral and documentary evidence and
not in the absence thereof. On the basis of the
material on record, the Court has the discretion to
raise a presumption of fact while considering
whether the fact of demand has been proved by the
prosecution or not. Of course, a presumption of fact
is subject to rebuttal by the accused and in the
absence of rebuttal presumption stands.
(f) In the event the complainant turns 'hostile', or has
died or is unavailable to let in his evidence during
trial, demand of illegal gratification can be proved by
letting in the evidence of any other witness who can
again let in evidence, either orally or by
26
documentary evidence or the prosecution can prove
the case by circumstantial evidence. The trial does
not abate nor does it result in an order of acquittal of
the accused public servant.
(g) In so far as Section 7 of the Act is concerned,
on the proof of the facts in issue, Section 20
mandates the court to raise a presumption that
the illegal gratification was for the purpose of a
motive or reward as mentioned in the said
Section. The said presumption has to be raised by
the court as a legal presumption or a presumption in
law. Of course, the said presumption is also subject
to rebuttal. Section 20 does not apply to Section
13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act.
(h) We clarify that the presumption in law under Section
20 of the Act is distinct from presumption of fact
referred to above in point
(e) as the former is a mandatory presumption while the
latter is discretionary in nature."
(emphasis added)
12. The referred question was answered in paragraph 76
of the aforesaid judgment, which reads thus:
"76. Accordingly, the question referred for
consideration of this Constitution Bench is answered as
under:
In the absence of evidence of the complainant
(direct/primary, oral/ document-tary evidence), it is
permissible to draw an inferential deduction of
culpability/guilt of a public servant under Section 7
and Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the
Act based on other evidence adduced by the
prosecution."
(emphasis added)
13. Even the issue of presumption under Section 20 of
the PC Act has been answered by the Constitution Bench by
holding that only on proof of the facts in issue, Section 20
mandates the Court to raise a presumption that illegal
gratification was for the purpose of motive or reward as
27
mentioned in Section 7 (as it existed prior to the amendment of
2018). In fact, the Constitution Bench has approved two
decisions by the benches of three Hon'ble Judges in the cases
of B. Jayaraj1 and P. Satyanarayana Murthy2. There is another
decision of a three Judges' bench in the case of N.
Vijayakumar v. State of Tamil Nadu5, which follows the view
taken in the cases of B. Jayaraj1 and P. Satyanarayana Murthy2.
In paragraph 9 of the decision in the case of B. Jayaraj1, this
Court has dealt with the presumption under Section 20 of the PC
Act. In paragraph 9, this Court held thus:
"9. Insofar as the presumption permissible to
be drawn under Section 20 of the Act is concerned,
such presumption can only be in respect of the
offence under Section 7 and not the offences under
Sections 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act. In any event,
it is only on proof of acceptance of illegal gratification
that presumption can be drawn under Section 20 of
the Act that such gratification was received for doing
or forbearing to do any official act. Proof of acceptance
of illegal gratification can follow only if there is proof of
demand. As the same is lacking in the present case the
primary facts on the basis of which the legal presumption
under Section 20 can be drawn are wholly absent."
(emphasis added)
14. The presumption under Section 20 can be invoked
only when the two basic facts required to be proved under
Section 7, are proved. The said two basic facts are 'demand' and
'acceptance' of gratification. The presumption under Section 20
is that unless the contrary is proved, the acceptance of
gratification shall be presumed to be for a motive or reward, as
contemplated by Section 7. It means that once the basic facts of
the demand of illegal gratification and acceptance thereof are
proved, unless the contrary are proved, the Court will have to
presume that the gratification was demanded and accepted as a
motive or reward as contemplated by Section 7. However, this
presumption is rebuttable. Even on the basis of the
preponderance of probability, the accused can rebut the
presumption.
15. In the case of N. Vijayakumar5, another bench of
three Hon'ble Judges dealt with the issue of presumption under
28
Section 20 and the degree of proof required to establish the
offences punishable under Section 7 and clauses (i) and (ii)
Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of PC Act. In
paragraph 26, the bench held thus:
"26. It is equally well settled that mere recovery by
itself cannot prove the charge of the prosecution against the
accused. Reference can be made to the judgments of this
Court in C.M. Girish Babu v. CBI [C.M. Girish
Babu v. CBI, (2009) 3 SCC 779 : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 1] and
in B. Jayaraj v. State of A.P. [B. Jayaraj v. State of
A.P., (2014) 13 SCC 55 : (2014) 5 SCC (Cri) 543] In the
aforesaid judgments of this Court while considering
the case under Sections 7, 13(1) (d)(i) and (ii) of
the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 it is reiterated
that to prove the charge, it has to be proved beyond
reasonable doubt that the accused voluntarily
accepted money knowing it to be bribe. Absence of
proof of demand for illegal gratification and mere possession
or recovery of currency notes is not sufficient to constitute
such offence. In the said judgments it is also held that even
the presumption under Section 20 of the Act can be drawn
only after demand for and acceptance of illegal gratification
is proved. It is also fairly well settled that initial
presumption of innocence in the criminal jurisprudence gets
doubled by acquittal recorded by the trial court."
(emphasis added)
16. Thus, the demand for gratification and its acceptance
must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
17. Section 7, as existed prior to 26th July 2018, was
different from the present Section 7. The unamended Section 7
which is applicable in the present case, specifically refers to
"any gratification". The substituted Section 7 does not use the
word "gratification", but it uses a wider term "undue
advantage". When the allegation is of demand of gratification
and acceptance thereof by the accused, it must be as a motive
or reward for doing or forbearing to do any official act. The fact
that the demand and acceptance of gratification were for motive
or reward as provided in Section 7 can be proved by invoking
the presumption under Section 20 provided the basic allegations
of the demand and acceptance are proved. In this case, we are
also concerned with the offence punishable under clauses (i)
29
and (ii) Section 13(1)(d) which is punishable under Section
13(2) of the PC Act. Clause (d) of sub-section (1) of Section 13,
which existed on the statute book prior to the amendment of
26th July 2018, has been quoted earlier. On a plain reading of
clauses (i) and (ii) of Section 13(1)(d), it is apparent that proof
of acceptance of illegal gratification will be necessary to prove
the offences under clauses (i) and (ii) of Section 13(1)(d). In
view of what is laid down by the Constitution Bench, in a given
case, the demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by a
public servant can be proved by circumstantial evidence in the
absence of direct oral or documentary evidence. While
answering the referred question, the Constitution Bench has
observed that it is permissible to draw an inferential deduction
of culpability and/or guilt of the public servant for the offences
punishable under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with Section
13(2) of the PC Act. The conclusion is that in absence of direct
evidence, the demand and/or acceptance can always be proved
by other evidence such as circumstantial evidence.
18. The allegation of demand of gratification and
acceptance made by a public servant has to be established
beyond a reasonable doubt. The decision of the Constitution
Bench does not dilute this elementary requirement of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt. The Constitution Bench was dealing
with the issue of the modes by which the demand can be
proved. The Constitution Bench has laid down that the proof
need not be only by direct oral or documentary evidence, but it
can be by way of other evidence including circumstantial
evidence. When reliance is placed on circumstantial evidence to
prove the demand for gratification, the prosecution must
establish each and every circumstance from which the
prosecution wants the Court to draw a conclusion of guilt. The
facts so established must be consistent with only one hypothesis
that there was a demand made for gratification by the accused.
Therefore, in this case, we will have to examine whether there is
any direct evidence of demand. If we come to a conclusion that
there is no direct evidence of demand, this Court will have to
consider whether there is any circumstantial evidence to prove
the demand."
30
10.5. Subsequent to NEERAJ DUTTA'S case, the Apex Court
in the case of SOUNDARAJAN v. STATE5 has held as follows:
"FINDING ON PROOF OF DEMAND:
9. We have considered the submissions. It is well settled
that for establishing the commission of an offence punishable under
Section 7 of the PC Act, proof of demand of gratification and
acceptance of the gratification is a sine qua non. Moreover, the
Constitution Bench in the case of Neeraj Dutta3 has reiterated that
the presumption under Section 20 of the PC Act can be invoked
only on proof of facts in issue, namely, the demand of gratification
by the accused and the acceptance thereof.
10. As stated earlier, complainant PW-2 has not supported
the prosecution. He has not said anything in his examination-in-
chief about the demand made by the appellant. The public
prosecutor cross-examined PW-2. The witness stated that there
was no demand of a bribe made by the appellant. According to him,
he filed a complaint as the return of the sale deed was delayed.
Though PW-2 accepted that he had filed the complaint, in the
cross-examination, he was not confronted with the material
portions of the complaint in which he had narrated how the alleged
demand was made. The public prosecutor ought to have confronted
the witness with his alleged prior statements in the complaint and
proved that part of the complaint through the concerned police
officer who had reduced the complaint into writing. However, that
was not done.
11. Now, we turn to the evidence of the shadow witness
(PW-3). In the examination-in-chief, he stated that the appellant
asked the PW-2 whether he had brought the amount. PW-3 did not
say that the appellant made a specific demand of gratification in his
presence to PW-2. To attract Section 7 of the PC Act, the demand
for gratification has to be proved by the prosecution beyond a
reasonable doubt. The word used in Section 7, as it existed before
26th July 2018, is 'gratification'. There has to be a demand for
gratification. It is not a simple demand for money, but it has to be
5
2023 SCC OnLine SC 424
31
a demand for gratification. If the factum of demand of gratification
and acceptance thereof is proved, then the presumption under
Section 20 can be invoked, and the Court can presume that the
demand must be as a motive or reward for doing any official act.
This presumption can be rebutted by the accused.
12. There is no circumstantial evidence of demand for
gratification in this case. In the circumstances, the offences
punishable under Section 7 and Section 13(2) read with
Section 13(1)(d) have not been established. Unless both
demand and acceptance are established, offence of
obtaining pecuniary advantage by corrupt means covered by
clauses (i) and (ii) of Section 13(1)(d) cannot be proved."
(Emphasis supplied)
The Apex Court in the case of NEERAJ DUTTA supra was clarifying
and interpreting the judgment in the case of NEERAJ DUTTA,
which was rendered by a Constitution Bench and further holds that
proof of demand and acceptance of gratification is sine qua non for
any allegation under Section 7 of the Act, be it pre-amendment or
post-amendment. This is reiterated in the case of SOUNDARAJAN
supra.
11. On a coalesce of the judgments rendered by the Apex
Court, as quoted supra, the soul of Section 7 of the Act is demand
and acceptance. The unmistakable inference on the interpretation,
in the considered view of the Court, would be if there is demand but
32
no acceptance, it would not make an offence under Section 7 of the
Act. If there is acceptance but no demand, it would then also make
no offence under Section 7 of the Act. An act alleged under Section
7 of the Act should have the ingredients of demand and acceptance
and it is for the performance of a public duty or forbearance from
performance. Therefore, demand and acceptance should be for the
purpose of performance of some public duty. For such performance,
there should be work pending at the hands of the public servant
against whom Section 7 of the Act is alleged.
12. The aforesaid judgments have been considered by this
Bench sitting at Dharwad Bench in the case of BEERALINGA v.
STATE OF KARNATAKA - W.P.No.105067 of 2023 decided on
7th June, 2024. The said judgment was challenged by the State
before the Apex Court in S.L.P.No.6770 of 2025. The said S.L.P.
comes to be dismissed on 04-09-2025 by the following order:
"Upon hearing the counsel the court made the following:
ORDER
1. The delay of 152 days in filing and 173 days in refiling the
Special Leave Petition is condoned in the facts and
33
circumstances of the case. Accordingly, I.A.Nos. 211938
of 2025 and 211943 of 2025 are allowed.
2. In the facts and circumstances of the case, we are not
convinced that any case for interference under Article 136
of the Constitution on India is made out.
3. The Special Leave Petition is, accordingly, dismissed.
Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.”
The Apex Court refuses to interfere with the findings recorded by
this Court. In the light of the judgment rendered as afore-quoted
the issue in the case at hand need not detain this Court for long or
delve deep into the matter. It is admitted that there is no trap and
there is not even a prima facie finding that there has been demand
and acceptance. There is no tainted money recovered from the
hands of the petitioner and it is a fact that the petitioner was
instrumental in registering several crimes against the complainant
and the complaint against the petitioner is filed undoubtedly to
wreak vengeance. The statement of objections filed by the
complainant is a vindication of the finding recorded hereinabove.
13. In that light, there is no warrant to permit investigation
to continue six years after registration of the crime, when there is
not even a titter of document to permit such investigation. It
34
becomes apposite, in this regard, to refer to the judgment of the
Apex Court in the case of STATE OF HARYANA v. BHAJAN LAL6,
wherein the Apex Court has held as follows:
“…. …. ….
102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various
relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the
principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions
relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article
226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which
we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following
categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power
could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any
court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may
not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and
sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid
formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases
wherein such power should be exercised.
(1) Where the allegations made in the first information
report or the complaint, even if they are taken at
their face value and accepted in their entirety do
not prima facie constitute any offence or make out
a case against the accused.
(2) where the allegations in the first information report and
other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not
disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation
by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except
under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of
Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or
complaint and the evidence collected in support of the
same do not disclose the commission of any offence and
make out a case against the accused.
6
1992 Supp.(1) SCC 335
35
(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a
cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable
offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer
without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under
Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint
are so absurd and inherently improbable on the
basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a
just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for
proceeding against the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of
the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under
which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution
and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is
a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act,
providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the
aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with
mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously
instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance
on the accused and with a view to spite him due to
private and personal grudge.”
(Emphasis supplied)
14. For the aforesaid reasons, the following:
ORDER
(i) Criminal Petition is allowed.
36
(ii) FIR registered against the petitioner in Crime No.45 of
2019 pending before the XXIII Additional City Civil and
Sessions Judge, Bengaluru stands quashed.
Sd/-
(M.NAGAPRASANNA)
JUDGE
Bkp
CT:MJ
