Jharkhand High Court
Pinki Devi @ Asha Devi vs Arbind Kumar Gupta on 24 March, 2026
Author: Sanjay Kumar Dwivedi
Bench: Sanjay Kumar Dwivedi
2026:JHHC:8242
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
Civil Revision No.17 of 2025
Pinki Devi @ Asha Devi, aged about 51 years, wife of Sri Ajay Kumar
Gupta, daughter of Late Laxmi Narayan Sahu, resident of Flat No. 304,
3rd Floor, Nandlal Tower, R.C. Street, Tharpakhna, G.P.O., Ranchi, P.S.
Lower Bazar, District Ranchi .... Petitioner
Versus
Arbind Kumar Gupta, son of Late Balo Sahu, resident of Behind Popular
Nursing Home, Ratu Road, Ranchi, P.O. Hehal, PS Sukhdeo Nagar,
District Ranchi. ..... Opposite Party
With
C.M.P. No.592 of 2025
Pinki Devi @ Asha Devi, aged about 51 years, wife of Sri Ajay Kumar
Gupta, daughter of Late Laxmi Narayan Sahu, resident of Flat No. 304,
3rd Floor, Nandlal Tower, R.C. Street, Tharpakhna, G.P.O., Ranchi, P.S.
Lower Bazar, District Ranchi .... Petitioner
Versus
Arbind Kumar Gupta, son of Late Balo Sahu, resident of Behind Popular
Nursing Home, Ratu Road, Ranchi, P.O. Hehal, P.S. Sukhdeo Nagar,
District Ranchi. .... Opposite Party
--------
CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY KUMAR DWIVEDI
——
For the Petitioner : Mr. Bibhash Sinha, Advocate.
For the Sole O.P. : Mr. Ashok Kumar Pandey Advocate
——
14/24.03.2026 Both these petitions have been assigned to this Bench and that
is how these matters have been listed before this Court.
2. CMP No.592 of 2025 has been filed for quashing of the order
dated 18.02.2003 passed by Permanent Lok Adalat, Ranchi, in P.L.A.
No. 270 of 2001, by which it has passed a compromise decree with
respect of suit for Specific Performance of Contract being (Title Suit
No. 12 of 2001) and thereafter has drawn the decree dated 04.03.2003.
3. Civil Revision No.17 of 2025 has been filed against the order
dated 29.11.2024 passed by Learned Civil Judge (Junior Division)
Ranchi, in Civil Miscellaneous Case No. 12 of 2020, in terms of
which the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division) Ranchi has been
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pleased to dismiss the objection filed by the petitioner under Section
47 of the Code of Civil Procedure in Execution Case No. 35 of 2020.
4. Mr. Bibhas Sinha, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners
submits that the sole opposite party herein has initially instituted Title
Suit No.12 of 2001 under Section 13 of the Specific Relief Act against
the father of the present petitioner namely late Laxmi Narayan Sahu
praying, inter alia, for the reliefs as follows:-
a) The defendant may be directed to execute and register
sale deed in respect of the suit property which has been
more fully described in Schedule ‘A’ of the plaint after
receiving balance consideration from the plaintiff and
failing which the learned Trial Court may be pleased to
execute and register the deed of sale in favour of the
plaintiff of the suit property after depositing the balance
consideration money by the plaintiff in court and the
plaintiff may be put in Khas Physical Possession through
the process of the court if the learned Court found that the
plaintiff is not in possession of the suit premises.
b) The alternative relief may be granted as money decree
for a sum of Rs.6,19,000/- (Rupees Six Lacs Nineteen
Thousand) only including the interest at the rate of 14%
per annum from the date of entering into an agreement for
sale of suit premises till the date of realization as damages
and cost of prestige.
c) Decree for the cost of the suit be awarded in favour of
the plaintiff.
d) The right, title and possession of the plaintiff over the
suit property may be declared and the order passed in M
495/2000 and the order dated 29.04.2000 declared null and
void as it is not operative against the plaintiff.
e) Any other relief or reliefs be awarded in favour of the
2
2026:JHHC:8242plaintiff, which will be deemed fit and proper.
5. He next submits that during the pendency of the aforesaid suit,
on 20.12.2002, an application was filed by the parties of Title Suit No.
12 of 2001 praying therein for transfer of their case to Lok Adalat for
the purpose of settlement between the parties. He refers to the order
sheet and submits that after filing of application on 20.12.2002, the
prayer was allowed and records were transferred to Lok Adalat
scheduled on 21.12.2002. He also submits that the said suit instead of
going to Lok Adalat was erroneously transferred to Permanent Lok
Adalat. The Permanent Lok Adalat after receipt of record on
21.12.2002 registered a separate case being PLA Case No. 270 of
2002 and thereafter the proceeding held on several dates and
ultimately on 18.02.2003 on the basis of joint compromise petition
filed by the parties therein, a suit for specific performance of contract
was disposed of and the office was directed to prepare a decree and
thereafter the decree was drawn and signed on 04.03.2003 by
Permanent Lok Adalat. He then submits that for the execution of the
said decree of Permanent Lok Adalat, the opposite party herein filed
the Execution Case No.01 of 2010 against the petitioner herein and
her mother, as because by that time, the original defendant namely
Laxmi Narayan Sahu passed away. He next submits that the mother
and the petitioner appeared in the said execution case and filed
objection under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure on amongst
the grounds particularly that the dispute between the parties resolved
by the PLA Court by passing the decree was not under the competence
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/ ambit of permanent Lok Adalat and thus was without jurisdiction.
He also submits that the mother of the petitioner during the pendency
of the said Misc. Case No.44 of 2014, has left for her heavenly
aboard and her name was deleted by the order dated 17.03.2023 and
further by order dated 29.11.2024, the objection filed by the petitioner
under Section 47 of the Civil Procedure Code has been rejected by the
learned Court, against that, the petitioner has preferred the Civil
Revision No.17 of 2025, in which, by order dated 30 th April 2025,
notices have been issued to the opposite party.
6. He next submits that the petitioner was not party in the Title
Suit No.12 of 2001 and PLA No.270 of 2001 and therefore, she was
not aware about the judgment and decree passed by the Permanent
Lok Adalat. He next submits that the petitioner came to know about
the said decree, when the mother and the petitioner were made parties
in the execution case filed by the opposite party and thereafter filed
the objection. He also submits in these backgrounds, the Permanent
Lok Adalat is having no jurisdiction of deciding any suit and has
passed the order, which is without jurisdiction and liable to be set-
aside.
7. He next submits that in light of Chapter VI-A of Legal Services
Authorities Act, 1987, only the public utility services can be subject
matter before the Permanent Lok Adalat. He refers to relevant
Sections of Chapter VI-A, particularly Sections 22-A and 22-B with
respect to the definition of Public Utility Services. By way of referring
Sections 22-A and 22-B of the Legal Services Authority Act, he
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submits that Permanent Lok Adalat does not have jurisdiction over
any dispute, which is not within the ambit of Public Utility Service.
He next submits that the said suit was with regard to the specific
performance of contract and even by way of compromise, the
Permanent Lok Adalat has wrongly assumed the jurisdiction. He also
submits that Permanent Lok Adalat inherently lacks jurisdiction over
the subject matter, passed the said order, that too, in absence of the
petitioner and her mother. He also submits that it is well settled that
even with consent, jurisdiction can’t be conferred upon any Court.
8. To buttress to his argument, he relied in the case of Harshad
Chiman Lal Modi Vs. DLF Universal Ltd. and another reported in
(2005) 7 SCC 791 and he refer to Para 30, 32 and 33, which are as
under:
“30. We are unable to uphold the contention. The
jurisdiction of a court may be classified into several
categories. The important categories are (i) Territorial or
local jurisdiction; (ii) Pecuniary jurisdiction; and (iii)
Jurisdiction over the subject matter. So far as territorial and
pecuniary jurisdictions are concerned, objection to such
jurisdiction has to be taken at the earliest possible
opportunity and in any case at or before settlement of
issues. The law is well settled on the point that if such
objection is not taken at the earliest, it cannot be allowed to
be taken at a subsequent stage. Jurisdiction as to subject
matter, however, is totally distinct and stands on a different
footing. Where a court has no jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the suit by reason of any limitation imposed by
statute, charter or commission, it cannot take up the cause
or matter. An order passed by a court having no5
2026:JHHC:8242jurisdiction is nullity.
32. In Bahrein Petroleum Co., this Court also held that
neither consent nor waiver nor acquiescence can confer
jurisdiction upon a court, otherwise incompetent to try the
suit. It is well-settled and needs no authority that ‘where a
court takes upon itself to exercise a jurisdiction it does not
possess, its decision amounts to nothing.’ A decree passed
by a court having no jurisdiction is non-est and its validity
can be set up whenever it is sought to be enforced as a
foundation for a right, even at the stage of execution or in
collateral proceedings. A decree passed by a court without
jurisdiction is a coram non judice.
33. In Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan, (1955) 1 SCR
117: AIR 1954 SC 340, this Court declared; “It is a
fundamental principle well established that a decree passed
by a court without jurisdiction is a nullity and that its
invalidity could be set up whenever and it is sought to be
enforced or relied upon, even at the stage of execution and
even in collateral proceedings. A defect of jurisdiction
strikes at the very authority of the court to pass any decree,
and such a defect cannot be cured even by consent of
parties.”
By way of referring the above judgment, he submits that with
consent or waiver or acquiescence, jurisdiction cannot be conferred
upon any court, if the Court incompetent to try the suit.
9. He next relied upon the case of Kanwar Singh Saini V. High
Court of Delhi reported in (2012) 4 SCC 307 and refers to Para 22,
which is as under:-
“22.There can be no dispute regarding the settled legal
proposition that conferment of jurisdiction is a legislative
function and it can neither be conferred with the consent of6
2026:JHHC:8242the parties nor by a superior court, and if the court passes
order/decree having no jurisdiction over the matter, it would
amount to a nullity as the matter goes to the roots of the
cause. Such an issue can be raised at any belated stage of the
proceedings including in appeal or execution. The finding of
a court or tribunal becomes irrelevant and
unenforceable/inexecutable once the forum is found to have
no jurisdiction. Acquiescence of a party equally should not
be permitted to defeat the legislative animation. The Court
cannot desire jurisdiction apart from the Statute.
Relying upon the above judgment, he submits that it has been
held that if in absence of any jurisdiction, order has been passed and
that will be amount to nullity.
10. Lastly, he relied in the case of Carona Ltd. V. Parvathy
Swaminathan & Sons reported in (2007) 8 SCC 559 and refers to
Para 27 and 28 of the said Judgment, which are as under:
“27. Stated simply, the fact or facts upon which the
jurisdiction of a Court, a Tribunal or an Authority
depends can be said to be a ‘jurisdictional fact’. If the
jurisdictional fact exists, a Court, Tribunal or Authority
has jurisdiction to decide other issues. If such fact does
not exist, a Court, Tribunal or Authority cannot act. It is
also well settled that a Court or a Tribunal cannot
wrongly assume existence of jurisdictional fact and
proceed to decide a matter. The underlying principle is
that by erroneously assuming existence of a
jurisdictional fact, a subordinate Court or an inferior
Tribunal cannot confer upon itself jurisdiction which it
otherwise does not posses.
28. In Halsbury’s Laws of England, (4th Edn.), Vol.1,
7
2026:JHHC:8242para 55, p.61; Reissue, Vol.1(1), para 68, pp.114- 15, it
has been stated:
“Where the jurisdiction of a tribunal is dependent on the
existence of a particular state of affairs, that state of
affairs may be described as preliminary to, or collateral
to the merits of the issue. If, at the inception of an
inquiry by an inferior tribunal, a challenge is made to its
jurisdiction, the tribunal has to make up its mind
whether to act or not and can give a ruling on the
preliminary or collateral issue; but that ruling is not
conclusive”.
The existence of a jurisdictional fact is thus a sine
qua non or condition precedent to the assumption of
jurisdiction by a Court or Tribunal.
11. Relying upon the above judgment, Mr. Sinha submits that the
existence of a jurisdictional fact is thus a sine qua non or condition
precedent to the assumption of jurisdiction by a court or tribunal.
12. He submits that in view of that the impugned orders may kindly
be set-aside and the said suit being Title Suit No.12 of 2001 may
kindly be restored for adjudication on merit. On these grounds, he
submits that the prayer in these petitions may kindly be allowed.
13. On the other hand, Mr. Pandey, learned counsel appearing for
the sole opposite party vehemently opposed the prayer and submits
that father of the present petitioner has compromised the matter and
in view of that, the matter was transferred to the Lok Adalat,
however, the permanent Lok Adalat has passed the order. According
to him, if Permanent Lok Adalat has exercised the power, there is no
illegality as the Lok Adalat and the Permanent Lok Adalat are having
the jurisdiction in light of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987.
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14. In view of the above submissions of the learned counsel
appearing for the parties and after going through the records as well
as the orders of both the courts in these petitions, it transpires that the
opposite party herein has instituted the Title Suit No.12 of 2001
under Section 13 of the Specific Relief Act for the reliefs as noted
herein above.
15. On 20.12.2002, an application was filed for transferring the
matter to the Lok Adalat for the purpose of settlement and pursuant
to that the said record has been transferred the Lok Adalat, however
subsequently, it has been registered in the Permanent Lok Adalat
being PLA Case No.270 of 2002 and thereafter the Permanent Lok
Adalat on the basis of the compromise, decreed the said suit and the
decree was drawn and signed on 4.03.2003 by the Permanent Lok
Adalat. For execution of the said decree of the Permanent Lok
Adalat, opposite party herein has filed the Execution Case No.01 of
2010, in which after notice, the petitioner and her mother have
appeared and filed the objection, saying that they were not made
party and they were not knowing about the said suit and there were
Partition Suit No.52 of 2000, which was pending between the father,
uncle and other family members of the petitioner herein. During the
pendency of the said Misc. Case No.44 of 2014, the mother of the
petitioner has left for her heavenly aboard. Thus it is crystal clear that
partition suit between the families have already been instituted in the
year 2000, wherein the specific performance case has been brought
by the party opposite party in the year 2001. In the specific
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performance Act, the other family members of the late Lakshmi
Narayan Sahu have not been made party. On the basis of the
compromise, the said suit was transferred to the Lok Adalat,
however, it has been registered by the Permanent Lok Adalat.
16. The questions remain in the aforesaid background as to whether
the said award/decree can be quashed by this Court or not and further
the dispute in question can be subject matter of Permanent Lok
Adalat or not?
17. Chapter VI-A of the Legal Services Authority Act of 1987
speaks about pre-litigation, conciliation and settlement. Section 22-A
of the Act, 1987 reads as under:
“22A. Definitions. – In this Chapter and for the purposes of
sections 22 and 23, unless the context otherwise requires-
(a) “Permanent Lok Adalat means a Permanent Lok Adalat
established under sub-section (1) of section 22B;
(b) “public utility service” means any-
(i) transport service for the carriage of passengers or goods by
air, road or water; or
(ii) postal, telegraph or telephone service; or
(iii) supply of power, light or water to the public by any
establishment; or
(iv) system of public conservancy or sanitation; or
(v) service in hospital or dispensary; or
(vi) insurance service
and includes any service which the Central Government or the
State Government, as the case may be, in the public interest, by
notification, declare to be a public utility service for the
purposes of this Chapter.”
18. Looking into the said definition, it is crystal clear that only
public utility service can be subject matter before the Permanent Lok
Adalat, whereas in the case in hand, on the basis of compromise with
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regard to a specific performance suit, the award / decree has been
obtained, that too in absence of the petitioner and her mother. It is
well settled in law that Lok Adalats have no adjudicatory or judicial
function. Their functions relate purely to conciliation. A Lok Adalat
determines the reference on the basis of a compromise or settlement
between the parties and puts it seal of confirmation by making the
award in terms of compromise. It is further well known that if any
party wants to challenge the award based on settlement, the same can
be examined in a writ petition under Article 226 and / or 227 on a
very limited ground. In Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan reported in
(1954) 1 SCC 710, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that as a
judgment or a decree obtained by playing fraud on the Court is a
nullity and non-est in the eyes of law and its invalidity can be
challenged even in collateral proceedings. Similar view has been
taken in S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu (dead) by L.Rs versus
Jagannath (dead) by L.Rs (1994) 1 SCC 1. In the case of P.T.
Thomas V. Thomas Job, 2005 (6) SCC 478, it has been held that
the award of a Lok Adalat is not a result of a contest on merit, just as
a regular suit by a Court in a regular trial is, however, it is as equal
and on par with a decree on compromise and will have same binding
effect and be conclusive. It is trite law that validity of a compromise
decree can be challenged on the ground that if it was obtained by
playing fraud. In this regard, reference may be made to the judgment
passed by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of A.A.
Gopalakrishnan V Cochin Devaswom Board, 2007 (7) SCC 482.
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2026:JHHC:8242
19. Since the award passed by Lok Adalat is akin to a compromise
decree, its validity can be challenged by a party under Article 226
/227 of the Constitution of India on the ground that the same has
been obtained by playing fraud.
20. ‘Fraud’ means and includes any of the following acts committed
by a party to a contract, or with his connivance, or by his agent, with
intent to deceive another party there to or his agent or to include him
enter into the contract:- (1) the suggestion, as a fact, of that which is
not true by one who does not believe it to be true (2) the active
concealment of a fact by one having knowledge or belief of the fact
which is not true by one who does not believe it to be true; (3) a
promise made without intention of performing it; (4) any other act
fitted to deceive; (5) any such act or omission as the law specially
declares to be fraudulent. A reference may be made to the Advanced
Law Lexicon by P. Ramanatha Aiyar, Third Edition Reprint 2007.
21. In view of the Judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court
in the case of State of Punjab versus Jalour Singh, (2008) 2 SCC
660, the law laid down that challenge to the award of Lok Adalat can
be only be done by filing a writ petition under Article 226 and / or
Article 227 of the Constitution of India in the High Court and that
too on very limited grounds. In light of that, a case of challenge,
limited ground is made out, the remedy is only to file writ petition
before the High Court and if it is brought before the court, it is with
the High Court to decide whether any ground was made out by the
petitioner for quashing the said award and if so whether those
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grounds are sufficient for its quashing or not.
22. In light of the above facts and discussions, what is emerging
now that in light of Section 22-A of the Act, 1987 is required to be
read along with Section 22-A and 22-A (a) and (b) of the said Act,
wherefrom, it is evident that the Permanent Lok Adalat can be
established only for exercising jurisdiction in respect of one or more
public utility services justifying under Section 22-A. In light of the
provisions made therein, Permanent Lok Adalat is not having
jurisdiction with respect to any matter other than public utility
services as defined under Section 22A (b) under Chapter VI-A of the
said Act, which deals with pre-litigation, conciliation and settlement.
The Permanent Lok Adalat is having no jurisdiction in respect of the
matter, which is pending in the court. In light of the above, the
subject matter of property has no connection with the public utility
service, for which Permanent Lok Adalat are established and only
over which the permanent Lok Adalat is having jurisdiction as
defined under Section 22A(b) of the said Act. The permanent Lok
Adalat in light of the above has got no jurisdiction at all to entertain
the matter arising out of a property dispute.
23. The allegations are made that in absence of the petitioner, her
mother and other family members, the said suit Specific Performance
Suit being Title Suit No. 12 of 2001 was instituted, which was
transferred on the request to the Lok Adalat, however, subsequently it
was registered in the Permanent Lok Adalat being PLA No.270 of
2001. The Partition Suit pending between the family members was
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already instituted in the year 2000, wherein the said Specific
Performance Suit was instituted in the year 2001.
24. It is well settled that if any illegality has been committed by
any court, that illegality cannot be allowed to be perpetuated. The
reference may made to the Judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in the case of Sarukh Singh Vs. Union of India reported in
2011(11) SCC 198, wherein Para 27, 29 and 30 of the Judgment, it
has been held as under:
27. In Union of India v. Rangila Ram [(1995) 5 SCC 585]
this Court held as follows: (SCC p. 586, para 4)
“4. The point is no longer res integra. This Court has
considered the scope of the power of the High Court under
Sections 151 and 152 CPC and also under Section 13-A of
the Act. This Court has held that once the civil court made
an award as per law then in force which became final and
that there is no error of law as on that date. Subsequent
amendment does not give power to the court to amend the
decree under Sections 151 and 152 CPC. This was held in
State of Maharashtra v. Maharau Srawan Hatkar [(1995) 3
SCC 316] and Union of India v. Pratap Kaur [(1995) 3 SCC
263]. In Maharau Srawan Hatkar case [(1995) 3 SCC 316]
this Court held that the civil court lacked inherent
jurisdiction and was devoid of the power to entertain an
application to award additional benefits under Amendment
Act 68 of 1984. The facts therein were that the award had
become final and Amendment Act 68 of 1984 had come into
force on 24-9-1984. The respondents made an application
under Sections 151 and 152 CPC to award enhanced
solatium and additional benefits, etc. and the civil court
allowed and granted the same. In that context, considering
the civil court’s power under Sections 151 and 152 CPC,14
2026:JHHC:8242this Court laid the above law.”
29. There are a number of decisions of this Court wherein it
has also been held that a wrong judgment given by the High
Court cannot be taken as a precedent for perpetrating such
wrong. In State of Haryana v. Ram Kumar Mann [(1997) 3
SCC 321: 1997 SCC (L&S) 801] this Court held as follows:
(SCC p. 322, para 3)
“3. The question, therefore, is whether the view taken by the
High Court is correct in law. It is seen that the respondent
had voluntarily resigned from the service and the
resignation was accepted by the Government on 18-5-1982.
On and from that date, the relationship of employer and the
employee between the respondent and the State ceased and
thereafter he had no right, whatsoever, either to claim the
post or a right to withdraw his resignation which had
already become effective by acceptance on 18-5-1982. …
The doctrine of discrimination is founded upon existence of
an enforceable right. He was discriminated and denied
equality as some similarly situated persons had been given
the same relief. Article 14 would apply only when invidious
discrimination is meted out to equals and similarly
circumstanced without any rational basis or relationship in
that behalf. The respondent has no right, whatsoever and
cannot be given the relief wrongly given to them i.e. benefit
of withdrawal of resignation. The High Court was wholly
wrong in reaching the conclusion that there was invidious
discrimination. If we cannot allow a wrong to perpetrate, an
employee, after committing misappropriation of money, is
dismissed from service and subsequently that order is
withdrawn and he is reinstated into the service. Can a
similarly circumstanced person claim equality under Article
14 for reinstatement? The answer is obviously ‘No’. … A
wrong decision by the Government does not give a right to
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enforce the wrong order and claim parity or equality. Two
wrongs can never make a right. Under these circumstances,
the High Court was clearly wrong in directing reinstatement
of the respondent by a mandamus with all consequential
benefits.”
“30. The concept of equality as envisaged under Article 14
of the Constitution is a positive concept which cannot be
enforced in a negative manner. … Benefits extended to some
persons in an irregular or illegal manner cannot be claimed
by a citizen on the plea of equality as enshrined in Article
14 of the Constitution by way of writ petition filed in the
High Court. The Court observed (in Gursharan Singh case
[Gursharan Singh v. NDMC, (1996) 2 SCC 459.] ): (SCC p.
465, para 9)
‘9. …Neither Article 14 of the Constitution conceives within
the equality clause this concept nor Article 226 empowers
the High Court to enforce such claim of equality before law.
If such claims are enforced, it shall amount to directing to
continue and perpetuate an illegal procedure or an illegal
order for extending similar benefits to others. Before a
claim based on equality clause is upheld, it must be
established by the petitioner that his claim being just and
legal, has been denied to him, while it has been extended to
others and in this process there has been a discrimination.’
Again in Jaipur Development Authority v. Daulat Mal Jain
[(1997) 1 SCC 35] this Court considered the scope of
Article 14 of the Constitution and reiterated its earlier
position regarding the concept of equality holding: (SCC pp.
51-52, para 28)
’28. … Suffice it to hold that the illegal allotment founded
upon ultra vires and illegal policy of allotment made to
some other persons wrongly, would not form a legal premise
to ensure it to the respondent or to repeat or perpetuate16
2026:JHHC:8242such illegal order, nor could it be legalised. In other words,
judicial process cannot be abused to perpetuate the
illegalities. Thus considered, we hold that the High Court
was clearly in error in directing the appellants to allot the
land to the respondents.’
25. In light of the above discussion, it is crystal clear that the
Permanent Lok Adalat is having no jurisdiction to decide any
property matter, has passed the said award on the basis of the
compromise between the opposite party and late Lakshmi Narayan
Sahu, who happened to be the father of the petitioner.
26. The Court finds that the judgments relied by the learned counsel
appearing for the petitioners Harshad Chiman Lal Modi Vs. DLF
Universal Ltd. and another (Supra), Kanwar Singh Saini V. High
Court of Delhi (Supra) and Carona Ltd. V. Parvathy Swaminathan
& Sons (Supra) are helping the petitioners and in the light of
discussion, it is further crystal clear that in absence of any
jurisdiction, the Permanent Lok Adalat has passed the said
award/degree. In light of those judgments, it is well settled principle
of law that a tribunal, court or statutory authority cannot confer upon
itself jurisdiction by wrongly assuming the existence of a
jurisdictional fact.
27. In light of the above facts, reasons and analysis, these petitions
succeeds.
28. As such, the judgment / award / degree dated 18/02/2003
passed by Permanent Lok Adalat, Ranchi in PLA Case No. 270 of
2001 on the basis of the compromise is hereby set-aside.
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29. Resultantly, the order dated 29/11/2004 passed by the learned
Civil Judge Junior Division, Ranchi in Civil Misc. Case No.12 of
2020 is also set aside.
30. Consequently, the Title Suit No. 12 of 2001 is restored to its
original file. The same will be decided in accordance with law.
31. The petitioner and opposite party herein will move before the
learned court in the said Title Suit No.12 of 2001 and will move
appropriate petition for deciding the said-on merit.
32. These petitions are allowed in the above terms and disposed of.
(Sanjay Kumar Dwivedi, J.)
24.03.2026
R.Kumar A.F.R.
Uploaded on 01.04.202618