Jharkhand High Court
Parwati Devi vs The State Of Jharkhand & Ors on 16 March, 2026
Author: Sujit Narayan Prasad
Bench: Sujit Narayan Prasad, Sanjay Prasad
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
LPA No. 376 of 2025
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Parwati Devi ... Appellant
Versus
The State of Jharkhand & Ors. ... Respondents
With
LPA No. 108 of 2025
Parwati Devi ... Appellant
Versus
The State of Jharkhand & Ors. ... Respondents
CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY PRASAD
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For the Appellant : Mrs. Nirupama, Advocate
For the State : Mr. R.K. Shahi, AC to SC (L&C)-I
For the A.G : Mr. Sharon Toppo, Advocate
: Mr. Sunil Kr. Agarwal, Advocate
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08/Dated: 16 March, 2026
th
I.A. No. 5369 of 2025:
1. The instant interlocutory application has been filed in LPA No. 376 of
2025 wherein the appellant prays for ignoring the defect no. 95 and
97 as pointed out by the office.
2. In defect No. 95 it was stated that address portion of parties is
incomplete and in defect No. 97 it has been stated that appellant was
not party in the connected writ i.e. W.P. (S) No. 5834 of 2019.
3. It has been submitted that the said writ petition has been allowed
vide order dated 10.10.2022 in favour of the second wife (Jawoni
Devi/writ petitioner) of the deceased employee and the present
appellant who is the wife of the deceased employee has not been
Page 1 of 14
made party by the writ petitioner, Jawoni Devi and the order was
passed against the appellant without her presence.
4. It has been submitted that after knowing about the order passed in
W.P. (S) No. 5834 of 2019, she had approached this Court for the
purpose of satisfying her subsisting right/claim by filing W.P.(S) 1605
of 2023 but the same has been rejected by learned single Judge of
this Court on the ground that considering the claim of the
petitioner(appellant herein) will amount to reviewing the order
dated 10.10.2022 passed in W.P. (S) No. 5834 of 2019.
5. It has been submitted that the appellant since was not impleaded as
party in the writ petition being W.P.(S) 5834 of 2019 which was
preferred by one Jawoni Devi, and therefore, the appellant cannot be
remediless.
6. Learned counsel for the appellant therefore has submitted that the
aforesaid defect may kindly be ignored in the aforesaid pretext.
7. No material objection has been placed on record.
8. This Court has heard the learned counsel and after considering the
admitted fact that an order was passed in a writ petition where the
present appellant has not been made party by the writ petitioner
namely, Jawoni Devi, who has claimed the right to get post death
benefit after the death of the employee as per allegation made by the
present appellant.
9. Considering the aforesaid fact, the said defect(s) are hereby ignored.
10. Accordingly, the interlocutory application being I.A. No. 5369 of
Page 2 of 14
2025 stands disposed of.
LPA No. 376 of 2025 & LPA No. 108 of 2025:
11. Reference may be made to the order dated 27th February, 2026.
12. The aforesaid order was passed in the backdrop of the fact that the
notice was served upon the respondent No. 5 through official
mechanism of State on 19.01.2026 and the acknowledgement receipt
of the notice having thumb impression of Jawoni Devi, respondent
No. 5, has been appended as Annexure-A.
13. The notice was served upon the respondent on 19.01.2026 but there
was no appearance of the respondent No. 5. As such, this Court, in
order to give one more opportunity to the respondent No. 5 for
putting her appearance, has deferred the matter by directing to be
listed on 16.03.2026, and thereby, the matter has been posted for
today. The said order is referred herein which reads as:
“1. A supplementary counter-affidavit dated 11.02.2026
has been filed in pursuance of the order dated 12.12.2025
passed by this court.
2. It has been stated therein at paragraph no.5 that
notice has been served to the respondent no.5 through
official mechanism of the State on 19.1.2026 and to
support the aforesaid statement the acknowledgement
receipt of the notice having thumb impression of Jawoni
Devi, respondent no.5 has been appended as Annexure-A
thereto. But there is no appearance on behalf of
respondent no.5.
3. With a view to give one more opportunity to the
respondent no.5 for putting her appearance, these
matters are being deferred to be listed on 16.3.2026.
4. List these cases on 16.3.2026.”
14. We have perused the office note and found that there is no
appearance as yet.
Page 3 of 14
15. This Court, therefore, is of the view that the matter is to be
proceeded by adverting to the merit of the case.
16. Before proceeding to the issue on merit, it needs to refer herein that
there are two letters patent appeals being LPA No. 376 of 2025 & LPA
No. 108 of 2025 were tagged together for analogous hearing,
17. The reason for filing of the letters patent appeals needs to refer
herein, the first letters patent appeal being LPA No. 376 of 2025 is
against the order passed by the writ court in W.P. (S) No. 5834 of
2019 dated 10.10.2022, in which the appellant namely Parwati Devi,
was not impleaded as party to the proceeding before the writ court
and immediately after knowing about the order dated 10.10.2022,
she had preferred another writ petition being W.P. (S) No. 1605 of
2023 praying inter alia therein for issuance of direction upon the
respondent to make payment of death/retiral benefits to the
petitioner, who happens to be the wife of deceased employee and
further to fix family pension in her favour with effect from the date of
the deceased employee.
18. Learned Single Judge while disposing of the said writ petition has
dismissed the same vide order dated 21.09.2023 and has held that in
view of the order dated 10.10.2022 passed in W.P. (S) No. 5834 of
2019 the direction has already been passed by this Court in the
subject matter of the LPA No. 376 of 2025, hence no positive
direction can be passed.
19. It needs to refer herein that the letters patent appeal being LPA No.
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108 of 2025 therefore arises out of an order dated 21.09.2023
passed in W.P. (S) No. 1605 of 2023, and Parwati Devi, being
aggrieved with both the orders, have preferred the appeal.
20. It is evident on record that both these appeals, i.e., LPA No. 376 of
2025 & LPA No. 108 of 2025 have been filed after a delay of 791 days
and 412 days respectively.
21. The appellant, for the purpose of condoning the delay in filing both
the appeals, have filed two separate interlocutory applications being
I.A. No. 10459 of 2024 in LPA No. 376 of 2025 and I.A. No. 13509 of
2024 in LPA No. 108 of 2025.
22. Before entering into merit of the case, this Court is proceeding to
hear both the said interlocutory applications independently.
I.A. No. 10459 of 2024 (in LPA No. 376 of 2025):
23. The instant interlocutory application has been filed under Section 5
of the Limitation Act for condoning the delay of 791 days which has
been caused in filing of the appeal.
24. The ground has been shown at Para 3 thereof that the appellant is a
tribal lady of 71 years residing in the remote village of Khunti and she
was not aware of the case because she was not made party to the
writ petition and she came to know about the order when at village
level they were informed by the Office.
25. Further, it has been stated in Para-5 that after came to know about
the order passed in W.P. (S) No. 5834 of 2019 the endeavour has been
taken to prefer an appeal, and as such, the delay of 791 days has been
Page 5 of 14
caused.
26. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the delay of 791
days may be condoned due to the reason that the aforesaid period
which has caused is not attributable to the appellant, she has not
been impleaded as party in the W.P. (S) No. 5834 of 2019 even though
the fact about the right of the present appellant was well-known to
the writ petitioner.
27. It has been submitted that if the delay in filing the appeal will not be
condoned, then the appellant will suffer irreparable loss and injury.
28. None appears for the State and even no written objection has been
filed to the interlocutory application by the State.
29. We have heard the learned counsel for the appellant and gone
through the explanation furnished in the delay condonation
application.
30. We are conscious that the period of delay is not a matter in
considering the delay caused in filing an appeal before the higher
forum, rather, the bearing is of sufficient cause and if the cause is
being shown to be sufficient, then irrespective of the period of delay,
the delay is to be condoned.
31. It requires to refer herein that what is the meaning of ‘sufficient
cause’. The consideration of meaning of ‘sufficient cause’ has been
made in “Basawaraj & Anr. Vrs. Spl. Land Acquisition Officer”,
[(2013) 14 SCC 81], wherein, it has been held by the Hon’ble Apex
Court at paragraphs 9 to 15 hereunder:-
Page 6 of 14
“9. Sufficient cause is the cause for which the defendant could
not be blamed for his absence. The meaning of the word
“sufficient” is “adequate” or “enough”, inasmuch as may be
necessary to answer the purpose intended. Therefore, the word
“sufficient” embraces no more than that which provides a
platitude, which when the act done suffices to accomplish the
purpose intended in the facts and circumstances existing in a
case, duly examined from the viewpoint of a reasonable
standard of a cautious man. In this context, “sufficient cause”
means that the party should not have acted in a negligent
manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of
the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be
allegedthat the party has “not acted diligently” or “remained
inactive”. However, the facts and circumstances of each case
must afford sufficient ground to enable the court concerned to
exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the court
exercises discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. The
applicant must satisfy the court that he was prevented by any
“sufficient cause” from prosecuting his case, and unless a
satisfactory explanation is furnished, the court should not allow
the application for condonation of delay. The court has to
examine whether the mistake is bona fide or was merely a
device to cover an ulterior purpose. (See Manindra Land and
Building Corpn. Ltd. v. Bhutnath Banerjee [AIR 1964 SC 1336] ,
Mata Din v. A. Narayanan [(1969) 2 SCC 770 : AIR 1970 SC
1953] , Parimal v. Veena [(2011) 3 SCC 545 : (2011) 2 SCC
(Civ) 1 : AIR 2011 SC 1150] and Maniben Devraj Shah v.
Municipal Corpn. of Brihan Mumbai [(2012) 5 SCC 157 :
(2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 24 : AIR 2012 SC 1629] .)
10. In Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar [AIR 1964 SC 993] this
Court explained the difference between a “good cause” and a
“sufficient cause” and observed that every “sufficient cause” is
a good cause and vice versa. However, if any difference exists it
can only be that the requirement of good cause is complied
with on a lesser degree of proof than that of “sufficient cause”.
11. The expression “sufficient cause” should be given a liberal
interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is done, but
only so long as negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot
be imputed to the party concerned, whether or not sufficient
cause has been furnished, can be decided on the facts of a
particular case and no straitjacket formula is possible. (Vide
Madanlal v. Shyamlal [(2002) 1 SCC 535 : AIR 2002 SC 100]
and Ram Nath Sao v. Gobardhan Sao [(2002) 3 SCC 195 : AIR
2002 SC 1201] .)
12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may
harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied withPage 7 of 14
all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The court has no
power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds.
“A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A
court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it
considers a distress resulting from its operation.” Thestatutory
provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular
party but the court has no choice but to enforce it giving full
effect to the same. The legal maxim dura lex sed lex which
means “the law is hard but it is the law”, stands attracted in
such a situation. It has consistently been held that,
“inconvenience is not” a decisive factor to be considered while
interpreting a statute.
13. The statute of limitation is founded on public policy, its aim
being to secure peace in the community, to suppress fraud and
perjury, to quicken diligence and to prevent oppression. It
seeks to bury all acts of the past which have not been agitated
unexplainably and have from lapse of time become stale.
According to Halsbury’s Laws of England, Vol. 28, p. 266: “605.
Policy of the Limitation Acts.–The courts have expressed at
least three differing reasons supporting the existence of
statutes of limitations namely, (1) that long dormant claims
have more of cruelty than justice in them, (2) that a defendant
might have lost the evidence to disprove a stale claim, and (3)
that persons with good causes of actions should pursue them
with reasonable diligence.” An unlimited limitation would lead
to a sense of insecurity and uncertainty, and therefore,
limitation prevents disturbance or deprivation of what may
have been acquired in equity and justice by long enjoyment or
what may have been lost by a party’s own inaction, negligence
or laches. (See Popat and Kotecha Property v. SBI Staff Assn.
[(2005) 7 SCC 510] , Rajender Singh v. Santa Singh [(1973) 2
SCC 705 : AIR 1973 SC 2537] and Pundlik Jalam Patil v. Jalgaon
Medium Project [(2008) 17 SCC 448]
14. In P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka [(2002) 4 SCC
578 ] this Court held that judicially engrafting principles of
limitation amounts to legislating and would fly in the face of
law laid down by the Constitution Bench in Abdul Rehman
Antulay v. R.S. Nayak [(1992) 1 SCC 225].
15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that
where a case has been presented in the court beyond
limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what
was the “sufficient cause” which means an adequate and
enough reason which prevented him to approach the court
within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent,
orfor want of bona fide on his part in the facts and
circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligentlyPage 8 of 14
or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to
condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such
an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The
application is to be decided only within the parameters laid
down by this Court in regard to the condonation of delay. In
case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to
approach the court on time condoning the delay without any
justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to
passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it
tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature.”
32. Thus, it is evident that the sufficient cause means that the party
should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of
bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case
or it cannot be alleged that the party has “not acted deliberately” or
“remained inactive”. However, the facts and circumstances of each
case must afford sufficient ground to enable the Court concerned to
exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the Court exercises
discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously.
33. The applicant must satisfy the Court that he was prevented by any
“sufficient cause” from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory
explanation is furnished, the Court should not allow the application
for condonation of delay. The Court has to examine whether the
mistake is bona fide or was merely a device to cover the ulterior
purpose as has been held in “Manindra Land and Building
Corporation Ltd. Vrs. Bhutnath Banerjee & Ors.”, AIR 1964 SC
1336; “Lala Matadin Vrs. A. Narayanan”, (1969) 2 SCC 770;
“Parimal Vrs. Veena @ Bharti”, (2011) 3 SCC 545 and “Maniben
Devraj Shah Vrs. Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai”,
(2012) 5 SCC 157.
Page 9 of 14
34. It has further been held in the aforesaid judgments that the
expression ‘sufficient cause’ should be given a liberal interpretation
to ensure that substantial justice is done, but only so long as
negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot be imputed to the
party concerned, whether or not sufficient cause has been furnished,
can be decided on the facts of a particular case and no straitjacket
formula is possible, reference in this regard may be made to the
judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Ram Nath Sao @
Ram Nath Sahu & Ors. Vrs. Gobardhan Sao & Ors., (2002) 3 SCC
195, wherein, at paragraph-12, it has been held as hereunder:-
“12. Thus, it becomes plain that the expression “sufficient
cause” within the meaning of Section 5 of the Act or Order 22
Rule 9 of the Code or any other similar provision should receive
a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when
no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides is imputable to
a party. In a particular case whether explanation furnished
would constitute “sufficient cause” or not will be dependent
upon facts of each case. There cannot be a straitjacket formula
for accepting or rejecting explanation furnished for the delay
caused in taking steps. But one thing is clear that the courts
should not proceed with the tendency of finding fault with the
cause shown and reject the petition by a slipshod order in over-
jubilation of disposal drive. Acceptance of explanation
furnished should be the rule and refusal, an exception, more so
when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides can be
imputed to the defaulting party. On the other hand, while
considering the matter the courts should not lose sight of the
fact that by not taking steps within the time prescribed a
valuable right has accrued to the other party which should not
be lightly defeated by condoning delay in a routine-like
manner. However, by taking a pedantic and hypertechnical
view of the matter the explanation furnished should not be
rejected when stakes are high and/or arguable points of facts
and law are involved in the case, causing enormous loss and
irreparable injury to the party againstwhom the lis terminates,
either by default or inaction and defeating valuable right of
such a party to have the decision on merit. While considering
the matter, courts have to strike a balance between resultant
effect of the order it is going to pass upon the parties either
way.”
35. It is evident from the judgments referred hereinabove, wherein,
Page 10 of 14
expression ‘sufficient cause’ has been dealt with which means that
the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a
want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of
a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has “not acted
deliberately” or “remained inactive”.
36. Adverting to the factual cause shown on behalf of the appellant in the
instant delay condonation application, this Court in order to come to
the conclusion as to whether the cause shown at Para 3 and 5 jointly,
is to be considered or not, has gone through the aforesaid Para(s), for
ready reference, the same is being referred herein:
“3. That the Appellant/Petitioner is a widowed tribal
lady of 71 years reside in remote village of Khunti
which almost covered in jungle and she was not
aware of the case because she was not made party to
the writ application and she came to know about the
order when at village level they were informed by the
office.
……
5. That the appellants/petitioner were not aware of
the fact that the Letter Patent Application has to be
filed within a stipulated period of time and they came
to know only when they contacted his lawyer and
thereafter, they immediately filed the instant Letters
Patent Application.”
Page 11 of 14
37. The admitted fact herein is evident from the record of the W.P. (S) No.
5834 of 2019 that the present appellant was not arrayed as party to
the proceedings even though she is claiming that she is the first wife
of the deceased employee and the fact about the status of the present
appellant as the first wife of the deceased employee even has not
been disputed by the writ petitioner in the writ proceedings, the
respondent No. 5 herein.
38. This Court, in view of the aforesaid admitted fact, is of the view that
if a litigant is not a party, having interest upon the lis, and if she
comes to know about any order said to be of adverse interest to the
litigant, as the facts of the present case, the delay is to be condoned.
39. Therefore, this Court is of the view that whatever the grounds have
been taken in Para 3 and 5 of the interlocutory application, are
sufficient one to condone the delay of 791 days.
40. Accordingly, the delay of 791 days in filing of the present appeal i.e.
LPA No. 376 OF 2025 is hereby condoned.
41. The interlocutory application being I.A. No. 10459 of 2024 stands
allowed.
I.A. No. 13509 of 2024 (in LPA No. 108 OF 2025):
42. Since the delay of 412 days has been occurred in filing the letters
patent appeal being LPA No. 108 of 2025, as such, the instant
interlocutory application has been filed under Section 5 of the
Limitation Act with prayer to condone the said delay.
43. The cause of delay in filing the appeal has been shown in Para- 3 & 5
Page 12 of 14
of the said interlocutory application.
44. This Court has already considered the interlocutory application being
I.A. No. 10459 of 2024 filed in LPA No. 376 of 2025 above and after
going through the reasons mentioned in the I.A. No. 10459 of 2024,
said to be sufficient, the said interlocutory application has been
allowed.
45. Since the common issues are involved in both these appeals and
similar reasons are mentioned in the present interlocutory
application being I.A. No. 13509 of 2024, therefore, the same is being
allowed and hence disposed of.
46. Accordingly, the delay of 412 days in filing the instant appeal is
hereby condoned.
LPA No. 376 of 2025 & LPA No. 108 of 2025:
47. Nobody is present to represent the respondent in LPA No. 376 of
2025.
48. Mr. Rakesh Kr. Shahi, learned AC to Mr. Ratnesh Kumar, learned S.C.
(L&C)-I, is present to represent the State in L.P.A. No. 108 of 2025
and since both the appeals are arising out of same claim, this Court is
hereby directing Mr. Rakesh Kr. Shahi, learned counsel to represent
the State in LPA No. 376 of 2025 as well.
49. Mr. Rakesh Kr. Shahi, learned counsel representing the State had
sought for three weeks’ time to seek instruction and file counter-
affidavit.
50. Learned counsel appearing for the Accountant General Jharkhand
Page 13 of 14
waives notice in both the appeals.
51. Three weeks’ time is given to the learned counsel for the respondents
to file counter-affidavit.
52. Learned State counsel is also directed to come with the original
service record of the deceased employee on the next date of hearing.
53. List this matter on 7th April, 2026.
(Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.)
(Sanjay Prasad, J.)
16th March, 2026
Samarth
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