Supreme Court of India
Parameshwari vs The State Of Tamil Nadu on 17 February, 2026
Author: Rajesh Bindal
Bench: Rajesh Bindal
2026 INSC 164 REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. ……………..OF 2026
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (CRIMINAL) NO. 7495 OF 2021)
PARAMESHWARI ….APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
THE STATE OF TAMIL NADU …RESPONDENT(S)
& ORS.
JUDGMENT
VIJAY BISHNOI, J.
“नृपस्य परमो धममः प्रजानाां पररपालनम्।
दु ष्टानाां ग्रहणां ननत्यां ननत्यानाां च निनाशनम्॥”
The supreme objective of law is the protection of society
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
and creating a deterrence against crime by imposing
NIDHI AHUJA
Date: 2026.02.17
17:43:37 IST
adequate punishment.
Reason:
1
Leave Granted.
2. This appeal has been preferred by the Appellant
challenging the Judgment dated 18.12.2020 (hereinafter
referred to as “impugned judgment”) passed in Crl. R.C.
(MD) No. 121 of 2016 by the High Court of Judicature at
Madras, Madurai Bench (hereinafter referred to as “the High
Court”) wherein the criminal revision filed by the
Respondent No. 2 and Respondent No. 3 (hereinafter
referred to as “Private Respondents”) was allowed by the
High Court. The High Court upheld the conviction of Private
Respondents for the offences punishable under Section 307,
326 and 324 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter
referred to as “IPC”), but it modified the sentence awarded
to them from three years rigorous imprisonment along with
a fine of ₹ 5,000/- each (totalling to ₹ 10,000/-) to period
already undergone with an enhanced fine of ₹ 50,000/- each
(totalling to ₹ 1,00,000/-).
2
FACTUAL MATRIX
3. As per the prosecution story, Crime No. 142/2009 was
registered at Thiruppachethi Police Station, wherein it was
alleged that there was previous enmity between the victim
and the Private Respondents. On 06.06.2009 at about 03.00
PM, the Private Respondents came with knives, while the
other two accused persons came with sticks. The Private
Respondents stabbed the victim with knives on the left side
of the chest, in the left rib, abdomen, and on the right hand
palm. The other accused persons attacked the victim with
sticks, causing minor injuries. Further, it was also alleged
that the Private Respondents, along with the other accused
persons, have used abusive language against the victim.
4. During the investigation, the Private Respondents and
the other accused persons were arrested, and based on the
confessional statement of one of the other accused persons,
the knives used for committing the offence were discovered.
Further, the Police recorded the statements of the victim and
other witnesses. After completion of the investigation, a
3
charge sheet dated 25.06.2009 was filed under Sections
294(b), 323, 324, 326, and 307 of IPC against all the accused
persons (including the Private Respondents) before the Addl.
District Munsif cum Judicial Magistrate Court,
Manamadurai.
5. Subsequently, the Addl. District Munsif cum Judicial
Magistrate Court, Manamadurai, committed the case to the
District and Sessions Court, Sivagangai, which framed
charges under Sections 294(b), 326, and 307 of the IPC
against Respondent No 2 and under Sections 294(b), 324,
and 307 of the IPC against Respondent No 3, and under
Sections 294(b) and 323 of the IPC against the other accused
persons. Thereafter, the case was transferred by the District
and Sessions Court, Sivagangai, to the Chief Judicial
Magistrate cum Subordinate Court/ Assistant Sessions
Judge, Sivagangai (hereinafter referred to as “Trial Court”).
6. During the trial, the complainant Rajendran
(hereinafter referred to as “PW1”), deposed that he knew the
accused persons, including the Private Respondents, as they
4
belonged to his village. Further, PW1 reiterated the
complaint and stated that he took the victim to the
Thiruppachethi Police Station and lodged the complaint.
Further, the Appellant herein was examined as PW3, and the
victim was examined as PW2. Additionally, Dr.
Prabhakaran, who was examined as PW9, identified that the
victim had sustained four stab injuries, and that these types
of injuries, if not immediately treated, could be life-
threatening.
7. After analysing all the evidence produced before it, the
Trial Court vide its final order and judgment dated
28.11.2013, convicted the Private Respondents under
Section 307, 326 and 324 of the IPC. The Trial Court held
that the evidence of PW1, PW9, and the Appellant herein
were corroborating the evidence of the Victim. Further, the
other accused persons were acquitted of the charge under
Section 323 of the IPC, as the prosecution failed to prove
their guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Additionally, the Trial
Court acquitted all the accused persons, including the
5
Private Respondents, of the charge framed under Section
294(b) of the IPC.
8. Accordingly, the Trial Court sentenced the Private
Respondents to undergo rigorous imprisonment of three
years and to pay a fine of ₹ 5,000/- each, and failing which
to undergo a simple imprisonment for a period of one month,
under Section 307 of the IPC. It further held that there was
no requirement to award separate sentences under Sections
326 and 324 of the IPC.
9. Aggrieved, the Private Respondents filed Crl. Appeal
No. 55/2013 before the District Sessions Fast Track Mahila
Court, Sivagangai, challenging the judgment and final order
dated 28.11.2013 passed by the Trial Court.
10. The District Sessions Fast Track Mahila Court,
Sivagangai vide judgment and final order dated 23.02.2016,
dismissed the appeal preferred by the Private Respondents
and upheld the conviction and sentence awarded by the Trial
Court. The District Sessions Fast Track Mahila Court,
Sivagangai, held that the Private Respondents with the
6
motive and intention to murder the victim, have inflicted the
injuries on the victim. Additionally, they had the knowledge
that causing such bodily injury is sufficient in the ordinary
course of nature to cause death, and hence, the charge
under Section 307 of IPC is proved beyond doubt. Further,
it was also held that the occurrence of the incident had been
sufficiently corroborated by the oral evidence and medical
evidence on record.
11. Aggrieved, the Private Respondents preferred Criminal
Revision bearing Crl. R.C. (MD) No.121 of 2016 before the
High Court against the judgment dated 23.02.2016 passed
by the District Sessions Fast Track Mahila Court,
Sivagangai. During the pendency of the same, the victim
passed away on 10.04.2017 under circumstances not
germane to the present case. It appears that during the
pendency of the Criminal Revision bearing Crl. R.C. (MD)
No.121 of 2016, the Appellant herein (wife of the victim) was
impleaded as Respondent No. 2 pursuant to the order dated
13.08.2019 passed by the High Court.
7
12. Before the High Court, it was contended by the Private
Respondents that more than 10 ½ years had elapsed since
the occurrence of the alleged incident, and some other
persons had also murdered the victim. The Private
Respondents did not challenge their guilt; however, they
depicted their willingness to pay a sum of ₹ 1,00,000/- (₹
50,000/- each) to the Appellant herein.
13. Accepting the aforesaid contentions raised on behalf of
the Private Respondents, the High Court vide impugned
judgment, confirmed the conviction of the Private
Respondents but modified the sentence from rigorous
imprisonment for three years to the period of imprisonment
already undergone by them, i.e., two months. Further, the
High Court also enhanced the amount of the fine imposed
on the Private Respondents from ₹ 5,000/- each (totalling to
₹ 10,000/-) to a further sum of ₹ 50,000/- each (totalling to
₹ 1,00,000/-). The impugned judgment is reproduced
hereinbelow for reference:
8
“ORDER
1. The revision petitioners were prosecuted for the offences
under Sections 294(b), 323, 324, 326 and 307 of I.P.C. on
the file of the Chief Judicial Magistrate/Assistant Sessions
Judge, Sivagangai.
2. In support of the charges, the prosecution examined as
many as ten witnesses. The case of the prosecution is that
the accused herein stabbed the victim in the abdomen. The
victim was said to have been in hospital for about 20 days.
P.W.1 was the complainant. P.W.2 was the injured witness.
P.W.3 who is the second respondent herein is the wife of
P.W.2. The trial Judge, after going through the evidence on
record came to the conclusion that the prosecution had
proved its case beyond reasonable doubt. Vide Judgment
dated 28.11.2013, the learned trial Judge convicted both
the petitioners herein for the offences under Section 307 of
I.P.C. and sentenced each of them to undergo three years
Rigorous Imprisonment. Fine of Rs.5,000/- was also
imposed. Though they were also convicted for the other
charges, no separate sentence was awarded. Though there
were two other accused in this case, namely, accused Nos.3
and 4, they were acquitted. The same was put to challenge
in C.A.No.55 of 2013. Vide Judgment dated 23.02.2016, the
learned appellate Judge confirmed the conviction Judgment
of the trial Court and dismissed the appeal. Challenging the
same, this criminal revision case came to be filed.
3. Even before commencing the argument, the learned
counsel appearing for the revision petitioners submitted that
having regard to the evidence on record, he would not
challenge the finding of guilt. He only seeks modification in
the matter of sentence. He pointed out that the occurrence
had taken place way back in June 2009. More than 10½
years have elapsed. The petitioners did not come under any
adverse notice either before or after the occurrence. The
victim had been murdered by some other persons a few
years later. The petitioners are willing to pay a sum of
Rs.1,00,000/-as compensation (Rs.50,000/-each) to the
wife of the victim.
4. The petitioners had been in prison for about two months.
Taking note of all these aspects, even while confirming the
conviction imposed on the petitioners, the sentence of
imprisonment imposed on the petitioners is modified to the
period already undergone by them. The fine amount of
9
Rs.5,000/- each imposed on them is enhanced and the
petitioners are directed to pay a further sum of Rs.50,000/-
each (Totally Rs.1,00,000/-). The enhanced fine amount will
be paid by the petitioners within a period of eight weeks
from the date of receipt of a copy of this
order. The enhanced fine amount to be paid by the
petitioners will be handed over by the Court below to the
wife of the victim as compensation. The second respondent
herein Parameshwari, wife of the victim is represented by
her counsel. If the petitioners fail to deposit the enhanced
fine amount, they will have to undergo one year Rigorous
Imprisonment by way of default sentence.
5. In this view of the matter, the sentence imposed by the
impugned Judgment is modified and this criminal revision
case is partly allowed.”
CONTENTION OF THE PARTIES
14. Learned Counsel for the Appellant, Mr. A Velan, herein
primarily contended that the reduction of sentence to the
period already undergone by the High Court is illegal and
misplaced. It was submitted that the sentence must be
commensurate with the seriousness of the crime, as held by
this Court in State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Suresh
reported in (2019) 14 SCC 151, wherein it was observed that
it is the duty of the Court to award just and adequate
punishment to the wrongdoer, in proportion with the gravity
of the crime. Reliance was also placed on the judgment of
this Court passed in State of Madhya Pradesh vs.
10
Kashiram & Ors reported in (2009) 4 SCC 26, mentioning
that mere lapse of time is not a mitigating factor.
Additionally, with regard to compensating the victim’s
family, it was contended that additional compensation to a
victim who has passed away is fruitless. The learned
counsel, thus, contended that by relying on irrelevant
factors and reducing the sentence without cogent reasons,
the High Court exceeded its revisional jurisdiction.
15. Mr. V. Krishnamurthy, Learned Additional Advocate
General (hereinafter referred to as “AAG”) for the State of
Tamil Nadu, in tandem with the arguments led by the
counsel of Appellant, submitted that the High Court failed
to state cogent reasons for such a reduction in sentence,
which is an essential requirement as reiterated by this Court
in State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Mohan and others
reported in (2013) 14 SCC 116. The learned AAG has also
stated that freeing the accused of punishment would lead
them to flee from justice and might harm society as a whole.
It was further submitted that the punishment must be
11
commensurate with the gravity of the crime and that herein,
the High Court, while exercising its revisionary powers,
showed undue sympathy in reducing the sentence. He has
also pointed out to the fact that a three-year sentence as
imposed by the trial Court would not be improper based on
the heinous nature of the crime.
16. Mr. M.P. Parthibhan, learned counsel appearing for the
Private Respondents have contended before us that the
judgment of the High Court could not be faulted with as the
High Court had passed the order of reducing the sentence
after due consideration of all the relevant factors including
the time lapsed since the incident, the death of the victim
(attributable to murder in some other incident), and the
antecedents of the Private Respondents. It was further
contended that the Private Respondents were willing to pay
₹ 1,00,000/- (₹ 50,000/- each) as compensation to the family
of the victim and accordingly, the High Court had rightly
reduced the sentence from rigorous imprisonment for three
years to the period already undergone, i.e., 2 months and
12
increased the amount of fine from ₹ 10,000/- (₹ 5,000/-
each) to ₹ 1,00,000/- (₹ 50,000/- each). It was further
contended by the learned counsel for Private Respondents
that the High Court precisely took note of all the relevant
factors in reducing the sentence and increasing the fine
amount so as to reinforce the spirit of the criminal justice
system by affording the opportunity for reformation to the
Private Respondents.
ANALYSIS
17. To appreciate the contentious submissions made at the
bar, we have meticulously perused the petition and
appreciated the materials on record and the judgments of
the subordinate Courts. The only question that requires
determination in this appeal is whether the High Court was
justified in reducing the sentence awarded to the Private
Respondents.
18. It is required to be stated outrightly that the Trial Court
convicted the accused persons under Section 307, 324 and
326 of the IPC and sentenced them to undergo rigorous
13
imprisonment of three years and a fine of ₹ 5,000/- each
(totalling to ₹ 10,000/-). The High Court vide impugned
judgment maintained the conviction; however, it reduced the
sentence to the period already undergone, i.e., 2 months, in
a case wherein the accused persons inflicted life-threatening
injuries to the victim in an assault.
19. We are constrained to observe that the High Court
acted in complete defiance of the law and created a travesty
of the established criminal jurisprudence in arriving at its
conclusion. The High Court in the impugned judgment noted
that more than 10 ½ years had elapsed since the incident
and that the victim had been murdered by some other
persons a few years later. Based on these aspects, the High
Court modified the sentence awarded to the accused
persons. Apart from the above, the High Court failed to
reason out the circumstances, acting on which, it reduced
the sentence for such a heinous offence and thereby, erred
in not applying its judicial mind to accurately decide the
sentence.
14
20. Before we jump into the merits of the case, it is
quintessential to touch upon the foundational aspects of
criminal jurisprudence, including punishment, penology
and victimology.
21. While deliberating upon the desirability of punishment,
Prof. HLA Hart observed:
“We do not live in society in order to condemn though
we may condemn in order to live.” (HLA Hart’s
Punishment and Responsibility, pp. 182)The objective of punishment is not to seek vengeance for the
crime, rather, it is an attempt to reconstruct the damaged
social fabric of society in order to pull back its wheel on the
track.
22. The objective of punishment is to create an effective
deterrence so that the same crime/actions are prevented
and mitigated in future. The consideration to be kept in
mind while awarding punishment is to ensure that the
punishment should not be too harsh, but at the same time,
15
it should also not be too lenient so as to undermine its
deterrent effect.
23. This Court, in the judgment of Hazara Singh vs. Raj
Kumar and others reported in (2013) 9 SCC 516, held that
the cardinal principle of sentencing policy is that the
sentence imposed on an offender should be commensurate
to the crime committed and be proportionate to the gravity
of the offence. This Court therein held as under:
“11. The cardinal principle of sentencing policy is that the
sentence imposed on an offender should reflect the crime he
has committed and it should be proportionate to the gravity
of the offence. This Court has repeatedly stressed the
central role of proportionality in sentencing of offenders in
numerous cases.
XXXX
17. We reiterate that in operating the sentencing system,
law should adopt the corrective machinery or deterrence
based on factual matrix. The facts and given circumstances
in each case, the nature of the crime, the manner in which
it was planned and committed, the motive for commission of
the crime, the conduct of the accused, the nature of weapons
used and all other attending circumstances are relevant
facts which would enter into the area of consideration. We
also reiterate that undue sympathy to impose inadequate
sentences would do more harm to the justice system to
undermine the public confidence in the efficacy of law. It is
the duty of every court to award proper sentence having
regard to the nature of the offence and the manner in which
it was executed or committed. The court must not only keep
in view the rights of the victim of the crime but also the
society at large while considering the imposition of
appropriate punishment.”
(emphasis supplied)16
24. This objective was also reiterated by this Court in a
catena of judgments (see: Ahmed Hussein Vali Mohammed
Saiyed and Another vs. State of Gujarat reported in
(2009) 7 SCC 254); Guru Basvaraj Alias Benne Settappa
vs. State of Karnataka reported in (2012) 8 SCC 734 and
various others) wherein it was held that the object of
awarding appropriate sentences is that society should be
protected and the crimes should be deterred. The balancing
has to be done between the rights of the accused and the
needs of the society at large.
25. This Court in the judgment of State of M.P. vs.
Saleem Alias Chamaru and Another reported in (2005) 5
SCC 554 was dealing with the validity of the judgment of the
High Court wherein the High Court had reduced the
sentence awarded to the accused (in conviction under
Sections 307 and 330 of the IPC) from 5 years to the period
already undergone, i.e., six months and 23 days. This Court,
therein, while setting aside the judgment of the High Court,
held that undue sympathy shown towards the accused while
17
imposing an inadequate sentence would do more harm to
society and erode the trust of the public in the justice
system. The Court therein held as follows:
“…6. Undue sympathy to impose inadequate sentence
would do more harm to the justice system to undermine the
public confidence in the efficacy of law and society could not
long endure under such serious threats. It is, therefore, the
duty of every court to award proper sentence having regard
to the nature of the offence and the manner in which it was
executed or committed, etc. This position was illuminatingly
stated by this Court in Sevaka Perumal v. State of T.N.
[(1991) 3 SCC 471 : 1991 SCC (Cri) 724 : AIR 1991 SC 1463]
7. After giving due consideration to the facts and
circumstances of each case, for deciding just and
appropriate sentence to be awarded for an offence, the
aggravating and mitigating factors and circumstances in
which a crime has been committed are to be delicately
balanced on the basis of really relevant circumstances in a
dispassionate manner by the court. Such act of balancing is
indeed a difficult task. It has been very aptly indicated in
Dennis Councle McGautha v. State of California [402 US 183
: 28 L Ed 2d 711 (1971)] that no formula of a foolproof nature
is possible that would provide a reasonable criterion in
determining a just and appropriate punishment in the
infinite variety of circumstances that may affect the gravity
of the crime. In the absence of any foolproof formula which
may provide any basis for reasonable criteria to correctly
assess various circumstances germane to the consideration
of gravity of crime, the discretionary judgment in the facts
of each case, is the only way in which such judgment may
be equitably distinguished.
8. The object should be to protect society and to deter the
criminal in achieving the avowed object of law by imposing
appropriate sentence. It is expected that the courts would
operate the sentencing system so as to impose such
sentence which reflects the conscience of the society and the
sentencing process has to be stern where it should be.
18
9. Imposition of sentence without considering its effect on
the social order in many cases may be in reality a futile
exercise. The social impact of the crime e.g. where it relates
to offences against women, dacoity, kidnapping,
misappropriation of public money, treason and other
offences involving moral turpitude or moral delinquency
which have great impact on social order and public interest,
cannot be lost sight of and per se require exemplary
treatment. Any liberal attitude by imposing meagre
sentences or taking too sympathetic view merely on account
of lapse of time in respect of such offences will be resultwise
counterproductive in the long run and against societal
interest which needs to be cared for and strengthened by a
string of deterrence inbuilt in the sentencing system.
10. The court will be failing in its duty if appropriate
punishment is not awarded for a crime which has been
committed not only against the individual victim but also
against the society to which the criminal and victim belong.
The punishment to be awarded for a crime must not be
irrelevant but it should conform to and be consistent with
the atrocity and brutality with which the crime has been
perpetrated, the enormity of the crime warranting public
abhorrence and it should “respond to the society’s cry for
justice against the criminal”.”
26. The view taken by this Court in Saleem (supra) has
been consistently reiterated by this Court in a series of
judgments, including State of Punjab vs. Saurabh Bakshi
reported in (2015) 5 SCC 182, State of Punjab vs. Dil
Bahadur reported in (2023) 18 SCC 183 and several others.
27. This Court, while again discussing the same issue in
Suresh (supra) reiterated that the Courts must keep in mind
several factors, while imposing or reducing the sentence of
19
any accused. The Court therein also held that sentencing is
awarding just and adequate punishment to the wrongdoer,
and is the primary duty of the courts. The relevant portion
of the said judgment is reproduced herein under:
“11. In State of M.P. v. Ghanshyam Singh [State of M.P. v.
Ghanshyam Singh, (2003) 8 SCC 13 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 1935]
, relating to the offence punishable under Section 304 Part I
IPC, this Court found sentencing for a period of 2 years to
be too inadequate and even on a liberal approach, found the
custodial sentence of 6 years serving the ends of justice.
This Court underscored the principle of proportionality in
prescribing liability according to the culpability; and while
also indicating the societal angle of sentencing, cautioned
that undue sympathy leading to inadequate sentencing
would do more harm to the justice system and undermine
public confidence in the efficacy of law. This Court observed,
inter alia, as under: (SCC pp. 19-21, paras 12-15, 17 & 19)“12. Therefore, undue sympathy to impose
inadequate sentence would do more harm to the
justice system to undermine the public confidence
in the efficacy of law and society could not long
endure under such serious threats. It is, therefore,
the duty of every court to award proper sentence
having regard to the nature of the offence and the
manner in which it was executed or committed,
etc. This position was illuminatingly stated by this
Court in Sevaka Perumal v. State of T.N. [Sevaka
Perumal v. State of T.N., (1991) 3 SCC 471 : 1991
SCC (Cri) 724]
13. Criminal law adheres in general to the
principle of proportionality in prescribing liability
according to the culpability of each kind of
criminal conduct. It ordinarily allows some
significant discretion to the Judge in arriving at a
sentence in each case, presumably to permit
sentences that reflect more subtle considerations
of culpability that are raised by the special facts
of each case. Judges, in essence, affirm that20
punishment ought always to fit the crime; yet in
practice sentences are determined largely by
other considerations. Sometimes it is the
correctional needs of the perpetrator that are
offered to justify a sentence, sometimes the
desirability of keeping him out of circulation, and
sometimes even the tragic results of his crime.
Inevitably, these considerations cause a
departure from just deserts as the basis of
punishment and create cases of apparent
injustice that are serious and widespread.
14. Proportion between crime and punishment is
a goal respected in principle, and in spite of errant
notions, it remains a strong influence in the
determination of sentences. The practice of
punishing all serious crimes with equal severity is
now unknown in civilised societies, but such a
radical departure from the principle of
proportionality has disappeared from the law only
in recent times. Even now for a single grave
infraction drastic sentences are imposed.
Anything less than a penalty of greatest severity
for any serious crime is thought then to be a
measure of toleration that is unwarranted and
unwise. But in fact, quite apart from those
considerations that make punishment
unjustifiable when it is out of proportion to the
crime, uniformly disproportionate punishment has
some very undesirable practical consequences.
15. After giving due consideration to the facts and
circumstances of each case, for deciding just and
appropriate sentence to be awarded for an
offence, the aggravating and mitigating factors
and circumstances in which a crime has been
committed are to be delicately balanced on the
basis of really relevant circumstances in a
dispassionate manner by the court. Such act of
balancing is indeed a difficult task. It has been
very aptly indicated in McGautha v. California
[McGautha v. California, 1971 SCC OnLine US SC
89 : 28 L Ed 2d 711 : 402 US 183 (1971)] that no
formula of a foolproof nature is possible that
would provide a reasonable criterion in
determining a just and appropriate punishment in
the infinite variety of circumstances that may
affect the gravity of the crime. In the absence of
21
any foolproof formula which may provide any
basis for reasonable criteria to correctly assess
various circumstances germane to the
consideration of gravity of crime, the discretionary
judgment in the facts of each case is the only way
in which such judgment may be equitably
distinguished.
***
17. Imposition of sentence without considering its
effect on the social order in many cases may be in
reality a futile exercise. The social impact of the
crime e.g. where it relates to offences against
women, dacoity, kidnapping, misappropriation of
public money, treason and other offences
involving moral turpitude or moral delinquency
which have great impact on social order and
public interest cannot be lost sight of and per se
require exemplary treatment. Any liberal attitude
by imposing meagre sentences or taking too
sympathetic a view merely on account of lapse of
time in respect of such offences will be resultwise
counterproductive in the long run and against
societal interest which needs to be cared for and
strengthened by a string of deterrence inbuilt in
the sentencing system.
***
19. Similar view has also been expressed in Ravji
v. State of Rajasthan [Ravji v. State of Rajasthan,
(1996) 2 SCC 175 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 225] . It has
been held in the said case that it is the nature and
gravity of the crime but not the criminal, which are
germane for consideration of appropriate
punishment in a criminal trial. The court will be
failing in its duty if appropriate punishment is not
awarded for a crime which has been committed
not only against the individual victim but also
against the society to which the criminal and
victim belong. The punishment to be awarded for
a crime must not be irrelevant but it should
conform to and be consistent with the atrocity and
brutality with which the crime has been
perpetrated, the enormity of the crime warranting
public abhorrence and it should ‘respond to the
society’s cry for justice against the criminal’.”
(emphasis supplied)
22
XXXXXX
13. Therefore, awarding of just and adequate punishment
to the wrongdoer in case of proven crime remains a part of
duty of the court. The punishment to be awarded in a case
has to be commensurate with the gravity of crime as also
with the relevant facts and attending circumstances. Of
course, the task is of striking a delicate balance between
the mitigating and aggravating circumstances. At the same
time, the avowed objects of law, of protection of society and
responding to the society’s call for justice, need to be kept in
mind while taking up the question of sentencing in any given
case. In the ultimate analysis, the proportion between the
crime and punishment has to be maintained while further
balancing the rights of the wrongdoer as also of the victim
of the crime and the society at large. No straitjacket formula
for sentencing is available but the requirement of taking a
holistic view of the matter cannot be forgotten.
14. In the process of sentencing, any one factor, whether of
extenuating circumstance or aggravating, cannot, by itself,
be decisive of the matter. In the same sequence, we may
observe that mere passage of time, by itself, cannot be a
clinching factor though, in an appropriate case, it may be of
some bearing, along with other relevant factors. Moreover,
when certain extenuating or mitigating circumstances are
suggested on behalf of the convict, the other factors relating
to the nature of crime and its impact on the social order and
public interest cannot be lost sight of.”
28. At this juncture, it is also imperative for us to mention
that retribution is not the ultimate aim of our criminal
justice system, rather it hinges on principles of reformation
and restitution. The criminal justice system aims to achieve
the twin objectives of creating a deterrence against crime
and also providing an opportunity for reformation to the
23
offender. Due consideration has also been provided by our
legal system to the rights of the victim, who essentially are
the first sufferers of the crime.
29. Section 395 of the Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita,
2023 (herein referred to as “BNSS”) (alternatively Section
357 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973) recognises the
loss caused to the victim and accordingly provides for
granting monetary compensation to the victim. The said
provision of victim compensation is not an alternative to the
sentence or punishment imposed, however, the
compensation is just an addition to the sentence already
awarded.
30. The provision of victim compensation finds its roots in
victimology, which acknowledges victims as the primary
sufferers of the crime and advocates the idea of providing
some relief to the victims from their grief and suffering. The
rationale behind victim compensation is to rehabilitate the
victim for the loss and injury caused to them as a direct
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consequence of the crime or offence and not to exonerate the
offender/accused from their culpability.
31. The practice of enhancing the compensation payable to
the victim and reducing the sentence, especially in cases of
grave offence, is dangerous as it might send a wrong
message to society that the offenders/accused persons can
absolve themselves from their liability by merely paying a
monetary consideration.
32. Compensation payable to the victim is only restitutory
in nature, and it cannot be considered as equivalent to or a
substitute for punishment. Punishment is punitive in
nature, and its object is to create an adequate deterrence
against the said crime and to send a social message to the
miscreants that any violation of the moral turpitude of
society would come with consequences, which cannot
merely be “purchased by money”.
33. It would be apt to discuss the judgment of this Court
in the Shivani Tyagi vs. State of U.P. & Another reported
in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 842, wherein this bench through
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one of us (Rajesh Bindal, J.) while concurring with the
judgment was dealing with a horrendous situation where in
an offence related to acid attack, the High Court suspended
the sentence of the accused in lieu of payment of ₹ 25 lakhs
to the victim for medical treatment. The High Court went to
the extent of directing the payment to be deposited with the
court when the victim refused to accept the said amount.
This Court while setting aside the judgment of the High
Court termed that such payment was kind of “Blood Money”
to the victim by the offenders. The relevant extracts from the
said judgment are reproduced herein below:
“22. From the facts it can safely be noticed that there is no
question of acceptance of money by the victim as she has
challenged the order of suspension of sentence of the private
respondents.
XXXXXX
27. The impugned order passed by the High Court is
perused. Specifically the order dated 21.02.2024 passed in
the Correction Application. The order does not suggest that
there was any consideration of the parameters laid down
by this court for grant of bail or suspension of sentence.
Instead, the High Court had noticed and directed that the
convicts have offered to pay compensation to the victim for
grant of suspension of sentence, which when she refused to
accept, was directed to be deposited in the court. It was in
a way kind of “Blood Money” offered by the convicts to the
victim for which there is no acceptability in our criminal
justice system.”
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34. The misplaced understanding of various courts in
treating compensation as a substitute of sentence is both a
matter of concern and a practice which should be
condemned. We have observed a trend amongst various High
Courts wherein the sentences awarded to the accused
persons by the Trial Court are reduced capriciously and
mechanically, without any visible application of judicial
mind. Considering the gravity of the situation as thus, we
have culled out certain basic factors, which are to be kept in
mind by the courts while dealing with imposition of
sentence, in line with the view taken by this Court in the
aforementioned cases. The said factors are enunciated as
below:
A. Proportionality: Adherence to the principle of
“just deserts” ought to be the primary duty of the courts.
There should be proportionality between the crime
committed and the punishment awarded, keeping in
consideration the gravity of the offence.
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B. Consideration to Facts and Circumstances:
Due consideration must be given to the facts and
circumstances of the case, including the allegations,
evidence and the findings of the trial court.
C. Impact on Society: While imposing sentences,
the courts shall bear in mind that crimes essentially
impair the social fabric of the society (of which the
victim(s) is/are an indispensable part) and erodes public
trust. The sentence should be adequate to maintain the
public trust in law and administration, however, caution
should also be taken, and the Court shall not be swayed
by the outrage or emotions of the public and must
decide the question independently.
D. Aggravating and Mitigating Factors: The
courts, while deciding the sentence or modifying the
sentence, must weigh the circumstances in which the
crime was committed, and while doing so, the court
must strike a fair balance between the aggravating and
the mitigating factors.
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35. In the present case, the testimonies on record of the
PW1 (the complainant), PW2 (the victim), and PW3 (the
Appellant herein), when taken conjointly, clearly establishes
existence of prior enmity between the victim and the Private
Respondents herein who had caused injuries to the victim.
Further, these testimonies have been corroborated by the
statements of PW9 (Doctor), who had stated that the victim
suffered 4 stab injuries, which were grievous in nature to the
extent that, if not given immediate care, could have been life-
threatening.
36. We have carefully considered the decisions of the Trial
Court, and are of the view that the Trial Court rightly
convicted the Private Respondents under Sections 307, 324
and 326 of the IPC as the injuries were grievous and life-
threatening. This decision was further affirmed, correctly so,
by the District and Sessions Fast Track Mahila Court,
Sivagangai.
37. Thereafter, the High Court, while exercising its
revisionary powers, very ignominiously reduced the
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sentence of the Private Respondents to the period already
undergone. The High Court was so undesirous to even
glance through the fact that the Trial Court had already
taken into consideration all the relevant factors while
imposing the sentence and showed adequate leniency while
awarding sentence of rigorous imprisonment for three years
only, whereas the maximum punishment permissible for the
offence under Section 307 of the IPC is ten years.
Additionally, the undue sympathy shown by the High Court
herein was totally unwarranted, and such displays of overt
sentiments risk undermining the administration of justice,
as it is imperative that justice is not merely done but also
seen to be done.
38. In light of the above discussion, we are of the view that
the impugned judgment warrants interference and is,
therefore, set aside. Further, the judgment of conviction and
sentence dated 28.11.2013 passed by the Chief Judicial
Magistrate/Assistant Sessions Judge, Sivagangai and later
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confirmed by the District Sessions Fast Track Mahila Court,
Sivagangai, are affirmed. The appeal stands allowed.
39. We direct that the Private Respondents must surrender
before the Trial Court within four weeks from today and shall
serve the remaining part of the sentence awarded to them.
The Trial Court shall ensure that they serve the remaining
sentence, after adjustment of the period already undergone
by them. In case the Private Respondents fail to surrender
within the stipulated time, the Trial Court shall take
appropriate steps as permissible under the law to ensure
compliance of the above stated directions.
40. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.
………………………., J.
(RAJESH BINDAL)
………………………., J.
(VIJAY BISHNOI)
NEW DELHI;
FEBRUARY 17, 2026.
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