Andhra Pradesh High Court – Amravati
P.Ravindranath Reddy vs The Ap Mineral Development Corporation … on 5 March, 2026
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH : AMARAVATI
****
Writ Petition Nos. 27043, 22654, 22682, 22879, 23081, 23092, 23102, 23117,
23123, 23399, 23430, 24785, 24904, 24908, 31749 of 2014
Between:
1. P.Ravindranath Reddy, S/o. Gurivi reddy, Aged about 52 years, R/o
Mangampet Village, Obulavaripalli Mandal, Y.S.R. District and Others
...Petitioner(s)
And
1. The AP Mineral Development Corporation Ltd, Represented by its Vice
Chairman Cum Managing Director, 3rd Floor, HMWSSB Premises,
Khairatabad, Hyderabad and Others
...Respondent(s):
DATE OF JUDGMENT PRONOUNCED: 05.03.2026
SUBMITTED FOR APPROVAL:
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE GANNAMANENI RAMAKRISHNA PRASAD
1. Whether Reporters of Local Newspapers
may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes / No
2. Whether the copies of judgment may be
marked to Law Reporters / Journals? Yes / No
3. Whether His Lordship wish to
see the fair copy of the Judgment? Yes / No
____________________________________________
GANNAMANENI RAMAKRISHNA PRASAD, J
2
* THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE GANNAMANENI RAMAKRISHNA PRASAD
+ Writ Petition Nos. 27043, 22654, 22682, 22879, 23081, 23092, 23102, 23117,
23123, 23399, 23430, 24785, 24904, 24908, 31749 of 2014
% 05.03.2026
Between:
1. P.Ravindranath Reddy, S/o. Gurivi reddy, Aged about 52 years, R/o
Mangampet Village, Obulavaripalli Mandal, Y.S.R. District and Others
...Petitioner(s)
And
1. The AP Mineral Development Corporation Ltd, Represented by its Vice
Chairman Cum Managing Director, 3rd Floor, HMWSSB Premises,
Khairatabad, Hyderabad and Others
...Respondent(s):
! Counsel for Petitioner : Sri L.J. Veera Reddy, learned Counsel for
the Writ Petitioners.
^ Counsel for Respondents : Sri N. Jeevan Kumar, learned Counsel for
the Respondents
< Gist:
> Head Note:
? Cases referred:
(2014) 3 SCC 183
(2020) 8 SCC 129
(2017) 13 SCC 474
(2013) 11 SCC 531
S.L.P.(C) No.10490 of 2022
2023 SCC OnLine SC 396
3
APHC010781412014
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
AT AMARAVATI [3328]
(Special Original Jurisdiction)
THURSDAY
THURSDAY, THE FIFTH DAY OF MARCH
TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY SIX
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE GANNAMANENI RAMAKRISHNA
PRASAD
Writ Petition Nos. 27043, 22654, 22682, 22879, 23081, 23092, 23102, 23117,
23123, 23399, 23430, 24785, 24904, 24908, 31749 of 2014
COMMON ORDER:
Heard Sri L.J. Veera Reddy, learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners and
Sri N. Jeevan Kumar, learned Counsel for the Respondents.
2. Common facts and common issues are involved in the present batch of
Writ Petitions. Therefore, for the purpose of narration of facts,
fac the facts
mentioned in W.P.No.27043
No.27043 of 2014 are referred to in this Order.
3. The Prayer in Writ Petition No.27043 of 2014 is as follows:
“It is therefore prayed that this Hon’ble High Court may be
pleased, to issue a writ, order or direction more particularly one in
the nature of writ of Mandamus declaring the action of the
respondents particularly 3rd respondent
ondent in directing the petitioner
to vacate and handover the possession of land of 0.54 Acres in Sy.
No. 39/10 of Mangampet Village, Obulavaripalli Mandal,
Y.S.R.District vide notice under Ref. No.
APMDC/LA/StructuresNotice/ dated 10.12.2013 though award is
dated 04.09.2002 as illegal, unjust, arbitrary, without jurisdiction
and against statutory provisions including Sec 24(2) of The Right to
Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition,
Rehabilitation and resettlement Act, 2013 and consequently set-
4
aside the notice issued by the 3rd respondent under Ref. No.
APMDC/LA/Structures/Notice/ dated 10.12.2013 and pass such
other order or orders as this Hon’ble High Court may deem fit and
proper in the circumstances of the case.”
4. The above Prayer would indicate that the Writ Petitioner has received the
Impugned Notice issued by the Andhra Pradesh Mineral Development
Corporation Limited (APMDC) (Respondent No.1), bearing Ref. No.
APMDC/LA/Structures/Notice dated 10.12.2013 (Ex.P.1). The Writ Petitioners in
the other Writ Petitions have also received similar Notices, which have been
challenged in the present batch of Writ Petitions.
Facts in Writ Petition No.27043 of 2014:-
5. The facts that emerge in W.P.No.27043 of 2014 are that the father of the
Writ Petitioner possessed patta land of an extent of Ac.0.54 cents in Sy. No.
39/10 of Mangampet Village, Obulavaripalli Mandal, Y.S.R. District; that the
father of the Writ Petitioner also possessed a house in the same location; that at
the behest of Respondent No.1, the Land Acquisition Officer (Respondent No. 2)
has initiated Land Acquisition Proceedings under The Land Acquisition Act, 1894
in the year 2003; that the land was sought to be acquired for the purpose of
mining ‘barytes’ by Respondent No.1; that an extent of Ac.0.54 cents and the
house belonging to the father of the Writ Petitioner were taken over by
Respondent No.2 in the year 2012 itself; that on 04.09.2002, Award
No.H.88/2001 was passed, thereby fixing compensation at the rate of Rs.450 per
each cent, which was paid to the father of the Writ Petitioner; that the father of
the Writ Petitioner had received the compensation under protest; that despite the
fact that the land was taken long ago, the Writ Petitioner would contend that he
and the other Writ Petitioners in the present batch of Writ Petitions were never
dispossessed of the land and continued to carry on agricultural activities in the
5
acquired land; and that the Writ Petitioner in W.P.No.27043 of 2014 would
contend that he has been raising paddy crop in the subject land.
6. The facts in this Writ Petition would further indicate that Respondent
Nos.1 and 3 issued the Impugned Notice bearing Ref. No.
APMDC/LA/Structures/Notice/ dated 10.12.2013 (Ex.P.1), directing the Writ
Petitioners to vacate the site on or before July 2014; that since no action was
taken from the date of issuance of the Impugned Notice on 10.12.2013 till July
2014, the Writ Petitioners continued to enjoy the subject land; and that in the
month of August 2014, when Respondent Nos.1 and 3 insisted on handing over
possession of the land, the Writ Petitioners had faced the threat of dispossession
by police force. Therefore, the Writ Petitioners in the present batch of Writ
Petitions have approached this Court by filing the present batch of Writ Petitions.
7. Vide Order dated 12.09.2014, the learned Single Judge of this Court in
W.P.M.P.No.33814 of 2014 in W.P.No.27043 of 2014 was pleased to pass the
following Interim Order:
“WPMP.No.33814 of 2014
It is submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that this
Court in similar circumstances granted interim order dated
08.08.2014 in WPMP.No.28410 of 2014 in W.P.No.22651 of 2014
and the same is not disputed by the learned Standing counsel for
the respondents.
Since it is stated that the petitioner is in physical possession of
the acquired land, in spite of an award having been passed on
04.09.2002, the acquisition proceedings would lapse. Therefore,
the respondents are not entitled to dispossess the petitioner from
the land under his occupation.
Therefore, there shall be interim direction as prayed for.”
8. Similar Interim Orders were obtained by the other Writ Petitioners. As it
can be seen from the above extract of the Interim Order dated 12.09.2014 that
the learned Single Judge has passed the Interim Order by following another
6
Interim Order passed in W.P.M.P.No.28410 of 2014 in W.P.No.22516 of 2014.
This W.P.No.22516 of 2014 is still pending on the file of this Court.
CONTENTIONS OF THE WRIT PETITIONERS:-
9. The Writ Petitioners contend that even though the Award was passed on
04.09.2002 and compensation was received under protest, neither Respondent
No.2 nor Respondent Nos.1 and 3 have ever dispossessed the Writ Petitioners
from the said land; that therefore, they continued to carry-on agricultural activities
until the Impugned Notices were issued. It is further contended that the Writ
Petitioners have been in possession of the said land for more than 12 years after
the passing of the Award, and therefore the Official Respondent Nos.1 and 3
cannot now take forcible possession from them.
10. It is also contended that the only method known to Law is to acquire the
land afresh by invoking the provisions of The Right to Fair Compensation and
Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act,
2013 (Act 30 of 2013) and pay the compensation once again. It is also
contended that, in view of the long passage of time, the earlier Proceedings
would lapse.
11. The Writ Petitioners have placed reliance on Section 24(2) of Act 30 of
2013. The said Provision is usefully extracted hereunder:
Section 24 of Act 30 of 2013:-
“24. Land acquisition process under Act No. 1 of 1894 shall be
deemed to have lapsed in certain cases.-
(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, in any case of
land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition
Act, 1894,–
(a) where no award under section 11 of the said Land Acquisition
Act has been made, then, all provisions of this Act relating to the
determination of compensation shall apply; or
7
(b) where an award under said section 11 has been made, then
such proceedings shall continue under the provisions of the said
Land Acquisition Act, as if the said Act has not been repealed.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), in case
of land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition
Act, 1894, where an award under the said Section 11 has been
made five years or more prior to the commencement of this Act but
the physical possession of the land has not been taken or the
compensation has not been paid, the said proceedings shall be
deemed to have lapsed and the appropriate Government, if it so
chooses, shall initiate the proceedings of such land acquisition
afresh in accordance with the provisions of this Act:
Provided that where an award has been made and
compensation in respect of a majority of land holdings has not
been deposited in the account of the beneficiaries, then all
beneficiaries specified in the notification for acquisition under
Section 4 of the said Land Acquisition Act shall be entitled to
compensation in accordance with the provisions of this Act.”
CONTENTIONS OF RESPONDENT NOS.1 AND 3 – APMDC:-
12. The Andhra Pradesh Mineral Development Corporation Limited
(Respondent No1) has filed Counter-Affidavit on 28.11.2014 along with
Interlocutory Application bearing W.V.M.P.No.3700 of 2014 in
W.P.M.P.No.33814 of 2014 in W.P.No.27043 of 2014, seeking to vacate the
Interim Order dated 12.09.2014.
13. It is contended by Respondent Nos.1 & 3 that the said land not only stood
acquired but possession was also taken long time ago by invoking The Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 vide Proceedings of the Mandal Revenue Officer,
Rajampet dated 19.03.2005; that Mutation was also carried out in the Revenue
Records to this effect; that once possession was taken by Respondent No.1, the
question of the Writ Petitioners being in possession does not arise; that as per
the Award dated 04.09.2002, the father of the Writ Petitioner in W.P.No.27043 of
2014 and all others have received compensation for the subject land at the rate
8
of Rs.47,450/- per acre; that all the other entitlements and the benefits as per the
Statute were also paid to the Writ Petitioners.
14. It is further contended in the Counter-Affidavit that, as per Regulation
164(1)(b) of the Metalliferous Mines Regulations, 1961, the Corporation
(Respondent No.1) is required to maintain a 300-meter buffer-zone around the
mining site free from any activity whenever mining is carried out in the contiguous
area; that for the purpose of maintaining the buffer-zone, open area around the
mining operations is maintained; and that certain third parties took undue
advantage of this vacant site and on a stray basis, they have made some
encroachments, and they happen to be the same persons for whom
compensation has already been paid as per the Awards.
15. It is further contended by Respondent Nos.1 and 3 that the Writ Petitioners
have been paid compensation way back on 04.09.2002 as per the Provisions of
the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and therefore initiating fresh Land Acquisition
Proceedings under Act 30 of 2013 does not arise, and the said Act 30 of 2013
has no application to the facts of this case at all.
16. It was also contended that, the buffer-zone is required to be kept free from
habitation and public movement, as the area around the mining area is
designated as ‘danger zone’, and there is a likelihood of impact of mining
activities in the periphery. These norms have been followed by Respondent No.1
Corporation as per the rules and regulations issued by the DGMS (Mines Safety).
17. It is also contended that, taking undue advantage of the 300 meters of the
buffer-zone, certain third parties, including the Writ Petitioners herein, occupied
the area towards the end of the year 2013 and the beginning of the year 2014,
for which Respondent Nos.1 and 3 have initiated the process of eviction by
following due process of law.
9
18. Along with the Counter-Affidavit, the Respondents have placed on record
Annexure Nos.1 to 3 to establish that the persons who have been dispossessed
under the Land Acquisition Act not only received compensation but also other
rehabilitation benefits like confirmation of job for one person in the family and a
site for construction of house. It is also submitted that Rs.1,00,000/- per family
was paid long ago to the affected persons to enable them to build a house. It is
contended that, in terms of the Award passed by the Land Acquisition Officer,
Respondent Nos.1 and 3 have implemented the Rehabilitation and Resettlement
Package (R&R Package). The Respondents have also satisfied the ‘charter of
demands’ submitted by the Claimants, pursuant to which the R&R Package was
conceded in favour of the Claimants and their families who lost their lands.
19. It is pertinent to mention that the Writ Petitioners have neither denied nor
have they rebutted the averments in the Counter Affidavit by filing a Rejoinder.
Analysis:
20. The admitted facts in this case are that Barytes Mining was sought to be
carried out in the land situated around Mangampet Village, Obulavaripalli
Mandal, Y.S.R. District for the purpose of mining Barytes. For this purpose, the
Land Acquisition Proceedings were initiated under the Land Acquisition Act,
1894 in the year 2003. Possessions were taken by the Mandal Revenue Officer,
Rajampet, vide Proceedings dated 19.03.2005 and the acquired land was
handed over to Respondent Nos.1 and 3. It is also an admitted fact that Mutation
was carried out in the Revenue Records as regards the land that stood vested in
Respondent No.1.
21. It is also an admitted fact that compensation was paid as per the Award
along with other emoluments and benefits. In addition to this, Respondent No.1
10
has also adhered to the R&R Package conceived by the Government at that
point of time.
22. It transpires from the facts and material on record that the Writ Petitioners
have not been able to produce any material to show that possession was never
taken from them and that they continued to enjoy the same land for more than 12
years after the Award has been passed. Even assuming that the actual physical
possession of land remained with the Writ Petitioners from 2003 to 2014, it would
not confer any legally enforceable right on the Writ Petitioners because they all
have received the compensation. Even this assumption as regards physical
possession of land is not required to be gone into in this case, in the light of the
fact that the Respondent Nos.1 and 3 have specifically averred in the Counter
Affidavit that the Mandal Revenue Officer of Rajampet has taken physical
possession of the land from the Claimants (Writ Petitioners here) vide
Proceedings dated 19.03.2005 and the mutation was also effected in this regard.
The Respondent Nos.1 and 3 have also averred that the Writ Petitioners have
trespassed into the buffer-zone in the year 2013, for which the Respondent No.3
had issued Impugned Notice for eviction in December-2013. The averment of the
Respondents that possession was taken over on 19.03.2005 and mutation was
effected and that the Writ Petitioners have trespassed into the buffer-zone during
the end of the year 2013 have not been either denied or rebutted by the Writ
Petitioners by filing a Rejoinder to the Counter Affidavit. In this view of the matter,
this Court would safely deem it that the Writ Petitioners do not have a semblance
of any right to stay in possession of the acquired property.
23. Admittedly, the Impugned Notice was issued in the month of December
2013 to all the Writ Petitioners, directing them to vacate, failing which they would
be evicted forcefully. The Interim Order passed by this Court on 12.09.2014
would indicate that the learned Single Judge proceeded on the premise that,
11
after acquisition of the land, if the Claimants continued to be in peaceful
possession of the land despite the Award having been passed, and therefore the
earlier Acquisition Proceedings would lapse.
24. The Writ Petitioners have placed reliance on the Judgment rendered by
the Hon’ble Apex Court in Pune Municipal Corporation and Another v.
Harakchand Misirimal Solanki and Others : (2014) 3 SCC 183, wherein the
Hon’ble Apex Court interpreted Section 24(2) of Act 30 of 2013, as set out in
Paragraph Nos.11 and 19:
“11. Section 24(2) also begins with non obstante clause. This
provision has overriding effect over Section 24(1). Section 24(2)
enacts that in relation to the land acquisition proceedings initiated
under the 1894 Act, where an award has been made five years or
more prior to the commencement of the 2013 Act and either of the
two contingencies is satisfied viz. (i) physical possession of the
land has not been taken, or (ii) the compensation has not been
paid; such acquisition proceedings shall be deemed to have
lapsed. On the lapse of such acquisition proceedings, if the
appropriate Government still chooses to acquire the land which
was the subject-matter of acquisition under the 1894 Act then it
has to initiate the proceedings afresh under the 2013 Act. The
proviso appended to Section 24(2) deals with a situation where in
respect of the acquisition initiated under the 1894 Act an award
has been made and compensation in respect of a majority of
landholdings has not been deposited in the account of the
beneficiaries then all the beneficiaries specified in the Section 4
notification become entitled to compensation under the 2013 Act.
12. XXXX
13. XXXX
14. XXXX
15. XXXX
16. XXXX
17. XXXX
18. XXXX
19. Now, this is admitted position that award was made on 31-1-
2008. Notices were issued to the landowners to receive the
compensation and since they did not receive the compensation,
the amount (Rs 27 crores) was deposited in the Government
treasury. Can it be said that deposit of the amount of compensation
in the Government treasury is equivalent to the amount of
12compensation paid to the landowners/persons interested? We do
not think so. In a comparatively recent decision, this Court in
Agnelo Santimano Fernandes [Ivo Agnelo Santimano Fernandes v.
State of Goa, (2011) 11 SCC 506 : (2011) 4 SCC (Civ) 268] ,
relying upon the earlier decision in Prem Nath Kapur [Prem Nath
Kapur v. National Fertilizers Corpn. of India Ltd., (1996) 2 SCC 71]
, has held that the deposit of the amount of the compensation in
the State’s revenue account is of no avail and the liability of the
State to pay interest subsists till the amount has not been
deposited in court.”
25. While that was the position of law as settled by the Hon’ble Apex Court
vide Judgment dated 24.01.2014 in the Pune Municipal Corporation case, the
same legal position continued and ruled the field until the issue was referred to a
Constitution Bench by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Indore Development
Authority v. Manoharlal and Others : (2020) 8 SCC 129.
26. In the case of Indore Development Authority v. Manoharlal and Others
: (2020) 8 SCC 129, the Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Apex Court had
expressly overruled the dictum of the Hon’ble Apex Court referred to in the Pune
Municipal Corporation case on 06.03.2020. Therefore, it has to be held that the
proposition of law laid down in the Pune Municipal Corporation case is no more
a good law. The relevant portion of the dictum rendered by the Constitution
Bench in the Indore Development Authority case in Para Nos.365 to 367 is
usefully extracted hereunder:
“365. Resultantly, the decision rendered in Pune Municipal
Corpn. [Pune Municipal Corpn. v. Harakchand Misirimal Solanki,
(2014) 3 SCC 183 : (2014) 2 SCC (Civ) 274] is hereby overruled
and all other decisions in which Pune Municipal Corpn. [Pune
Municipal Corpn. v. Harakchand Misirimal Solanki, (2014) 3 SCC
183 : (2014) 2 SCC (Civ) 274] has been followed, are also
overruled. The decision in Sree Balaji Nagar Residential Assn.
[Sree Balaji Nagar Residential Assn. v. State of T.N., (2015) 3 SCC
353 : (2015) 2 SCC (Civ) 298] cannot be said to be laying down
good law, is overruled and other decisions following the same
are also overruled. In Indore Development Authority v. Shailendra
13[Indore Development Authority v. Shailendra, (2018) 3 SCC 412 :
(2018) 2 SCC (Civ) 426] , the aspect with respect to the proviso to
Section 24(2) and whether “or” has to be read as “nor” or as “and”
was not placed for consideration. Therefore, that decision too
cannot prevail, in the light of the discussion in the present
judgment.
366. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we answer the questions
as under:
366.1. Under the provisions of Section 24(1)(a) in case the award
is not made as on 1-1-2014, the date of commencement of the
2013 Act, there is no lapse of proceedings. Compensation has to
be determined under the provisions of the 2013 Act.
366.2. In case the award has been passed within the window
period of five years excluding the period covered by an interim
order of the court, then proceedings shall continue as provided
under Section 24(1)(b) of the 2013 Act under the 1894 Act as if it
has not been repealed.
366.3. The word “or” used in Section 24(2) between possession
and compensation has to be read as “nor” or as “and”. The
deemed lapse of land acquisition proceedings under Section 24(2)
of the 2013 Act takes place where due to inaction of authorities for
five years or more prior to commencement of the said Act, the
possession of land has not been taken nor compensation has been
paid. In other words, in case possession has been taken,
compensation has not been paid then there is no lapse. Similarly, if
compensation has been paid, possession has not been taken then
there is no lapse.
366.4. The expression “paid” in the main part of Section 24(2) of
the 2013 Act does not include a deposit of compensation in court.
The consequence of non-deposit is provided in the proviso to
Section 24(2) in case it has not been deposited with respect to
majority of landholdings then all beneficiaries (landowners) as on
the date of notification for land acquisition under Section 4 of the
1894 Act shall be entitled to compensation in accordance with the
provisions of the 2013 Act. In case the obligation under Section 31
of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 has not been fulfilled, interest
under Section 34 of the said Act can be granted. Non-deposit of
compensation (in court) does not result in the lapse of land
acquisition proceedings. In case of non-deposit with respect to the
majority of holdings for five years or more, compensation under the
2013 Act has to be paid to the “landowners” as on the date of
notification for land acquisition under Section 4 of the 1894 Act.
366.5. In case a person has been tendered the compensation
as provided under Section 31(1) of the 1894 Act, it is not open
14
to him to claim that acquisition has lapsed under Section 24(2)
due to non-payment or non-deposit of compensation in court.
The obligation to pay is complete by tendering the amount
under Section 31(1). The landowners who had refused to
accept compensation or who sought reference for higher
compensation, cannot claim that the acquisition proceedings
had lapsed under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act.
366.6. The proviso to Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act is to be treated
as part of Section 24(2), not part of Section 24(1)(b).
366.7. The mode of taking possession under the 1894 Act and as
contemplated under Section 24(2) is by drawing of inquest
report/memorandum. Once award has been passed on taking
possession under Section 16 of the 1894 Act, the land vests in
State there is no divesting provided under Section 24(2) of the
2013 Act, as once possession has been taken there is no lapse
under Section 24(2).
366.8. The provisions of Section 24(2) providing for a deemed
lapse of proceedings are applicable in case authorities have
failed due to their inaction to take possession and pay
compensation for five years or more before the 2013 Act came
into force, in a proceeding for land acquisition pending with
the authority concerned as on 1-1-2014. The period of
subsistence of interim orders passed by court has to be excluded
in the computation of five years.
366.9. Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act does not give rise to new
cause of action to question the legality of concluded
proceedings of land acquisition. Section 24 applies to a
proceeding pending on the date of enforcement of the 2013
Act i.e. 1-1-2014. It does not revive stale and time-barred
claims and does not reopen concluded proceedings nor allow
landowners to question the legality of mode of taking
possession to reopen proceedings or mode of deposit of
compensation in the treasury instead of court to invalidate
acquisition.
367. Let the matters be placed before appropriate Bench for
consideration on merits.”
(emphasis supplied)
27. In the light of the clear verdict as above, the contention of the Writ
Petitioners that despite the passing of the Award and despite receipt of
compensation they still have a right of ownership or atleast right of possession,
15
and therefore the only option left open to the State is to
re-acquire the already acquired land under Act 30 of 2013 is completely
misplaced.
28. The proposition of law in this regard has been laid down by the Hon’ble
Apex Court in Ram Singh and Others v. Jammu Development Authority and
Others : (2017) 13 SCC 474. The Hon’ble Apex Court held in Para Nos. 25 to 28
as under:
“25. In our considered opinion, the filing of the writ petition by
the appellants was wholly misconceived so was the reliefs
claimed therein. It is not in dispute that the land in question
was the subject-matter of acquisition proceedings and
eventually resulted in passing an award for payment of
compensation. It is also not in dispute that compensation was
deposited by the State. In these circumstances, even if the
writ petitioners asserted their so-called possession over the
land in question subsequent to completion of the acquisition
proceedings, their possession on the land was not legal
possession in the eye of the law but it was an illegal and
unauthorised possession over the acquired land. The State
has filed documentary evidence, which in clear terms,
establish that the State took possession of the entire acquired
land including the land in question on 16-4-1976. It was done
as per the law laid down in Balmokand Khatri [Balmokand
Khatri Educational & Industrial Trust v. State of Punjab, (1996)
4 SCC 212 : AIR 1996 SC 1239] and, in our view, the Division
Bench rightly relied on the law.
26. In these circumstances, in our view, if anyone claimed to
have entered in possession of the acquired land including the
writ petitioners, their possession could neither be regarded as
being legal nor could it create any right to enable the writ
petitioners to claim back such land or to retain it as owners.
The State/JDA alone was deemed to be continued to remain in
its legal possession in whom the title of the land stood vested
by virtue of the provisions of the State Land Acquisition Act.
The writ petitioners could, therefore, neither claim nor
exercise any of their so-called rights to re-enter on the land
for want of any title and interest in them.
27. In our considered view, the only right or relief, which the
writ petitioners were entitled to exercise/claim from/against
16the State/JDA was to ask the State to determine and pay
compensation for the loss of their land which, as mentioned
above, was already found determined by the Collector by an
award passed in relation to the acquired land. If the writ
petitioners were not satisfied with the determination of
compensation made by the Collector, their remedy lay in
pursuing the matter for redetermination of compensation by
the Reference Court and then by the High Court in appeal. We
are, however, not concerned with this issue because it is not
the subject-matter of this appeal and nor the writ petitioners
questioned the legality or/and correctness of the acquisition
proceedings. Even otherwise the writ petitioners (appellants)
could not be allowed to challenge the acquisition proceedings
after a lapse of almost 3 decades in these proceedings.
28. It is, however, stated that the State/JDA has already deposited
the compensation amount determined by the Collector pursuant to
the award long back. If that be so, we permit the appellants herein
(writ petitioners/landowners) to withdraw the said amount, if not
already withdrawn or/and accepted.”
(emphasis supplied)
)
29. The above extract would clearly indicate that the facts of the case of Ram
Singh and Others are identical to the facts of the case on hand and would
therefore squarly apply against the claim of the Writ Petitioners herein.
30. In State of Haryana v. Sunder Lal: (2013) 11 SCC 531, the Hon’ble Apex
Court held in Para Nos.13 to 20 as under:
13. In Balmokand Khatri Educational & Industrial Trust v. State of
Punjab [Balmokand Khatri Educational & Industrial Trust v. State of
Punjab, (1996) 4 SCC 212] , it has been observed that the normal
rule of taking possession is drafting the panchnama in the
presence of panchas. This Court observed: (SCC p. 215, paras 4-
5)
“4……………………………………………………………
………………………………………….. It is now well-
settled legal position that it is difficult to take
physical possession of the land under compulsory
acquisition. The normal mode of taking possession
is drafting the panchnama in the presence of
panchas and taking possession and giving delivery
17
to the beneficiaries is the accepted mode of taking
possession of the land. Subsequent thereto, the
retention of possession would tantamount only to
illegal or unlawful possession.
5. Under these circumstances, merely because the
appellant retained possession of the acquired land,
the acquisition cannot be said to be bad in
law……………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………”
14. In P.K. Kalburqi v. State of Karnataka [P.K. Kalburqi v. State of
Karnataka, (2005) 12 SCC 489] , this Court held that if the land
was vacant and unoccupied, taking symbolical possession would
be enough.
15. In Sita Ram Bhandar Society v. State (NCT of Delhi) [Sita Ram
Bhandar Society v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2009) 10 SCC 501 :
(2009) 4 SCC (Civ) 268] , it was observed that mode of taking
possession is by way of drawing of panchnama. Similar view has
been reiterated in Omprakash Verma v. State of A.P. [Omprakash
Verma v. State of A.P., (2010) 13 SCC 158 : (2010) 4 SCC (Civ)
823]
16. In M. Venkatesh v. BDA [M. Venkatesh v. BDA, (2015) 17 SCC
1 : (2017) 5 SCC (Civ) 387] , again it was reiterated that mode of
taking possession is by drawing a panchnama. It is further held
that the mode of taking possession adopted by BDA was
permissible.
17. In State of M.P. v. Narmada Bachao Andolan [State of
M.P. v. Narmada Bachao Andolan, (2011) 7 SCC 639 : (2011) 3
SCC (Civ) 875] , this Court held that it would depend upon the
facts of the individual case that whether possession has been
taken or not. We are of the considered opinion that possession has
been taken as is apparent from the memorandum dated 21-7-2003
placed on record.
18. The learned counsel for the respondent has submitted that
there were two rooms in existence admeasuring 15′ × 12′ and 18′ ×
12′ with boundary wall. He has taken us to the site plan, in which,
now 10 shops are shown, besides that there are three rooms, one
kitchen and verandah. Thus, most of these structures have been
erected subsequently. Even if there were two outhouses in
existence at the time of issuance of notification under Section 4 of
the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 in the shape of rooms admeasuring
15′ × 12′ and 18′ × 12′ and boundary wall, obviously it was not
meant for the residential purposes, but meant for agricultural
purposes. It appears that once possession had been taken after
making a trespass upon the land, construction has been raised.
18
Most of these structures were not in existence as per the finding
recorded by the High Court. Thus, the site plan rather than
espousing the cause of the respondent, defeats the same. Once
possession had been taken and compensation has been
admittedly collected by the respondent, it was not open for him to
apply for de-notification of land under Section 48 of the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 or for its release.
19. The submission raised that land of two other incumbents has
been released in 2006 and 2014, is of no avail. There is no
concept of negative equality and the respondent cannot be
permitted to take advantage of his wrong. The land had been
acquired and thereafter the respondent has trespassed upon the
land and has raised construction, in completely illegal manner. He
is not entitled to protect it. Based on such encroachment, he is not
entitled to release of the land.
20. It cannot be said that land acquired is unutilised land, as a
matter of fact, lot of development has taken place as there is
encroachment made, as such, land could not have been utilised
and by making unwarranted interference by the High Court, the
acquisition was ordered to be quashed. We are of the opinion that
the prayer made by the respondent to apply for releasing the land
as per the Notification dated 14-9-2018, cannot be entertained.
The respondent cannot be given such a right as he has not come
to the Court with clean hands. He is an encroacher and cannot be
said to be entitled to any indulgence.
(emphasis supplied)
31. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Jai Prakash v. State of U.P. & Others in
S.L.P.(C) No.10490 of 2022 dated 10.06.2022, dismissed the SLP filed by the
Claimants by holding as under:
“It is not in dispute that the land of the petitioner has been
acquired, possession of the same has been taken over and
the payment of compensation under the Land Acquisition Act,
1894 has been paid.
In that view of the matter, the petitioner has no right to
occupy and/or continue with the possession, as after the
acquisition, the land absolutely vests with the State
Government.
The High Court has rightly refused to interfere and we are
in complete agreement with the view taken by the High Court.
19
Therefore, we see no reason to interfere with the impugned
order in exercise of our powers under Article 136 of the
Constitution of India. The Special Leave Petition is,
accordingly, dismissed.”
(emphasis supplied)
32. Following the decision of the Constitution Bench in Indore Development
Authority case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Land and Building
Department Through Secretary and Another v. Attro Devi and Others : 2023
SCC OnLine SC 396, has reaffirmed the same.
CONCLUSION:
33. In the light of the above discussion, the reliance placed by the Writ
Petitioners on the dictum of Pune Municipal Corporation case is misplaced and
presently it is not a good law in the light of the fact that the said Judgement has
been overruled by the Constitution Bench in Indore Development Authority
v.Manoharlal and Others : (2020) 8 SCC 129.
34. In this view of the matter, this Court is of the opinion that the Writ Petition
Nos. 27043, 22654, 22682, 22879, 23081, 23092, 23102, 23117, 23123, 23399,
23430, 24785, 24904, 24908, 31749 of 2014 are devoid of merit. Accordingly, the
Writ Petitions are dismissed. No order as to costs.
35. Interlocutory Applications, if any, stand closed in terms of this order.
_________________________________
GANNAMANENI RAMAKRISHNA PRASAD, J
Dt: 05.03.2026
DSV/CHS
20
10
HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE GANNAMANENI RAMAKRISHNA PRASAD
Writ Petition Nos. 27043, 22654, 22682, 22879, 23081, 23092, 23102, 23117,
23123, 23399, 23430, 24785, 24904, 24908, 31749 of 2014
05.03.2026
DSV/CHS