Calcutta High Court (Appellete Side)
Nirmal Mondal vs The Union Of India & Ors on 9 March, 2026
Author: Hiranmay Bhattacharyya
Bench: Hiranmay Bhattacharyya
IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
CONSTITUTIONAL WRIT JURISDICTION
APPELLATE SIDE
Before:
The Hon'ble Justice Hiranmay Bhattacharyya
WPA 28229 of 2025
Nirmal Mondal
VS.
The Union of India & Ors.
For the Petitioner : Mr. Prantick Ghosh
Mr. Prasad Bhattacharyya
Ms. Shravani Ghosh
Ms. Poulami Saha
..... advocates
For the State : Mr. Chandi Charan De, Ld. AGP
Ms. Reshma Chatterjee
.... advocates
Reserved on : 02.02.2026
Judgment on : 09.03.2026
Hiranmay Bhattacharyya, J.:-
1. Petitioners have prayed for setting aside the order of the Special Land
Acquisition Officer, 24 Parganas (North) at Barasat dated 10.09.2025 and a
direction upon the respondent authorities to issue release order in favour of
the petitioners certifying that the land measuring about 26.38 Decimals in
Dag No. 502 is free from acquisition proceeding. Alternatively, a writ in the
nature of mandamus was sought for to declare the acquisition proceeding
under LA Case No.- D-8(N) of 1966-67 and LA Case No. D-24 of 1961-62
dated 9th July, 1959 as illegal.
Page 1 of 14
2. The case made out by the petitioners in a nutshell is as follows:
Several plots of land at Mouza Gouripur including CS Plot No. 502 and
several plots within Mouza Doharia in the District of 24 Parganas (North)
were acquired for the purpose of diversion of the existing road which is
popularly known as “Jessore Road” being part of NH-12. Some of the owners
of the aforesaid lands filed a writ petition in the year 1967 ventilating
various grievances including return of surplus unused lands and for
payment of compensation. By an order dated 12.05.1969, this Hon’ble
Court directed return of those lands that may be left over after construction
of the diversion road to the writ petitioners within the time limit mentioned
in the said order. It is stated that after construction of the diversion road it
was found that there was huge area of surplus land which was not utilized
and the same was abandoned by the respondent authorities. Sushil Ranjan
Majumdar and Satya Ranjan Majumdar became the absolute owners of a
plot of land being CS Dag No. 502 within Mouza Gouripur measuring about
38 decimals by dint of purchase on 01.02.1961. Out of the total land
measuring about 38 decimals in C.S. Dag No. 502, quantum of land
measuring about 24 decimals was required by the respondent authorities
but out of the said 24 Decimals only land measuring about 11.62 Decimals
was utilized and the balance 12.38 Decimals of land was not utilized.
Petitioners allege that the said surplus land measuring about 12.38
Decimals in CS Dag No. 502 corresponding to RS Dag No. 502 is lying
vacant and adjacent to Jessore Road. It is stated that the remaining
unacquired portion of CS Dag No. 502 measuring about 14 i.e., (38-24)
decimals is also lying vacant and adjacent to Jessore Road.
3. Petitioners claim to have purchased the entire (14+12.38) i.e., 26.38
Decimals of land by dint of six deeds from the heirs, heiresses and legal
representatives of Sushil Ranjan Majumdar and Satya Ranjan Majumdar
both since deceased and recorded their names in the LR Record of Rights in
respect of C.S./R.S. Dag No. 502 in Mouza Gouripur. Petitioners jointly
submitted a representation dated 21.03.2024 before the District Magistrate,
Page 2 of 14
24 Parganas (North) being the 5th respondent praying for issuance of a
release order in favour of the petitioners certifying that the land measuring
about 26.38 Decimals in Dag No. 502 which was purchased by the
petitioners by virtue of those deeds of conveyance are released from
government incumbrances.
4. Petitioners allege that the 5th respondent referred the matter to the Officer-
in-Charge of the Land Acquisition Department but the said authority also
did not communicate their decision to the petitioners on their representation
dated 21.03.2024. Finding no other alternative, the petitioners approached
this Court by filing a writ petition being WPA 14232 of 2024 which was
disposed of by a co-ordinate bench by an order dated 11.06.2025 by
directing the 8th respondent therein to treat the writ petition as a
representation of the writ petitioners and after affording an opportunity of
hearing to the petitioners and/or their representative and/or any other
interested persons to pass a reasoned order in writing and to communicate
the same to the writ petitioners within the time limit stipulated therein.
Pursuant to the said order, Special Land Acquisition Officer 24 Parganas
(North) at Barasat being the 8th respondent passed the order dated
10.09.2025 which is under challenge in this writ petition.
5. The learned advocate appearing for the petitioners submitted that in an
earlier writ petition being Civil Rule No. 2195(W) of 1967, an order was
passed on 12.05.1969 on consent of the parties whereby the respondent
authorities agreed that whatever lands may be left out after construction of
the diversion road on both sides are to be returned. The learned advocate for
the petitioner further submits that the petitioners acquired title to the
property being Dag No. 502 measuring about 26.38 Decimals and are in
possession of the same. He further submitted that the respondent
authorities agreed to return the unutilized land to the land losers and,
therefore, the petitioners having purchased the unutilized portion of CS Dag
No. 502 are entitled to a release order from the government certifying that
the said unutilized portion is free from acquisition.
Page 3 of 14
6. The learned advocate for the petitioner placed reliance upon a decision of
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Haryana vs. Jay Singh1
in support of his contention that the petitioners have a right to claim return
of surplus land. He further contended that when the Government mutated
the name of the petitioner as a tenant and accepted rent from them, the
land cannot be treated as vested land and in support of such contention, the
learned advocate for the petitioner placed reliance upon the decisions of this
Court in the case of Panchu Molla vs. State of West Bengal and ors.2 and
Bholanath Chakraborty vs. State of West Bengal3.
7. Per contra, Mr. Chandicharan Dey, learned Additional Government Pleader
submitted that 24 Decimals of land in CS Dag No. 502 of Mouza Gouripur
were acquired and the award was declared and the possession has been
handed over to the Requiring Body. He submitted that 24 Decimals of land
in CS Dag No. 502 stood vested to the State free from all incumbrances with
the passing of the award and handing over possession of the same to the
Requiring Body.
8. Heard the learned advocate for the parties and perused the materials placed.
9. The petitioners are seeking a similar relief that was granted to the land
owners by an order dated 10.12.1973 passed in CR 2195 (W) of 1967. By
the said order, a direction was passed upon the authorities to return the
surplus/unutilized land in CS Dag No. 502 of Mouza Gouripur.
10. The petitioners in CR 2195(W) of 1967 approached this Court with an
application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India disputing certain
notifications and declarations made under the Land Acquisition Act in
connection with the proceeding being LA Case no. 4/71 of 1963-64. The said
Rule was disposed of by consent of parties by an Order dated 12.05.1969.
1 2025 INSC 1122
2 1980 (2) CLJ 1
3 (2001) 2 CLT 114
Page 4 of 14
11. The operative portion of the said order dated 12.05.1969 is extracted
hereinafter-
“By consent of parties the following order is made:-
Whatever lands may be left out after construction of the diversion
road including the crown of the road, the shoulders or flanks, foot-path
and drains on both sides are to be returned to the petitioners. The
construction of the diversion road and also the flanks, footpath and
drains are to be completed within a period of two years. Liberty is given
to the parties to apply for the award with regard to the acquisition
which may be made but no effect will be given to the same for a period
of two years. Liberty is also given to apply for extension of time, if
necessary.
This order is confined to the petitioners and the added petitioners.
All interim orders are vacated.
The Rule and the application are disposed of accordingly.”
(emphasis supplied)
12. After disposal of the main rule i.e., CR 2195 (W) of 1967, an application
dated 03.09.1973 was taken out by the Union of India praying for an order
extending the time for construction of the road and also for return of the
surplus land by three years. The said application was disposed of by an
order passed on 10.12.1973 by refusing to grant any extension except on
fulfillment of the directions of the Court regarding clear return and release
of the surplus land at the middle and the plots which have gone beyond the
alignment in Mouza Doharia. It was further clarified that by clear release
and return, it means release from acquisition and return free from all
incumbrances and until that was done there will be no order extending the
time as prayed for. With the above observations, the application was
disposed of. However, liberty was given to apply for extension on fulfillment
of conditions as aforesaid.
13. The learned advocate for the petitioner would contend that since the order
dated 12.05.1969 was a consent order, the respondent authorities are
Page 5 of 14
bound by such order and, therefore, the respondent authorities should be
directed to release the unutilized land in plot no. 502 to the petitioners.
14. At the first blush the argument of the learned advocate for the petitioner
appeared to be attractive but on a closer scrutiny of the materials on record
this Court is not inclined to accept the contention of the learned advocate
for the petitioner for the reasons as set out hereinafter.
15. The order dated 12.05.1969 was passed on consent of the parties. It was
specifically observed in the said order that such order is confined to the
petitioners and the added petitioners. It is not the case of the petitioners
that their vendors were parties in the said writ petition or were the added
petitioners therein. Thus, the order dated 12.05.1969 or the subsequent
orders more particularly the order dated 10.12.1973 cannot enure to the
benefit of the writ petitioners.
16. The writ petitioners claim to have purchased the property measuring about
26.38 decimals by virtue of several deeds of conveyance during the years
2022-24 from the heirs, heiresses and legal representatives of Satya Ranjan
Majumdar and Sushil Ranjan Majumdar both since deceased.
17. Record reveals that Satya Ranjan Majumdar and Sushil Ranjan Majumdar
purchased 38 Decimals of land in CS Dag No. 502 from one Jatindra Kumar
Pal upon payment of valuable consideration and became the owners of the
said plot. The Special Land Acquisition Officer 24 Parganas (North) at
Barasat upon scrutiny of the records of the land acquisition case recorded
the following factual finding in the order dated 31.07.2025.
That CS Plot no. 502 in Mouza Gouripur along with other plots were
involved in a land acquisition proceeding being LA-D-8 of 1966-67
initiated under the Land Acquisition Act 1894 including various plots of
Mouza Doharia in the District of 24 Parganas (North) for the purpose of
diversion of Jessore Road at Dumdum in the village of Gouripur and
Doharia. Award was declared against CS Plot nos. 502 in favour of Satya
Ranjan Majumdar and Sushil Ranjan Majumdar. An application under
Page 6 of 14
Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act was also filed being Reference Case
no. 142/68 and consequently the matter was referred before the Referral
Court. Possession of the acquired land in CS Dag No. 502 was taken over
and an area of land measuring about 0.24 acres pertaining to CS Plot no.
502 in Mouza Gouripur along with other plots was handed over to the
Requiring Body.
18. The aforesaid factual finding could not be controverted by the petitioners by
producing any material records at the time of hearing of this writ petition.
19. The writ petitioner, in paragraph 8 of the writ petition, specifically stated
that in the year 1979, the individual raiyats including the vendors of the
writ petitioners approached before the State respondents for the purpose of
taking benefit alike the petitioner in Civil Rule No. 2195(W) of 1967 but the
respondent authorities were reluctant to extend the benefit of the Civil Rule
in the case of the land owners of Mouza Gouripur. However, the petitioners
have approached only in the year 2024 praying for release of the
surplus/unutilized land in C.S./R.S. Dag No. 502 of Mouza Gouripur.
20. It is evident from the factual finding recorded by the Special Land
Acquisition Officer that the award has been passed and the possession has
been taken over from the erstwhile owners and handed over to the Requiring
Body. Thus, upon declaration of award and handing over possession of the
portion of the land in Dag No. 502, which forms the subject matter of
acquisition, such land stood vested upon the Government free from all
incumbrances.
21. Petitioner has prayed for release/return of the land which, according to the
petitioner, was unutilized.
22. The question that arises for consideration is whether the possession of the
land in question can be directed to be returned to the petitioners even if the
same has not been utilized for the purpose for which the same was required.
Page 7 of 14
23. The issue whether land once vested in the Government can be divested fell
for consideration before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of V.
Chandrasekaran v. Administrative Officer,4. In the said reported
decision, the Hon’ble Supreme Court after noting various decisions
summarized its conclusion in paragraph 31 of the said reports wherein it
was held that once the land is acquired and it vests in the State free from all
incumbrances, it is not the concern of the land owner whether the land is
being used for the purpose for which it was acquired or for any other
purpose. It was further held that he becomes persona non grata once the
land vests in the State and has a right to only receive compensation for the
same, unless the acquisition proceeding is itself challenged. The Hon’ble
Supreme Court further held that the State neither has the requisite power to
re-convey the land to the person interested nor can such person claim any
right of restitution on any ground, whatsoever, unless there is some
statutory mandate to this effect.
24. The learned advocate for the petitioner in course of his argument could not
point out any provision of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 which provides for
return of unutilized land to the erstwhile land owner or the subsequent
purchaser after the same stood vested to the State.
25. The petitioners herein, who are subsequent purchasers, sought to challenge
the acquisition proceeding in this writ petition.
26. The issue whether a subsequent purchaser has a right to challenge the
legality of the acquisition proceeding fell for consideration before the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in the case of Star Wire (India) Ltd. v. State of Haryana5.
In the said reports the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that any incumbrances
created by the erstwhile owner of the land after publication of the
notification under Section 4(1) does not bind the State. If the possession of
the land is already taken over after the award came to be passed, the land
4 (2012) 12 SCC 133
5 (1996) 11 SCC 698
Page 8 of 14
stood vested in the State free from all incumbrances under Section 16. It
was further held that a subsequent purchaser is not entitled to challenge
the legality of the acquisition proceeding on the ground of lack of publication
of the notification. It was held therein that the purchase made by the
erstwhile owner of the land after publication of the notification under
Section 4(1) do not bind either the State Government or the beneficiary for
whose benefit the land was acquired and the purchaser does not acquire
any valid title. It was held that even the colour of title claimed by the
purchaser was void and the beneficiaries are entitled to have absolute
possession free from all incumbrances.
27. In U.P. Jal Nigam v. Kalra Properties (P) Ltd.,6 the Hon’ble Supreme
Court held that the purchaser of the property after the notification under
Section 4(1) was published, is devoid of any right to challenge the validity of
the notification or irregularity in taking possession of the land before
publication of the declaration under Section 6.
28. In view of the aforesaid well settled proposition of law laid down by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court, this Court holds that the petitioners being
subsequent purchasers did not acquire any valid title in respect of the
portion of CS Dag No. 502 corresponding to RS Dag No. 502 which was the
subject matter of the acquisition proceeding.
29. The learned advocate appearing for the petitioner would vehemently contend
that the petitioners are in possession of the property and in support thereof
placed strong reliance upon the Record of Rights.
30. The word “vest” fell for consideration before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
the case of Fruit & Vegetable Merchants Union v. Delhi Improvement
Trust,7 wherein it was held that the word “vest” means that the property
acquired becomes the property of the Government without any condition or
limitation either as to title or possession. Thus, when there is absolute
6 (1996) 3 SCC 124
7 (1956) 2 SCC 484
Page 9 of 14
vesting in the State it is vesting along with possession and thereafter a
person who remains in possession is only a trespasser without any rightful
possession. It was further held that vesting cannot be considered with any
rider as to title or possession and vesting contemplates absolute title and
possession in the State. The said proposition of law has been reiterated by
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Indore Development Authority
vs. Sailendra8 (see paragraph 94 and 95 of the said reports).
31. This Court has already held that the petitioners did not acquire any valid
title by virtue of the purchase from the heirs, heiresses and legal
representatives of Sushil Ranjan Majumdar and Satya Ranjan Majumdar.
Since the land stood vested with the State, the lawful possession is deemed
to be of the State.
32. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Jitendra Singh vs. State of
Madhya Pradesh9 after noting various decisions held that mutation of
property in revenue records neither creates nor extinguishes title to the
property nor has it any presumptive value of title. It was further held therein
that entries in the revenue records have only fiscal purpose and such entries
are relevant only for the purpose of collecting land revenue and no
ownership is conferred on the basis of such entries. The Hon’ble Supreme
Court held thus-
“7. Right from 1997, the law is very clear. In the case of Balwant
Singh v. Daulat Singh (D) By Lrs., reported in (1997) 7 SCC 137, this
Court had an occasion to consider the effect of mutation and it is
observed and held that mutation of property in revenue records neither
creates nor extinguishes title to the property nor has it any presumptive
value on title. Such entries are relevant only for the purpose of collecting
land revenue. Similar view has been expressed in the series of
decisions thereafter.
8. In the case of Suraj Bhan v. Financial Commissioner, (2007) 6 SCC
186, it is observed and held by this Court that an entry in revenue
records does not confer title on a person whose name appears in record-
8 (2018) 3 SCC 405
9 (2021) SCC Online SC 802
Page 10 of 14
of-rights. Entries in the revenue records or jamabandi have only “fiscal
purpose”, i.e., payment of land revenue, and no ownership is conferred
on the basis of such entries. It is further observed that so far as the title
of the property is concerned, it can only be decided by a competent civil
court. Similar view has been expressed in the cases of Suman
Verma v. Union of India, (2004) 12 SCC
58; Faqruddin v. Tajuddin, (2008) 8 SCC 12; Rajinder Singh v. State of
J&K, (2008) 9 SCC 368; Municipal Corporation, Aurangabad v. State of
Maharashtra, (2015) 16 SCC 689; T. Ravi v. B. Chinna
Narasimha, (2017) 7 SCC 342; Bhimabai Mahadeo Kambekar v. Arthur
Import & Export Co., (2019) 3 SCC 191; Prahlad Pradhan v. Sonu
Kumhar, (2019) 10 SCC 259; and Ajit Kaur v. Darshan Singh, (2019) 13
SCC 70.”
33. In State of Punjab vs. Sadhu Ram10 it was held that if consequent upon
the passing of the award and the possession taken of the land, the right,
title and interest of the erstwhile owner stood extinguished and the
Government became the absolute owner of the property free from all
encumbrances, unless the title is conferred on any person in accordance
with a procedure known to law, no one can claim any title much less
equitable title by remaining in possession. It was further held in the said
reports that the Government is not bound by the entries made in the record
of rights under such circumstances.
34. This Court has already held that the petitioner did not acquire valid title to
the property and the lawful possession is with the State. To the mind of this
Court, the Government is not bound by the entries in the revenue records in
the name of the petitioner. Thus, the said entries cannot have the effect of
divesting the State of the property which already stood vested with the State
free from all encumbrances.
35. The Special Land Acquisition Officer after noting that the writ petitioners
purchased the said land from the legal heirs of the original awardees,
applied the well settled proposition of law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme
10
(1997) 9 SCC 544
Page 11 of 14
Court in V. Chandra Sekharan (supra)11 and rightly held that once the
land stood vested to the State there is no scope to release the land to the
tenure holders or the persons interested even if it is not used for the
purpose for which it was so acquired. The order impugned is a well-
reasoned order. The said order does not suffer from infirmity.
36. This Court accordingly holds that the petitioner is not entitled to an order
for return of the alleged unutilized portion of the plot in question.
37. In Jay Singh (supra)12, the respondents therein filed the writ petition
challenging the amendments carried out in the Punjab Village Common
Lands Regulation Act 196,1 thereby inserting Sub-clause (6) to Section 2(g)
of the 1961 Act along with an explanation to the said sub-clause. The Full
Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court, after examining the legality of
sub-clause (6) of 2(g) the 1961 Act, partly allowed the writ petition preferred
by the respondent/ land owners by issuing certain consequential directions
with regard to certain mutation entries made by the authorities.
38. The Full Bench of the Hon’ble High Court drew a distinction between the
land reserved for common purpose under Section 18(c) of the Consolidation
Act of 1948 which might become part and parcel of a scheme framed under
Section 14, for the areas reserved for common purposes, that have actually
not been put to any common use and may be put to common use in a later
point of time on the one hand and the lands which might have been
contributed by the proprietors on pro rata basis but have not been reserved
or earmarked for common purposes in the scheme.
39. The Hon’ble Full Bench after drawing a distinction between the aforesaid
two categories held that the lands reserved for common purposes vests with
the Government or the Gram Panchayat as the case may be and the
proprietors are left with no right or interest in such lands meant for common
purpose under their scheme.
11 (2012) 12 SCC 133
12 2025 INSC 1122
Page 12 of 14
40. The Hon’ble Full Bench held that the lands which have not been earmarked
for the specific purpose do not vest in the Gram Panchayat or the state.
41. After taking note of the provisions of the 1948 Act it was held that if the land
which has not been reserved or earmarked for a common purpose in a
scheme, known as Bachaat land, the same would not vest either with the
State or the Gram Panchayat. The Hon’ble Supreme Court affirmed the
finding of the Hon’ble Full Bench of the High Court in so far it was held
therein that the lands which have not been earmarked for any specific
purpose do not vest in the Gram Panchayat or the state.
42. The provisions of the 1961 Act which fell for consideration before the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Jay Singh (supra)13 is different from the
provisions laid down under the Land Acquisition Act 1894. Therefore, the
decision in the case of Jay Singh (supra)14 cannot be of any assistance for
the purpose of deciding the dispute involved in the instant case.
43. In Bholanath Chakraborty (supra)15 the State initiated a proceeding under
Section 5(a) of the West Bengal Estate Acquisition Act 1953 and the Revenue
Officer held that the deed of gift executed in the year 1954 was not bona
fide. In the said decision the co-ordinate bench held that since the State has
accepted the rents from the plaintiff and the name of the plaintiff has been
mutated in the recent record of rights the State cannot treat the land as
vested land as by such subsequent conduct the State has recognized the
tenancy right of the plaintiff in respect of the land in question.
44. In view of the well settled proposition of law laid down by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court as observed supra this Court is not inclined to follow the
13 2025 INSC 1122
14 2025 INSC 1122
15 (2001) 2 CLT 114
Page 13 of 14
decision of the co-ordinate bench in the case of Bholanath Chakraborty
(supra)16.
45. For all the reasons as aforesaid this Court is not inclined to interfere with
the order impugned. Accordingly the writ petition stands dismissed. There
shall be, however, no order as to costs.
46. Urgent photostat certified copies, if applied for, be supplied to the parties
upon compliance of all formalities.
(HIRANMAY BHATTACHARYYA, J.)
16 (2001) 2 CLT 114
Page 14 of 14