Madhya Pradesh High Court
Naharsingh vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 18 February, 2026
Author: Sanjeev S Kalgaonkar
Bench: Sanjeev S Kalgaonkar
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:4980
1 MCRC-54117-2023
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT INDORE
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE SANJEEV S KALGAONKAR
ON THE 18th OF FEBRUARY, 2026
MISC. CRIMINAL CASE No. 54117 of 2023
NAHARSINGH
Versus
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
Appearance:
Ms. Pooja Vaktariya - Advocate for the petitioner.
Shri Romil Verma- Public Prosecutor for the State.
ORDER
1 . This petition under section 482 of the Cr.P.C is filed quashing the
FIR at Crime no 466 of 2023, registered at Police Station – Taal, District –
Ratlam for offence punishable under section 34(2) of the M.P. Excise Act
and all consequential proceedings arising thereof.
2. The exposition of facts giving rise to present petition is as under :
A. A.S.I. Mohan Bhati of Police Check-Post, Karwakala received secret
information that one Swift Desire Car bearing registration no. MP-09-
CM-0290 is transporting illicit liquor. Accordingly, a Police Check-Post
was installed near Village – Aabpura on 11/09/2023. This Swift Desire
Car was intercepted. Praveen Singh was driving the vehicle. Mitthu
Singh was passenger in the vehicle. The country-made plan liquor, total
quantity 180 bulk liters was recovered on search of the car. The illicit
country-made plan liquor and the vehicle were seized from joint
possession of Praveen Singh and Mitthu Singh as they could not
produce any valid permit or licence for transportation of the liquor. The
Police Station – Taal registered FIR at Crime no. 466 of 2023 for
offence punishable under section 34(2) of the M.P. Excise Act. PraveenSignature Not Verified
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Singh and Mitthu Singh were arrested. They informed that they had
procured the illicit liquor from Rajendra Singh Panwar, Salesman of
local liquor shop. They further informed that they had purchased the
illicit liquor at the instruction of Nahar Singh Panwar and they were
transporting it for delivery to Nahar Singh Panwar. Accordingly, Nahar
Singh Panwar was apprehended on 14/12/2023. His statement under
section 27 of the Evidence Act was recorded. He informed that he is
working at the liquor shop of Village – Richha Devada. He had asked
Praveen Singh and Mitthu Singh to get the illicit liquor from Rajendra
Singh. The final report was submitted on completion of investigation.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner, in addition to the grounds
mentioned in the petition, submits that the petitioner is implicated on the
basis of information memo recorded under section 27 of the Evidence Act.
Learned counsel further referring to the judgment of Privy Council in the
case of Pulukari Kottaya Vs. King-Emperor reported in AIR 1947 PC 67
contends that unless there is discovery of any object pursuant to the
information, the information memo do not make out an offence. No case is
made out against the petitioner, therefore, the impugned FIR deserves to be
quashed.
4. Per-contra, learned counsel for the State submits that the
impugned FIR and the material on record prima-facie establishes the
complicity of the petitioner in the alleged offence. Praveen Singh and Mitthu
Singh were transporting the illicit liquor at the direction of petitioner Nahar
Singh Panwar. The petition is meritless.
5. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
6 . The Supreme Court in case of State of Haryana vs. Ch. Bhajan
Lal, reported in AIR 1992 SC 604 after an elaborate consideration of the
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matter and after referring to its various earlier decisions, has observed in para
108 as under:-
”108. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the
Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a
series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article
226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted
and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of
illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the
process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be
possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelized and
inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds
of cases wherein such power should be exercised.
(1) Where the allegations made in the First Information Report or the complaint,
even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima
facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the First Information Report and other materials, if any,
accompanying the F.I.R. do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an
investigation by police officers under Section 156(1)of the Code except under an
order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the
evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any
offence and make out a case against the accused.
(4) Where, the allegations in the F.I.R. do not constitute a cognizable offence but
constitute only a noncognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police
officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the
Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently
improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion
that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the
Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the
institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific
provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the
grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7) where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where
the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking
vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal
grudge.” (emphasis added)
7. In the case of Surinder Kumar Khanna v. Directorate of Revenue
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Intelligence, reported in (2018) 8 SCC 271 , it was observed that
“10. In Kashmira Singh v. State of M.P., (1952) 1 SCC 275 : 1952 SCR 526 : AIR 1952
SC 159 , this Court relied upon the decision of the Privy Council in Bhuboni Sahu v. R.,
1949 SCC OnLine PC 12 : (1948-49) 76 IA 147 at p. 155 and laid down as under: (AIR p.
160, paras 8-10)
“8. Gurubachan’s confession has played an important part in implicating the
appellant, and the question at once arises, how far and in what way the confession of
an accused person can be used against a co-accused? It is evident that it is not
evidence in the ordinary sense of the term because, as the Privy Council say in
Bhuboni Sahu v. R., 1949 SCC OnLine PC 12 : (1948- 49) 76 IA 147 at p. 155.
‘…It does not indeed come within the definition of “evidence” contained in
Section 3 of the Evidence Act. It is not required to be given on oath, nor in
the presence of the accused, and it cannot be tested by cross-examination.’
Their Lordships also point out that it is ‘obviously evidence of a very weak type. …
It is a much weaker type of evidence than the evidence of an approver, which is not
subject to any of those infirmities’.
They stated in addition that such a confession cannot be made the foundation of a
conviction and can only be used in “support of other evidence”. In view of these
remarks, it would be pointless to cover the same ground, but we feel it is necessary
to expound this further as misapprehension still exists. The question is, in what way
can it be used in support of other evidence? Can it be used to fill in missing gaps?
Can it be used to corroborate an accomplice or, as in the present case, a witness who,
though not an accomplice, is placed in the same category regarding credibility
because the Judge refuses to believe him except insofar as he is corroborated?
9. In our opinion, the matter was put succinctly by Sir Lawrence Jenkins in Emperor
v. Lalit Mohan Chuckerbutty [Emperor v. Lalit Mohan Chuckerbutty, ILR (1911) 38
Cal 559 at p. 588.] where he said that such a confession can only be used to “lend
assurance to other evidence against a co-accused “or, to put it in another way, as
Reilly, J. did in Periaswami Moopan, In re , 1930 SCC OnLine Mad 86 : ILR (1931)
54 Mad 75 at p. 77. : (SCC OnLine Mad)
‘…the provision goes no further than this–where there is evidence against
the co-accused sufficient, if believed, to support his conviction, then the kind
of confession described in Section 30 may be thrown into the scale as an
additional reason for believing that evidence.’
10. Translating these observations into concrete terms they come to this. The proper
way to approach a case of this kind is, first, to marshal the evidence against the
accused excluding the confession altogether from consideration and see whether, if
it is believed, a conviction could safely be based on it. If it is capable of belief
independently of the confession, then of course it is not necessary to call the
confession in aid. But cases may arise where the Judge is not prepared to act on the
other evidence as it stands even though, if believed, it would be sufficient to sustain
a conviction. In such an event the Judge may call in aid the confession and use it to
lend assurance to the other evidence and thus fortify himself in believing what
without the aid of the confession he would not be prepared to accept.”
11. The law laid down in Kashmira Singh v. State of M.P., (1952) 1 SCC 275 : 1952
SCR 526 : AIR 1952 SC 159, was approved by a Constitution Bench of this Court in
Haricharan Kurmi v. State of Bihar, (1964) 6 SCR 623 at pp. 631-633 : AIR 1964
SC 1184, wherein it was observed: “
12. As we have already indicated, this question has been considered on several
occasions by judicial decisions and it has been consistently held that a confession
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cannot be treated as evidence which is substantive evidence against a co-accused
person. In dealing with a criminal case where the prosecution relies upon the
confession of one accused person against another accused person, the proper
approach to adopt is to consider the other evidence against such an accused person,
and if the said evidence appears to be satisfactory and the court is inclined to hold
that the said evidence may sustain the charge framed against the said accused
person, the court turns to the confession with a view to assure itself that the
conclusion which it is inclined to draw from the other evidence is right. As was
observed by Sir Lawrence Jenkins in Emperor v. Lalit Mohan Chuckerbutty, ILR
(1911) 38 Cal 559 at p. 588. a confession can only be used to “lend assurance to
other evidence against a co-accused”. In Periaswami Moopan, In re, 1930 SCC 14
OnLine Mad 86 : ILR (1931) 54 Mad 75 at p. 77. Reilly, J., observed that the
provision of Section 30 goes not further than this: (SCC OnLine Mad)
‘…where there is evidence against the co-accused sufficient, if believed, to
support his conviction, then the kind of confession described in Section 30
may be thrown into the scale as an additional reason for believing that
evidence.’
8. Later, in case of Dipakbhai Jagdishchandra Patel v. State of Gujarat ,
(2019) 16 SCC 547, it was held that
24. Undoubtedly, this Court has in Suresh Budharmal Kalani v. State of Maharashtra,
(1998) 7 SCC 337, taken the view that confession by a co-accused containing incriminating
matter against a person would not by itself suffice to frame charge against it. We may
incidentally note that the Court has relied upon the judgment of this Court in Kashmira
Singh v. State of M.P., (1952) 1 SCC 275 : 1952 SCR 526 : AIR 1952 SC 159, We notice
that the observations, which have been relied upon, were made in the context of an appeal
which arose from the conviction of the appellant therein after a trial. The same view has
been followed undoubtedly in other cases where the question arose in the context of a
conviction and an appeal therefrom. However, in Suresh Budharmal Kalani v. State of
Maharashtra, (1998) 7 SCC 337, the Court has proceeded to take the view that only on the
basis of the statement of the co-accused, no case is made out, even for framing a charge.
30. In Law of Evidence by M. Monir, 17th Edn., p. 555, we notice the following discussion
regarding the distinction between Section 25 on the one hand and Section 26 on the other
hand:
“… The section deals with confessions which are made not to Police Officers but to
persons other than Police Officers, e.g., to a fellow prisoner, a doctor or a visitor,
and makes such confessions inadmissible if they were made whilst the accused was
in the custody of a Police Officer. In Section 25 the criterion for excluding a
confession is the answer to the question. “To whom was the confession made?” If
the answer is that it was made to a Police Officer, the confession is absolutely
excluded from evidence. On the other hand, the criterion adopted in Section 26 for
excluding a confession is the answer to the question. “Under what circumstances
was the confession made?” If the answer is that it was made whilst the accused was
in the custody of a Police Officer, the law lays down that such confession shall be
excluded from evidence, unless it was made in the immediate presence of a
Magistrate.” ****************************
42. A Bench of three learned Judges of this Court in Mahabir Mandal v. State of Bihar,
(1972) 1 SCC 748 : 1972 SCC (Cri) 454 : AIR 1972 SC 1331 , had this to say:
“46. Coming to the case of Kasim, we find that there is no reliable evidence as may
show that Kasim was present at the house of Mahabir on the night of occurrence andSignature Not Verified
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took part in the disposal of the dead body of Indira. Reliance was placed by the
prosecution upon the statement alleged to have been made by Kasim and Mahadeo
accused at the police station in the presence of Baijnath PW after Baijnath had
lodged report at the police station. Such statements are legally not admissible in
evidence and cannot be used as substantive evidence. According to Section 162 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure, no statement made by any person to a police officer
in the course of an investigation shall be signed by the person making it or used for
any purpose at any enquiry or trial in respect of any offence under investigation at
the time when such statement was made. The only exception to the above rule is
mentioned in the proviso to that section. According to the proviso, when any witness
is called for the prosecution in the enquiry or trial, any part of his statement, if duly
proved, may be used by the accused and with the permission of the court by the
prosecution, to contradict such witness in the manner provided by Section 145 of the
Indian Evidence Act and when any part of such statement is so used, any part thereof
may also be used in the reexamination of such witness for the purpose only of
explaining any matter referred to in his cross-examination. The above rule is,
however, not applicable to statements falling within the provisions of Clause 1 of
Section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act or to affect the provisions of Section 27 of
that Act. It is also well established that the bar of inadmissibility operates not only
on statements of witnesses but also on those of the accused (see Pakala Narayana
Swami v. King Emperor, 1939 SCC OnLine PC 1 : (1938-39) 66 IA 66 : AIR 1939
PC 47] ). Lord Atkin, in that case, while dealing with Section 162 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure observed:
‘Then follows the section in question which is drawn in the same general way
relating to “any person”. That the words in their ordinary meaning would
include any person though he may thereafter be accused seems plain.
Investigation into crime often includes the examination of a number or
persons none of whom or all of whom may be suspected at the time. The first
words of the section prohibiting the statement, if recorded, from being signed
must apply to all the statements made at the time and must therefore apply to
a statement made by a person possibly not then even suspected but eventually
accused….’
47. Reference may also be made to Section 26 of the Indian Evidence Act,
according to which no confession made by any person whilst he is in the custody of
a police officer, unless it be made in the immediate presence of a Magistrate, shall be
proved against such person. There is nothing in the present case to show that the
statements which were made by Kasim and Mahadeo accused on 18-9-1963, at the
police station in the presence of Baijnath resulted in the discovery of any
incriminating material as may make them admissible under Section 27 of the Indian
Evidence Act. As such, the aforesaid statements must be excluded from
consideration.” (emphasis supplied)
44. Such a person viz. person who is named in the FIR, and therefore, the accused in the
eye of the law, can indeed be questioned and the statement is taken by the police officer. A
confession, which is made to a police officer, would be inadmissible having regard to
Section 25 of the Evidence Act. A confession, which is vitiated under Section 24 of the
Evidence Act would also be inadmissible. A confession unless it fulfils the test laid down
in Pakala Narayana Swami and as accepted by this Court, may still be used as an admission
under Section 21 of the Evidence Act. This, however, is subject to the bar of admissibility
of a statement under Section 161 CrPC. Therefore, even if a statement contains admission,
the statement being one under Section 161, it would immediately attract the bar under
Section 162 CrPC.
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45. Bar under Section 162 CrPC, no doubt, operates in regard to the statement made to a
police officer in between two points of time viz. from the beginning of the investigation till
the termination of the same. In a case where statement containing not a confession but
admission, which is otherwise relevant and which is made before the investigation
commences, may be admissible. We need not, however, say anything more.
******
50. From the statement of the law contained in CBI v. V.C. Shukla, (1998) 3 SCC 410, it
becomes clear as to what constitutes confession and how if it does not constitute
confession, it may still be an admission. Being an admission, it may be admissible under
the Evidence Act provided that it meets the requirements of admission as defined in
Section 17 of the Evidence Act. However, even if it is an admission, if it is made in the
course of investigation under the CrPC to a police officer, then, it will not be admissible
under Section 162 CrPC as it clearly prohibits the use of statement made to a police officer
under Section 161 CrPC except for the purpose which is mentioned therein. Statement
given under Section 161, even if relevant, as it contains an admission, would not be
admissible, though an admission falling short of a confession which may be made
otherwise, may become substantive evidence.
51. A confession made to a police officer is clearly inadmissible. The statement relied on
by the respondent is dated 11-4-1996 and the appellant was arrested on 11-4-1996. This is
pursuant to the FIR registered on 10-4-1996. The statement dated 11-4-1996 is made to a
police officer. This is clear from the statement as also the letter dated 10- 8-1996
(Annexure R-6) produced by the respondent. It is clearly during the course of the
investigation. Even if it does contain admissions by virtue of Section 162 and as interpreted
by this Court in V.C. Shukla, such admissions are clearly inadmissible.
52. If the statement made by the appellant on 11-4-1996 is inadmissible, then, there will
only be the statement of the co-accused available to be considered in deciding whether the
charge has to be framed against the appellant or not. It is here that the law laid down by
this Court in Suresh Budharmal Kalani v. State of Maharashtra, (1998) 7 SCC 337
becomes applicable.
9. The material in case diary is examined in light of the aforestated
prepositions of law.
10. Petitioner Nahar Singh Panwar is implicated in the alleged
offence on the basis of information given by co-accused Praveen Singh and
Mitthu Singh in police custody and his own incriminating statement before
the police recorded under section 27 of the Evidence Act. No incriminating
material, much less, the illicit liquor was seized from active, conscious and
direct possession of the petitioner. There is no call detail report or money
trail suggesting complicity of the petitioner in the alleged offence. Thus, no
admissible evidence is available to connect the petitioner with the allegedSignature Not Verified
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offence, except the information given in police custody, which is not
admissible as evidence, even to frame charges in view of the law laid down
in the cases of Surinder Kumar Khanna and Dipakbhai Jagdishchandra
Patel (supra)
11. In view of the above discussions, this Court is of the considered
opinion that further prosecution of the petitioner Nahar Singh Panwar in the
present case would be abuse of process of Court. The chances of conviction
are bleak. Further prosecution against the petitioner would be a wastage of
precious judicial time, therefore, the inherent power under section 482 of the
Cr.P.C (section 528 of the BNSS, 2023) is invoked for the ends of jsutice.
12. Consequently, the impugned FIR at Crime no 466 of 2023
registered at Police Station – Taal, District – Ratlam for offence punishable
under section 34(2) of the M.P. Excise Act and the subsequent proceedings
are quashed with reference to petitioner Nahar Singh Panwar.
C C as per rules.
(SANJEEV S KALGAONKAR)
JUDGEamol
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