Supreme Court – Daily Orders
Muna Bisoi vs State Of Odisha on 16 February, 2026
Author: Dipankar Datta
Bench: Dipankar Datta
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL No. OF 2026
[arising out of SLP (Crl.) Diary No. 163 of 2026]
MUNA BISOI APPELLANT
VERSUS
STATE OF ODISHA RESPONDENTS
ORDER
1. Leave granted.
2. The High Court of Orissa at Cuttack by the impugned judgment
and order dated 22nd October, 20251 has declined the appellant’s
prayer for suspension of sentence; however, he was directed to be
released on interim bail for three months.
3. Appellant was convicted by the Sessions Court for an offence
punishable under Sections 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 as
well as under Section 27 of the Arms Act, 1959 and sentenced to life
imprisonment.
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
JATINDER KAUR
Date: 2026.02.17
16:57:54 IST
Reason:
1 impugned order
2
4. Such conviction and suspension having been carried in appeal 2
before the High Court by the appellant, the same is yet to be disposed
of.
5. Interestingly, by the time the appellant’s application for
suspension of sentence was considered by the High Court and
disallowed by the impugned order, he had suffered incarceration in
excess of 11 years.
6. Considering such prolonged incarceration and realizing the
period of time during which the appeal has remained pending, the
High Court took a sympathetic view and granted the appellant partial
relief, as noted above. The period of interim bail of three months was
to terminate on 22nd January, 2006, whereafter the appellant had to
surrender.
7. It was immediately prior to expiry of the aforesaid period that the
appellant challenged the order dated 22 nd October, 2025 in the special
leave petition, out of which this appeal arises.
8. A coordinate Bench of this Court by its order dated 12th January,
2026 granted interim relief to the appellant and permitted the order of
release on interim bail to continue till the next date of hearing.
9. In light of the aforesaid factual narrative, we have heard learned
counsel appearing for the respective parties and perused the records.
2 Crl. Appeal No. 552 of 2016
3
10. It does not surprise us any longer that despite the appeal having
been filed in 2016, the High Court could not find time to hear it
resulting in the appellant, in the meanwhile, having suffered over a
decade’s incarceration.
11. At the same time, we have no doubt in our mind that the High
Court was disabled for genuine reasons to decide the appeal finally.
However, sight cannot be lost that the right of appeal is a statutory
right in terms of Section 374(2), Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
Serious failure of justice could ensue if the appellant, while continuing
to remain incarcerated, ultimately, finds that his appeal has
succeeded.
12. A coordinate bench of this Court, nearly half a century back in
Kashmira Singh vs. State of Punjab 3, made the following poignant
observations:
2. The appellant contends in this application that pending the hearing
of the appeal he should be released on bail. Now, the practice in this
Court as also in many of the High Courts has been not to release on
bail a person who has been sentenced to life imprisonment for an
offence under Section 302 of the Penal Code, 1860. The question is
whether this practice should be departed from and if so, in what
circumstances. It is obvious that no practice howsoever sanctified by
usage and hallowed by time can be allowed to prevail if it operates to
cause injustice. Every practice of the Court must find its ultimate
justification in the interest of justice. The practice not to release on bail
a person who has been sentenced to life imprisonment was evolved in
the High Courts and in this Court on the basis that once a person has
been found guilty and sentenced to life imprisonment, he should not
be let loose, so long as his conviction and sentence are not set aside,
but the underlying postulate of this practice was that the appeal of
such person would be disposed of within a measurable distance of3 (1977) 4 SCC 291
4time, so that if he is ultimately found to be innocent, he would not
have to remain in jail for an unduly long period. The rationale of this
practice can have no application where the Court is not in a position to
dispose of the appeal for five or six years. It would indeed be a
travesty of justice to keep a person in jail for a period of five or six
years for an offence which is ultimately found not to have been
committed by him. Can the Court ever compensate him for his
incarceration which is found to be unjustified? Would it be just at all for
the Court to tell a person: “We have admitted your appeal because we
think you have a prima facie case, but unfortunately we have no time
to hear your appeal for quite a few years and, therefore, until we hear
your appeal, you must remain in jail, even though you may be
innocent?” What confidence would such administration of justice
inspire in the mind of the public? It may quite conceivably happen, and
it has in fact happened in a few cases in this Court, that a person may
serve out his full term of imprisonment before his appeal is taken up
for hearing. Would a Judge not be overwhelmed with a feeling of
contrition while acquitting such a person after hearing the appeal?
Would it not be an affront to his sense of justice? Of what avail would
the acquittal be to such a person who has already served out his term
of imprisonment or at any rate a major part of it? It is, therefore,
absolutely essential that the practice which this Court has been
following in the past must be reconsidered and so long as this Court is
not in a position to hear the appeal of an accused within a reasonable
period of time, the Court should ordinarily, unless there are cogent
grounds for acting otherwise, release the accused on bail in cases
where special leave has been granted to the accused to appeal against
his conviction and sentence.
13. Bearing in mind that nothing is on record to indicate that delay in
disposal of the appeal is attributable to the appellant and giving due
consideration to what this Court in Kashmira Singh (supra) observed
with regard to the necessity of reconsidering the practice of denying
bail to murder convicts languishing in custody for five-six years, we are
inclined to allow the appeal by suspending the sentence of life
imprisonment imposed on the appellant by the Sessions Court and to
make the interim order absolute. Ordered accordingly.
14. As a sequel thereto, the impugned order stands set aside and
5
the appeal is, accordingly, allowed on the aforesaid terms.
15. Appellant shall continue to remain on interim bail till such time
further order to the contrary is passed by the High Court.
16. We request the High Court to decide the appeal as early as
possible, preferably within a period of six months from date of receipt
of a copy of this order.
17. In the event, the appellant does not show any interest in
prosecuting the appeal, the High Court may proceed to engage an
Amicus Curiae and decide the appeal on its own merits.
18. Pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of.
……………………………………..J.
[DIPANKAR DATTA]
………………………………………J.
[SATISH CHANDRA SHARMA]
New Delhi;
February 16, 2026.
6
ITEM NO.35 COURT NO.7 SECTION II-B
S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A
RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No(s). 163/2026
[Arising out of impugned final judgment and order dated
22-10-2025 in IA No. 1816/2025 in Crl.A. No. 552/2016
passed by the High Court of Orissa at Cuttack]
MUNA BISOI Petitioner(s)
VERSUS
STATE OF ODISHA Respondent(s)
FOR ADMISSION and I.R.
IA No. 2943/2026 – PERMISSION TO FILE ADDITIONAL
DOCUMENTS/FACTS/ANNEXURES
Date : 16-02-2026 This matter was called on for hearing today.
CORAM : HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE DIPANKAR DATTA
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SATISH CHANDRA SHARMA
For Petitioner(s) :Mr. Haraprasad Sahu, Adv.
Mr. Ajay Kumar Jain, Adv.
Mr. Pranaya Kumar Mohapatra, AOR
For Respondent(s) :Ms. Bharti Tyagi, AOR
Ms. Vishakha Raghuram, Adv.
Mr. Tarun Bhati, Adv.
Mr. Vikash Kumar, Adv.
UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following
O R D E R
1. Leave granted.
2. The appeal is allowed in terms of the signed order placed on the
file.
(JATINDER KAUR) (SUDHIR KUMAR SHARMA) P.S. to REGISTRAR COURT MASTER (NSH)
