Rajasthan High Court – Jaipur
Mukesh Kumar S/O Shri Rohitash vs The State Of Rajasthan on 27 February, 2026
[2026:RJ-JP:5810-DB]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN
BENCH AT JAIPUR
D.B. Special Appeal Writ No. 612/2021
Rajendra Kumar S/o Shri Rohitashav Gurjar, Aged About 34
Years, R/o Village Kalata, Post Babai, Tehsil Khetri, District
Jhunjhunu (Rajasthan).
----Appellant
Versus
1. The State Of Rajasthan, Through Secretary Home,
Department Of Home, Secretariat, Jaipur (Rajasthan)
2. Director General Of Police, Jaipur Rajasthan, Jaipur
----Respondents
Connected With
D.B. Special Appeal Writ No. 613/2021
Arjun Lal S/o Shri Gyarsi Lal, Aged About 49 Years, Resident Of
Village And Post Rajgarh, Via Sardhana, Tehsil Nasirabad, District
Ajmer (Rajasthan).
—-Appellant
Versus
1. The State Of Rajasthan, Through Secretary Home,
Department Of Home, Secretariat, Jaipur (Rajasthan)
2. The Director General Of Police, Jaipur Rajasthan, Jaipur
—-Respondents
D.B. Special Appeal Writ No. 614/2021
Hardeep Singh Choudhary S/o Shri Kishan Lal Choudhary, Aged
About 33 Years, Resident Of Village Kalayanpura, Post Sewa,
Tehsil Mouzmabad, District Jaipur (Rajasthan).
—-Appellant
Versus
1. The State Of Rajasthan, Through Secretary Home,
Department Of Home, Secretariat, Jaipur (Rajasthan)
2. Director General Of Police, Jaipur Rajasthan, Jaipur
—-Respondents
D.B. Special Appeal Writ No. 615/2021
Sunil Kumar Dangi, S/o Shri Ranveer Siwan Dangi, Aged About
31 Years, Resident Of Village And Post Narhar, Tehsil – Chirawa,
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District Jhunjhunu (Rajasthan).
—-Appellant
Versus
1. The State Of Rajasthan, Through Secretary Home,
Department Of Home, Secretariat, Jaipur (Rajasthan).
2. The Director General Of Police, Jaipur Rajasthan, Jaipur.
—-Respondents
D.B. Special Appeal Writ No. 616/2021
Phool Chand S/o Shri Jayram Prajapat, Aged About 63 Years,
Resident Of Ganesh Nagar, Tekari, Tara Grah Road, Behind Kanak
House, Ajmer (Rajasthan)
—-Appellant
Versus
1. The State Of Rajasthan, Through Secretary Home,
Department Of Home, Secretariat, Jaipur (Rajasthan)
2. The Director General Of Police, Jaipur, Rajasthan, Jaipur.
—-Respondents
D.B. Special Appeal Writ No. 617/2021
Mukesh Kumar S/o Shri Rohitash, Aged About 30 Years, Resident
Of Village Rajora Post Mandri Tehsil Khetri, District Jhunjhunu,
(Rajasthan).
—-Appellant
Versus
1. The State Of Rajasthan, Through Secretary Home,
Department Of Home, Secretariat, Jaipur (Rajasthan).
2. The Director General Of Police, Jaipur Rajasthan, Jaipur.
—-Respondents
D.B. Special Appeal Writ No. 618/2021
Gopal Lal Sharma S/o Shri Ram Ji Lal Sharma, Aged About 33
Years, Resident Of Village And Post Rajpura Tehsil Malpura
District Tonk (Rajasthan)
—-Appellant
Versus
1. The State Of Rajasthan, Through Secretary Home,
Department Of Home, Secretariat, Jaipur (Rajasthan)
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2. The Director General Of Police, Jaipur Rajasthan, Jaipur
—-Respondents
For Appellant(s) : Mr. Pradeep Kumar
For Respondent(s) : Mr. Bhuwnesh Sharma, AAG assisted
by Mr. Vishnu Dutt Sharma,
Mr. Siddharth Sharma, AGC and
Mr. Shivam Chauhan, AGC
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE INDERJEET SINGH
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE RAVI CHIRANIA
Order
1. Date of conclusion of Arguments 03.02.2026
2. Date on which the judgment was reserved 03.02.2026
3. Whether the full judgment or only operative Full
part is pronounced
4. Date of pronouncement 27.02.2026
Per, Ravi Chirania, J:-
1. These writ petitions are decided by this common order, as the
facts and issues involved in these writ petitions are common. For
convenience, the facts are taken from Special Appeal Writ No.
612/2021.
2. The present appeals have been filed by the appellants-petitioners
(hereinafter referred to as ‘petitioners’ for short) whereby they have
challenged the judgment dated 18.05.2021 passed by the learned
Single Judge, by which their writ petitions i.e. S.B. Civil Writ Petition
Nos. 5600/2021, 5573/2021, 5576/2021, 5601/2021, 5602/2021,
5603/2021, 5604/2021, 5605/2021, 5606/2021 & 5608/2021 were
dismissed.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the Disciplinary
Authority as well as the Appellate Authority have not considered the
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[2026:RJ-JP:5810-DB] (4 of 30) [SAW-612/2021]preliminary report and the other evidence on record, which is sufficient
to show that, in the entire incident, none of the petitioners herein were
responsible in any manner and further there was no intentional
negligence or dereliction of duties on their part. Learned counsel further
submitted that the Enquiry Officer also did not consider the complete
facts and found the charges proved and by considering the same, the
Disciplinary Authority punished them with the stoppage of annual grade
increment with cumulative effect as mentioned in the punishment order
dated 04.04.2018.
4. Learned counsel submitted that against the punishment order
dated 04.04.2018, the petitioners filed the Departmental appeal under
Rule 30A of the CCA Rules, 1958 along-with other similarly situated
persons namely Anil Kumar Pandey, Phool Chand & Dharmesh Dayma
etc. The charges against all the delinquent employees including the
petitioners herein were almost same, in respect of the same incident,
the Enquiry Officer also found the charges to be proved against all and
passed the order of punishment, however, the Appellate Authority
dismissed the departmental appeals filed by the petitioners herein and
the punishment order was maintained. However, in the case of the other
similarly situated persons namely Anil Kumar Pandey, Dharmesh Dayma
& Shambu Singh, different yardsticks were followed and their appeals
were allowed and were exonerated from all the charges.
5. Learned counsel further submitted that except the Commando
Shakti Singh, not before the Court, all police persons who were inside
the police van were carrying the criminal Anand Pal Singh, had no idea
about his (Commando Shakti Singh’s) involvement with the criminal in
van and his associated groups. Despite seriousness of the charges as
levelled against all the persons, the specific findings of the Enquiry
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[2026:RJ-JP:5810-DB] (5 of 30) [SAW-612/2021]Officer and the after consideration by the Disciplinary Authority while
passing the punishment order, the Appellate Authority exonerated the
above three persons while maintaining the punishment order in respect
of all the petitioners herein.
6. Learned counsel further submitted that the punishment as
imposed by the Disciplinary Authority cannot be interfered with by the
Appellant Authority until and unless there are reasons to do so and the
same are required to be recorded while quashing the punishment order.
The complete findings as recorded by the Appellate Authority are illegal,
arbitrary and a classic case of applying different yardsticks in the case
of employees having the same charges in respect of the same incident.
7. Learned counsel further submitted that against the order of the
Appellant Authority of dismissing the departmental appeal, the
petitioners filed the writ petitions before the learned Single Judge,
which were dismissed in limine by order dated 18.05.2021. The learned
Single Judge by considering the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in the case of Union of India & Anr. Vs. P. Gunasekaran 1 and
Industrial Security Force & Ors. Vs. Abrar Ali 2, dismissed the writ
petitions on the ground that the above settled law does not permit
interference in the departmental proceedings and that the Courts
cannot substitute a punishment unless it shocks the conscience of the
Court.
8. Learned counsel further submitted that the learned Single Judge
while dismissing the writ petitions in limine failed to consider the fact
that the similarly situated persons namely Anil Kumar Pandey,
Dharmesh Dayma & Shambu Singh were exonerated by allowing their
departmental appeals, whereas the petitioners herein have been
1 (2015) 2 SCC 610 &
2 (2017) 4 SCC 507
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punished by maintaining the punishment order. The order passed by the
learned Single Judge suffers from the infirmity that the impugned
punishment order was upheld without proper consideration of the
complete facts and circumstances of the case. The impugned order is
unreasonable as there is no consideration of the issue of exoneration of
the similarly situated persons on the similar charges based on the same
facts. Therefore, the learned Single Judge has committed a serious
mistake in law while dismissing the writ petitions.
9. In support of his arguments, learned counsel relied upon the
following judgments passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, which are
as under:-
9.1. In the case of Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd v Ashok Kumar Arora
(supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court laid down the principle governing
the scope of judicial review in the departmental proceedings. The Court
held that the High Court’s jurisdiction in such matters is not that of an
appellant authority but is strictly circumscribed. The relevant para 20 of
the judgment is reproduced as under:-
3. (1997) 3 SCC 72
4. (2017) 2 SCC 308
5. 2019 SCC OnLine All 4004
6. 2022 SCC OnLine SC 881
7. (2015) 2 SCC 610
8. 1963 SCC OnLine SC 6
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20. At the outset, it needs to be mentioned that the
High Court in such cases of departmental enquiries and
the findings recorded therein does not exercise the
powers of appellate court/authority. The jurisdiction of
the High Court in such cases is very limited for
instance where it is found that the domestic enquiry is
vitiated because of non-observance of principles of
natural justice, denial of reasonable opportunity;
findings are based on no evidence, and/or the
punishment is totally disproportionate to the proved
misconduct of an employee. There is a catena of
judgments of this Court which had settled the law on
this topic and it is not necessary to refer to all these
decisions. Suffice it to refer to a few decisions of this
Court on this topic viz. State of A.P. v. S. Sree Rama
Rao, State of A.P. v. Chitra Venkata Rao, Corpn. of the
City of Nagpur v. Ramchandra and Nelson Motis v.
Union of India.
9.2. In the case of Allahabad Bank Vs. Krishna Narayan Tewari
(supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that while a writ court is
justified in interfering with disciplinary proceedings where findings are
based on “no evidence” or appellant authority fails to apply its mind
independently, it may, instead of remanding the matter, modify the
relief by granting only partial back wages (50%) where a remand would
be harsh due to the employee’s superannuation and poor health. The
relevant paras of the judgment is reproduced as under: –
7. We have given our anxious consideration to the
submissions at the Bar. It is true that a writ court is very
slow in interfering with the findings of facts recorded by
a departmental authority on the basis of evidence
available on record. But it is equally true that in a case
where the disciplinary authority records a finding that is
unsupported by any evidence whatsoever or a finding
which no reasonable person could have arrived at, the
writ court would be justified if not duty-bound to
examine the matter and grant relief in appropriate cases.
The writ court will certainly interfere with disciplinary
enquiry or the resultant orders passed by the competent
authority on that basis if the enquiry itself was vitiated
on account of violation of principles of natural justice, as
is alleged to be the position in the present case. Non-
application of mind by the enquiry officer or the
disciplinary authority, non-recording of reasons in
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support of the conclusion arrived at by them are also
grounds on which the writ courts are justified in
interfering with the orders of punishment. The High
Court has, in the case at hand, found all these infirmities
in the order passed by the disciplinary authority and the
appellate authority. The respondent’s case that the
enquiry was conducted without giving a fair and
reasonable opportunity for leading evidence in defence
has not been effectively rebutted by the appellant. More
importantly the disciplinary authority does not appear to
have properly appreciated the evidence nor recorded
reasons in support of his conclusion. To add insult to
injury the appellate authority instead of recording its
own reasons and independently appreciating the material
on record, simply reproduced the findings of the
disciplinary authority. All told, the enquiry officer, the
disciplinary authority and the appellate authority have
faltered in the discharge of their duties resulting in
miscarriage of justice. The High Court was in that view
right in interfering with the orders passed by the
disciplinary authority and the appellate authority.
8. There is no quarrel with the proposition that in cases
where the High Court finds the enquiry to be deficient,
either procedurally or otherwise, the proper course
always is to remand the matter back to the authority
concerned to redo the same afresh. That course could
have been followed even in the present case. The matter
could be remanded back to the disciplinary authority or
to the enquiry officer for a proper enquiry and a fresh
report and order. But that course may not have been the
only course open in a given situation. There may be
situations where because of a long time-lag or such
other supervening circumstances the writ court considers
it unfair, harsh or otherwise unnecessary to direct a
fresh enquiry or fresh order by the competent authority.
That is precisely what the High Court has done in the
case at hand.
9.3. The Allahabad High Court in Rakesh Kumar Pandey v State of
U.P. reported in (2019) SCC OnLine All 4004 decided on 20.02.2019,
held that a disciplinary enquiry completed prior to the to the expiry of
the 15-day period granted delinquent employee to submit his reply to
charge sheet is in clear violation of Rule 794) of the Uttar Pradesh
Government Servant (Discipline and Appeal) Rule, 1999 and principal of
natural justice, rendering the enquiry report unsustainable and
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consequently the punishment order based on such report, along with an
unreasoned appellant order affirming it, are liable to be quashed.
Relevant paragraphs of the said judgment Rakesh Kumar Pandey (supra)
are reproduced as under: –
5. The scope of judicial review with respect to the
departmental proceedings is limited.
6. This Court under its power conferred by Article 226
of Constitution of India, can interfere in the matter of
disciplinary proceedings if the disciplinary/enquiry
proceedings were conducted in violation of manner
prescribed and against Principle of Natural Justice and if
the order of concerned authority is non speaking and
unreasoned. This Court can interfere in the matter of
disciplinary proceedings if the decision making process
is in violation of Rules or against Principle of Natural
Justice. The judicial review in the matter of
departmental proceedings is permissible with respect to
decision making process and not against the decision
itself unless it is shown that the decision is without any
evidence or suffers from malafide or malice or harsh or
without jurisdiction.
7. In the case of Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. v. Ashok Kumar
Arora, (1997) 3 SCC 72 the Hon’ble Supreme Court has
held as under:-
“At the outset, it needs to be mentioned that the High
Court in such cases of departmental enquiries and the
findings recorded therein does not exercise the powers
of appellate court/authority. The jurisdiction of the High
Court in such cases is very limited for instance where it
is found that the domestic enquiry is vitiated because of
non-observance of principles of natural justice, denial of
reasonable opportunity; findings are based on no
evidence, and/or the punishment is totally
disproportionate to the proved misconduct of an
employee. There is a catena of judgments of this Court
which had settled the law on this topic and it is not
necessary to refer to all these decisions. Suffice it to
refer to a few decisions of this Court on this topic viz.
State of A.P. v. S. Sree Rama Rao [AIR 1963 SC 1723:
(1964) 2 LLJ 150], State of A.P. v. Chitra Venkata Rao
[(1975) 2 SCC 557: 1975 SCC (L&S) 349: (1976) 1
SCR 521], Corpn. of the City of Nagpur v. Ramchandra
[(1981) 2 SCC 714: 1981 SCC (L&S) 455: (1981) 3
SCR 22] and Nelson Motis v. Union of India [(1992) 4
SCC 711: 1993 SCC (L&S) 13: (1993) 23 ATC 382: AIR
1992 SC 1981]”.
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8. In the case of Lalit Popli v. Canara Bank, (2003) 3
SCC 583 the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as
under:-
“17. While exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of
the Constitution the High Court does not act as an
appellate authority. Its jurisdiction is circumscribed by
limits of judicial review to correct errors of law or
procedural errors leading to manifest injustice or
violation of principles of natural justice. Judicial review
is not akin to adjudication of the case on merits as an
appellate authority.
18. In B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India [(1995) 6 SCC
749: 1996 SCC (L&S) 80: (1996) 32 ATC 44] the scope
of judicial review was indicated by stating that review
by the court is of decision-making process and where
the findings of the disciplinary authority are based on
some evidence, the court or the tribunal cannot
reappreciate the evidence and substitute its own
finding.
19. As observed in R.S. Saini v. State of Punjab [(1999)
8 SCC 90: 1999 SCC (L&S) 1424] in paras 16 and 17
the scope of interference is rather limited and has to be
exercised within the circumscribed limits. It was noted
as follows: (SCC p. 96)
“16. Before adverting to the first contention of the
appellant regarding want of material to establish the
charge, and of non-application of mind, we will have to
bear in mind the rule that the court while exercising
writ jurisdiction will not reverse a finding of the
inquiring authority on the ground that the evidence
adduced before it is insufficient. If there is some
evidence to reasonably support the conclusion of the
inquiring authority, it is not the function of the court to
review the evidence and to arrive at its own
independent finding. The inquiring authority is the sole
judge of the fact so long as there is some legal
evidence to substantiate the finding and the adequacy
or reliability of the evidence is not a matter which can
be permitted to be canvassed before the court in writ
proceedings.
17. A narration of the charges and the reasons of the
inquiring authority for accepting the charges, as seen
from the records, shows that the inquiring authority has
based its conclusions on materials available on record
after considering the defence put forth by the appellant
and these decisions, in our opinion, have been taken in
a reasonable manner and objectively. The conclusion
arrived at by the inquiring authority cannot be termed
as either being perverse or not based on any material
nor is it a case where there has been any non-
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[2026:RJ-JP:5810-DB] (11 of 30) [SAW-612/2021]application of mind on the part of the inquiring
authority. Likewise, the High Court has looked into the
material based on which the enquiry officer has come to
the conclusion, within the limited scope available to it
under Article 226 of the Constitution and we do not find
any fault with the findings of the High Court in this
regard.”
9. In the case of Allahabad Bank v. Krishna Narayan
Tewari, (2017) 2 SCC 308 the Hon’ble Supreme Court
has held as under:-
“7. We have given our anxious consideration to the
submissions at the Bar. It is true that a writ court is
very slow in interfering with the findings of facts
recorded by a departmental authority on the basis of
evidence available on record. But it is equally true that
in a case where the disciplinary authority records a
finding that is unsupported by any evidence whatsoever
or a finding which no reasonable person could have
arrived at, the writ court would be justified if not duty-
bound to examine the matter and grant relief in
appropriate cases. The writ court will certainly interfere
with disciplinary enquiry or the resultant orders passed
by the competent authority on that basis if the enquiry
itself was vitiated on account of violation of principles of
natural justice, as is alleged to be the position in the
present case. Non-application of mind by the enquiry
officer or the disciplinary authority, non-recording of
reasons in support of the conclusion arrived at by them
are also grounds on which the writ courts are justified
in interfering with the orders of punishment. The High
Court has, in the case at hand, found all these
infirmities in the order passed by the disciplinary
authority and the appellate authority. The respondent’s
case that the enquiry was conducted without giving a
fair and reasonable opportunity for leading evidence in
defence has not been effectively rebutted by the
appellant. More importantly the disciplinary authority
does not appear to have properly appreciated the
evidence nor recorded reasons in support of his
conclusion. To add insult to injury the appellate
authority instead of recording its own reasons and
independently appreciating the material on record,
simply reproduced the findings of the disciplinary
authority. All told, the enquiry officer, the disciplinary
authority and the appellate authority have faltered in
the discharge of their duties resulting in miscarriage of
justice. The High Court was in that view right in
interfering with the orders passed by the disciplinary
authority and the appellate authority.”
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9.4. In the case of Amarendra Kumar Pandey Vs. Union of India
(supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court elaborated on the scope of judicial
review where disciplinary action is based on the subjective satisfaction
of the authority, particularly in the context of discharge from service on
the ground of securing four red ink entries. The Court held that while
the opinion of the authority is ordinarily conclusive if the prescribed
procedure is followed and the authority acts bona fide, such action is
nonetheless subject to judicial review on limited grounds, including
examination of the existence of facts forming the basis of the opinion,
the nexus between those facts and the purpose of the power, and
whether the finding is based on no evidence or is perverse. The relevant
para of the judgment is reproduced as under: –
32. Where an Act or the statutory rules framed
thereunder left an action dependent upon the opinion of
the authority concerned, by some such expression as ‘is
satisfied’ or ‘is of the opinion’ or ‘if it has reason to
believe’ or ‘if it considered necessary’, the opinion of the
authority is conclusive,
(a) if the procedure prescribed by the Act or rules for
formation of the opinion was duly followed,
(b) if the authority acted bona fide,
(c) if the authority itself formed the opinion and did
not borrow the opinion of somebody else and
(d) if the authority did not proceed on a fundamental
misconception of the law and the matter in regard to
which the opinion had to be formed.
33. The action based on the subjective opinion or
satisfaction, in our opinion, can judicially be reviewed first
to find out the existence of the facts or circumstances on
the basis of which the authority is alleged to have formed
the opinion. It is true that ordinarily the court should not
inquire into the correctness or otherwise of the facts
found except in a case where it is alleged that the facts
which have been found existing were not supported by
any evidence at all or that the finding in regard to
circumstances or material is so perverse that no
reasonable man would say that the facts and
circumstances exist. The courts will not readily defer to
the conclusiveness of the authority’s opinion as to the
existence of matter of law or fact upon which the validity
of the exercise of the power is predicated.
34. The doctrine of reasonableness thus may be invoked.
Where there are no reasonable grounds for the formation
of the authority’s opinion, judicial review in such a case is
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permissible. [See Director of Public Prosecutions v. Head,
[1959] A.C. 83 (Lord Denning).
35. When we say that where the circumstances or
material or state of affairs does not at all exist to form an
opinion and the action based on such opinion can be
quashed by the courts, we mean that in effect there is no
evidence whatsoever to form or support the opinion. The
distinction between insufficiency or inadequacy of
evidence and no evidence must of course be borne in
mind. A finding based on no evidence as opposed to a
finding which is merely against the weight of the evidence
is an abuse of the power which courts naturally are loath
to tolerate. Whether or not there is evidence to support a
particular decision has always been considered as a
question of law. [See Reg. v. Governor of Brixton Prison,
Armah, Ex Parte, [1966] 3 WLR 828 at p. 841].
36. It is in such a case that it is said that the authority
would be deemed to have not applied its mind or it did
not honestly form its opinion. The same conclusion is
drawn when opinion is based on irrelevant matter. [See
Rasbihari v. State of Orissa, (1969) 1 SCC 414: AIR 1969
SC 1081].
37. In Rohtas Industries Ltd. v. S.D. Agarwal, (1969) 1
SCC 325 AIR 1969 SC 707, it was held that the existence
of circumstances is a condition precedent to form an
opinion by the Government. The same view was earlier
expressed in Barium Chemicals Ltd. v. Company Law
Board, AIR 1967 SC 295.
38. Secondly, the court can inquire whether the facts and
circumstances so found to exist have a reasonable nexus
with the purpose for which the power is to be exercised.
In other words, if an inference from facts does not
logically accord with and flow from them, the Courts can
interfere treating them as an error of law. [See Bean v.
Doncaster Amalgamated Collieries, (1944) 2 All ER 279 at
p. 284]. Thus, this Court can see whether on the basis of
the facts and circumstances found, any reasonable man
can say that an opinion as is formed can be formed by a
reasonable man. That would be a question of law to be
determined by the Court. [See Farmer v. Cotton’s
Trustees, [1915] A.C. 922]. Their Lordships observed:
“…..in my humble judgment where all the material
facts are fully found, and the only question is whether the
facts are such as to bring the case within the provisions
properly construed of some statutory enactment, the
question is one of law only.”
[See also Muthu Gounder v. Government of Madras,
(1969) 82 Mad LW 1].
39. Thirdly, this Court can interfere if the constitutional or
statutory term essential for the exercise of the power has
either been misapplied or misinterpreted. The Courts have
always equated the jurisdictional review with the review
for error of law and have shown their readiness to quash
an order if the meaning of the constitutional or statutory
term has been misconstrued or misapplied. [See Iveagh
(Earl of) v. Minister of Housing and Local Govt., [1962] 2
Q.B. 147; Iveagh (Earl of) v. Minister of Housing and
Local Govt. (1964) 1 AB 395].
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40. Fourthly, it is permissible to interfere in a case where
the power is exercised for improper purpose. If a power
granted for one purpose is exercised for a different
purpose, then it will be deemed that the power has not
been validly exercised. If the power in this case is found
to have not been exercised genuinely for the purpose of
taking immediate action but has been used only to avoid
embarrassment or wreck personal vengeance, then the
power will be deemed to have been exercised improperly.
[See Natesa Asari v. State of Madras, AIR 1954 Mad 481].
41. Fifthly, the grounds which are relevant for the purpose
for which the power can be exercised have not been
considered or grounds which are not relevant and yet are
considered and an order is based on such grounds, then
the order can be attacked as invalid and illegal. In this
connection, reference may be made to Ram Manohar
Lohia v. State of Bihar, AIR 1966 SC 740; Dwarka Das
Bhatia v. State of J. and K., AIR 1957 SC 164 and Moti Lal
Jain v. State of Bihar, AIR 1968 SC 1509. On the same
principle, the administrative action will be invalidated if it
can be established that the authority was satisfied on the
wrong question: [See Maradana Mosque Trustees v
Mahumud [1967] 1 A.C. 13].
9.5. In the case of Union of India & Anr. Vs. P. Gunasekaran
(supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court explained the limits of judicial
review available to High Courts under Articles 226 and 227 of the
Constitution in matters relating to departmental disciplinary
proceedings. The Court held that the High Court cannot act as an
appellate authority in disciplinary matters and must refrain from re-
appreciating evidence or interfering with conclusions recorded in a duly
conducted enquiry. The relevant principles and the scope of interference
were succinctly laid down in the following paragraphs: –
12. Despite the well-settled position, it is painfully
disturbing to note that the High Court has acted as an
appellate authority in the disciplinary proceedings, re-
appreciating even the evidence before the enquiry
officer. The finding on Charge I was accepted by the
disciplinary authority and was also endorsed by the
Central Administrative Tribunal. In disciplinary
proceedings, the High Court is not and cannot act as a
second court of first appeal. The High Court, in exercise
of its powers under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution
of India, shall not venture into reappreciation of the
evidence. The High Court can only see whether:
(a) the enquiry is held by a competent authority:
(b) the enquiry is held according to the procedure
prescribed in that behalf;
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(c) there is violation of the principles of natural justice
in conducting the proceedings;
(d) the authorities have disabled themselves from
reaching a fair conclusion by some considerations
extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case;
(e) the authorities have allowed themselves to be
influenced by irrelevant or extraneous considerations;
(f) the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly
arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person
could ever have arrived at such conclusion;
(g) the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to
admit the admissible and material evidence;
(h) the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted
inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding:
(i) the finding of fact is based on no evidence.
13. Under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India,
the High Court shall not:
(i) re-appreciate the evidence;
(ii) interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case
the same has been conducted in accordance with law;
(iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence;
(iv) go into the reliability of the evidence;
(v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which
findings can be based.
(vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may
appear to be;
(vii) go into the proportionality of punishment unless it
shocks its conscience.
14. In one of the earliest decisions in State of A.P. v. S.
Sree Rama Rao, many of the above principles have
been discussed and it has been concluded thus: (AIR
pp. 1726-27, para 7)
“7. The High Court is not constituted in a proceeding
under Article 226 of the Constitution as a court of
appeal over the decision of the authorities holding a
departmental enquiry against a public servant: it is
concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by
an authority competent in that behalf, and according to
the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether
the rules of natural justice are not violated. Where
there is some evidence, which the authority entrusted
with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and
which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion
that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is
not the function of the High Court in a petition for a writ
under Article 226 to review the evidence and to arrive
at an independent finding on the evidence. The High
Court may undoubtedly interfere where the
departmental authorities have held the proceedings
against the delinquent in a manner inconsistent with
the rules of natural justice or in violation of the
statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or
where the authorities have disabled themselves from
reaching a fair decision by some considerations
extraneous to the evidence and the merits of the case
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or by allowing themselves to be influenced by irrelevant
considerations or where the conclusion on the very face
of it is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no
reasonable person could ever have arrived at that
conclusion, or on similar grounds. But the departmental
authorities are, if the enquiry is otherwise properly
held, the sole judges of facts and if there be some legal
evidence on which their findings can be based, the
adequacy or reliability of that evidence is not a matter
which can be permitted to be canvassed before the
High Court in a proceeding for a writ under Article 226
of the Constitution.”
15. In State of A.P. v. Chitra Venkata Rao, the
principles have been further discussed at paras 21-24,
which read as follows: (SCC pp. 561-63)
“21. The scope of Article 226 in dealing with
departmental inquiries has come up before this Court.
Two propositions were laid down by this Court in State
of A.P. v. S. Sree Rama Rao. First, there is no warrant
for the view that in considering whether a public officer
is guilty of misconduct charged against him, the rule
followed in criminal trials that an offence is not
established unless proved by evidence beyond
reasonable doubt to the satisfaction of the Court must
be applied. If that rule be not applied by a domestic
tribunal of inquiry the High Court in a petition under
Article 226 of the Constitution is not competent to
declare the order of the authorities holding a
departmental enquiry invalid. The High Court is not a
court of appeal under Article 226 over the decision of
the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against
a public servant. The Court is concerned to determine
whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent
in that behalf and according to the procedure prescribed
in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice
are not violated. Second, where there is some evidence
which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the
enquiry has accepted and which evidence may
reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent
officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of
the High Court to review the evidence and to arrive at
an independent finding on the evidence. The High Court
may interfere where the departmental authorities have
held the proceedings against the delinquent in a
manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or
in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode
of enquiry or where the authorities have disabled
themselves from reaching a fair decision by some
considerations extraneous to the evidence and the
merits of the case or by allowing themselves to be
influenced by irrelevant considerations or where the
conclusion on the very face of it is so wholly arbitrary
and capricious that no reasonable person could ever
have arrived at that conclusion. The departmental
authorities are, if the enquiry is otherwise properly
held, the sole judges of facts and if there is some legal
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evidence on which their findings can be based, the
adequacy or reliability of that evidence is not a matter
which can be permitted to be canvassed before the
High Court in a proceeding for a writ under Article 226.
22. Again, this Court in Railway Board v. Niranjan Singh
said that the High Court does not interfere with the
conclusion of the disciplinary authority unless the
finding is not supported by any evidence or it can be
said that no reasonable person could have reached such
a finding. In Niranjan Singh case this Court held that
the High Court exceeded its powers in interfering with
the findings of the disciplinary authority on the charge
that the respondent was instrumental in compelling the
shutdown of an air compressor at about 8.15 a.m. on
31-5-1956. This Court said that the Enquiry Committee
felt that the evidence of two persons that the
respondent led a group of strikers and compelled them
to close down their compressor could not be accepted
at its face value. The General Manager did not agree
with the Enquiry Committee on that point. The General
Manager accepted the evidence. This Court said that it
was open to the General Manager to do so and he was
not bound by the conclusion reached by the committee.
This Court held that the conclusion reached by the
disciplinary authority should prevail and the High Court
should not have interfered with the conclusion.
23. The jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari under
Article 226 is a supervisory jurisdiction. The Court
exercises it not as an appellate court. The findings of
fact reached by an inferior court or tribunal as a result
of the appreciation of evidence are not reopened or
questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is
apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by
a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may
appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by
a tribunal, a writ can be issued if it is shown that in
recording the said finding, the tribunal had erroneously
refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or
had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which
has influenced the impugned finding. Again if a finding
of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded
as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of
certiorari. A finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal
cannot be challenged on the ground that the relevant
and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal is
insufficient or inadequate to sustain a finding. The
adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and
the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding
are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal.
(See Syed Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishnan.)
24. The High Court in the present case assessed the
entire evidence and came to its own conclusion. The
High Court was not justified to do so. Apart from the
aspect that the High Court does not correct a finding of
fact on the ground that the evidence is not sufficient or
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adequate, the evidence in the present case which was
considered by the Tribunal cannot be scanned by the
High Court to justify the conclusion that there is no
evidence which would justify the finding of the Tribunal
that the respondent did not make the journey. The
Tribunal gave reasons for its conclusions. It is not
possible for the High Court to say that no reasonable
person could have arrived at these conclusions. The
High a Court reviewed the evidence, reassessed the
evidence and then rejected the evidence as no
evidence. That is precisely what the High Court in
exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari should
not do.”
9.6. In the case of State of Andra Pradesh Vs. S. Sree Rama Rao
(supra), a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court laid down the
foundational principles governing the scope of judicial review by High
Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution in matters related to
departmental disciplinary proceedings. The Court held that the High
Court does not sit as a court of appeal over the decisions of
departmental authorities and cannot reappreciate the evidence or
interfere with findings of fact recorded in a duly conducted enquiry. The
scope of interference is limited to cases involving violation of natural
justice, procedural irregularity, extraneous considerations, or findings
that are perverse or based on no evidence. The relevant para of the
said judgment are reproduced as under: –
7. There is no warrant for the view expressed by the
High Court that in considering whether a public officer is
guilty of the misconduct charged against him, the rule
followed in criminal trials that an offence is not
established unless proved by evidence beyond
reasonable doubt to the satisfaction of the Court, must
be applied, and if that rule be not applied, the High Court
in a petition I… under Article 226 of the Constitution is
competent to declare the order of the authorities holding
a departmental enquiry invalid. The High Court is not
constituted in a proceeding under Article 226 of the
Constitution a court of appeal over the decision of the
authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a
public servant: it is concerned to determine whether the
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[2026:RJ-JP:5810-DB] (19 of 30) [SAW-612/2021]and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated.
Where there is some evidence, which the authority
entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted
and which evidence may reasonably support the
conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the
charge, it is not the function of the High Court in a
petition for a writ under Article 226 to review the
evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the
evidence. The High Court may undoubtedly interfere
where the departmental authorities have held the
proceedings against the delinquent in a manner
inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in
violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of
enquiry or where the authorities have disabled
themselves from reaching a fair decision by some
considerations extraneous to the evidence and the merits
of the case or by allowing themselves to be influenced by
irrelevant considerations or where the conclusion on the
very face of it is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that
no reasonable person could ever have arrived at that
conclusion, or on similar grounds. But the departmental
authorities are, if the enquiry is otherwise properly held,
the sole judges of facts and if there be some legal
evidence on which their findings can be based, the
adequacy or reliability of that evidence is not a matter
which can be permitted to be canvassed before the High
Court in a proceeding for a writ under Article 226 of the
Constitution.
10. Learned counsel, in view of the submissions and the above cited
judgments, prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the
impugned order dated 18.05.2021 passed by the learned Single Judge,
the punishment order dated 04.04.2018 and dismissal of the
departmental appeal by order dated 16.10.2020 be quashed and set
aside.
11. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents strongly opposed
the submissions and argued that the wisdom of the Disciplinary
Authority as well as the Appellate Authority cannot be questioned by the
Courts in exercise of judicial powers in terms of law as settled by the
Supreme Court, and therefore, the learned Single Judge has not
committed any mistake while dismissing the writ petition by judgment
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dated 18.05.2021. Learned counsel submitted that the petitioners
herein have to stand on their own legs and they cannot claim any relief
by citing the order of the Appellate Authority as passed in the case of
Anil Kumar Pandey, Dharmesh Dayma & Shambu Singh.
12. In support of his arguments, learned counsel relied upon the
following judgments passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, which are
as under:-
1. Director General of Police, Railway Protection Force and
Ors. Vs. Rajendra Kumar Dubey9.
12.1. In the case of Director General of Police, Railway
Protection Force and Ors. Vs. Rajendra Kumar Dubey, the Hon’ble
Supreme Court reiterated the well-settled principles governing the
scope of judicial review by High Courts under Articles 226 and 227 of
the Constitution in matters arising from departmental/disciplinary
proceedings. The Court held that the High Court must not act as an
appellate authority and reappreciate evidence led before the enquiry
officer, and can interfere only on limited grounds such as violation of
natural justice, findings based on no evidence, or perversity. The
relevant principles were enunciated in the following paragraphs: –
21.1. We will first discuss the scope of interference by
the High Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction with
respect to disciplinary proceedings. It is well settled that
the High Court must not act as an appellate authority,
and reappreciate the evidence led before the enquiry
officer. We will advert to some of the decisions of this
Court with respect to interference by the High Courts9 (2021) 14 SCC 735
10 (2021) 11 SCC 321
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servant.
AIR 1963 SC 1723, a three judge bench of this Court
held that the High Court Under Article 226 of the
Constitution is not a court of appeal over the decision of
the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a
public servant. It is not the function of the High Court
under its writ jurisdiction to review the evidence, and
arrive at an independent finding on the evidence. The
High Court may, however interfere where the
departmental authority which has held the proceedings
against the delinquent officer are inconsistent with the
principles of natural justice, where the findings are based
on no evidence, which may reasonably support the
conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the
charge, or in violation of the statutory Rules prescribing
the mode of enquiry, or the authorities were actuated by
some extraneous considerations and failed to reach a fair
decision, or allowed themselves to be influenced by
irrelevant considerations, or where the conclusion on the
very face of it is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that
no reasonable person could ever have arrived at that
conclusion. If, however, the enquiry is properly held, the
departmental authority is the sole judge of facts, and if
there is some legal evidence on which the findings can
be based, the adequacy or reliability of that evidence is
not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed
before the High Court in a writ petition.
21.3. These principles were further reiterated in the
State of Andhra Pradesh v. Chitra Venkata Rao: (1975) 2
SCC 557. The jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari
Under Article 226 is a supervisory jurisdiction. The court
exercises the power not as an appellate court. The
findings of fact reached by an inferior court or tribunal on
the appreciation of evidence, are not re-opened or
questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is
apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a
writ court, but not an error of fact, however grave it may
be. A writ can be issued if it is shown that in recording
the finding of fact, the tribunal has erroneously refused
to admit admissible and material evidence, or had
erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence. A finding of
fact recorded by the tribunal cannot be challenged on the
ground that the material evidence adduced before the
tribunal is insufficient or inadequate to sustain a finding.
The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point,
and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said
finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
tribunal.
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21.4. In subsequent decisions of this Court, including
Union of India v. G. Ganayutham: (1997) 7 SCC 463,
Director General RPF v. Ch. Sai Babu: (2003) 4 SCC 331,
Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board
v. T.T. Murali: (2014) 4 SCC 108, Union of India v.
Manab Kumar Guha: (2011) 11 SCC 535, these
principles have been consistently followed.
21.5. In a recent judgment delivered by this Court in the
State of Rajasthan and Ors. v. Heem Singh this Court
has summed up the law in following words: (SCC para
37)
“37. In exercising judicial review in disciplinary
matters, there are two ends of the spectrum. The first
embodies a Rule of restraint. The second defines when
interference is permissible. The rule of restraint
constricts the ambit of judicial review. This is for a valid
reason. The determination of whether a misconduct has
been committed lies primarily within the domain of the
disciplinary authority. The judge does not assume the
mantle of the disciplinary authority. Nor does the judge
wear the hat of an employer. Deference to a finding of
fact by the disciplinary authority is a recognition of the
idea that it is the employer who is responsible for the
efficient conduct of their service. Disciplinary enquiries
have to abide by the rules of natural justice. But they are
not governed by strict rules of evidence which apply to
judicial proceedings. The standard of proof is hence not
the strict standard which governs a criminal trial, of
proof beyond reasonable doubt, but a civil standard
governed by a preponderance of probabilities. Within the
rule of preponderance, there are varying approaches
based on context and subject. The first end of the
spectrum is founded on deference and autonomy –
deference to the position of the disciplinary authority as
a fact-finding authority and autonomy of the employer in
maintaining discipline and efficiency of the service. At
the other end of the spectrum is the principle that the
court has the jurisdiction to interfere when the findings
in the enquiry are based on no evidence or when they
suffer from perversity. A failure to consider vital
evidence is an incident of what the law regards as a
perverse determination of fact. Proportionality is an
entrenched feature of our jurisprudence. Service
jurisprudence has recognized it for long years in allowing
for the authority of the court to interfere when the
finding or the penalty are disproportionate to the weight
of the evidence or misconduct. Judicial craft lies in
maintaining a steady sail between the banks of these
two shores which have been termed as the two ends of
the spectrum. Judges do not rest with a mere recitation
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of the hands-off mantra when they exercise judicial
review. To determine whether the finding in a
disciplinary enquiry is based on some evidence an initial
or threshold level of scrutiny is undertaken. That is to
satisfy the conscience of the court that there is some
evidence to support the charge of misconduct and to
guard against perversity. But this does not allow the
court to re-appreciate evidentiary findings in a
disciplinary enquiry or to substitute a view which appears
to the judge to be more appropriate. To do so would
offend the first principle which has been outlined above.
The ultimate guide is the exercise of robust common
sense without which the judges’ craft is in vain.”
21.6. In Union of India v. P. Gunasekaran, this Court
held that the High Court in exercise of its power Under
Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India shall not
venture into re-appreciation of the evidence. The High
Court would determine whether:
“(a) the enquiry is held by the competent authority;
(b) the enquiry is held according to the procedure
prescribed in that behalf;
(c) there is violation of the principles of natural justice
in conducting the proceedings;
(d) the authorities have disabled themselves from
reaching a fair conclusion by some considerations which
are extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case;
(e) the authorities have allowed themselves to be
influenced by irrelevant or extraneous considerations;
(f) the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly
arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could
ever have arrived at such conclusion;
(g) the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to
admit the admissible and material evidence;
(h) the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted
inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding;
(i) the finding of fact is based on no evidence.”
21.7. In paragraph 13 of the judgment, the Court held
that: (P. GunasekRn case, SCC p. 617)
“13. Under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of
India, the High Court shall not:
(i) re-appreciate the evidence;
(ii) interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in
the case the same has been conducted in accordance
with law;
(iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence;
(iv) go into the reliability of the evidence;
(v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on
which findings can be based;
(vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may
appear to be;
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(vii) go into the proportionality of punishment
unless it shocks its conscience.”
12.2. In the case of Union of India and Ors. v. Dalbir Singh,
the Hon’ble Supreme Court reiterated the well-settled principles
governing the scope of judicial review by High Courts under
Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution in matters arising from
departmental disciplinary proceedings. The Court held that the
High Court must not act as an appellate authority and
reappreciate evidence led before the enquiry officer, and can
interfere only on limited grounds such as violation of natural
justice, findings based on no evidence, or perversity. The relevant
paragraphs are reproduces as under: –
16. We find that the High Court has exceeded its
jurisdiction while exercising the power of judicial review
over the orders passed in the disciplinary proceedings
which were conducted while adhering to the principles of
natural justice.
21. This Court in Union of India and Ors. v. P. Gunasekaran
(2015) 2 SCC 610 had laid down the broad parameters for
the exercise of jurisdiction of judicial review. The Court
held as under:
“12. Despite the well-settled position, it is painfully
disturbing to note that the High Court has acted as an
appellate authority in the disciplinary proceedings,
reappreciating even the evidence before the enquiry
officer. The finding on Charge I was accepted by the
disciplinary authority and was also endorsed by the Central
Administrative Tribunal. In disciplinary proceedings, the
High Court is not and cannot act as a second court of first
appeal. The High Court, in exercise of its powers Under
Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, shall not
venture into reappreciation of the evidence. The High Court
can only see whether:
(a) the enquiry is held by a competent authority;
(b) the enquiry is held according to the procedure
prescribed in that behalf;
(c) there is violation of the principles of natural justice in
conducting the proceedings;
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(d) the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching
a fair conclusion by some considerations extraneous to the
evidence and merits of the case;
(e) the authorities have allowed themselves to be
influenced by irrelevant or extraneous considerations;
(f) the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly
arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could
ever have arrived at such conclusion;
(g) the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to
admit the admissible and material evidence;
(h) the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted
inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding;
(i) the finding of fact is based on no evidence.
13. Under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the
High Court shall not:
(i) reappreciate the evidence;
(ii) interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the
same has been conducted in accordance with law;
(iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence;
(iv) go into the reliability of the evidence;
(v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which
findings can be based;
(vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may appear
to be;
(vii) go into the proportionality of punishment unless it
shocks its conscience.
29. The burden of proof in the departmental proceedings is
not of beyond reasonable doubt as is the principle in the
criminal trial but probabilities of the misconduct. The
delinquent such as the writ Petitioner could examine
himself to rebut the allegations of misconduct including use
of personal weapon. In fact, the reliance of the writ
petitioner is upon a communication dated 1.5.2014 made
to the Commandant through the inquiry officer. He has
stated that he has not fired on higher officers and that he
was out of camp at the alleged time of incident. Therefore,
a false case has been made against him. His further stand
is that it was a terrorist attack and terrorists have fired on
the Camp. None of the departmental witnesses have been
even suggested about any terrorist attack or that the writ
Petitioner was out of camp. Constable D.K. Mishra had
immobilized the writ Petitioner whereas all other witnesses
have seen the writ Petitioner being immobilized and being
removed to quarter guard. PW-5 Brij Kishore Singh
deposed that 3-4 soldiers had taken the Self-Loading Rifle
(S.L.R.) of the writ Petitioner in their possession.
Therefore, the allegations in the chargesheet dated
25.2.2013 that the writ Petitioner has fired from the official
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weapon is a reliable finding returned by the Departmental
Authorities on the basis of evidence placed before them. It
is not a case of no evidence, which alone would warrant
interference by the High Court in exercise of power of
judicial review. It is not the case of the writ Petitioner that
there was any infraction of any rule or regulations or the
violation of the principles of natural justice. The best
available evidence had been produced by the appellants in
the course of enquiry conducted after long lapse of time.
12.3. In State of Uttar Pradesh and Others v. Rajit Singh,
the Hon’ble Supreme Court examined two crucial aspects of
departmental proceedings: (i) whether the “doctrine of equality”
can be invoked to set aside a punishment on the ground that co-
delinquents were exonerated, and (ii) what is the proper remedy
when a disciplinary enquiry is found to be vitiated due to violation
of principles of natural justice. The Court held that the doctrine of
equality cannot be applied in such a manner, and that where an
enquiry is vitiated, the matter must be remanded to the
disciplinary authority to proceed from the stage of violation,
rather than reinstating the employee. The relevant paragraphs of
the judgment are as under: –
10. Now, so far as the quashing and setting aside the
order of punishment imposed by the Disciplinary
Authority applying the Doctrine of Equality on the
ground that other officers involved in the incident have
been exonerated and/or no action has been taken
against them, is concerned, we are of the firm view
that on the aforesaid ground, the order of punishment
could not have been set aside by the Tribunal and the
High court. The Doctrine of Equality ought not to have
been applied when the Enquiry Officer and the
Disciplinary Authority held the charges proved against
the delinquent officer. The role of the each individual
officer even with respect to the same misconduct is
required to be considered in light of their duties of
office. Even otherwise, merely because some other
officers involved in the incident are exonerated and/or
no action is taken against other officers cannot be a
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[2026:RJ-JP:5810-DB] (27 of 30) [SAW-612/2021]charges against the individual concerned – delinquent
officer are held to be proved in a departmental
enquiry. There cannot be any claim of negative
equality in such cases. Therefore, both the Tribunal as
well as the High Court have committed a grave error
in quashing and setting aside the order of punishment
imposed by the Disciplinary Authority by applying the
Doctrine of Equality.
11. It appears from the order passed by the Tribunal
that the Tribunal also observed that the enquiry
proceedings were against the principles of natural
justice inasmuch as the documents mentioned in the
charge sheet were not at all supplied to the delinquent
officer. As per the settled proposition of law, in a case
where it is found that the enquiry is not conducted
properly and/or the same is in violation of the
principles of natural justice, in that case, the Court
cannot reinstate the employee as such and the matter
is to be remanded to the Enquiry Officer/Disciplinary
Authority to proceed further with the enquiry from the
stage of violation of principles of natural justice is
noticed and the enquiry has to be proceeded further
after furnishing the necessary documents mentioned
in the charge sheet, which are alleged to have not
been given to the delinquent officer in the instant
case.
12. In the case of Chairman, Life Insurance
Corporation of India and Ors. v. A. Masilamani: (2013)
6 SCC 530, which was also pressed into service on
behalf of the Appellants before the High Court, it is
observed in paragraph 16 as under:
“16. It is a settled legal proposition, that once the
court sets aside an order of punishment, on the
ground that the enquiry was not properly conducted,
the court cannot reinstate the employee. It must remit
the case concerned to the disciplinary authority for it
to conduct the enquiry from the point that it stood
vitiated, and conclude the same. (Vide ECIL v. B.
Karunakar: (1993) 4 SCC 727], Hiran Mayee
Bhattacharyya v. S.M. School for Girls [(2002) 10 SCC
293], U.P. State Spg. Co. Ltd. v. R.S. Pandey : (2005)
8 SCC 264] and Union of India v. Y.S. Sadhu: (2008)
12 SCC 30]).”
13. From the impugned judgment and order passed by
the High Court, it appears that when the aforesaid
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[2026:RJ-JP:5810-DB] (28 of 30) [SAW-612/2021]into service, the High Court has not considered the
same on the ground that the other officers involved in
respect of the same incident are exonerated and/or no
action is taken against them. Applying the law laid
down in the case of A. Masilamani (supra) to the facts
of the case on hand, we are of the opinion that the
Tribunal as well as the High Court ought to have
remanded the matter to the Disciplinary Authority to
conduct the enquiry from the stage it stood vitiated.
Therefore, the order passed by the High Court in not
allowing further proceedings from the stage it stood
vitiated, i.e., after the issuance of the charge sheet, is
unsustainable.
13. In the end, learned counsel for the State submitted that there is
no error in the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge and
therefore, as the conduct of the petitioners was serious rightly noted by
the Disciplinary Authority as well as the Appellate Authority and also
affirmed by the learned Single Judge, deserves no interference and the
special appeals deserve to be dismissed.
14. This Court is aware of the law as settled by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court with regard to exercise the power of judicial review in the
departmental proceedings and further that the Court cannot even
examine the adequacy of the evidence nor substitute a punishment until
and unless it shocks the conscience of the Court.
15. Considering the law as laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
the above cited judgment by counsel for respondent with regard to
power of judicial review, this Court is not inclined to interfere in the
findings as recorded by the Enquiry Officer and the punishment order
dated 04.04.2018 as passed by the Disciplinary Authority. The Enquiry
Officer specifically recorded that the charges were found to be proved
against all the employees, and thereafter, the Disciplinary Authority
after providing sufficient opportunity of hearing and following the
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[2026:RJ-JP:5810-DB] (29 of 30) [SAW-612/2021]
principles of natural justice, imposed punishment on the respective
employees by order dated 04.04.2018.
16. This Court noted that the Enquiry Officer as well as the
Disciplinary Authority considered their role and conduct in the entire
incident in depth and thereafter the charges were found to be proved
and petitioners were punished vide order dated 04.04.2018. Once the
charges were found to be proved, the punishment order was passed.
The Appellate Authority decided the appeal and the learned Single
Judge rightly dismissed the writs.
17. The Court is not inclined, as already noted hereinabove, to
interfere with the findings as recorded by the Enquiry Officer and the
punishment as awarded by the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate
Authority which decided the departmental appeal as preferred by the
petitioners herein.
18. The law in regard to powers of the Court with regard to judicial
review in the disciplinary cases is well settled by the Supreme Court, as
noted from the judgments cited by both the counsels.
19. This Court has noted that, in the case of Union of India and Ors
v Ex Constable Ram Karan12, the Hon’ble Supreme Court set out the
limits of judicial interference in the matters of the disciplinary
proceedings. The Court held that it is sole prerogative of the Disciplinary
Authority or Appellate Authority, to determine the punishment based on
the gravity of the misconduct. While the power of judicial interference in
the matter of disciplinary proceedings is available with the Courts but
the scope is very narrow. The judicial interference is warranted only in
cases where the imposed penalty is so disproportionate that it shocks
the conscience of the Court.
12 2022 (1) SCC 373
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[2026:RJ-JP:5810-DB] (30 of 30) [SAW-612/2021]
20. In view of the above settled law as quoted in as quoted in initial
paras of the judgment regarding the exercise of power of judicial review
in the matters of disciplinary proceedings, this Court, is not inclined to
interfere in the impugned order.
21. The order passed by the Appellate Authority in the case of Anil
Kumar Pandey is not available on record for perusal of the Court and
therefore the reasons as recorded in their case cannot be considered by
this Court even otherwise the petitioners herein are required to stand
on their own legs. Learned counsel for the petitioner failed to satisfy
this Court in regard to violation of any procedure by the Disciplinary
Authority and also there is no violation of principle of natural justice. In
the absence of the above, this Court finds no merits in the present
appeal.
21. In view thereof, the present Special Appeals Writ are dismissed
and the order passed by the Learned Single Judge dated 18.05.2021
along-with order of the Appellate Authority dated 16.10.2020 are
affirmed.
22. No order as to costs.
23. All pending application(s), if any, stands disposed off.
(RAVI CHIRANIA),J (INDERJEET SINGH),J
Monika
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