Delhi High Court – Orders
Ms A S vs Central Bureau Of Investigation & Ors on 20 April, 2026
Author: Navin Chawla
Bench: Navin Chawla
$~16
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ CRL.A. 1602/2025
MS A S .....Appellant
Through: Mr. Mehmood Pracha, Mr. Jatin
Bhatt, Mr. Sanawar, Ms.
Nujhat, Mr. Sikander, Mr.
Kshitij Singh and Mr. Chiraj
Verma, Advs.
versus
CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION & ORS.
.....Respondents
Through: Ms. Anubha Bhardwaj, SPP
with Mr. Anurag Modi,
Ms.Ananya Shamshery, Ms.
Riddhi Grover, Mr. Mayank
Bawa, Advs. Mr. Anurag Modi,
Adv. and Mr. Arijit Sinha, IO
for R-1/ CBI
Mr. Rajiv Mohan, Mr. Swapnil
Krishna, Mr. Nishant Madan,
Mr. Chandveer Shyoran, Mr.
Sachit Sharma, Mr. Hemant
Goyal and Mr. Abhishek
Sharma Adv. for R-2 & 7.
Mr. Akhand Pratap Singh, Ms.
Samridhi Dobhal, Ms. Krishna
Mohan Chandel, Advs. Mr.
Hritwik Maurya, Mr. Apporv
Paliya, Mr. Utkarsh Singh and
Ms. Lisa Pegwal, Advs. for R-
3.
Mr. Kanhaiya Singhal, Mr.
Naval Goel, Mr. Prasanna, Mr.
Ajay Kumar and Ms. Vani
Singhal, Advs. for R-4.
Mr. S.P.M Tripathi, Ms.
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Aishwarya Senger, Mr. Rahul
Poonia and Mr. Gaurav
Chaudhary, Advocates for R-5.
Mr. Hemant Shah, Mr. Saurabh
Pal, Mr. Saurabh Rajput, Mr.
Ojas Kaushik and Mr. Akshay
Rana, Advs. for R-6.
Mr. Pramod Kumar Dubey, Sr.
Adv. with Mr. SPM Tripathi,
Mr. Gaurav Mani Tripathi, Mr.
Satyam Sharma, Mr.
Ramachandruni B. Siddhartha,
Mr. Yash saxena, Mr. Samarth
Kasana, Advs. for R-8.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE NAVIN CHAWLA
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAVINDER DUDEJA
ORDER
% 20.04.2026
CRL.M.A. 34666/2025 (delay of 1945 days in filing the appeal
along with affidavit)
1. The present application is filed by the appellant under Section 5
of the Limitation Act, 1963 read with Section 482 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure [Cr.P.C.] seeking condonation of delay of 1945
days in filing the captioned criminal appeal, which assails the
judgment of conviction dated 04.03.2020 and the order on sentence
dated 13.03.2020 passed by the learned District & Sessions Judge
(West), Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi [Trial Court] in Sessions Case Nos.
446/2019 and 449/2019 arising out of CBI FIR No. 9(S) and 10(S),
which were originally registered as FIR No. 89/2018 and 90/2018 at
Police Station Makhi, District Unnao, Uttar Pradesh.
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2. The learned Trial Court, vide the impugned judgment, convicted
the Respondent Nos. 2 to 8 for multiple offences under the Indian
Penal Code, 1860 [IPC] and the Arms Act, 1959. The appellant, who
is the daughter of the deceased victim, has preferred the present appeal
seeking, inter alia, alteration of conviction to offences punishable
under Sections 302 and 364A IPC and enhancement of sentence.
3. Since the appeal has been filed after a substantial delay of 1945
days, the appellant has sought condonation of the said delay by way of
the present application.
4. Mr. Pracha, learned counsel for the appellant submits that the
delay, though considerable, is neither deliberate nor attributable to any
mala fide conduct on the part of the appellant. It is contended that the
appellant is the daughter of the deceased victim and has been
continuously pursuing remedies in relation to a grave and sensitive
criminal matter involving the death of her father under circumstances
already found to be the result of a criminal conspiracy by the learned
Trial Court. It is urged that the appellant, is herself a victim, having
been subjected to rape by Respondent No.8, and has been engaged in
multiple proceedings, representations, and complaints arising out of
the same chain of events, which contributed to the delay in
approaching this Court by way of the present appeal. It is further
submitted that being a rape victim, she has faced immense trauma and
has been shun from society. It is submitted that she is under constant
threat to her life and is already in a precarious position being a rape
victim, and cannot be expected to be totally vigilant while pursuing
litigation and that the reasons for delay provide “sufficient”
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explanation.
5. It is further submitted that the case pertains to serious offences
involving allegations of custodial violence, conspiracy, intimidation
and sexual assault, and therefore raises issues of substantial public
importance and grave miscarriage of justice. Learned counsel
contends that the learned Trial Court itself recorded findings
indicative of a concerted conspiracy and brutal assault upon the
deceased, yet erroneously refrained from convicting the accused under
graver provisions such as Sections 302 and 364A IPC. In these
circumstances, it is argued that a hyper-technical approach to
limitation would defeat the cause of substantive justice.
6. Learned counsel emphasizes the right of a victim or her family
to seek appropriate conviction and sentence and argues that such right
ought not to be defeated merely on account of delay, particularly when
the delay stands reasonably explained. It is submitted that the
appellant belongs to a rural background and has faced considerable
hardship, including social and legal challenges, in pursuing the matter.
The delay, is thus, stated to be a consequence of bona fide
circumstances rather than negligence.
7. He submits that the appellant has no financial resources to
pursue litigation and even he is appearing pro-bono for her. On the
other hand, the Respondent Nos. 2 to 8 are extremely powerful and
resourceful individuals.
8. He submits that since the date of the incident, the appellant had
been living in Delhi in a rented accommodation provided to her by the
Delhi Commission for Women [DCW], for which also, she had to
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pursue litigation.
9. He submits that the appellant had suffered grave injuries and
had to undergo treatment at the All India Institute of Medical Sciences
[AIIMS] for several months in 2019. She is being subjected to
constant threats, harassment and Public Vilification Campaign, and is
being made to suffer from pillar to post, because of which, she could
not file this appeal within the period of limitation.
10. He submits that other appeals filed by the respondents in
challenge to the impugned orders of the learned Trial Court are
pending adjudication, before this Court, no prejudice would be caused
to the respondents if this application is allowed and the appeal is
considered on merits.
11. It is also contended that refusal to condone the delay would
result in irreparable injustice by foreclosing the appellant’s statutory
right of appeal. Learned counsel accordingly prays for adopting a
liberal approach consistent with settled principles governing
condonation of delay, particularly in criminal matters involving
serious offences.
12. The counsels for the Respondents have vehemently opposed the
application.
13. Mr. Dubey, learned Senior Counsel appearing for Respondent
no.8, while opposing the application, submits that the delay of 1945
days is grossly inordinate and unjustified. It is contended that when an
application under section 5 of Limitation Act seeking condonation of
delay is filed beyond the prescribed period, such delay must be
explained by demonstrating the “sufficient cause” that resulted in such
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delay. It is submitted that even though a liberal approach has been
adopted by courts in dealing with delay condonation, but such liberal
approach cannot be extended to condone delay of this magnitude in
the absence of “sufficient cause” being demonstrated. In this regard,
reliance is placed upon judgment of Supreme Court in Shivamma (D)
by LRs v. Karnataka Housing Board & Ors., VII (2025) SLT 321
and on judgement of this Court in Ms. X Vs. The State of NCT of
Delhi and Ors., CRL. REV. PET. 482/2025.
14. Learned Senior Counsel further submits that a bare perusal of
the chronology of events would show that the limitation period for
filing the appeal expired on 29.05.2022, but, the present appeal came
to be filed only on 09.09.2025, that is, after a huge delay of almost 3.5
years, without any explanation whatsoever. It is thus contended that
the application is liable to be rejected on this ground alone.
15. It has been further submitted that the appellant continued to be a
party to multiple proceedings arising out of RC no. 8(S)/2018, RC No.
9(S)/2018 and RC No. 10(S)/2018. She had duly participated in the
trial and was well aware of order of conviction dated 04.03.2020 and
Order on Sentence dated 13.03.2020. Not only this, she has also been
represented by private counsels at various stages of the trial/appeals
and other proceedings and participated either in person or through a
counsel for more than 90 times, thereby showing her deliberate
negligence and inaction on her part.
16. Learned Senior Counsel further submits that the grounds urged
in the application, such as financial constraints, issues relating to
rented accommodation, alleged physical debilitation, and assertions of
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threats or harassment, are vague and unsupported by any documentary
evidence. It is contended that these grounds are general excuses rather
than legally acceptable explanations, and do not meet the threshold of
“sufficient cause” as required under law. In support, reliance is placed
on Vinod Kumar Chetram Ganeriwala Vs. Khushal Chandra
Lalitprasad Poddar, 2026 SCC Online Bom 649.
17. Mr. Dubey further submits that the application is liable to be
dismissed as defective and non-est in the eyes of law being violative
of Rule 9(ii), Part B, Chapter XII, Volume IV of the High Court
Rules, as the same has not been signed by the appellant and is also not
supported by a valid Affidavit.
18. Mr. Singhal, appearing for Respondent no.4, asserts that the
plea of financial constraint is wholly untenable, particularly because
the appellant was already represented by counsels in multiple
proceedings before this Court over the years. Moreover, no particulars
have been furnished as to the period during which such constraint
existed, nor has any supporting material been placed on record.
Furthermore, if any such financial constraint ever existed, the
appellant surprisingly never approached the Legal Services Authority
for free legal aid, rather the appellant has been represented by private
advocates during the proceedings. It is submitted that the appellant,
being a woman, falls in the eligible category of Section 12 (c) of the
Legal Services Authority Act, 1987 which entitles her to free legal
service. It is submitted that access to legal aid remedies was always
available, and the failure to avail the same cannot be a ground for
condonation of delay. In support of his argument, reliance is placed on
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judgment of this Court in Braj Mohan Goel Vs. Union of India, 2025
SCC Online Del 1043.
19. Learned counsel further states that out of the total compensation
amount, Rs. 10 lacs have already been paid by the Respondents and
another sum of Rs. 25 lacs have been paid by the State of Uttar
Pradesh to the appellant and hence, the stance adopted by the
appellant regarding financial constraint becomes unsustainable. It is
further submitted that the merits of the case are wholly irrelevant at
the stage of considering an application for condonation of delay. The
application must stand or fall on the sufficiency of the explanation
offered for such delay, and not on the nature of the underlying dispute.
20. It is thus contended that the present case is an example of
conscious inaction, where despite full knowledge and opportunity, the
appellant failed to act within limitation period and has now sought to
revive a stale claim by way of a belated appeal. In these
circumstances, learned counsels for the Respondents submit that the
appellant has failed to establish any “sufficient cause” for condonation
of such inordinate delay and pray that the present application be
dismissed, being devoid of merit.
21. Mr. Hemant Shah, learned counsel appearing for Respondent
No. 6, submits that the callous manner in which the application has
been filed, is evident from the Opening Sheets attached with the
appeals, which gives a wrong narration of provisions on which the
respondents have been charged/convicted.
22. He submits that the present appeal has been filed with a mala
fide intent and to somehow stall the consideration of application filed
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by the respondent, seeking suspension of his sentence in his own
appeal pending adjudication before this Court.
23. Ms. Anubha Bhardwaj, learned Special Public Prosecutor
appearing for CBI submits that as far as CBI is concerned, it has
accepted the order of conviction and sentence passed by the learned
Trial Court and has not challenged the same. As far as the present
application is concerned, she submits that the CBI has no submission
than to offer and leave it to the Court.
24. In rebuttal, Mr. Pracha argues that there is no presumption that
delay is occasioned deliberately or on account of mala fide or culpable
negligence. He further states that a litigant does not stand to benefit by
resorting to delay, rather he runs a serious risk. It is also stated that the
Supreme Court in Suo Moto Writ Petition (Crl.) No. 1/2019, while
dealing with application seeking fresh directions in respect of CRPF
security granted to victims, vide order dated 25.03.2025 has directed
that the security may continue to be granted to the appellant due to the
threat perception she still faces, thereby highlighting the seriousness
and daunting reality.
25. Learned Counsel further submits that the Court must not adopt a
pedantic approach and may address the case with liberality,
considering the gravity of the situation. In support of his arguments,
he places reliance on judgments of Supreme Court in State Vs. Yogesh
@ Gulu & Ors., CRL. REV. PET. No. 456/2024; Sheo Raj Singh
(Deceased) Thr LRs & Ors., CIVIL APPEAL No. 5867/2015; State
of Nagaland Vs. Lipok AO & Ors., APPEAL (CRL.) No. 484/2005 &
Collector Land Acquisition, Anantnag & Anr. Vs. Mst. Katiji & Ors.,
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1987 SCC (2) 107.
26. We have considered the arguments advanced by counsels of
respective parties.
27. From perusal of the record, it emerges that the impugned
judgment was passed on 04.03.2020 and the order on sentence was
passed on 13.03.2020. Even after extending the benefit of extension of
period of limitation as per orders of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Suo Motu W.P.(C) No. 3/2020, the limitation period expired on
29.05.2022. The present appeal, however, came to be filed only on
09.09.2025, that is, almost 1199 days after expiry of limitation period,
thereby resulting in an extraordinary delay.
28. It is trite that while the expression “sufficient cause” under
Section 5 of the Limitation Act is to receive a liberal construction, but
such liberal interpretation cannot be extended to condone inordinate
and unexplained delays in a routine manner. The applicant is required
to demonstrate bona fide and due diligence and also furnish a
reasonable and acceptable explanation regarding the delay. The
Supreme Court in Shivamma (supra) placed reliance on various
judgments and emphasized on the meaning of “sufficient cause” in
Section 5 of the Limitation Act, and held that even though the above
expression “sufficient cause” in Section 5 is to be given a liberal
interpretation, the party seeking condonation of delay has to provide
cogent reasons and demonstrate the existence of “sufficient cause”
that resulted in such delay in filing the appeal beyond the prescribed
period.
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29. It is true that as held in Katiji (supra), every day’s delay need
not be explained with such precision but the fact remains that a
reasonable and acceptable explanation is very much necessary.
30. The Supreme Court in H. Guruswamy Vs. A. Krishnaiah, 2025
SCC OnLine SC 54 emphasized that the length of delay is a relevant
factor and that once a party loses its right due to prolonged inaction, it
cannot invoke the principle of substantial justice as a matter of course.
The Court is first required to test the bona fide of the explanation
offered, and only if the explanation inspires confidence can discretion
be exercised.
31. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pathapati Subba Reddy (died)
by L.Rs. Vs. The Special Deputy Collector (LA), 2024 SCC Online
SC 513, has reiterated that while Section 5 of the Limitation Act may
be construed liberally, however, it cannot be extended to defeat the
substantive law of limitation. Howsoever liberal approach is adopted
in condoning the delay, the existence of “sufficient cause” for not
filing the appeal in time is a condition precedent for exercising the
power to condone delay. It was further held that the power to condone
delay is discretionary and may not be exercised even where sufficient
cause is claimed, particularly in cases involving inordinate delay,
negligence or lack of due diligence.
32. Assessing the actions of the appellant, and without going in the
merits of the case, we find that the appellant was not only aware of the
impugned judgment and order on sentence, but was rather actively
participating in connected proceedings arising out of the same
incident. The record reflects that the appellant had entered appearance
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multiple times before the learned Trial Court, was in possession of
certified copies of the impugned orders, and had thereafter actively
participated in Criminal Appeal No. 451/2020 preferred by
Respondent No. 8, including being impleaded therein and appearing
on numerous dates. The appellant’s participation on several occasions,
including personal appearances before this Court, clearly demonstrate
that she was fully cognizant of her legal rights. Yet, despite such
active participation and availability of legal advice from her advocate,
the appellant consciously chose not to avail the statutory remedy of
appeal within the prescribed period of limitation.
33. The grounds urged in the application, namely financial
constraints, issues relating to accommodation, alleged physical
debilitation, and assertions of threats or harassment, do not inspire
confidence at the stage of considering the application for condonation
of delay. These grounds are vague in nature, unsupported by any
documentary material, and do not disclose the period during which
such circumstances prevailed. Mere assertions, without substantiation,
cannot constitute “sufficient cause”.
34. Furthermore, the plea of financial constraint is particularly
untenable in light of the admitted position that the appellant was
represented by private counsels in multiple proceedings before this
Court as well as the Trial Court and the Apex Court, and has already
received a total of Rs. 35 lacs as compensation. No material has been
placed to demonstrate any genuine inability to approach the Court
within limitation, nor is there any explanation as to why legal aid
mechanisms were not availed. Even though Mr. Pracha may have been
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appearing for her pro-bono, why he was not approached for filing of
this appeal in time and why he could not file the same, has not been
explained by the appellant.
35. The law of limitation is founded on principles of certainty and
public policy. The appellant has not made out any reasonable
explanation so as to constitute a “sufficient cause” for condoning the
delay. This Court is also required to bear in mind the consequences
that would enure if such an inordinate delay were to be condoned at
this belated stage. Entertaining a belated appeal seeking enhancement
of conviction and sentence after an unexplained delay of several years
would seriously prejudice the rights of the accused, who would be
exposed to the uncertainty of prolonged litigation and the possibility
of aggravated penal consequences long after the conclusion of trial.
Such an approach would be contrary to the settled principles
governing criminal jurisprudence. To condone such an extraordinary
delay in the absence of “sufficient cause” would defeat these
principles and open the floodgates for belated claims.
36. We find that the maxim vigilantibus non dormientibus jura
subveniunt [the law assists those who are vigilant and not those who
sleep over their rights] squarely applies to the present case. The
appellant, despite having full knowledge of the impugned judgment
and having actively participated in related proceedings, failed to avail
the statutory remedy within the prescribed time. The delay, being
inordinate and unexplained, reflects a lack of due diligence. The
appellant cannot behave in a casual manner and then approach Court
seeking condonation of delay as a right, without providing reasonable
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grounds for the delay caused.
37. The present case, therefore, is not one of inability, but of
deliberate inaction and negligence. The conduct of the appellant
disentitles her from seeking equitable relief of condonation of delay.
In such circumstances, this Court finds no reason to exercise its
discretionary power, as doing so would defeat the very object of the
law of limitation and erode the discipline it seeks to enforce.
38. We are of the opinion that the appellant has failed to establish
any “sufficient cause” for condonation of delay within the meaning of
Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The delay being gross, unexplained,
and attributable to negligence, the application deserves to be
dismissed.
39. Accordingly, the application is disposed of.
CRL.A. 1602/2025
40. Since the application for condonation of delay is dismissed,
consequently, the captioned appeal is also dismissed as barred by
limitation.
NAVIN CHAWLA, J
RAVINDER DUDEJA, J
APRIL 20, 2026/AK/ RM
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