Rajasthan High Court – Jodhpur
Mr. Aseem Watts vs Union Of India (2026:Rj-Jd:10773) on 26 February, 2026
[2026:RJ-JD:10773]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT
JODHPUR
S.B. Misc. Application No. 19/2026
Mr. Aseem Watts S/o Sher Singh, Aged About 59 Years, R/o 135-
L-Block, Sriganganagar, Rajasthan- 335001 Sole Proprietor Of
M/s Aseem And Company, Having Its Office At 135-L-Block,
Sriganganagar, Rajasthan-335001
----Petitioner
Versus
1. Union Of India, Through The Chief Engineer, Bathinda
Zone, Bathinda Military Station, Bhatinda-151004
2. The Commander, Hq Commander Works Engineer,
Ganganagar Military Station, Sri Ganganagar
----Respondents
For Petitioner(s) : Aakash Kukkar
Meenal Garg through VC
For Respondent(s) : -
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MUKESH RAJPUROHIT
Order
26/02/2026
1. The present matter has comes upon an application filed by
the applicant under Section 151 CPC seeking extension of
time for pronouncement of the arbitral award by the learned
Sole Arbitrator.
2. This Court does not deem it necessary to recapitulate the
entire factual matrix of the case, as the same has already
been dealt with in the previous order whereby an application
seeking extension of the arbitral period as well as
substitution of the arbitrator was allowed. Consequently,
Hon’ble Mr. Justice (Retd.) Arvind Singh Sangwan was
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appointed as the learned Sole Arbitrator to proceed from the
stage at which the proceedings were pending, and the time
for completion of the arbitral proceedings was extended by
six months from the date the learned new Arbitrator held the
first hearing.
3. Learned counsel for the applicant submits that the first
hearing before the learned Sole Arbitrator was held on
17.06.2025 and the award was reserved on 08.11.2025. It is
further submitted that vide email dated 16.12.2025, the
learned Sole Arbitrator informed the parties that the award
was ready and at the final stage of vetting; however, on
account of his illness and the said date being the last date
for pronouncement of the award, he requested the parties to
grant mutual consent for extension of 15 day’s time for
pronouncement of the award.
4. It is further submitted that since the mandate could not be
extended by mutual consent of the parties, the learned Sole
Arbitrator, vide email dated 24.12.2025, requested the
parties to approach this Court for extension of time for
pronouncing the award by a period of one month. Hence, the
present application has been filed.
5. Heard learned counsel for the applicant and perused the
material available on record.
6. The issue that arises for consideration is whether extension
of the time granted by this Court for completion of the
arbitral proceedings can be allowed and whether “sufficient
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cause” has been made out for extension of time for making
and pronouncement of the arbitral award.
7. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in M/s Ajay Protech Ltd. vs.
General Manager & Anr. passed in SLP (Civil) No.
2272 of 2024 has elaborately considered the scope of
extension of time and the meaning of “sufficient cause”
under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act. The relevant
paragraphs reproduced as under:
“15. Efficiency in the conduct of arbitral proceedings
is integral to the effectiveness of the dispute
resolution remedy through arbitration. Efficiency is
inextricably connected with expeditious conclusion of
arbitral proceedings. While the statute incorporates
party autonomy even with respect to the conduct and
conclusion of arbitral proceedings, there is a statutory
recognition of the power of the Court to step in
wherever it is necessary to ensure that the process of
resolution of the dispute is taken to its logical end, if
according to the Court, the circumstances so warrant.
It is in this context that the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act adopts the well-known language of
limitation statutes and provides that the Court can
extend the time if it finds that there is sufficient
cause.
16. The meaning of ‘sufficient cause’ for extending
the time to make an award must take colour from the
underlying purpose of the arbitration process. The
primary objective in rendering an arbitral award is to
resolve disputes through the agreed dispute resolution
mechanism as contracted by the parties. Therefore,
‘sufficient cause’ should be interpreted in the context
of facilitating effective dispute resolution.”
8. From the aforesaid principle, it is clear that while expeditious
disposal of arbitral proceedings is a legislative mandate, the
Court is vested with the power to extend time where
circumstances so warrant, in order to ensure that the arbitral
process reaches its logical conclusion. The expression
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“sufficient cause” must be construed in a manner that
advances the object of effective and meaningful dispute
resolution rather than defeating it on technical grounds.
9. In the present case, it is not in dispute that the arbitral
proceedings have concluded and the award has already been
reserved. The learned Sole Arbitrator has informed the
parties that the award is ready and at the final stage of
vetting. The delay in pronouncement is stated to have
occurred due to illness of the learned Arbitrator. There is no
material to suggest any deliberate inaction or lack of
diligence.
10.This Court also observes that the appropriate statutory
remedy for seeking extension of time for completion of
arbitral proceedings ordinarily lies under Section 29A(4) and
Section 29A(5) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
However, the present application has been moved under
Section 151 CPC invoking the inherent powers of this Court.
Considering that the proceedings have already culminated in
reservation of the award and only a short extension is sought
for its pronouncement, relegating the parties to initiate fresh
proceedings under Section 29A would result in avoidable
delay and would defeat the very objective of expeditious
dispute resolution.
11. In exercise of the inherent powers under Section 151 CPC to
secure the ends of justice, and keeping in view that time is
of essence in arbitral proceedings, this Court is satisfied that
sufficient cause has been shown. Refusal to extend time at
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this stage would frustrate the arbitral process after
conclusion of hearings and would run contrary to the
principles laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court.
12.Accordingly, the present application is allowed. The time for
making and pronouncement of the arbitral award by the
learned Sole Arbitrator is hereby extended by a further
period of thirty (30) days from the date of this order. In view
of aforesaid, the application stands disposed of.
(MUKESH RAJPUROHIT),J
147-Ramesh/-
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