Supreme Court – Daily Orders
Mohd Parvez Alam vs State Of Uttar Pradesh on 23 February, 2026
1
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1128/2026
(@Special Leave Petition(Crl.) No.2375/2026)
MOHD PARVEZ ALAM Appellant(s)
VERSUS
STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS. Respondent(s)
WITH
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1129/2026
(@Special Leave Petition(Crl.) No.2376/2026)
O R D E R
1. Leave granted.
2. Since the issues raised in both the captioned Criminal Appeals
are the same, those were taken up for hearing analogously and are
being disposed of by this common order.
3. These appeals arise from the Orders passed by the High Court
of Judicature at Allahabad dated 14-1-2026 in Criminal Appeal
No.9392/2022 and Criminal Appeal No.264/2023 respectively, by which
the High Court suspended the substantive orders of sentence of life
imprisonment imposed by the Trial Court against the accused persons
– herein in Sessions Trial No.7831/2007, arising out of Case Crime
No.6/2007 registered with Kakrauli Police Station, District
Muzaffar Nagar, U.P. for the offence punishable under Sections 147,
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
ANITA MALHOTRA
Date: 2026.02.26
148 and 302 of the Indian Penal Code (for short the, “IPC”).
17:34:52 IST
Reason:
4. It is the case of the prosecution that on 2-1-2007, the first
informant, i.e., the appellant before us and his son Jan Mohammad
2had gone to offer namaz in a masjid.
5. At about 2.00 p.m., when they were about to leave for their
home from the masjid, the accused persons are alleged to have fired
shots on Jan Mohammed.
6. Jan Mohammed fell down at the very spot of the incident on
suffering the gun shot injuries. The accused persons are alleged to
have thereafter run away from the place of the incident.
7. The aforesaid is the sum and substance of the case of the
prosecution.
8. The accused persons were arrested and were put to trial. In
the course of the trial, the prosecution examined two eye-witnesses
to the incident.
9. The Trial Court ultimately held all the accused persons guilty
of the alleged crime of murder.
10. The accused persons, being dissatisfied with the Judgment and
Order of conviction passed by the Trial Court, went before the High
Court with two appeals, referred to above.
11. In the two appeals, referred to above, they preferred
appropriate applications praying that pending the final disposal of
their respective Criminal Appeals, they be released on bail by
suspending the substantive orders of sentence of life imprisonment
passed by the Trial Court.
12. The High Court allowed the applications preferred by the
convicts seeking suspension of sentence of life imprisonment saying
that as more than 200 Criminal Appeals are being listed before the
Court every day, it was just not possible for the High Court to
decide all these appeals on merits.
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13. The High Court further observed that the appeals would not be
taken up for hearing in near future and saying so, proceeded to
suspend the substantive orders of sentence of life imprisonment
imposed upon the accused persons before us.
14. We quote the observations made by the High Court as contained
in Para 8 of the impugned order:-
“8. After hearing the rival submissions and considering the fact
that there are more than two hundreds criminal appeals being
listed before this court per day and it is not humanly possible
to decide all on merit. There is remote possibility of hearing
of this appeal in near future hence prayer for grant of bail to
the appellant nos. 1, 3 and 4 are allowed.”
15. In such circumstances, referred to above, the original first
informant, being dissatisfied with the order passed by the High
Court, is here before us with the present appeals.
16. We heard Mr. D.N. Goburdhun, the learned Senior counsel
appearing for the appellant (original first informant), Mr. Arvind
Singh Sangwan, the learned Senior counsel appearing for the
Respondent No.2 – Mudassir, Son of Musharraf in the connected
Appeal, Mr. Vikas Singh Jangra, the learned counsel appearing for
the Respondent No.2 – Bhoora @ Mudassir, Son of Manzoor Hasan @
Iddu, Respondent No.3 – Manawwar and Respondent No.4 – Jahir Alam
respectively in the main Appeal.
17. When an accused is put to trial and is held guilty of the
offence with which he is charged, the first thing that happens is
that the presumption of innocence comes to an end. Till the accused
is not held guilty, the law presumes him to be innocent. This is a
well settled principle of criminal jurisprudence.
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18. There is a fine distinction between a sentence imposed by the
trial court for a fixed term and a sentence of life imprisonment.
If a sentence is for a fixed term, ordinarily, the appellate court
may exercise its discretion to suspend the operation of the same
liberally unless there are any exceptional circumstances emerging
from the record to decline. However, when it is a case of life
imprisonment, the only legal test which the Court should apply is
to ascertain whether there is anything palpable or apparent on the
face of the record on the basis of which the court can come to the
conclusion that the conviction is not sustainable in law and that
the convict has very fair chances of succeeding in his appeal. For
applying such test, it is also not permissible for the court to
undertake the exercise of re-appreciating the evidence. The
emphasis is on the word “palpable” and the expression “apparent on
the face of the record”.
19. We are not convinced with the ground assigned by the High
Court for the purpose of suspending the sentence of life
imprisonment.
20. It may be true that the High Court is flooded with Criminal
Appeals and it may be equally true that the Courts may not be in a
position to take up all these appeals for hearing at the earliest.
However, this by itself, cannot be a ground to suspend the
substantive order of sentence of life imprisonment and that too in
connection with a serious offence like murder. The High Court is
obliged to consider the serious nature of offence like murder.
21. The Court is also obliged to consider the relevant factors
like the nature of accusation made against the accused, the manner
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in which the crime is alleged to have been committed, the
desirability of releasing the accused on bail, after they have been
convicted for committing the serious offence of murder.
22. We may refer to and rely upon the decision of this Court in
the case of “Omprakash Sahni v. Jai Shankar Chaudhary”, reported in
(2023) 6 SCC 123.
23. We quote the relevant observations made in the said decision,
24. Paras 19 to 34 respectively read thus:-
“19. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties
and having gone through the materials on record, the only
question that falls for our consideration is whether the High
Court committed any error in passing the impugned order [Jai
Shankar Chaudhary v. State of Bihar, 2022 SCC OnLine Pat 7144] ?
Section 389CrPC and the law on the suspension of sentence
20. Section 389CrPC reads thus:
“389. Suspension of sentence pending the appeal; release of
appellant on bail.—(1) Pending any appeal by a convicted person,
the appellate court may, for reasons to be recorded by it in
writing, order that the execution of the sentence or order
appealed against be suspended and, also, if he is in
confinement, that he be released on bail, or on his own bond:
Provided that the appellate court shall, before releasing on
bail or on his own bond a convicted person who is convicted of
an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life or
imprisonment for a term of not less than ten years, shall give
opportunity to the Public Prosecutor for showing cause in
writing against such release:
Provided further that in cases where a convicted person is
released on bail it shall be open to the Public Prosecutor to
file an application for the cancellation of the bail.
(2) The power conferred by this Section on an appellate court
may be exercised also by the High Court in the case of an appeal
by a convicted person to a court subordinate thereto.
(3) Where the convicted person satisfies the Court by which he
is convicted that he intends to present an appeal, the Court
shall,—
(i) where such person, being on bail, is sentenced to
imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years, or
(ii) where the offence of which such person has been convicted
is a bailable one, and he is on bail, order that the convicted
person be released on bail, unless there are special reasons for
6refusing bail, for such period as will afford sufficient time to
present the appeal and obtain the orders of the appellate court
under sub-section (1), and the sentence of imprisonment shall,
so long as he is so released on bail, be deemed to be suspended.
(4) When the appellant is ultimately sentenced to imprisonment
for a term or to imprisonment for life, the time during which he
is so released shall be excluded in computing the term for which
he is so sentenced.”
21. Suspension conveys postponement or temporarily preventing a
state of affairs from continuing. According to Black’s Law
Dictionary (Seventh Edition), the word “suspend” means, inter
alia, to interrupt; postpone; defer. Black’s Law Dictionary
(Seventh Edition) describes the word “suspension” to mean, inter
alia, an act of temporarily delaying, interrupting or
terminating something. Attributing the same meaning to the word
“suspend” as pointed out above, New Oxford Dictionary of English
(1998 Edition) describes suspend as temporarily preventing from
continuing or being enforced or given effect or defer or delay
an action, event or judgment.
22. Thus, when we speak of suspension of sentence after
conviction, the idea is to defer or postpone the execution of
the sentence. The purpose of postponement of sentence cannot be
achieved by detaining the convict in jail; hence, as a natural
consequence of postponement of execution, the convict may be
enlarged on bail till further orders.
23. The principle underlying the theory of criminal
jurisprudence in our country is that an accused is presumed to
be innocent till he is held guilty by a court of competent
jurisdiction. Once the accused is held guilty, the presumption
of innocence gets erased. In the same manner, if the accused is
acquitted, then the presumption of innocence gets further
fortified.
24. From perusal of Section 389CrPC, it is evident that save and
except the matter falling under the category of sub-section (3)
neither any specific principle of law is laid down nor any
criteria has been fixed for consideration of the prayer of the
convict and further, having a judgment of conviction erasing the
presumption leaning in favour of the accused regarding innocence
till contrary recorded by the court of competent jurisdiction,
and in the aforesaid background, there happens to be a fine
distinction between the prayer for bail at the pre-conviction as
well as the post-conviction stage viz. Sections 437, 438, 439
and 389(1)CrPC.
25. In Rajesh Ranjan Yadav v. CBI [Rajesh Ranjan Yadav v. CBI,
(2007) 1 SCC 70 : (2007) 1 SCC (Cri) 254] , it has been held
under paras 8, 9 and 10, respectively, which are as follows :
(SCC pp. 74-75)
“8. The learned counsel for the appellant then relied on the
decision of this Court in Kashmira Singh v. State of Punjab
[Kashmira Singh v. State of Punjab, (1977) 4 SCC 291 : 1977 SCC
(Cri) 559] . In para 2 of the said decision it was observed as
under : (SCC pp. 292-93)
‘2. … It would indeed be a travesty of justice to keep a person
in jail for a period of five or six years for an offence which
7is ultimately found not to have been committed by him. Can the
Court ever compensate him for his incarceration which is found
to be unjustified? Would it be just at all for the Court to tell
a person:‘We have admitted your appeal because we think you have
a prima facie case, but unfortunately we have no time to hear
your appeal for quite a few years and, therefore, until we hear
your appeal, you must remain in jail, even though you may be
innocent?’ What confidence would such administration of justice
inspire in the mind of the public? It may quite conceivably
happen, and it has in fact happened in a few cases in this
Court, that a person may serve out his full term of imprisonment
before his appeal is taken up for hearing. Would a Judge not be
overwhelmed with a feeling of contrition while acquitting such a
person after hearing the appeal? Would it not be an affront to
his sense of justice? Of what avail would the acquittal be to
such a person who has already served out his term of
imprisonment or at any rate a major part of it? It is,
therefore, absolutely essential that the practice which this
Court has been following in the past must be reconsidered and so
long as this Court is not in a position to hear the appeal of an
accused within a reasonable period of time, the Court should
ordinarily, unless there are cogent grounds for acting
otherwise, release the accused on bail in cases where special
leave has been granted to the accused to appeal against his
conviction and sentence.’
9. The learned counsel for the appellant then relied on the
decision of this Court in Bhagirathsinh v. State of Gujarat
[Bhagirathsinh v. State of Gujarat, (1984) 1 SCC 284 : 1984 SCC
(Cri) 63] , Shaheen Welfare Assn. v. Union of India [Shaheen
Welfare Assn. v. Union of India, (1996) 2 SCC 616 : 1996 SCC
(Cri) 366] , Joginder Kumar v. State of U.P. [Joginder Kumar v.
State of U.P., (1994) 4 SCC 260 : 1994 SCC (Cri) 1172] , etc.
10. In our opinion none of the aforesaid decisions can be said
to have laid down any absolute and unconditional rule about when
bail should be granted by the Court and when it should not. It
all depends on the facts and circumstances of each case and it
cannot be said that there is any absolute rule that because a
long period of imprisonment has expired bail must necessarily be
granted.”
26. This Court in Ash Mohammad v. Shiv Raj Singh [Ash Mohammad
v. Shiv Raj Singh, (2012) 9 SCC 446 : (2012) 3 SCC (Cri) 1172] ,
has observed in para 30, as follows : (SCC pp. 458-59)
“30. We may usefully state that when the citizens are scared to
lead a peaceful life and this kind of offences usher in an
impediment in establishment of orderly society, the duty of the
court becomes more pronounced and the burden is heavy. There
should have been proper analysis of the criminal antecedents.
Needless to say, imposition of conditions is subsequent to the
order admitting an accused to bail. The question should be posed
whether the accused deserves to be enlarged on bail or not and
only thereafter issue of imposing conditions would arise. We do
not deny for a moment that period of custody is a relevant
factor but simultaneously the totality of circumstances and the
criminal antecedents are also to be weighed. They are to be
weighed in the scale of collective cry and desire. The societal
concern has to be kept in view in juxtaposition of individual
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liberty. Regard being had to the said parameter we are inclined
to think that the social concern in the case at hand deserves to
be given priority over lifting the restriction on liberty of the
accused.”
27. In Bhagwan Rama Shinde Gosai v. State of Gujarat [Bhagwan
Rama Shinde Gosai v. State of Gujarat, (1999) 4 SCC 421 : 1999
SCC (Cri) 553] , wherein the appellants were convicted by the
trial court against which, the appeal was pending before the
High Court, the High Court successively rejected the prayer for
grant of bail till the pendency of appeal after suspending the
sentence. Thus, it has been held as follows : (SCC p. 422, para
3)
“3. When a convicted person is sentenced to a fixed period of
sentence and when he files an appeal under any statutory right,
suspension of sentence can be considered by the appellate court
liberally unless there are exceptional circumstances. Of course,
if there is any statutory restriction against suspension of
sentence it is a different matter. Similarly, when the sentence
is life imprisonment the consideration for suspension of
sentence could be of a different approach. But if for any reason
the sentence of a limited duration cannot be suspended every
endeavour should be made to dispose of the appeal on merits more
so when a motion for expeditious hearing of the appeal is made
in such cases. Otherwise the very valuable right of appeal would
be an exercise in futility by efflux of time. When the appellate
court finds that due to practical reasons such appeals cannot be
disposed of expeditiously the appellate court must bestow
special concern in the matter of suspending the sentence so as
to make the appeal right, meaningful and effective. Of course,
appellate courts can impose similar conditions when bail is
granted.”
28. In Sidhartha Vashisht v. State (NCT of Delhi) [Sidhartha
Vashisht v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2008) 5 SCC 230 : (2008) 2
SCC (Cri) 571] (popularly known as the Jessica Lal murder case),
this Court had the occasion to consider the rival submissions as
well as various judicial pronouncements referred to by both the
sides over the prayer for bail. Thus, it has been held as
follows : (SCC pp. 235, 239-40, paras 19, 30-32)
“19. We are conscious and mindful that the main matter (appeal)
is admitted and is pending for final hearing. Observations on
merits, one way or the other, therefore, are likely to prejudice
one or the other party to the appeal. We are hence not entering
into the correctness or otherwise of the evidence on record. It,
however, cannot be overlooked that as on today, the applicant
has been found guilty and convicted by a competent criminal
court. Initial presumption of innocence in favour of the
accused, therefore, is no more available to the applicant.
***
30. … In the above cases, it has been observed that once a
person has been convicted, normally, an appellate court will
proceed on the basis that such person is guilty. It is no doubt
true that even thereafter, it is open to the appellate court to
suspend the sentence in a given case by recording reasons. But
it is well settled, as observed inVijay Kumar [Vijay Kumar v.
Narendra, (2002) 9 SCC 364 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 1195] that in
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considering the prayer for bail in a case involving a serious
offence like murder punishable under Section 302IPC, the Court
should consider all the relevant factors like the nature of
accusation made against the accused, the manner in which the
crime is alleged to have been committed, the gravity of the
offence, the desirability of releasing the accused on bail
after he has been convicted for committing serious offence of
murder, etc. It has also been observed in some of the cases
that normal practice in such cases is not to suspend the
sentence and it is only in exceptional cases that the benefit
of suspension of sentence can be granted.
31. In Hasmat [State of Haryana v. Hasmat, (2004) 6 SCC 175 :
2004 SCC (Cri) 1757] , this Court stated : (SCC p. 176, para 6)
6. Section 389 of the Code deals with suspension of execution
of sentence pending the appeal and release of the appellant on
bail. There is a distinction between bail and suspension of
sentence. One of the essential ingredients of Section 389 is
the requirement for the appellate court to record reasons in
writing for ordering suspension of execution of the sentence or
order appealed. If he is in confinement, the said court can
direct that he be released on bail or on his own bond. The
requirement of recording reasons in writing clearly indicates
that there has to be careful consideration of the relevant
aspects and the order directing suspension of sentence and
grant of bail should not be passed as a matter of routine.’
32. The mere fact that during the period of trial, the accused
was on bail and there was no misuse of liberty, does not per se
warrant suspension of execution of sentence and grant of bail.
What is really necessary is to consider whether reasons exist
to suspend execution of the sentence and grant of bail.”
29. In Atul Tripathi v. State of U.P. [Atul Tripathi v. State
of U.P., (2014) 9 SCC 177 : (2014) 6 SCC (Cri) 19] , whereunder
apart from identifying the differences of consideration of
prayer for grant of bail relating to pre-conviction stage as
well as post-conviction stage, it has been held in para 14
which is as follows : (SCC p. 184)
“14. Service of a copy of the appeal and application for bail
on the Public Prosecutor by the appellant will not satisfy the
requirement of the first proviso to Section 389(1)CrPC. The
appellate court may even without hearing the Public Prosecutor,
decline to grant bail. However, in case the appellate court is
inclined to consider the release of the convict on bail, the
Public Prosecutor shall be granted an opportunity to show cause
in writing as to why the appellant be not released on bail.
Such a stringent provision is introduced only to ensure that
the court is apprised of all the relevant factors so that the
court may consider whether it is an appropriate case for
release having regard to the manner in which the crime is
committed, gravity of the offence, age, criminal antecedents of
the convict, impact on public confidence in the justice-
delivery system, etc.”
30. In Kishori Lal v. Rupa [Kishori Lal v. Rupa, (2004) 7 SCC
638 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 2021] , this Court has indicated the
10
factors that require to be considered by the courts while
granting benefit under Section 389CrPC in cases involving
serious offences like murder, etc. Thus, it is useful to refer
to the observations made therein, which are as follows : (SCC
pp. 639-40, paras 4-6)
“4. Section 389 of the Code deals with suspension of execution
of sentence pending the appeal and release of the appellant on
bail. There is a distinction between bail and suspension of
sentence. One of the essential ingredients of Section 389 is
the requirement for the appellate court to record reasons in
writing for ordering suspension of execution of the sentence or
order appealed against. If he is in confinement, the said court
can direct that he be released on bail or on his own bond. The
requirement of recording reasons in writing clearly indicates
that there has to be careful consideration of the relevant
aspects and the order directing suspension of sentence and
grant of bail should not be passed as a matter of routine.
5. The appellate court is duty-bound to objectively assess the
matter and to record reasons for the conclusion that the case
warrants suspension of execution of sentence and grant of bail.
In the instant case, the only factor which seems to have
weighed with the High Court for directing suspension of
sentence and grant of bail is the absence of allegation of
misuse of liberty during the earlier period when the accused-
respondents were on bail.
6. The mere fact that during the trial, they were granted bail
and there was no allegation of misuse of liberty, is really not
of much significance. The effect of bail granted during trial
loses significance when on completion of trial, the accused
persons have been found guilty. The mere fact that during the
period when the accused persons were on bail during trial there
was no misuse of liberties, does not per se warrant suspension
of execution of sentence and grant of bail. What really was
necessary to be considered by the High Court is whether reasons
existed to suspend the execution of sentence and thereafter
grant bail. The High Court does not seem to have kept the
correct principle in view.”
31. In Vijay Kumar v. Narendra [Vijay Kumar v. Narendra, (2002)
9 SCC 364 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 1195] and Ramji Prasad v. Rattan
Kumar Jaiswal [Ramji Prasad v. Rattan Kumar Jaiswal, (2002) 9
SCC 366 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 1197] , it was held by this Court that
in cases involving conviction under Section 302IPC, it is only
in exceptional cases that the benefit of suspension of sentence
can be granted. In Vijay Kumar [Vijay Kumar v. Narendra, (2002)
9 SCC 364 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 1195] , it was held that in
considering the prayer for bail in a case involving a serious
offence like murder punishable under Section 302IPC, the court
should consider the relevant factors like the nature of
accusation made against the accused, the manner in which the
crime is alleged to have been committed, the gravity of the
offence, and the desirability of releasing the accused on bail
after they have been convicted for committing the serious
offence of murder.
32. The aforesaid view is reiterated by this Court in Vasant
Tukaram Pawar v. State of Maharashtra [Vasant Tukaram Pawar v.
11
State of Maharashtra, (2005) 5 SCC 281 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 1052]
and Gomti v. Thakurdas [Gomti v. Thakurdas, (2007) 11 SCC 160 :
(2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 644] .
33. Bearing in mind the aforesaid principles of law, the
endeavour on the part of the court, therefore, should be to see
as to whether the case presented by the prosecution and
accepted by the trial court can be said to be a case in which,
ultimately the convict stands for fair chances of acquittal. If
the answer to the abovesaid question is to be in the
affirmative, as a necessary corollary, we shall have to say
that, if ultimately the convict appears to be entitled to have
an acquittal at the hands of this Court, he should not be kept
behind the bars for a pretty long time till the conclusion of
the appeal, which usually takes very long for decision and
disposal. However, while undertaking the exercise to ascertain
whether the convict has fair chances of acquittal, what is to
be looked into is something palpable. To put it in other words,
something which is very apparent or gross on the face of the
record, on the basis of which, the court can arrive at a prima
facie satisfaction that the conviction may not be sustainable.
The appellate court should not reappreciate the evidence at the
stage of Section 389 CrPC and try to pick up a few lacunae or
loopholes here or there in the case of the prosecution. Such
would not be a correct approach.
34. In the case on hand, what the High Court has done is
something impermissible. The High Court has gone into the
issues like political rivalry, delay in lodging the FIR, some
over-writings in the first information report, etc. All these
aspects, will have to be looked into at the time of the final
hearing of the appeals filed by the convicts. Upon cursory
scanning of the evidence on record, we are unable to agree with
the contentions coming from the learned Senior Counsel for the
convicts that, either there is absolutely no case against the
convicts or that the evidence against them is so weak and
feeble in nature, that, ultimately in all probabilities the
proceedings would terminate in their favour. For the very same
reason we are unable to accept the contention coming from the
convicts through their learned Senior Counsel that, it would be
meaningless, improper and unjust to keep them behind the bars
for a pretty long time till they are found not to be guilty of
the charges.”
25. Although the learned counsel appearing for the convicts made a
gallant effort to convince us that the conviction is even otherwise
not sustainable in law, yet we would not like to undertake the
exercise of appreciating the evidence on record at this stage.
26. We are of the view that we should set aside both the orders
impugned before us and remit the matter to the High Court for fresh
12
consideration insofar as the plea of the convicts for suspension of
substantive order of sentence of life imprisonment is concerned.
27. We expect the High Court to keep in mind the well-settled
principles governing the subject, more particularly, what has been
explained by this Court in its decision, referred to above and pass
a fresh order keeping in mind the well-settled principles governing
the subject i.e. suspension of the substantive order of sentence of
life imprisonment.
28. At this stage, the learned counsel appearing for the original
de-facto complainant made a fervent appeal that let the plea for
suspension of the sentence afresh be heard by any other Bench i.e.
the Bench other than the one which passed the impugned order. We
outright reject this prayer of the appellant – original first
informant. Let it be made very clear that whenever we set aside an
order what we are finding fault with, is the order and not the
learned judge who has made the order. Hence, there is absolutely no
justification for the appellant to make this prayer.
29. In the result, both the appeals succeed. The two impugned
orders passed by the High Court are set aside. The matters are
remitted to the High Court for fresh consideration of the plea for
suspension of the substantive order of sentence of life
imprisonment.
30. As we have set aside both the orders, we direct the convicts
before us to surrender before the concerned Jail Authorities within
a period of two weeks from today. Once they surrender and a
surrender certificate is produced before the Bench of the High
Court, the High Court shall thereafter proceed to hear the matter
13
afresh in accordance with law and pass appropriate orders.
31. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of.
…………………………………………J
(J.B. PARDIWALA)
…………………………………………J
(K.V.VISWANATHAN)
NEW DELHI
23rd FEBRUARY, 2026.
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ITEM NO.58 COURT NO.7 SECTION II
S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A
RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
Petition for Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No.2375/2026
[Arising out of impugned final judgment and order dated 14-01-2026
in CRLA No. 9392/2022 passed by the High Court of Judicature at
Allahabad]
MOHD PARVEZ ALAM Petitioner(s)
VERSUS
STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS. Respondent(s)
(IA No. 32464/2026 – EXEMPTION FROM FILING C/C OF THE IMPUGNED
JUDGMENT & IA No. 32465/2026 – EXEMPTION FROM FILING O.T.)
WITH
SLP(Crl) No. 2376/2026 (II)
(IA No. 32441/2026 – EXEMPTION FROM FILING C/C OF THE IMPUGNED
JUDGMENT & IA No. 32444/2026 – EXEMPTION FROM FILING O.T.)
Date : 23-02-2026 These matters were called on for hearing today.
CORAM :
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE J.B. PARDIWALA
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE K.V. VISWANATHANFor Petitioner(s) :
Mr. D.N. Goburdhun, Sr. Adv.
Mr. Vipin Kumar Bharti, Adv.
Mr. Towseef Ahmad Dar, AOR
Yasho Agarwal, Adv.
Mr. Tejveer, Adv.
For Respondent(s) :
Mr. Vishwa Pal Singh, AOR
Mr. Mukesh Kumar, Adv.
Mr. Ashutosh Bhardwaj, Adv.
Mr. Prateek Rai, Adv.
Mr. Y.p. Singh, Adv.
Mr. Abhijit Singh, Adv.
Mr. Pankaj Gupta, Adv.
Mr. Anurag Nagar, Adv.
Mr. Akas Gothwal, Adv.
Mr. Arun Singh, Adv.
Mr. Varun Singh, Adv.
15
Mr. Arvind Singh Sangwan, Sr.Adv.
Mr. Aniruddh Singh Shera, Adv.
Ms. Vanya Gupta, AOR
Ms. Monika Anand, Adv.
Mr. Shantanu Singh Sangwan, Adv.
Mr. Vikas Singh Jangra, AOR
Ms. Sabarni Som, Adv.
UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following
O R D E R
1. Exemption Applications are allowed.
2. Leave granted
3. Both the appeals succeed, in terms of the signed order.
4. As we have set aside both the orders, we direct the convicts
before us to surrender before the concerned Jail Authorities within
a period of two weeks from today. Once they surrender and a
surrender certificate is produced before the Bench of the High
Court, the High Court shall thereafter proceed to hear the matter
afresh in accordance with law and pass appropriate orders.
5. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of.
(VISHAL ANAND) (POOJA SHARMA)
ASTT. REGISTRAR-cum-PS COURT MASTER (NSH)
(Signed Order is placed on the file)
