Madhya Pradesh High Court
Mohar Singh Jatav vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 29 April, 2025
Author: Hirdesh
Bench: Hirdesh
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT GWALIOR
BEFORE
DB :- HON'BLE JUSTICE ANAND PATHAK &
HON'BLE JUSTICE HIRDESH, JJ
ON THE 29th OF APRIL, 2025
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 10482 OF 2023
MOHAR SINGH JATAV
Versus
STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
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Appearance:
Shri Ashok Kumar Jain and Ms. Nikita Jain- learned Counsel for appellant.
Shri Vijay Sundaram- learned Public Prosecutor for respondent/State.
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JUDGMENT
Per Justice Hirdesh:-
Today, case is listed on I.A. No.8938 of 2024, second application under
Section 389(1) of CrPC for suspension of jail sentence and grant of bail, moved on
behalf of appellant- Mohar Singh. First application (I.A.No.1327/2024) is rejected
vide order dated 13.03.2024.
With the content of both the parties, matter is heard finally on merits
Accordingly, IA No. 8938 of 2024 stands closed.
(2) The instant criminal appeal under Section 374(1) of CrPC is filed by
appellant- Mohar Singh assailing the judgment of conviction and order of sentence
dated 12-03-2018 passed by Sessions Judge, Datia in Sessions Trial No.86 of 2017,
whereby appellant has been convicted under Section 302 of IPC and sentenced to
undergo life imprisonment with a fine of Rs. 2,000/- with default stipulation.
(3) The prosecution case, in short, is that complainant Vimla, W/o Late Balram
Jatav submitted a report at Trauma Centre, District Hospital, Datia on 29 th of April,
2017 around 01:20 in the night, stating therein that her brother-in-law (nephew of
her father-in-law Mannu), Mohar Singh (appellant) was living in the house for the
2past two years. On 28th of April, 2017 around 08:45 PM, appellant Mohar Singh
came back from Bhander and started fighting with her. Her father-in-law Mannu
came to rescue and tried to settle the fight. Appellant took a wooden stick (danda)
and inflicted on his head, as a result of which, Mannu sustained grievious injury. On
hearing commotion, Kailash and Suresh who live nearby, came on spot for rescue.
Her son, namely, Ram Sahay and Kailash took her father-in-law Mannu to District
Hospital, Datia. During treatment, Mannu died.
(4) On the basis of report submitted by complainant Vimla, a dehati nalishi was
recorded vide Crime No.01 of 2017 and sent to PS Unao for registration of FIR. On
the basis of Dehati Nalishi, FIR at Crime No.63 of 2017 (Ex.P15) for offence under
Section 302 of IPC was registered against appellant. Matter was investigated.
(5) During investigation, inquest panchnama and spot map were prepared,
postmortem of deceased Mannu was conducted, statements of witnesses under
Section 161 of CrPC were recorded and accused was arrested. Relevant seizure was
made.
(6) After completion of investigation and other formalities, charge-sheet was
filed before the Magisterial Court from where the case was committed to the
Sessions Court.
(7) Charges were framed and read over to accused. Appellant abjured his guilt
and pleaded complete innocence. Statement of accused was recorded under Section
313 of CrPC.
(8) Prosecution, in order to prove its case, examined as many as 9 witnesses
whereas appellant, in order to lead his evidence, did not examine a single witness in
his defence.
(9) After conclusion of trial, the Trial Court on the basis of prosecution evidence
as well as exhibited material/documents available on record, found the appellant
guilty and, accordingly, convicted and sentenced him with fine for commission of
offence under Section 302, as stated in Para 2 of this judgment.
(10) Challenging the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence, it
is contended on behalf of appellant that three witnesses PW-4 Suresh Dangi, PW-5
3
Vimla Jatav and PW-6 Ram Sahay Jatav are related to deceased Mannu, therefore,
their evidence cannot be relied upon. The deceased died due to single lathi blow
and there was no intention of accused to commit murder of deceased leading to
death of deceased. There is no premeditation or pre-plan or malice on the part of
appellant. There is no previous enmity between the appellant and the deceased. The
alleged incident took place at the spur of moment. Therefore, offence against
appellant is not proved under Section 302 of IPC. At the most, offence would fall
under Section 304 either Part I or Part II of IPC. On these grounds, it is prayed that
the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by learned Trial
Court deserves to be set aside by allowing the instant appeal.
(11) On the other hand, learned Counsel for State supported the impugned
judgment and submitted that accused inflicted on the head of deceased with full
might or main that the deceased suffered a fracture of parietal bone of skull and
intracranial haemorrhage, which were sufficient to cause his death. The testimony
of PW-4 Suresh Dangi, PW-5 Smt. Vimla Jatav and PW-6 Ramsahay Jatav cannot
be discarded merely on the ground that they are relatives of deceased Mannu.
Prosecution has produced its evidence and has proven the charges against the
appellant beyond reasonable doubt. The appellant has not produced any evidence in
his defence. The findings arrived at by learned Trial Court do not require any
interference by this Court. No leniency can be adopted in favour of appellant.
Hence, prayed for dismissal of this appeal.
(12) Heard counsel for parties at length and perused the record.
(13) The first question arises for consideration is whether the death of deceased
was homicidal in nature or not ?
(14) Dr. K.P. Barediya (PW-9), who was posted as Medical Officer at District
Hospital, Datia on 29 th of April, 2016 conducted postmortem of deceased Mannu
and found following external injuries:-
”Injury No.1- Lacerated wound on left side parietal bone of
skull 5X 0.5 bone deep. Fracture of parietal bone of skull seen.
Intracranial haemorrhage present.
Injury No.2. Contrusion on left lateral side of lower chest wall
4just near and parallel to 12 th lower rib 10×2 cm. Abdominal cavity
filled with approximately 2 liters of blood and spleen was ruptured.”
Both the injuries were caused by hard and blunt object.
(15) On internal examination of deceased, Dr. Barediya found following injuries:-
”There was a fracture of parietal bone in the skull. Haemorrhage
was seen on occipital region, brain, spinal cord and meninges.
Diaphragm, ribs and soft tissues were pale larynx and trachea were
pale. Left and right lungs were pale. Pericardium was pale. Left
chamber of heart was empty and right chamber was filled with
blood. Aorta and inferior vena-cava were pale. Mouth and
oesophagus were pale, semi-digested food was present in the
stomach. Digested food and gases were present in the small
intestine. Faecal matter and gases were present in the large intestine.
Liver, Kidneys were pale, spleen was pale and ruptured. Urinary
bladder was empty. Genital organs were healthy.”
As per opinion of Dr. Barediya, the cause of death of deceased was due to
shock and excessive haemorrhage, caused by hard and blunt object. Duration of
death of deceased was within 6 to 24 hours before postmortem examination.
(16) Since the evidence given by Dr. Barediya remained unchallenged in his
cross-examination, therefore, from the medical evidence, it is clear that the cause of
death of deceased was homicidal in nature.
(17) The next question arises for determination of appeal is whether appellant
had inflicted blow of wooden stick (danda) on the head of deceased or not ?
(18) Smt. Vimala Dangi (PW-5) in Paras 1 and 2 of her examination-in-chief
deposed that accused Mohar Singh, who is nephew of her father-in-law (deceased)
was living with deceased for his help. On the date of incident around 08:45 pm,
accused came and started fighting with her. When her father-in-law Mannu came to
rescue, accused inflicted lathi blow on his head. This witness further deposed that
on hearing hue and cry, Kailash and her son Ramsahay came on spot. Thereafter,
her father-in-law Mannu was taken to District Hospital, Datia and during treatment,
he died.
(19) Suresh Dangi (PW-4), who reached the spot, after hearing commotion, in
Para 1 of his examination-in-chief deposed that on the date of incident, he was at
the distance of 10 steps from the place of incident, i.e. backyard. Accused Mohan
5Singh was fighting with Smt. Vimla. When deceased Mannu came to settle the fight,
accused Mohar Singh inflicted a blow of wooden stick (lathi) on the head of
deceased as a result of which, blood started oozing.
(20) PW-6, Ramsahay Jatav (son-in-law of deceased) in Para 1 of his
examination-in-chief deposed that on the date of incident around 08:45 in the night,
accused Mohar Singh came from Bhander and started fighting with her mother
Vimla. When his grandfather Mannu came to rescue her, accused Mohar Singh
inflicted a blow of wooden stick (danda) on his head, due to which, blood started
oozing and he fell down on the ground.
(21) The statements of above witnesses remained unchallenged in their cross-
examination. Further, Kailash Jatav (PW-2) and Bhaiyalal Jatav (PW-3), on hearing
hue and cry, reached the spot for rescue, also deposed that they found that blood
started oozing from the head of deceased because of lathi blow inflicted by accused
Mohar Singh. Investigating Officer Rajesh Satankar (PW-7) also recorded
statements of witnesses, prepared inquest panchnama vide Ex.P3 On the basis of
disclosure statement made by appellant-accused under Section 27 of the Evidence
Act, a wooden stick (danda) was recovered at the instance of accused. From the
evidence available on record, it is clear that the appellant had inflicted injury on the
head of deceased by means of wooden stick (danda) resulted into death of
deceased.
(22) The next question arises for determination of appeal is whether appellant
had inflicted injury on the head of deceased by means of wooden stick with
intention of causing death or not ?
(23) The provisions under Section 304 of IPC regarding punishment for
culpable homicide not amounting to murder read as under:-
”Whoever commits culpable homicide not amounting to murder shall
be punished with imprisonment for life, or imprisonment of either
description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be
liable to fine, if the act by which the death is caused is done with the
intention of causing death, or of causing such bodily injury as is likely to
cause death,
or with imprisonment of either description for a term which may
6extend to ten years, or with fine, or with both, if the act is done with the
knowledge that it is likely to cause death, but without any intention to cause
death, or to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death.”
(24) The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Gurmukh Singh vs. State of
Haryana (2009) 15 SCC 635, in detail, has discussed the relevant factors which are
required to be taken into consideration before awarding appropriate sentence to
accused as under:-
”10. We have carefully perused the judgments of the trial court and
the High Court as also the evidence of witnesses. It is fully
established from the evidence on record that the appellant had
caused the injury to the deceased Hazoor Singh which proved fatal.
11. The short question which falls for consideration of this court is
whether, on consideration of the peculiar facts and circumstances
of the case, the conviction of the appellant under Section 302 IPC
should be upheld or the conviction be converted to one under
Section 304 Part II IPC? Appropriate sentencing is a very vital
function and obligation of the court.
12. There are significant features of the case which are required to
be taken into consideration in awarding the appropriate sentence to
the accused:
(1) Admittedly, the incident happened at the spur of the
moment;
(2) It is clear from the evidence on record that the appellant was
not using that path everyday.
(3) The appellant gave a single lathi blow on the head of
the deceased which proved fatal;
(4) The other accused did not indulge in overt act
therefore, except the appellant, the other co-accused
namely Niranjan Singh, Harbhajan Singh and Manjit
Singh have been acquitted by the trial court;
(5) The incident took place on 8.1.1997 and the deceased
remained hospitalized and ultimately died on 14.1.1997;
(6) The trial court observed that there was no previous
enmity between the parties.
Therefore, it is abundantly clear that there was no pre-
7
arranged plan or that the incident had taken place in
furtherance of the common intention of the accused
persons. When all these facts and circumstances are taken
into consideration in proper perspective, then it becomes
difficult to maintain the conviction of the appellant under
section 302 IPC.
14. This Court had an occasion to deal with cases of similar
nature. In Jagrup Singh v. State of Haryana (1981) 3 SCC
616, the accused had inflicted a single blow in the heat of
moment in a sudden fight with blunt side of Gandhala on the
head of the deceased causing his death. According to the
opinion of the doctor this particular injury was sufficient in
the ordinary course of nature to cause death. But, according to
this Court, the intention to cause such an injury was likely to
cause death had not been made out. This Court altered the
conviction of the accused from section 302 IPC to section
304 Part II IPC and the accused was directed to suffer
rigorous imprisonment for a period of seven years.
15. In Gurmail Singh & Others v. State of Punjab (1982) 3
SCC 185, the accused had no enmity with the deceased. The
accused gave one blow with the spear on the chest of the
deceased causing his death. The injury was an incised wound.
The Sessions Judge convicted the accused under section
302 IPC and sentenced him to rigorous imprisonment for life.
The High Court affirmed the same. This Court, while taking
into consideration the age of the accused and other
circumstances, converted the conviction from section 302 IPC
to one under section 304 Part II IPC and sentenced him to
suffer rigorous imprisonment for five years and a fine of
Rs.500/-, in default to suffer rigorous imprisonment for six
months.
16. In Kulwant Rai v. State of Punjab (1981) 4 SCC 245, the
accused, without any prior enmity or pre-meditation, on a
short quarrel gave a single blow with a dagger which
later proved to be fatal. This Court observed that since there
was no pre-meditation, Part 3 of section 300 of the Indian
Penal Code could not be attracted because it cannot be said
that the accused intended to inflict that particular injury which
was ultimately found to have been inflicted. In the facts and
circumstances of that case, the conviction of the accused was
altered from section 302 to that under section 304 Part
II IPC and the accused was sentenced to suffer rigorous
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imprisonment for five years.
17. In Jagtar Singh v. State of Punjab (1983) 2 SCC 342, the
accused in the spur of the moment inflicted a knife blow in
the chest of the deceased. The injury proved to be fatal. The
doctor opined that the injury was sufficient in the ordinary
course of nature to cause death. This Court observed that:-
(SCC p. 344 , para 8)
”8. the quarrel was of a trivial nature and even in
such a trivial quarrel the appellant wielded a weapon like
a knife and landed a blow in the chest. In these
circumstances, it is a permissible inference that the
appellant at least could be imputed with a knowledge that
he was likely to cause an injury which was likely to cause
death. This Court altered the conviction of the appellant
from section 302 IPC to section 304 Part II IPC and
sentenced the accused to suffer rigorous imprisonment for
five years.
18. In Hem Raj v. State (Delhi Administration) (1990) Supp.
SCC 291, the accused inflicted single stab injury landing on
the chest of the deceased. The occurrence admittedly had
taken place in the spur of the moment and in heat of passion
upon a sudden quarrel. According to the doctor the injury was
sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. This
Court observed as under:
“14. The question is whether the appellant could be said
to have caused that particular injury with the intention
of causing death of the deceased. As the totality of the
established facts and circumstances do show that the
occurrence had happened most unexpectedly in a
sudden quarrel and without pre- meditation during the
course of which the appellant caused a solitary injury,
he could not be imputed with the intention to cause
death of the deceased or with the intention to cause that
particular fatal injury; but he could be imputed with the
knowledge that he was likely to cause an injury which
was likely to cause death. Because in the absence of any
positive proof that the appellant caused the death of the
deceased with the intention of causing death or
intentionally inflicted that particular injury which in the
ordinary course of nature was sufficient to cause death,
neither Clause I nor Clause III of Section 300 IPC will
9be attracted……”
This Court while setting aside the conviction under section
302 convicted the accused under section 304 Part II and
sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for seven
years.
19. In Abani K.Debnath & Another v. State of
Tripura (2005) 13 SCC 422, this Court, in somewhat similar
circumstances, while converting the sentence from section
302 IPC to one under section 304 Part II IPC observed as
under: (SCC p. 424, para 5)
“5. This leads us to consider as to under what Section of
law A-1 Abani K. Debnath is liable to be convicted in a
given facts of the case. The prosecution evidence clearly
discloses that the dao blow dealt by A-1 is preceded by a
mutual quarrel. We have already noted that there was no
common intention to kill Ranjit Das. From the nature of
injuries it is disclosed that A-1 dealt only one dao blow
perhaps in the spur of moment. The incident had taken
place on 10.8.1990 and the deceased succumbed to
injury on 15.8.1990 after a lapse of 7 days. Taking the
prosecution evidence and medical evidence cumulatively
we are of the view that the conviction of A-1 also cannot
fall under Section 34 IPC but at the most under Section
304 Part II. We accordingly convert the sentence of A-1
Abani K. Debnath under Section 34 IPC to that one
under Section 304 Part II IPC and sentence him to suffer
R.I. for five years. The fine amount imposed by the trial
court and Page 2091 affirmed by the High Court is
maintained. It is stated at the Bar that A-1 has undergone
about 18 months’ imprisonment, if that is so, he will be
entitled to get the benefit of Section 428 Cr.P.C.”
20. In another case Pappu v. State of M.P. (2006) 7 SCC
391, this Court observed as under: (SCC pp. 394-95,
paras 13-16)
“13…….The help of Exception 4 can be invoked if death
is caused (a) without premeditation, (b) in a sudden
fight; (c) without the offender’s having taken undue
advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner; and (d)
the fight must have been with the person killed. To bring
a case within Exception 4 all the ingredients mentioned
10
in it must be found. It is to be noted that the ‘fight’
occurring in Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC is not
defined in the IPC. It takes two to make a fight. Heat of
passion requires that there must be no time for the
passions to cool down and in this case, the parties have
worked themselves into a fury on account of the verbal
altercation in the beginning. A fight is a combat between
two and more persons whether with or without weapons.
It is not possible to enunciate any general rule as to what
shall be deemed to be a sudden quarrel. It is a question of
fact and whether a quarrel is sudden or not must
necessarily depend upon the proved facts of each case.
For the application of Exception 4, it is not sufficient to
show that there was a sudden quarrel and there was no
premeditation. It must further be shown that the offender
has not taken undue advantage or acted in cruel or
unusual manner. The expression ‘undue advantage’ as
used in the provision means ‘unfair advantage’.
14. It cannot be laid down as a rule of universal
application that whenever one blow is given, Section
302 IPC is ruled out. It would depend upon the weapon
used, the size of it in some cases, force with which the
blow was given, part of the body it was given and
several such relevant factors.
15. Considering the factual background in the case at
hand it will be appropriate to convict the appellant
under Section 304 Part II IPC, instead of Section
302 IPC as has been done by the trial court and affirmed
by the High Court. Custodial sentence of eight years
would meet the ends of justice. The appeal is allowed to
the aforesaid extent.”
21. In the instant case, the occurrence had taken place at
the spur of the moment. Only the appellant Gurmukh
Singh inflicted a single lathi blow. The other accused
have not indulged in any overt act. There was no
intention or pre- meditation in the mind of the appellant
to inflict such injuries to the deceased as were likely to
cause death in the ordinary course of nature. On
consideration of the entire evidence including the
medical evidence, we are clearly of the view that the
conviction of the appellant cannot be sustained
under section 302 IPC, but the appropriate section under
11
which the appellant ought to be convicted is section
304 Part II IPC.
22. Before we part with the case, we would like to
clearly observe that we are not laying down that in no
case of single blow or injury, the accused cannot be
convicted under section 302 IPC. In cases of single
injury, the facts and circumstances of each case has to be
taken into consideration before arriving at the conclusion
whether the accused should be appropriately convicted
under section 302 IPC or under section 304 Part II IPC.
23. These are some factors which are required to be
taken into consideration before awarding appropriate
sentence to the accused. These factors are only
illustrative in character and not exhaustive. Each case
has to be seen from its special perspective. The relevant
factors are as under:
a) Motive or previous enmity;
b) Whether the incident had taken place on the spur of
the moment;
c) The intention/knowledge of the accused while
inflicting the blow or injury;
d) Whether the death ensued instantaneously or the
victim died after several days;
e) The gravity, dimension and nature of injury;
f) The age and general health condition of the accused;
g) Whether the injury was caused without pre-meditation
in a sudden fight;
h) The nature and size of weapon used for inflicting the
injury and the force with which the blow was inflicted;
i) The criminal background and adverse history of the
accused;
j) Whether the injury inflicted was not sufficient in the
ordinary course of nature to cause death but the death
was because of shock;
12
k) Number of other criminal cases pending against the
accused;
l) Incident occurred within the family members or close
relations;
m) The conduct and behaviour of the accused after the
incident. Whether the accused had taken the injured/the
deceased to the hospital immediately to ensure that
he/she gets proper medical treatment?
These are some of the factors which can be taken into
consideration while granting an appropriate sentence to
the accused.
24. The list of circumstances enumerated above is
only illustrative and not exhaustive. In our considered
view, proper and appropriate sentence to the accused is
the bounded obligation and duty of the court. The
endeavour of the court must be to ensure that the accused
receives appropriate sentence, in other words, sentence
should be according to the gravity of the offence. These
are some of the relevant factors which are required to be
kept in view while convicting and sentencing the
accused.
25. When we apply the settled principle of law which
has been enumerated in the aforementioned cases, the
conviction of the appellant under section 302 I.P.C. cannot be
sustained. In our considered view, the accused appellant ought
to have been convicted under section 304 Part II I.P.C. instead
of under section 302 I.P.C.”
(25) Looking to the factual scenario as well as the evidence of above material
witnesses, it is not in dispute that appellant used to live in the house of deceased for
his help. He used to quarrel with Smt. Vimla, who is daughter-in-law of deceased.
On the date of alleged incident, accused came to the house of deceased and started
fighting with Smt. Vimla. When the deceased came for rescue, all of a sudden, at the
spur of moment, accused took a wooden stick and inflicted on the head of deceased
due to which, he fell down and blood started oozing. Thereafter, the deceased was
brought to District Hospital, Datia and during treatment he died. So, it is clear from
the evidence of prosecution witnesses, there was no intention of appellant to cause
13
death or causing particular injury, which has proved fatal as per medical evidence.
Appellant, at least, could be imputed with a knowledge that he was likely to cause
an injury which caused death of deceased. There is no premeditation or pre-plan or
malice on the part of appellant. Therefore, the appellant is shown to have committed
an offence under Section 304 Part II of IPC.
(26) Accordingly, the instant criminal appeal so far as it relates to present
appellant stands allowed in part by setting aside the judgment of conviction and
order of sentence dated 12-03-2018 passed by Sessions Judge, Datia in Sessions
Trial No.86 of 2017 and instead, he is convicted under Section 304 Part II of IPC
and sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment of seven years. The fine amount as
awarded by learned Trial Court stands maintained. In default of payment of fine,
accused shall have to go further imprisonment as awarded by learned Trial Court.
On completion of aforesaid period of seven years’ jail sentence of the appellant and
on verifying the same by the jail authorities concerned, appellant shall be released,
if not required in any other case.
(27) A copy of this judgment along-with record be sent to concerned Trial Court
for necessary information, so also a copy of this judgment be forwarded to
concerned Jail Authority for information and compliance.
(ANAND PATHAK) (HIRDESH)
JUDGE JUDGE
MAHE
Digitally signed by MAHENDRA
BARIK
MKB DN: c=IN, o=HIGH COURT OF
MADHYA PRADESH BENCH
GWALIOR, ou=HIGH COURT OF
MADHYA PRADESH BENCH
NDRA
GWALIOR,
2.5.4.20=8c6d4d6122d7ee987e457a
3bec5922cacbc050c998981397a35d
9758a2b55074, postalCode=474001,
st=Madhya Pradesh,
BARIK
serialNumber=AB90F893988F10D71
8DA01F8065D87F25DDC9B6C8C3FF
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cn=MAHENDRA BARIK
Date: 2025.04.30 10:36:22 +05'30'
