Chattisgarh High Court
Milan Bargah vs State Of Chhattisgarh on 15 April, 2026
Author: Ramesh Sinha
Bench: Ramesh Sinha
1
MANPREET
2026:CGHC:17113-DB
KAUR
Digitally signed
by MANPREET
KAUR
NAFR
Date: 2026.04.16
11:05:41 +0530
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
CRA No. 126 of 2024
Milan Bargah S/o Late Bhola Ram Bargah Aged About 46 Years
Profession - Agriculture And Laborer, R/o Village Kedma, Khalpara,
Police Chowki Kedma, Thana Udaipur, District Surguja (C.G.)
... Appellant(s)
versus
State Of Chhattisgarh Through Police Station Udaipur, District Surguja
(C.G.)
... Respondent(s)
For Appellant(s) : Mr. Ashok Kumar Dewangan, Advocate
For Respondent(s) : Mr. Priyank Rathi, Government Advocate
Hon’ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice
Hon’ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge
Judgment on Board
Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice
15.04.2026
1. Heard Mr. Ashok Kumar Dewangan, learned counsel for the
appellant as well as Mr. Priyank Rathi, learned Government
Advocate, appearing for respondent / State.
2. This criminal appeal filed by the appellant under Section 374(2) of
2
the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, ‘Cr.P.C.’) is
directed against the impugned judgment of conviction and order of
sentence dated 25.11.2023 passed by the learned Sessions
Judge, Sarguja (Ambikapur), District- Surguja (C.G.) in Sessions
Trial No. 185/2022, whereby the appellant have been convicted
for the offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal
Code (IPC) and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life and
fine of Rs.1,000/-, in default of payment of fine, additional R.I. for
03 months.
3. The prosecution case, in brief, is that the accused Milan Bargah
was married to Moti Bai, the sister of the deceased Samundar
Yadav, about 12 years prior to the date of incident in Village
Kedama. After the marriage, the father of Moti Bai had given a
piece of land adjacent to his house to the accused, where the
accused constructed a house and started residing with his family.
It is further alleged that the accused intended to acquire more
land from his father-in-law. On account of such intention, disputes
frequently arose between the accused and the deceased
Samundar Yadav, who objected to the accused allegedly
encroaching upon the land.
4. On 23.10.2022, the deceased Samundar Yadav was sitting in front
of his house, while his mother Siddhi Bai was present nearby. At
that time, the accused Milan Bargah reached there in an
intoxicated condition. On seeing the accused, the deceased
3
objected and stated that the land belonged to him and accused
Milan was trying to usurp the same. This led to a quarrel between
them. During the course of the altercation, the accused took out a
knife and inflicted a stab injury on the chest of the deceased, due
to which the deceased fell down outside the courtyard and
sustained serious injuries. It is also the case of the prosecution
that immediately after the incident, the accused went to his father-
in-law Bhanwarsai, holding a blood-stained knife, and stated that
since Samundar Yadav was accusing him of occupying his land
and attempting to grab it, he had stabbed him near the house and
killed him. Upon hearing this, Bhanwarsai rushed to the spot and
found his son Samundar Yadav lying in a pool of blood with injury
on his chest. Despite efforts, the deceased did not respond.
5. Thereafter, with the help of neighbours namely Sushil Tirkey, Rohit
Yadav and Sukhu Bargah, the injured was taken to PHC Kedma,
where the doctor examined him and declared him dead. The
information regarding the death of Samundar Yadav was given by
Bhanwarsai at Police Outpost Kedma, on the basis of which an
unnumbered FIR (Ex.P-1) was registered, followed by registration
of offence under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. The said
information was forwarded to Police Station Udaipur, where FIR
No. 171/2022 (Ex.P-24) under Section 302 IPC was formally
registered against the accused.
6. During the course of investigation, inquest proceedings were
4
conducted and inquest report (Ex.P-5) was prepared. The dead
body was sent for postmortem examination, which was conducted
by Dr. B.M. Kamre and report (Ex.P-13) was obtained. Blood-
stained clothes of the deceased and other articles were seized
vide seizure memo (Exhibit P-12). Blood-stained and plain soil
were also seized from the spot (Exhibit P-18), and the spot map
was prepared (Exhibit P-3). During investigation, the accused was
taken into custody and his memorandum statement (Exhibit P-15)
was recorded, pursuant to which the knife used in the commission
of offence was seized at his instance (Exhibit P-16). The blood-
stained shirt worn by the accused at the time of the incident was
also seized (Exhibit P-19). The accused was formally arrested
vide arrest memo (Exhibit P-20). The seized articles were sent for
forensic examination to FSL Ambikapur, from where report
(Exhibit P-27) was received. The medical query report also
confirmed that the injuries sustained by the deceased could be
caused by the seized knife.
7. Statements of witnesses were recorded under Section 161 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure. After completion of investigation,
charge-sheet was filed before the Court of Judicial Magistrate
First Class, Ambikapur, from where the case was committed to
Sessions Court for trial.
8. On the basis of evidence presented in the case, when the
statement of the accused was examined in the form of a
5
questionnaire under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, the accused expressed his innocence, but did not
produce any witness in his defence.
9. In order to bring home the offence, the prosecution examined as
many as 14 witnesses and exhibited 25 documents Exs.P-1 to P-
25.
10. The trial Court upon appreciation of oral and documentary
evidence available on record, by its judgment dated 25.11.2023,
convicted the appellant for offence under Section 302 of the IPC
and sentenced him as aforementioned, against which, this
criminal appeal has been preferred by the accused / appellant.
11. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the impugned
judgment of conviction passed by the learned trial Court is wholly
erroneous, illegal and contrary to the settled principles of criminal
jurisprudence. It is contended that the learned trial Court has
gravely erred in convicting the appellant by adopting a selective
approach in appreciation of evidence, inasmuch as it has ignored
the material portions of testimony of witnesses which were
favourable to the defence and has relied only upon such parts as
suited the prosecution, thereby adopting a “pick and choose”
method to secure conviction. It is further submitted that although
the prosecution examined as many as 14 witnesses, there exist
material contradictions and inconsistencies in their statements
regarding the incident as well as the manner in which the
6investigation was conducted, which renders the prosecution case
doubtful, yet the learned trial Court, despite noticing such
discrepancies, has perversely proceeded to convict the appellant.
Learned counsel further argues that the prosecution has failed to
adduce cogent, reliable and sufficient evidence to prove the
charge beyond reasonable doubt, and the conviction based on
such insufficient evidence is unsustainable in the eyes of law. It is
also contended that even as per the prosecution story, the
incident occurred on account of sudden provocation during a
quarrel, when the appellant was under the influence of alcohol,
and there was no premeditation or intention to commit murder
rather, the act, if any, was committed in the heat of passion. It is
further urged that the prosecution has failed to establish the chain
of circumstances conclusively and the case appears doubtful. In
the alternative, it is prayed that even if the prosecution case is
accepted in its entirety, the offence would not fall under Section
302 IPC but would at best be covered under Section 304 of the
Indian Penal Code, as the essential ingredients of murder are not
made out. Hence, the impugned judgment of conviction and
sentence deserves to be set aside, or in the alternative, the
conviction be altered from Section 302 IPC to Section 304 IPC
with appropriate modification of sentence.
12. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the
respondent/State supports the impugned judgment and submits
that the appellant has caused murder of deceased by deadly
7
attacking him with knife due to which, he succumbed to his
injuries, therefore, the learned trial Court has rightly convicted the
appellant under Section 302 of the IPC and it is not a case where
the appellant’s conviction under Section 302 of the IPC can be
altered/converted under Section 304 Part-I or Part-II IPC and as
such, the instant criminal appeal deserves to be dismissed.
13. We have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties,
considered their rival submissions made hereinabove and also
went through the records with utmost circumspection.
14. The first question for consideration would be whether the
deceased died under unnatural circumstances ?
15. In order to determine the aforesaid issue, the prosecution has
relied upon the testimony of Assistant Sub-Inspector Manoj Singh
(PW-14), who has stated that upon receiving information, he
reached the place of occurrence at Village Kedama, inspected the
dead body of the deceased and issued notice (Exhibit P-4) for
conducting the inquest proceedings. He thereafter prepared the
inquest report (Exhibit P-5) and sent the dead body for
postmortem examination to PHC Kedma through Constable Suraj
Rai along with requisition (Exhibit P-13A).
16. The prosecution has further examined Dr. B.M. Kamre (PW-6),
who conducted the postmortem examination of the deceased on
24.10.2022 at PHC Kedma. The witness has deposed that the
body was brought by Constable Suraj Rai and was duly identified
8
by the family members of the deceased. Upon external
examination, the doctor found that the deceased was wearing a
blue-yellow T-shirt and brown underwear. Rigor mortis was
present throughout the body. A stab wound measuring 3 x 1.5 cm
was found on the left side of the chest between the fourth and fifth
ribs. On internal examination, the doctor found that there was a
stab injury penetrating into the chest cavity, resulting in
accumulation of blood. Notably, a stab wound measuring about
1.5 cm was present in both chambers of the heart, which had
caused profuse internal bleeding. The internal organs such as
lungs, liver, spleen and kidneys were found congested.
17. The doctor opined that the cause of death was shock and
asphyxia due to internal and external bleeding resulting from the
chest injury, and that the death was homicidal in nature. He
further stated that the injuries were caused by a hard and sharp
object and were inflicted approximately 14 to 18 hours prior to the
post-mortem examination. The post-mortem report prepared by
him is Exhibit P-13.
18. In his cross-examination, the doctor has specifically denied the
suggestion that such injuries could be caused by a fall on a sharp
object, stone or rod. His testimony on material aspects has
remained unshaken and no contradiction or infirmity has been
brought on record to discredit his medical opinion.
19. The medical evidence, thus, clearly establishes that the death of
9
the deceased was not accidental or natural, but was caused by a
deliberate stab injury inflicted on a vital part of the body, resulting
in fatal internal bleeding.
20. In view of the aforesaid evidence, particularly the unimpeached
testimony of the medical expert and the postmortem report, this
Court is of the considered opinion that the prosecution has
successfully proved that the death of the deceased Samundar
Yadav was homicidal in nature.
21. Now, the question for consideration would be whether the
accused-appellant herein is the perpetrator of the crime in
question?
22. In this regard, the prosecution has examined Sidhi Bai (PW-2),
mother of the deceased and mother-in-law of the accused, as an
eyewitness. She has categorically stated in her examination-in-
chief that on the date of incident at about 6:00 p.m., while she was
sitting outside her house along with her son Samundar Yadav, the
accused Milan came there, caught hold of her son and assaulted
him on the chest with a sharp object, as a result of which he fell
down and blood started oozing out. The accused thereafter fled
from the spot. Her testimony has remained intact in cross-
examination and nothing material has been elicited to discredit
her version. Being a natural witness present at the spot, her
testimony inspires confidence.
23. The other alleged eyewitnesses, namely Mansi Bai (PW-3),
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daughter of the accused, and Moti Bai (PW-4), wife of the
accused, have not supported the prosecution case and have been
declared hostile. However, it is well settled that merely because
certain witnesses have turned hostile, the entire prosecution case
does not fail, and the testimony of reliable witnesses can be safely
relied upon. In the present case, their hostility appears to be
natural considering their close relationship with the accused.
24. The prosecution has further relied upon the testimony of Bhanwar
Sai (PW-1), father of the deceased and father-in-law of the
accused, who has stated that while he was sitting at the house of
Sushil Tirkey, the accused came there holding a blood-stained
knife and confessed that he had killed Samundar Yadav. Upon
hearing this, he rushed to the spot and found his son lying in a
pool of blood. His testimony regarding extra-judicial confession
has remained unshaken in cross-examination and there is no
reason for him to falsely implicate his own son-in-law.
25. The testimony of Sushil Kumar Tirkey (PW-4) also lends
corroboration to the statement of Bhanwar Sai (PW-1), as he has
stated that the accused came there and made a statement
indicating that he had finished Samundar over a land dispute.
Though he has not seen the actual assault, he is a witness to the
extra-judicial confession and the circumstances immediately
thereafter.
26. Similarly, Rohit Kumar (PW-7) has stated that when he reached
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the spot, he saw the accused holding a knife and moving near the
place of occurrence. Though his statement regarding the accused
uttering he has kill him suffers from omission in police statement,
his testimony that he saw the accused with a knife immediately
after the incident remains uncontroverted and supports the
prosecution case.
27. The extra-judicial confession made by the accused before
Bhanwar Sai (PW-1) stands corroborated by surrounding
circumstances, including the presence of the accused with a knife
immediately after the incident, as seen by witnesses, and the
prompt conduct of Bhanwar Sai in rushing to the spot and
reporting the matter to the police. There is nothing on record to
suggest that the said confession was obtained by coercion or
inducement. Hence, the same is found to be voluntary and
reliable.
28. The medical evidence adduced by Dr. B.M. Kamre (PW-6) clearly
establishes that the deceased sustained a stab injury on the
chest, which penetrated vital organs including the heart, resulting
in death due to shock and hemorrhage. The doctor has also
opined that such injuries could be caused by a knife like the one
seized in the present case.
29. The recovery of the knife at the instance of the accused and
seizure of his blood-stained clothes, though not fully supported by
independent witnesses, still gain significance in light of the FSL
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report (Exhibit P-27), which shows that human blood of the same
group “AB” was found on the knife, the clothes of the accused and
the clothes of the deceased. The accused has failed to offer any
explanation for the presence of such blood on his clothes and the
weapon.
30. The prompt lodging of FIR also supports the prosecution case, as
the incident occurred around 6:00 p.m. and was reported without
undue delay, ruling out possibility of false implication.
31. On a cumulative appreciation of the evidence of eyewitness Sidhi
Bai (PW-2), extra-judicial confession before Bhanwar Sai (PW-1),
corroboration by Sushil Tirkey (PW-4) and Rohit Kumar (PW-7),
medical evidence, and FSL report, this Court finds that the
prosecution has successfully established beyond reasonable
doubt that it was the accused who inflicted the fatal injury on the
deceased.
32. The aforesaid finding brings us to the next question for
consideration, whether the case of the appellant is covered within
Exception 4 to Section 300 of the IPC vis-a-vis culpable homicide
not amounting to murder and his conviction can be converted to
Section 304 Part-I or Part-II of the IPC, as contended by learned
counsel for the appellant?
33. The cause of death assigned in the postmortem report of the
deceased is already noticed are ‘the cause of death was shock
and asphyxia due to internal and external bleeding resulting from
13
the chest injury, and that the death was homicidal in nature’. It is
a trite law that “culpable homicide” is a genus and “murder” is its
species and all “murders” are “culpable homicides, but all
“culpable homicides are not “murders” as held by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Rampal Singh Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh 1.
The intention of the accused must be judged not in the light of
actual circumstances, but in the light of what is supposed to be
the circumstances.
34. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Basdev Vs. State of
Pepsu2 has made the following observations :
“Of course, we have to distinguish between motive,
intention and knowledge. Motive is something which
prompts a man to form an intention and knowledge is
an awareness of the consequences of the act. In many
cases intention and knowledge merge into each other
and mean the same thing more or less and intention
can be presumed from knowledge. The demarcating
line between knowledge and intention is no doubt thin
but it is not difficult to perceive that they connote
different things. Even in some English decisions, the
three ideas are used interchangeably and this has led
to a certain amount of confusion.”
35. It requires to be borne in mind that the test suggested in the
aforesaid decision and the fact that the legislature has used two
different terminologies, ‘intent’ and ‘knowledge’ and separate
1 (2012) 8 SCC 289
2 AIR 1956 SC 488
14
punishments are provided for an act committed with an intent to
cause bodily injury which is likely to cause death and for an act
committed with a knowledge that his act is likely to cause death
without intent to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause
death, it would be unsafe to treat ‘intent’ and ‘knowledge’ in equal
terms. They are not different things. Knowledge would be one of
the circumstances to be taken into consideration while
determining or inferring the requisite intent. Where the evidence
would not disclose that there was any intention to cause death of
the deceased but it was clear that the accused had knowledge
that his acts were likely to cause death, the accused can be held
guilty under second part of Section 304 IPC. It is in this
background that the expression used in Indian Penal Code
namely “intention” and “knowledge” has to be seen as there being
a thin line of distinction between these two expressions. The act
to constitute murder, if in given facts and circumstances, would
disclose that the ingredients of Section 300 are not satisfied and
such act is one of extreme recklessness, it would not attract the
said Section. In order to bring a case within Part 3 of Section 300
IPC, it must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that
particular bodily injury which in the ordinary course of nature was
sufficient to cause death. In other words, that the injury found to
be present was the injury that was intended to be inflicted.
36. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Sukhbir Singh v.
15
State of Haryana3 has observed as under:-
“21. Keeping in view the facts and circumstances
of the case, we are of the opinion that in the
absence of the existence of common object
Sukhbir Singh is proved to have committed the
offence of culpable homicide without premeditation
in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a
sudden quarrel and did not act in a cruel or
unusual manner and his case is covered by
Exception 4 of Section 300 IPC which is
punishable under Section 304 (Part I) IPC. The
finding of the courts below holding the aforesaid
appellant guilty of offence of murder punishable
under Section 302 IPC is set aside and he is held
guilty for the commission of offence of culpable
homicide not amounting to murder punishable
under Section 304 (Part I) IPC and sentenced to
undergo rigorous imprisonment for 10 years and to
pay a fine of Rs.5000. In default of payment of fine,
he shall undergo further rigorous imprisonment for
one year.”
37. The Supreme Court in the matter of Gurmukh Singh v. State of
Haryana4 has laid down certain factors which are to be taken into
consideration before awarding appropriate sentence to the
accused with reference to Section 302 or Section 304 Part II of
the IPC, which state as under :-
“23. These are some factors which are required to be
taken into consideration before awarding appropriate3 (2002) 3 SCC 327
4 (2009) 15 SCC 635
16sentence to the accused. These factors are only
illustrative in character and not exhaustive. Each
case has to be seen fro its special perspective. The
relevant factors are as under :
(a) Motive or previous enmity;
(b) Whether the incident had taken place on
the spur of the moment;
(c) The intention/knowledge of the accused
while inflicting the blow or injury;
(d) Whether the death ensued instantaneously
or the victim died after several days;
(e) The gravity, dimension and nature of injury;
(f) The age and general health condition of the
accused;
(g) Whether the injury was caused without
premeditation in a sudden fight;
(h) The nature and size of weapon used for
inflicting the injury and the force with which
the blow was inflicted;
(i) The criminal background and adverse
history of the accused;
(j) Whether the injury inflicted was not sufficient
in the ordinary course of nature to cause
death but the death was because of shock;
(k) Number of other criminal cases pending
against the accused;
(l) Incident occurred within the family members
or close relations;
(m) The conduct and behaviour of the accused
after the incident.
Whether the accused had taken the
injured/the deceased to the hospital
immediately to ensure that he/she gets
17proper medical treatment ?
These are some of the factors which can be
taken into consideration while granting an
appropriate sentence to the accused.
24. The list of circumstances enumerated above is
only illustrative and not exhaustive. In our considered
view, proper and appropriate sentence to the
accused is the bounded obligation and duty of the
court. The endeavour of the court must be to ensure
that the accused receives appropriate sentence, in
other words, sentence should be according to the
gravity of the offence. These are some of the
relevant factors which are required to be kept in view
while convicting and sentencing the accused.”
38. Likewise, in the matter of State v. Sanjeev Nanda5, their
Lordships of the Supreme Court have held that once knowledge
that it is likely to cause death is established but without any
intention to cause death, then jail sentence may be for a term
which may extend to 10 years or with fine or with both. It has
further been held that to make out an offence punishable under
Section 304 Part II of the IPC, the prosecution has to prove the
death of the person in question and such death was caused by
the act of the accused and that he knew that such act of his is
likely to cause death.
39. Further, the Supreme Court in the matter of Arjun v. State of
Chhattisgarh6 has elaborately dealt with the issue and observed
5 (2012) 8 SCC 450
6 (2017) 3 SCC 247
18
in paragraphs 20 and 21, which reads as under :-
“20. To invoke this Exception 4, the requirements that
are to be fulfilled have been laid down by this Court
in Surinder Kumar v. UT, Chandigarh [(1989) 2 SCC
217 : 1989 SCC (Cri) 348], it has been explained as
under :(SCC p. 220, para 7)
“7. To invoke this exception four
requirements must be satisfied, namely,
(I) it was a sudden fight; (ii) there was no
premeditation; (iii) the act was done in a
heat of passion; and (iv) the assailant had
not taken any undue advantage or acted
in a cruel manner. The cause of the
quarrel is not relevant nor its I relevant
who offered the provocation or started the
assault. The number of wounds caused
during the occurrence is not a decisive
factor but what is important is that the
occurrence must have been sudden and
unpremeditated and the offender must
have acted in a fit of anger. Of course, the
offender must not have taken any undue
advantage or acted in a cruel manner.
Where, on a sudden quarrel, a person in
the heat of the moment picks up a
weapon which is handy and causes
injuries, one of which proves fatal, he
would be entitled to the benefit of this
exception provided he has not acted
cruelly.”
21. Further in Arumugam v. State [(2008) 15 SCC
590 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 1130], in support of the
proposition of law that under what circumstances
Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC can be invoked if
death is caused, it has been explained as under :
(SCC p. 596, para 9)
“9. …. The help of exception 4 can be
invoked if death is caused (a) without
premeditation; (b) in a sudden fight; (c)
without the offender’s having taken undue
advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual
manner; and (d) the fight must have been
with the person killed. To bring a case
within Exception 4 all the ingredients
mentioned in it must be found. It is to be
noted that the “fight” occurring in Exception
194 to Section 300 IPC is not defined in the
Penal Code, 1860. It takes two to make a
fight. Heat of passion requires that there
must be no time for the passions to cool
down and in this case, the parties had
worked themselves into a fury on account
of the verbal altercation in the beginning. A
fight is a combat between two or more
persons whether with or without weapons.
It is not possible to enunciate any general
rule as to what shall be deemed to be a
sudden quarrel. It is a question of fact and
whether a quarrel is sudden or not must
necessarily depend upon the proved facts
of each case. For the application of
Exception 4, it is not sufficient to show that
there was a sudden quarrel and there was
no premeditation. It must further be shown
that the offender has not taken undue
advantage or acted in cruel or unusual
manner. The expression “undue
advantage” as used in the provisions
means “unfair advantage”.
40. In the matter of Arjun (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has
held that if there is intent and knowledge, the same would be case
of Section 304 Part-I of the IPC and if it is only a case of
knowledge and not the intention to cause murder and bodily
injury, then same would be a case of Section 304 Part-II of the
IPC.
41. Further, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Rambir v.
State (NCT of Delhi)7 has laid down four ingredients which
should be tested to bring a case within the purview of Exception 4
to Section 300 of IPC, which reads as under:
“16. A plain reading of Exception 4 to Section 300
IPC shows that the following four ingredients are
required:
7 (2019) 6 SCC 122
20
(i) There must be a sudden fight;
(ii) There was no premeditation;
(iii) The act was committed in a heat of
passion; and
(iv) The offender had not taken any undue
advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual
manner.”
42. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in a recent judgment in the case of
Anbazhagan vs. The State represented by the Inspector of
Police in Criminal Appeal No.2043 of 2023 disposed of on
20.07.2023 has defined the context of the true test to be adopted
to find out the intention or knowledge of the accused in doing the
act as under:
“60. Few important principles of law discernible from
the aforesaid discussion may be summed up thus:
(1) When the court is confronted with the question,
what offence the accused could be said to have
committed, the true test is to find out the intention or
knowledge of the accused in doing the act. If the
intention or knowledge was such as is described in
Clauses (1) to (4) of Section 300 of the IPC, the act
will be murder even though only a single injury was
caused. To illustrate: ‘A’ is bound hand and foot. ‘B’
comes and placing his revolver against the head of
‘A’, shoots ‘A’ in his head killing him instantaneously.
Here, there will be no difficulty in holding that the
intention of ‘B’ in shooting ‘A’ was to kill him, though
only single injury was caused. The case would,
therefore, be of murder falling within Clause (1) of
21
Section 300 of the IPC. Taking another instance, ‘B’
sneaks into the bed room of his enemy ‘A’ while the
latter is asleep on his bed. Taking aim at the left
chest of ‘A’, ‘B’ forcibly plunges a sword in the left
chest of ‘A’ and runs away. ‘A’ dies shortly thereafter.
The injury to ‘A’ was found to be sufficient in ordinary
course of nature to cause death. There may be no
difficulty in holding that ‘B’ intentionally inflicted the
particular injury found to be caused and that the said
injury was objectively sufficient in the ordinary course
of nature to cause death. This would bring the act of
‘B’ within Clause (3) of Section 300 of the IPC and
render him guilty of the offence of murder although
only single injury was caused.
(2) Even when the intention or knowledge of the
accused may fall within Clauses (1) to (4) of Section
300 of the IPC, the act of the accused which would
otherwise be murder, will be taken out of the purview
of murder, if the accused’s case attracts any one of
the five exceptions enumerated in that section. In the
event of the case falling within any of those
exceptions, the offence would be culpable homicide
not amounting to murder, falling within Part 1 of
Section 304 of the IPC, if the case of the accused is
such as to fall within Clauses (1) to (3) of Section 300
of the IPC. It would be offence under Part II of
Section 304 if the case is such as to fall within
Clause (4) of Section 300 of the IPC. Again, the
intention or knowledge of the accused may be such
that only 2nd or 3rd part of Section 299 of the IPC,
may be attracted but not any of the clauses of
Section 300 of the IPC. In that situation also, the
22
offence would be culpable homicide not amounting to
murder under Section 304 of the IPC. It would be an
offence under Part I of that section, if the case fall
within 2nd part of Section 299, while it would be an
offence under Part II of Section 304 if the case fall
within 3rd part of Section 299 of the IPC.
(3) To put it in other words, if the act of an accused
person falls within the first two clauses of cases of
culpable homicide as described in Section 299 of the
IPC it is punishable under the first part of Section
304. If, however, it falls within the third clause, it is
punishable under the second part of Section 304. In
effect, therefore, the first part of this section would
apply when there is ‘guilty intention,’ whereas the
second part would apply when there is no such
intention, but there is ‘guilty knowledge’.
(4) Even if single injury is inflicted, if that particular
injury was intended, and objectively that injury was
sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause
death, the requirements of Clause 3rdly to Section
300 of the IPC, are fulfilled and the offence would be
murder.
(5) Section 304 of the IPC will apply to the following
classes of cases : (i) when the case falls under one
or the other of the clauses of Section 300, but it is
covered by one of the exceptions to that Section, (ii)
when the injury caused is not of the higher degree of
likelihood which is covered by the expression
‘sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause
death’ but is of a lower degree of likelihood which is
23
generally spoken of as an injury ‘likely to cause
death’ and the case does not fall under Clause (2) of
Section 300 of the IPC, (iii) when the act is done with
the knowledge that death is likely to ensue but
without intention to cause death or an injury likely to
cause death.
To put it more succinctly, the difference between the
two parts of Section 304 of the IPC is that under the
first part, the crime of murder is first established and
the accused is then given the benefit of one of the
exceptions to Section 300 of the IPC, while under the
second part, the crime of murder is never established
at all. Therefore, for the purpose of holding an
accused guilty of the offence punishable under the
second part of Section 304 of the IPC, the accused
need not bring his case within one of the exceptions
to Section 300 of the IPC.
(6) The word ‘likely’ means probably and it is
distinguished from more ‘possibly’. When chances of
happening are even or greater than its not
happening, we may say that the thing will ‘probably
happen’. In reaching the conclusion, the court has to
place itself in the situation of the accused and then
judge whether the accused had the knowledge that
by the act he was likely to cause death.
(7) The distinction between culpable homicide
(Section 299 of the IPC) and murder (Section 300 of
the IPC) has always to be carefully borne in mind
while dealing with a charge under Section 302 of the
IPC. Under the category of unlawful homicides, both,
24
the cases of culpable homicide amounting to murder
and those not amounting to murder would fall.
Culpable homicide is not murder when the case is
brought within the five exceptions to Section 300 of
the IPC. But, even though none of the said five
exceptions are pleaded or prima facie established on
the evidence on record, the prosecution must still be
required under the law to bring the case under any of
the four clauses of Section 300 of the IPC to sustain
the charge of murder. If the prosecution fails to
discharge this onus in establishing any one of the
four clauses of Section 300 of the IPC, namely, 1stly
to 4thly, the charge of murder would not be made out
and the case may be one of culpable homicide not
amounting to murder as described under Section 299
of the IPC.
(8) The court must address itself to the question of
mens rea. If Clause thirdly of Section 300 is to be
applied, the assailant must intend the particular injury
inflicted on the deceased. This ingredient could rarely
be proved by direct evidence. Inevitably, it is a matter
of inference to be drawn from the proved
circumstances of the case. The court must
necessarily have regard to the nature of the weapon
used, part of the body injured, extent of the injury,
degree of force used in causing the injury, the
manner of attack, the circumstances preceding and
attendant on the attack.
(9) Intention to kill is not the only intention that makes
a culpable homicide a murder. The intention to cause
injury or injuries sufficient in the ordinary cause of
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nature to cause death also makes a culpable
homicide a murder if death has actually been caused
and intention to cause such injury or injuries is to be
inferred from the act or acts resulting in the injury or
injuries.
(10) When single injury inflicted by the accused
results in the death of the victim, no inference, as a
general principle, can be drawn that the accused did
not have the intention to cause the death or that
particular injury which resulted in the death of the
victim. Whether an accused had the required guilty
intention or not, is a question of fact which has to be
determined on the facts of each case.
(11) Where the prosecution proves that the accused
had the intention to cause death of any person or to
cause bodily injury to him and the intended injury is
sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause
death, then, even if he inflicts a single injury which
results in the death of the victim, the offence squarely
falls under Clause thirdly of Section 300 of the IPC
unless one of the exceptions applies.
(12) In determining the question, whether an accused
had guilty intention or guilty knowledge in a case
where only a single injury is inflicted by him and that
injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to
cause death, the fact that the act is done without
premeditation in a sudden fight or quarrel, or that the
circumstances justify that the injury was accidental or
unintentional, or that he only intended a simple injury,
would lead to the inference of guilty knowledge, and
26
the offence would be one under Section 304 Part II of
the IPC.”
43. Reverting to the facts of the present case in light of principles of
law laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the
above-stated judgments (supra), it is quite vivid that the incident
occurred suddenly in the course of a quarrel between the accused
and the deceased over a land dispute. The prosecution evidence
itself indicates that there was a verbal altercation immediately
preceding the incident. It is also evident that the accused was
under the influence of alcohol at the time of the incident, and the
act was committed in the heat of passion upon sudden
provocation without any premeditation. There is nothing on record
to show that the accused had any prior intention or preplanned
design to commit the murder of the deceased. The incident
appears to have occurred on the spur of the moment.
44. Although the injury was inflicted on a vital part of the body, namely
the chest, the surrounding circumstances clearly indicate that the
act falls within the ambit of Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC, as it
was committed without premeditation, in a sudden fight, in the
heat of passion, as such, his case would falls within the purview of
Exception 4 of Section 300 of IPC, as the act of appellant herein
completely satisfies the four necessary ingredients of Exception 4
to Section 300 IPC i.e. (i) there must be a sudden fight; (ii) there
was no premeditation; (iii) the act was committed in a heat of
27
passion and (iv) the appellant had not taken any undue advantage
or acted in a cruel or unusual manner.
45. Thus, upon careful consideration of the entire evidence on record,
including the reliable testimony of eyewitness Sidhi Bai (PW-2),
the extra-judicial confession made by the accused before
Bhanwar Sai (PW-1) duly corroborated by Sushil Tirkey (PW-4),
the presence of the accused with a knife immediately after the
incident as seen by Rohit Kumar (PW-7) and other witnesses, the
medical evidence establishing that the death was caused by a
stab injury on a vital part of the body, and the FSL report (Ex.P-
25) confirming presence of human blood of the same group on the
weapon and clothes of the accused, this Court is of the
considered opinion that the prosecution has successfully proved
beyond reasonable doubt that the accused is the author of the
injury which resulted in the death of Samundar Yadav. However,
considering the circumstances in which the incident occurred,
namely a sudden quarrel without premeditation and in the heat of
passion, the act of the accused would fall within the ambit of
culpable homicide not amounting to murder.
46. Accordingly, conviction of the appellant under Section 302 of the
IPC is set aside, however, he is convicted under Section 304 Part-
I of the IPC and sentenced to undergo RI for 7 years.
47. The appellant is stated to be in jail since 24.10.2022 being the
28
date of arrest. He is directed to serve out the sentence as
modified above.
48. The criminal appeal is partly allowed to the extent indicated
herein-above.
49. Registry is directed to send a copy of this judgment to the
concerned Superintendent of Jail where the Appellant is
undergoing the jail term, to serve the same on the Appellant
informing him that he is at liberty to assail the present judgment
passed by this Court by preferring an appeal before the Hon’ble
Supreme Court with the assistance of High Court Legal Services
Committee or the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee.
50. Let a copy of this judgment and the original record be transmitted
to the trial court concerned forthwith for necessary information
and compliance.
Sd/- Sd/-
(Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha)
Judge Chief Justice
Manpreet