Andhra Pradesh High Court – Amravati
Mikkilineni Yujaya Dinesh Babu & 4 … vs Pasala Satyavathi on 27 February, 2026
1
* THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE RAVI NATH TILHARI
+ CIVIL REVISION PETITION NO: 331/2026
% 27.02.2026
# Mikkilineni Yujaya Dinesh Babu & 4 others.
......Petitioners
And:
$ Pasala Satyavathi
....Respondent
!Counsel for the petitioners : Sri B.Nalin Kumar, learned senior
counsel assisted by Sri Mannam
Venkata Krishna
^Counsel for the respondent :
<Gist:
>Head Note:
? Cases referred:
1. 2025 SCC OnLine SC 779
2. (2016) 1 SCC 332
3. (2011) 9 SCC 126
4. AIR 2008 Supreme Court 2033
5. (2020) 7 SCC 366
6. (2005) 7 SCC 510
7. 2025 SCC OnLine SC 975
8. (2024) 19 SCC 121
2
HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI
****
CIVIL REVISION PETITION NO: 331/2026
DATE OF JUDGMENT PRONOUNCED: 27.02.2026
SUBMITTED FOR APPROVAL:
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE RAVI NATH TILHARI
1. Whether Reporters of Local newspapers Yes/No
may be allowed to see the Judgments?
2. Whether the copies of judgment may be Yes/No
marked to Law Reporters/Journals
3. Whether Your Lordships wish to see the fair Yes/No
copy of the Judgment?
____________________
RAVI NATH TILHARI,J
3
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE RAVI NATH TILHARI
CIVIL REVISION PETITION NO: 331/2026
ORDER:
Heard Sri B.Nalin Kumar, learned senior advocate, assisted by Sri
MannamVenkata Krishna Rao, learned counsel for the petitioners.
2. The present Civil Revision Petition under Article 227 of Constitution of
India has been filed by the petitioners/defendants being aggrieved from the
order dated 10.12.2025 of rejection of their application under Order VII Rule
11 of the Code of Civil Procedure (in short ‘CPC‘) in I.A.No.474 of 2025 in
O.S.No.230 of 2021 on the file of the XI Additional District Judge,
Visakhapatnam filed by the plaintiff-respondent.
3. The plaintiff (respondent herein) initially filed O.S.No.1492 of 2005 on
the file of III Additional Senior Civil Judge, Visakhapatnam for a perpetual
injunction restraining the defendants (the petitioner Nos.1, 2 & the
predecessor in the interest of the petitioner Nos.3 to 5 herein) from interfering
with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the plaintiff of the suit
schedule property.In the suit, the petitioners filed written statement raising
various pleas. The suit was dismissed on 04.07.2016. The plaintiff filed
A.S.No.155 of 2016which was dismissed as not pressed vide order dated
18.02.2016 passed by XI Additional District Judge, Visakhapatnam.
4. The plaintiff thereafter filed another O.S.No.230 of 2021 in the Court of
XI Additional District Judge, Visakhapatnam for declaration of title and
permanent injunction. The suit is pending.
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5. In O.S.No.230 of 2021, the defendants/petitioners filed I.A.No.474 of
2025 under Order VII Rule 11 CPC to reject the plaint on the ground that the
suit was barred by limitation. Inter-alia, it was stated that in the previous suit
O.S.No.1492 of 2005, the defendants had filed written statement and denied
the title of the plaintiff. The defendants case in the application under Order VII
Rule 11 CPC was that since the defendants denied the title of the plaintiff in
the written statement filed in O.S.No.1492 of 2005, as per Article 58 of the
Limitation Act, the suit O.S.No.230 of 2021 for declaration was barred by
limitation and was liable to be rejected. The O.S.No.230 of 2021 was required
to be filed within a period of limitation of 3 years from the date cause of action
first accrued i.e., when the written statement was filed in O.S.No.1492 of 2005
in 2005 itself. Reliance was placed in Article 58 of the Limitation Act.
6. The plaintiff-respondent filed objection/counter,inter-alia taking the
stand that the application under Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC on the ground of
limitation was premature, legally untenable and misconceived. The suit was
not barred by limitation. The plaintiff-respondent further pleaded that after the
decree in O.S.No.1492 of 2005, the plaintiff had filed A.S.No.155 of 2016 and
during its pendency the defendants/petitioners with malafide intent, began
spreading false propaganda in and around the vicinity of the suit schedule
property, falsely claiming ownership thereof and on 15.08.2021 taking the
advantage of their men, they made an unsuccessful attempt to trespass into
the suit schedule property. Their right to sue for declaration was said to have
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accrued on 15.08.2021.The defendants misconstituted the cause of action
from the written statement filed in earlier suit, O.S.No.1492 of 2005.
7. Learned XI Additional District Judge, Visakhapatnam framed the
following point for consideration:
“Whether any ground exists under Order VII Rule 11 CPC to reject the plaint as
prayed by the petitioner/defendant or not?”
8. The learned Trial Court held that the plaint averments specifically stated
that the cause of action arose on 15.08.2021. The plaintiff pleaded that
plaintiff was an owner and in peaceful possession of the plaint schedule
property and on 15.08.2021 the defendants attempted to interfere and set up
false ownership and tried to trespass. Learned Trial Court held that the Court
was bound to confine strictly to the plaint averments and the written statement
or defense documents, earlier written statement, judgment in O.S.No.1492 of
2005 or the appeal pleadings could not be looked into at this stage to
determine the limitation period based on disputed aspects. Under Article 58 of
the Limitation Act, the limitation begins when the right to sue first accrued and
according to the plaint averments a clear hostile act occurred on 15.08.2021.
The suit was filed well within 3 years from the date of such cause of action.
The plaint disclosed cause of action on 15.08.2021 and so, the relief in the
suit on the face of the plaint, was not barred by limitation.
9. Learned XI Additional District Judge, Visakhapatnam on such
consideration by order dated 10.12.2025 rejected I.A.No.474 of 2025.
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10. Learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the impugned order
suffers from illegality. He submitted that in O.S.No.1492 of 2005 the
defendants denied the title of the plaintiff. So, from such denial, cause of
action for the declaration, accrued for the first time. He referred to the
judgment of the learned Trial Court in O.S.No.1492 of 2005, (at page No.118
of the present CRP), and emphasized on the defendants pleading as
mentioned therein to the following effect:
“……they pleaded that plaintiff has no right over property since late
Panchadarla Appayyamma does not have exclusive right to alienate the
property……”.
11. From the aforesaid part of the judgment, the learned counsel submitted
that it was the defendants’ case that the plaintiff has no right over the property.
It was denial of the plaintiff’s title. So the cause of action for the suit for
declaration accrued firstly in the year 2005 when the written statement was
filed. Any cause of action as stated in the plaint of O.S.No.230 of 2021, on
15.08.2021, at best would be the subsequent or further cause of action but not
the first cause of action under Article 58 of the limitation Act.The suit was thus
barred by the limitation on the face of the material filed with the plaint, and the
learned XI Additional District Judge, Visakhapatnam ought to have rejected
the plaint under Order 7 Rule 11(d) CPC.
12. Learned counsel for the petitioners placed reliance in the judgments of
NikhilaDivyang Mehtav. Hitesh P.Sanghvi 1 , L.C.Hanumanthappa v.
1
2025 SCC OnLine SC 779
7
H.B.Shivakumar 2 ,Khatri Hotels Private Limited v. Union of India 3 ,
4
AnathulaSudhakar v. P.Buchi Reddy , Dahiben v.
ArvindbhaiKalyanjiBhanusali5, on the scope of Order VII Rule 11 CPC and
Article 58 of the Limitation Act in support of his contentions.
13. I have considered the submissions of the learned counsel for the
petitioners and perused the material on record.
14. The point for consideration and determination is as follows:
“Whether the impugned order rejecting the application under Order 7 Rule
11(d) CPC and thereby not rejecting the plaint on the plea of limitation,
suffers from any illegality?”
15. The main contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that the
question of limitation is not a mixed question of law and fact. It is a pure
question of law. He submitted that Article 58 of the Limitation Act provides that
to obtain any other declaration, the period of limitation is three years and the
time begins to run, ‘when the right to sue first accrues’. The right to sue for
declaration accrued first to the plaintiff, when the defendant/petitioners filed
written statement in O.S.No.1492 of 2005 denying the title of the plaintiff. That
suit was dismissed on 04.07.2016. The appeal there against was also
dismissed as withdrawn. So the suit for declaration in O.S.No.230 of 2021
must have been filed within a period of three years from the cause of action
2
(2016) 1 SCC 332
3
(2011) 9 SCC 126
4
AIR 2008 Supreme Court 2033
5
(2020) 7 SCC 366
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when it accrued first, but the same was filed in the year 2021, much beyond
the period of limitation under Article 58 of Limitation Act. So on the face of it,
the suit was barred under Order 7 Rule 11(d) CPC.
16. Learned counsel submitted that the principles of law on the scope of
Order 7 Rule 11 CPC are well settled by the Judicial precedents. Only the
plaint averments and the material filed along with the plaint is to be
considered. The defense of the defendant is not to be seen. He submitted that
consequently the defendants/petitioners did not file the copy of their written
statement of the O.S.No.1492 of 2005. He submitted that the plaintiff herself
referred in the plaint about the written statement and the copy of the judgment
dated 04.07.2016 of O.S.No.1492 of 2005 was filed along with the plaint and
from perusal of that judgment it became evident that the defendants had
denied the title of the plaintiff way back in the year 2005. So, on the face of the
plaint with its material, the suit filed in the year 2021 was barred by limitation.
17. This Court proceeds to consider the aforesaid submission on merits,
referring to the legal provisions of Order 7 Rule 11 (d) CPC, Article 58 of the
Limitation Act and the legal precedents on the subject.
18. Order 7 Rule 11 CPC reads as under:
“11. Rejection of plaint.– The plaint shall be rejected in the following
cases:–
(a) where it does not disclose a cause of action;
(b) where the relief claimed is undervalued, and the plaintiff, on being
required by the Court to correct the valuation within a time to be fixed by
the Court, fails to do so;
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(c) where the relief claimed is properly valued, but the plaint is returned
upon paper insufficiently stamped, and the plaintiff, on being required by
the Court to supply the requisite stamp-paper within a time to be fixed by
the Court, fails to do so;
(d) where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by
any law;
(e) where it is not filed in duplicate;
(f) where the plaintiff fails to comply with the provisions of rule 9
Provided that the time fixed by the Court for the correction of the valuation or
supplying of the requisite stamp-paper shall not be extended unless the Court,
for reasons to be recorded, is satisfied that the plaintiff was prevented by any
cause of an exceptional nature from correcting the valuation or supplying the
requisite stamp-paper, as the case may be, within the time fixed by the Court
and that refusal to extend such time would cause grave injustice to the plaintiff.”
19. In Dahiben (supra) the Hon’ble Apex Court laid down the principles
which are to be adhered to while considering the application under Order 7
Rule 11 CPC. Para Nos. 23.1 to 23.15 is reproduced as under:
“23.1 We will first briefly touch upon the law applicable for deciding an application
under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC, which reads as under:
“11. Rejection of plaint.- The plaint shall be rejected in the following cases:-
(a) where it does not disclose a cause of action;
(b) where the relief claimed in undervalued, and the plaintiff, on being required by
the Court to correct the valuation within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do
so;
(c) where the relief claimed is properly valued but the plaint is written upon paper
insufficiently stamped, and the plaintiff, on being required by the Court to supply the
requisite stamp-paper within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so;
(d) where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law;
(e) where it is not filed in duplicate;
(f) where the plaintiff fails to comply with the provisions of rule 9
Provided that the time fixed by the Court for the correction of the valuation or
supplying of the requisite stamp-paper shall not be extended unless the Court, for
reasons to be recorded, is satisfied that the plaintiff was prevent by any cause of
10exceptional nature for correction the valuation or supplying the requisite stamp-
paper, as the case may be, within the time fixed by the Court and that refusal to
extend such time would cause grave injustice to the plaintiff.”
(emphasis supplied)
23.2. The remedy under Order VII Rule 11 is an independent and special
remedy, wherein the Court is empowered to summarily dismiss a suit at the
threshold, without proceeding to record evidence, and conducting a trial, on the
basis of the evidence adduced, if it is satisfied that the action should be terminated
on any of the grounds contained in this provision.
23.3. The underlying object of Order VII Rule 11 (a) is that if in a suit, no cause of
action is disclosed, or the suit is barred by limitation under Rule 11 (d), the Court
would not permit the plaintiff to unnecessarily protract the proceedings in the suit. In
such a case, it would be necessary to put an end to the sham litigation, so that
further judicial time is not wasted.
23.4. In Azhar Hussain v. Rajiv Gandhi this Court held that the whole purpose
of conferment of powers under this provision is to ensure that a litigation which is
meaningless, and bound to prove abortive, should not be permitted to waste
judicial time of the court, in the following words :
“12. …The whole purpose of conferment of such power is to ensure that a litigation
which is meaningless, and bound to prove abortive should not be permitted to
occupy the time of the Court, and exercise the mind of the respondent. The sword
of Damocles need not be kept hanging over his head unnecessarily without point or
purpose. Even if an ordinary civil litigation, the Court readily exercises the power to
reject a plaint, if it does not disclose any cause of action.”
23.5. The power conferred on the court to terminate a civil action is, however, a
drastic one, and the conditions enumerated in Order VII Rule 11 are required to be
strictly adhered to.
23.6. Under Order VII Rule 11, a duty is cast on the Court to determine whether the
plaint discloses a cause of action by scrutinizing the averments in the plaint2, read
in conjunction with the documents relied upon, or whether the suit is barred by any
law.
23.7. Order VII Rule 14(1) provides for production of documents, on which the
plaintiff places reliance in his suit, which reads as under :
“14: Production of document on which plaintiff sues or relies.- (1)Where a
plaintiff sues upon a document or relies upon document in his possession or power
in support of his claim, he shall enter such documents in a list, and shall produce it
in Court when the plaint is presented by him and shall, at the same time deliver the
document and a copy thereof, to be filed with the plaint.
(2)Where any such document is not in the possession or power of the plaintiff, he
shall, wherever possible, state in whose possession or power it is.
(3)A document which ought to be produced in Court by the plaintiff when the plaint
is presented, or to be entered in the list to be added or annexed to the plaint but is
not produced or entered accordingly, shall not, without the leave of the Court, be
received in evidence on his behalf at the hearing of the suit.
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(4)Nothing in this rule shall apply to document produced for the cross examination
of the plaintiff’s witnesses, or, handed over to a witness merely to refresh his
memory.” (emphasis supplied)23.8. Having regard to Order 7 Rule 14 CPC, the documents filed alongwith the
plaint, are required to be taken into consideration for deciding the application under
Order VII Rule 11 (a). When a document referred to in the plaint, forms the basis of
the plaint, it should be treated as a part of the plaint.
23.9. In exercise of power under this provision, the Court would determine if the
assertions made in the plaint are contrary to statutory law, or judicial dicta, for
deciding whether a case for rejecting the plaint at the threshold is made out.
23.10. At this stage, the pleas taken by the defendant in the written statement and
application for rejection of the plaint on the merits, would be irrelevant, and cannot
be adverted to, or taken into consideration.
23.11. The test for exercising the power under Order VII Rule 11 is that if the
averments made in the plaint are taken in entirety, in conjunction with the
documents relied upon, would the same result in a decree being passed. This test
was laid down in Liverpool & London S.P. & I Assn. Ltd. v.M.V.Sea Success I which
reads as :
“139. Whether a plaint discloses a cause of action or not is essentially a question of
fact. But whether it does or does not must be found out from reading the plaint itself.
For the said purpose, the averments made in the plaint in their entirety must be held
to be correct. The test is as to whether if the averments made in the plaint are taken
to be correct in their entirety, a decree would be passed.”
23.12. In Hardesh Ores (P.) Ltd. v. Hede & Co. the Court further held that it is not
permissible to cull out a sentence or a passage, and to read it in isolation. It is the
substance, and not merely the form, which has to be looked into. The plaint has to
be construed as it stands, without addition or subtraction of words. If the allegations
in the plaint prima facie show a cause of action, the court cannot embark upon an
enquiry whether the allegations are true in fact. D.Ramachandran
v.R.V.Janakiraman
23.13. If on a meaningful reading of the plaint, it is found that the suit is manifestly
vexatious and without any merit, and does not disclose a right to sue, the court
would be justified in exercising the power under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC.
23.14. The power under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC may be exercised by the Court at
any stage of the suit, either before registering the plaint, or after issuing summons
to the defendant, or before conclusion of the trial, as held by this Court in the
judgment of Saleem Bhai v.State of Maharashtra. The plea that once issues are
framed, the matter must necessarily go to trial was repelled by this Court in Azhar
Hussain case (supra).
23.15. The provision of Order VII Rule 11 is mandatory in nature. It states that the
plaint “shall” be rejected if any of the grounds specified in clause (a) to (e) are made
out. If the Court finds that the plaint does not disclose a cause of action, or that the
suit is barred by any law, the Court has no option, but to reject the plaint.”
20. The law therefore is well settled that in the exercise of the power under
Order 7 Rule 11 CPC, the Court would determine if the assertions made in the
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plaint are contrary to statutory law, or judicial dicta for deciding whether a case
for rejecting the plaint at the threshold is made out. At this stage, the pleas
taken by the defendant in the written statement and application for rejection of
the plaint on the merits, would be irrelevant which cannot be adverted to or
taken into consideration. The plaint averments and the documents filed along
with the plaint are only required to be taken into consideration.
21. Article 58 of the Limitation Act reads as under:
“THE SCHEDULE
Period of Limitation
[See Sections 2(j) and 3]
First Division-Suits
Description of suit Period of limitation Time from which period limitation
begins to run
* * *
Part III- Suits Relating To Declarations
* * *
58. To obtain any other Three Years When the right to sue first
declaration. accrues.
22. In Khatri Hotels Private Limited (supra), the Hon’ble Aped Court held
as under:
“25. Article 58 of the Schedule to the 1963 Act, which has a bearing on the
decision of this appeal, reads as under:
“THE SCHEDULE
Period of Limitation
[See Sections 2(j) and 3]
First Division-Suits
Description of suit Period of limitation Time from which period limitation
begins to run
* * *
Part III- Suits Relating To Declarations
* * *
58. To obtain any other Three Years When the right to sue first
declaration. accrues.
26. Article 120 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1908 (for short “the 1908
Act”) which was interpreted in the judgment relied upon by Shri Rohatgi reads
as under:
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Description of suit Period of limitation Time from which period limitation
begins to run
* * *
120. Suit for which no Six years When the right to sue accrues
period of limitation is
provided elsewhere in
this Schedule.
27. The differences which are discernible from the language of the above
reproduced two articles are:
(i) The period of limitation prescribed under Article 120 of the 1908 Act was six
years whereas the period of limitation prescribed under the 1963 Act is three
years and,
(ii) Under Article 120 of the 1908 Act, the period of limitation commenced when
the right to sue accrues. As against this, the period prescribed under Article
58 begins to run when the right to sue first accrues.
28. Article 120 of the 1908 Act was interpreted by the Judicial Committee
in Bolo v. Koklan [(1929-30) 57 IA 325 : AIR 1930 PC 270] and it was held: (IA
p. 331)
“There can be no ‘right to sue’ until there is an accrual of the right asserted in
the suit and its infringement, or at least a clear and unequivocal threat to infringe
that right, by the defendant against whom the suit is instituted.”
The same view was reiterated in Annamalai Chettiar v
A.M.K.C.T.Muthukaruppan Chettiar [ILR (1930) 8 Rang 645] and Gobinda
Narayan Singh v. Sham Lal Singh [(1930-31) 58 IA 125].
29. In Rukhmabai v. Lala Laxminarayan [AIR 1960 SC 335 : (1960) 2 SCR 253]
, the three-Judge Bench noticed the earlier judgments and summed up the legal
position in the following words:
“33. … The right to sue under Article 120 of the [1908 Act] accrues when the
defendant has clearly or unequivocally threatened to infringe the right asserted
by the plaintiff in the suit. Every threat by a party to such a right, however
ineffective and innocuous it may be, cannot be considered to be a clear and
unequivocal threat so as to compel him to file a suit. Whether a particular threat
gives rise to a compulsory cause of action depends upon the question whether
that threat effectively invades or jeopardizes the said right.”
30. While enacting Article 58 of the 1963 Act, the legislature has designedly made
a departure from the language of Article 120 of the 1908 Act. The word “first” has
been used between the words “sue” and “accrued”. This would mean that if a suit
is based on multiple causes of action, the period of limitation will begin to run from
the date when the right to sue first accrues. To put it differently, successive
violation of the right will not give rise to fresh cause and the suit will be liable to be
dismissed if it is beyond the period of limitation counted from the day when the
right to sue first accrued.”
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23. In Nikhila Divyang Mehta (supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court considered
Article 58 of the Limitation Act and observed that the use of the words “when
the right to sue first accrues” was very relevant and important. It categorically
provided that the limitation of three years had to be counted from the date
when the right to sue first accrued. Paragraph Nos.19 & 20 of Nikhila
Divyang Mehta (supra) read as under:
“19. The relief of declaration claimed in the suit at hand does not fall under
Articles 56 and 57 and, therefore, by necessary implication, Article 58 would
stand attracted which provides for a limitation period of three years to obtain
any other declaration other than that mentioned under Articles 56 and 57. It
provides that for such a declaration, the limitation is three years from the date
when the right to sue first accrues.
20. The use of the words “when the right to sue first accrues” as mentioned in
Article 58 is very relevant and important. It categorically provides that the
limitation of three years has to be counted from the date when the right to sue
first accrues.”
24. The Hon’ble Apex Court further held in Nikhila Divyang Mehta (supra)
in paragraph No.24 as under:
“24. There is no dispute to the fact that the limitation for filing of the suit falls
under Article 58 of the Schedule to the Act wherein limitation prescribed is three
years. It may be pertinent to note that the limitation of three years is from the
date when the cause of action first arose. So, according to the plaintiff’s case,
the cause of action first arose on 04.02.2014 and, therefore, the limitation would
end on 04.02.2017. However, even if the limitation is calculated from the date of
knowledge of the Will and/or the Codicil, it would run from the first week of
November, 2014 and would end in the first week of November, 2017. The suit
admittedly was instituted on 21.11.2017; much beyond the first week of
November, 2017 and as such is apparently barred by limitation, for which
neither any defence is required to be looked into nor any evidence in support is
needed to be adduced.”
25. In Nikhila Divyang Mehta (supra) the Hon’ble Apex Court recorded
that according to the plaintiff’s own admission the cause of action for filing the
suit commenced on 04.02.2014 and ended on 21.10.2014. So, in view of
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Article 58 of the Limitation Act, from 04.02.2014 when the cause of action first
accrued, the limitation of three years came to an end on 04.02.2017. The suit
instituted on 21.11.2017 was apparently barred by limitation.
26. Learned counsel for the petitioners placed much reliance in para-27 of
the Nikhila Divyang Mehta (supra) to contend that the limitation is not a
mixed question of law and fact. It can be decided even without evidence. He
emphasised that the question of limitation, can be considered at the stage of
Order 7 Rule 11(d) CPC and the plaint if it is barred by limitation has to be
rejected without even allowing the parties to lead the evidence on the point of
limitation. Para 27 reads as under:
“27. The submission that limitation is a mixed question of law and fact and
that it cannot be decided without allowing the party to lead evidence is of no
substance. In the present case, we have earlier noted that the suit was
admittedly instituted on 21.11.2017 whereas according to the plaint
averments the cause of action first arose on 04.02.2014. Even assuming that
the cause of action last arose in the first weekof November, 2014, the suit
ought to have been filed by 07.11.2017. The suit was filed on 21.11.2017. It
was ex-facie barred by limitation for which, no evidence was required to be
adduced by the parties. The above issue is purely an issue of fact and in the
admitted facts as per the plaint, allegations stand concluded for which no
evidence is needed.”
27. Article 58 of the Limitation Act, governs the suit for declaration, not
governed by any other Article of the Limitation Act. Limitation, in such a case,
would be three years from the date the cause of action accrued first. To
maintain the suit for declaration the cause of action may arise on many
occasions but for the purpose of a suit governed by Article 58, it is the first
cause of action from which the limitation period has to be counted. If the suit is
not filed within three years from the date the cause of action accrued first, it
16
would be barred by limitation and there is no dispute on such a proposition of
law.
28. However, when it comes to the applicability of Article 58 of the
Limitation Act and so the question of within limitation or beyond limitation, at
the stage of rejection of plaint under Order 7 Rule 11(d) CPC, if the plaint
averments and the material filed along therewith disclose clearly the date of
first cause of action and on the face of the plaint, the suit is barred by
limitation, then only it would be a case of rejection of the plaint under Order 7
Rule 11(d) CPC.
29. Here, the main question that arises is as to when, the cause of action
first accrued to the plaintiff to maintain O.S.No.230 of 2021, for declaration
and injunction. In the plaint the plaintiff mentioned 15.08.2021 as the date of
cause of action for filing the suit (vide para IV of the plaint at page 98). There
is a dispute raised by the defendants that the cause of action did not accrue
firstly, on the date mentioned in the plaint but it arose prior thereto, from the
date the written statement was filed in 2005 in O.S.No.1492 of 2005, which
according to the defendant is the first date of accrual of the cause of action as
the title of the plaintiff was denied at that time. I am of the view that, in the
facts & circumstances arising in this case, the issue which required
determination was as to when the cause of action accrued first, as there is a
dispute on the point of date of first accrual of the cause of action. At the stage
of Order 7 Rule 11(d) CPC, the Court will consider only the plaint averments
and the material filed along with the plaint. If as per the plaint averments itself,
17
ex-facie, the cause of action accrued firstly on the date mentioned in the
plaint and from that date the suit is not within the period of limitation, the plaint
has to be rejected under Order 7 Rule 11(d) CPC. The suit must be barred on
the averments of the plaint, ex-facie. In other words it would not require
determination of the fact as to when the cause of action accrued first. If there
is objection by the defendants that the cause of action did not accrue on the
date mentioned in the plaint but accrued on a different date and from that date
the suit is barred, then the question as to when the cause of action accrued
first, being a question of fact and its determination being dependent on the
evidence to be led, to prove the plea of the plaintiff or of the defendant, the
question of limitation would not be a pure question of law. It would then be a
mixed question of law and fact and then the question of limitation so as to
reject the plaint under Order 7 Rule 11(d) CPC, cannot be gone into at this
initial stage without trial.
30. In Nikhila Divyang Mehta (supra), Hon’ble Apex Court recorded that
on the averments in the plaint the suit was barred by limitation as it was filed
after three years from the date the cause of action accrued first as already
referred (supra) in para-27 of Nikhila Divyang Mehta (supra).
31. To reiterate, a plaint can be rejected under Order 7 rule 11(d) in those
case where the suit is barred by limitation on the averments in the plaint, ex-
facie, but not in those cases where the defendants dispute the date of the first
cause of action and cites a different date.
18
32. In Popat and Kotecha Property v. State Bank of India Staff
Association 6 , the Hon’ble Apex Court held that Clause (d) of Order 7 Rule
11 speaks of suit, as appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by
any law. The Hon’ble Apex Court held that the disputed questions cannot be
decided at the time of considering the application filed under Order 7 Rule 11
CPC. Clause(d) of Rule 11 of Order 7 applies in those cases only where the
statement made by the plaintiff in the plaint without any doubt or dispute
shows that the suit is barred by any law in force. Where the suit from
statement in the plaint could not be said to be barred by limitation, plaint
cannot be rejected. The Hon’ble Apex Court held that the statement in the
plaint without addition or subtraction must show that it is barred by any law to
attract the application of Order 7 Rule 11.
33. Para Nos.10 & 25 in Popat and Kotecha Property (supra) read as
under:
“10. Clause (d) of Order VII Rule 7 speaks of suit, as appears from the statement in
the plaint to be barred by any law. Disputed questions cannot be decided at the
time of considering an application filed under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC. Clause (d) of
Rule 11 of Order VII applies in those cases only where the statement made by the
plaintiff in the plaint, without any doubt or dispute shows that the suit is barred by
any law in force.
* * * * *
25. When the averments in the plaint are considered in the background of the
principles set out in Sopan Sukhdeo case (supra) {(2004) 3 SCC 137}, the
inevitable conclusion is that the Division Bench was not right in holding that Order
7 Rule 11 CPC was applicable to the facts of the case. Diverse claims were made
and the Division Bench was wrong in proceeding with the assumption that only the
non-execution of lease deed was the basic issue. Even if it is accepted that the6
(2005) 7 SCC 510
19other claims were relatable to it they have independent existence. Whether the
collection of amounts by the respondent was for a period beyond 51 years need
evidence to be adduced. It is not a case where the suit from statement in the plaint
can be said to be barred by law. The statement in the plaint without addition or
subtraction must show that is barred by any law to attract application of Order VII
Rule 11. This is not so in the present case.”
34. Recently, in P.Kumarakurubaran v. P.Narayanan 7 , the suit was
instituted seeking a declaration and consequential reliefs. The defendants in
their application under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC stated that the appellant had
knowledge of the execution of the sale deed at the earliest point of time and
so the suit was barred by limitation. The Trial Court rejected the application
holding that the issue of limitation involved a mixed question of law and fact. In
the revision the High Court took a contrary view and rejected the plaint on the
ground that the suit was barred by limitation. The plaintiff/appellant had
specifically averred in the plaint that upon becoming aware of registration of
documents on a particular date the suit was filed, and from that date the suit
was within the period of limitation. The Hon’ble Apex Court held that the issue
as to whether the appellant had prior notice or reason to be aware of the
transaction at an earlier point of time or whether the plea regarding the date of
knowledge was credible, all those matters necessarily required appreciation of
evidence and at the preliminary stage, the averments made in the plaint must
be taken at their face value and assumed to be true. Once the date of
knowledge was specifically pleaded and formed the basis of cause of action,
the issue of limitation could not be decided summarily. It became a mixed
7
2025 SCC OnLine SC 975
20
question of law and fact, which could not be adjudicated at the threshold stage
under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC. The Hon’ble Apex Court held that the rejection of
the plaint on the ground of limitation without permitting the parties to lead
evidence as passed by the High Court was legally unsustainable.
35. Para Nos.12, 12.1 & 13 in P.Kumarakurubaran (supra) read as under:
“12. In the present case, the appellant has specifically averred in the plaint that
upon becoming aware of registration of documents allegedly carried out among the
defendants in relation to the suit property, he immediately approached the
Additional Commissioner of Police, Chennai and lodged a land grabbing complaint
on 09.12.2011 against the family of Defendant No.1. Subsequently, he applied for
patta in his favour on 24.02.2012, and raised objections on 05.03.2012 to
Defendant No. 4 stating that the suit property belonged to the plaintiff and that no
registration concerning the same should be carried out. He has also submitted an
objection petition to Defendant No. 5 requesting that no planning permit be granted
to anybody except the appellant in respect of the suit property. Thereafter, the
appellant instituted the suit on 03.12.2014 seeking a declaration and consequential
reliefs. On the other hand, the respondents / defendants stated in their application
filed under Order VII Rule 11 CPC that the appellant had knowledge of the
execution of the sale deed by his father in favour of Defendant No.1 at the earliest
point of time and hence, the suit instituted by the appellant was barred by
limitation. While the trial Court rejected the said application holding that the issue of
limitation involved a mixed question of law and fact, the High Court in revision, took
a contrary view and allowed the application filed under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC and
rejected the plaint solely on the ground that the suit was barred by limitation.
12.1. However, we are of the considered view that the issue as to whether the
appellant had prior notice or reason to be aware of the transaction at an earlier
point of time, or whether the plea regarding the date of knowledge is credible, are
matters that necessarily require appreciation of evidence. At this preliminary stage,
the averments made in the plaint must be taken at their face value and assumed to
be true. Once the date of knowledge is specifically pleaded and forms the basis of
the cause of action, the issue of limitation cannot be decided summarily. It
becomes a mixed question of law and fact, which cannot be adjudicated at the
threshold stage under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. Therefore, rejection of the plaint
21on the ground of limitation without permitting the parties to lead evidence, is legally
unsustainable.
* * * * * * *
13. In this backdrop, the approach of the High Court in reversing the well-
reasoned order of the trial Court warrants interference. The trial Court had rightly
held that the issue of limitation necessitated adjudication upon
evidence, particularly in view of the appellant’s assertion that the Power of Attorney
executed by him did not confer any authority upon his father to alienate the suit
property and that the impugned transaction came to his knowledge only at a much
later point in time. In such circumstances, the determination of limitation involved
disputed questions of fact that could not be summarily decided without the benefit
of trial. The High Court, however, proceeded to reject the plaint solely on a prima
facie assumption that the suit was barred by limitation, without undertaking any
examination as to whether the plea regarding the date of knowledge was
demonstrably false or inherently improbable in light of the record. In the opinion of
this Court, such an approach amounts to an error of law and constitutes a
misapplication of the well-established principles governing the exercise of power
under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. For the same reasons, the decisions relied upon by
the learned counsel for the respondents are inapplicable, being factually
distinguishable.”
36. In Hanumanthappa (supra), the issue was the applicability of Article 58
of the Limitation Act to the amendment of the plaint. There, it was not disputed
that Article 58 of the Limitation Act would apply, as the amendment sought
was to add the relief of declaration of title to the already existing relief of
permanent injunction. The Hon’ble Apex Court held that the amendment of the
plaint was time-barred in that the right to sue for declaration of title first arose
on 16.05.1990. There was clear denial of the title of the plaintiff in the suit for
declaration and in that very suit the amendment application to add the prayer
of declaration was sought to be added. The amendment application was
beyond the period of limitation from 16.05.1990.
22
37. Hanumanthappa (supra) is not on Order 7 Rule 11 CPC. The question
whether at the stage of Order 7 Rule 11 CPC, the question of the suit being
barred by limitation can be determined and the plaint can be rejected was not
involved. No doubt such a question can be determined at this stage applying
the law as in Hanumanthappa (supra) but, only on the plaint averments. If the
plaint averments show the date when the first cause of action accrued and
from that date the suit is beyond three years limitation it would be liable to be
rejected.
38. Further, in Hanumanthappa (supra), the original written statement
unmistakably indicated that the defendant had not accepted the plaintiff’s title.
Learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance in para No. 29 of
Hanumanthappa (supra) which considered Khatri Hotels (P) Ltd. v. Union
of India, {(2011) 9 SCC 126} which reads as under to contend that in the
present case also there was clear denial of title of the plaintiff in the
defendants’ written statement filed in O.S.No.1492 of 2005:
“29. Applying the law thus laid down by this Court to the facts of this case, two
things become clear. First, in the original written statement itself dated 16th
May, 1990, the defendant had clearly put the plaintiff on notice that it had denied
the plaintiff’s title to the suit property. A reading of an isolated para in the written
statement, namely, para 2 by the trial court on the facts of this case has been
correctly commented upon adversely by the High Court in the judgment under
appeal. The original written statement read as a whole unmistakably
indicates that the defendant had not accepted the plaintiff’s title. Secondly,
while allowing the amendment, the High Court in its earlier judgment dated 28th
March, 2002 had expressly remanded the matter to the trial court, allowing the
defendant to raise the plea of limitation. There can be no doubt that on an
application of Khatri Hotels (p) Ltd. (supra), the right to sue for declaration of
title first arose on the facts of the present case on 16th May, 1990 when
the original written statement clearly denied the plaintiff’s title. By 16th
May, 1993 therefore a suit based on declaration of title would have
become time-barred. It is clear that the doctrine of relation back would not
apply to the facts of this case for the reason that the court which allowed the
amendment expressly allowed it subject to the plea of limitation, indicating
23thereby that there are no special or extraordinary circumstances in the present
case to warrant the doctrine of relation back applying so that a legal right that
had accrued in favour of the defendant should be taken away. This being so, we
find no infirmity in the impugned judgment of the High Court. The present appeal
is accordingly dismissed.”
39. When this Court looks into the averment of the petitioners of denial of
the plaintiff’s title in their written statement of O.S.No.1492 of 2005, from the
copy of the judgment of O.S.No.1492 of 2005, annexed with the plaint (at
page 118), referred by the learned counsel for the petitioner, it cannot be said
that there was a clear denial of plaintiff’s title. What was pointed out by the
learned counsel for the petitioners is as under:
“……….. They pleaded that plaintiff has no right over property since late
panchadarla Appayyamma does not have exclusive right to alienate
the property….”.
Learned counsel also referred to para-12 of the judgment under issue
No.1 and laid emphasis on the following part:
“…………….As said above it is the claim of the defendants that plaintiff’s
vendor’s vendor panchadarla Appayyamma has no exclusive right
over the total property and hence she could not covey title to the
plaintiff’s vendor….”.
Based on the aforesaid he submitted that there was denial of the
plaintiff’s title in the year 2005 when the cause of action accrued firstly to the
plaintiff, so the suit filed in the year 2021 was barred by limitation.
40. Hanumanthappa (supra) was a case of denial of title, in the written
statement. The Hon’ble Apex Court observed that the original written
statement unmistakably indicated that the defendant had not accepted the
24
plaintiff’s title and the original written statement clearly denied the plaintiff’s
title.
41. So, there must be a clear denial of the plaintiff’s title. The question
therefore is whether from the referred part of the judgment in O.S.No.1492 of
2005, is it a case of clear denial of plaintiff’s title by the defendants in their
written statement filed in O.S.No.1492 of 2005, so as to attract the applicability
of law as in Hanumanthappa (supra).
42. This Court is of the view that there is not a clear denial of the plaintiff’s
title in the written statement of O.S.No.1492 of 2005, from the portion referred
by the learned counsel from the judgment of that previous suit. The copy of
the written statement is not on record and the same can also not be seen at
this stage, when only plant is to be considered. The defendants’ case as per
the aforesaid was that, the plaintiffs vendor’s vendor had no exclusive right
over suit schedule property and therefore she could not convey title to the
plaintiff’s vendor. So, at best the defendants’ case was of ‘no exclusive title’,
but not the denial of complete title. ‘No exclusive’ means not the sole owner ;
not to the exclusion of all others, but along with others.
43. In the plaint of O.S.No.230 of 2021 there is a clear statement that
on18.10.2021 the cause of action accrued to file the suit for declaration. The
Court has to see the plaint averments and the material along with the plaint.
The plaint averments are very clear that the cause of action accrued on
18.10.2021 and from that date the suit was filed within three years. The
25
document annexed with the plaint, judgment copy of O.S.No.1492 of 2005
upon which the reliance was placed by the learned counsel does not establish
that the defendants had clearly denied the title of the plaintiff in their written
statement filed in O.S.No.1492 of 2005.
44. This Court is of the view that at this stage of Order 7 Rule 11 CPC,
taking the cause of action accrued as per the plaint averments on 18.10.2021,
the suit having been filed within three years from that date, the learned Trial
Court did not act illegally or without jurisdiction, in rejecting the application of
the petitioners to reject the plaint under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC.
45. Anathula Sudhakar (supra) is on the point as to when a suit for
injunction simpliciter is maintainable and when the declaration is also required.
It is not relevant for the issue involved at this stage.
46. Thus considered, the conclusions are as follows:
i) At the stage of considering the application under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC
only the plaint averments and the material filed along with the plaint are
to be considered.
ii) The written statement of the defendant, any material produced by the
defendant or even the contents of the application under Order 7 Rule 11
CPC are not relevant.
iii) The averments of the plaint, must ex-facie show that the suit is barred
by limitation then the plaint can be rejected under Order 7 Rule 11(d).
26
iv) The limitation for a suit for declaration, under Article 58 of Limitation
Act is three years from the date the cause of action accrues ‘firstly’.
v) If the plaint makes clear averment of only one date of cause of action,
or in case of many dates for accrual of the cause of action, it is the first
date of accrual of the cause of action, from which the limitation would
start to run and if the suit is within three years from such date, the plaint
cannot be rejected at the threshold.
vi) If the defendant disputes the date mentioned in the plaint as the date
of accrual of the cause of action firstly and sets up another date, then the
first question for determination would be what is the date of accrual of
cause of action firstly and depending upon such determination the period
of limitation of three years will have to be computed. This would require
evidence. The question of limitation then would be a mixed question of
fact & law and not a pure question of law. The plaint cannot be rejected
under Order 7 Rule 11(d) CPC in such a case.
vii) In the present case the defendants’ case is that the cause of action
accrued firstly in the year 2005 when in O.S.No.1492 of 2005, written
statement was filed denying the title of the plaintiff. The plaint on the
other hand clearly stated that the cause of action accrued on 18.10.2021
and from that date the suit was not barred by the law of limitation. So,
there was a dispute on the date of accrual of cause of action firstly. The
petitioners placed reliance in the judgment of O.S.No.1492 of 2005, to
27show the plea taken in their written statement in O.S.No.1492 of 2005.
But, that requires evidence to determine, and so based on such a plea of
limitation, plaint cannot be rejected at the threshold.
viii) Even from perusal of the judgment of O.S.No.1492 of 2005 there is
no clear denial of the plaintiff’s title. The denial was that the plaintiff’s
vendor’s vendor was not the ‘exclusive owner’. It is not a clear and
complete denial of title of the plaintiff. What is denied is exclusive
ownership.
ix) On the point of determination; there is no illegality in the order
impugned.
47. Before parting, this Court makes it clear that it has proceeded to decide
the issue considering Article 58 of the Limitation Act for the reason that the
argument was advanced based on Article 58 of Limitation Act and the learned
Trial Court has also decided the controversy considering Article 58 of the
48. However, it is clarified that the present is a suit for declaration of title
and also for the consequential relief of injunction. In N.Thajudeen v. Tamil
Nadu Khadi and Village Industries Board8, the Hon’ble Apex Court held
that in a suit for declaration of title if a further relief is claimed in addition to the
mere declaration, the relief of declaration would only be an ancillary relief and
8
(2024) 19 SCC 121
28
for the purpose of limitation it would be governed by the relief that has been
additionally claimed.
49. Para Nos.26 to 28 in N.Thajudeen (supra) reads as under:
“26. In the case at hand, the suit is not simply for the declaration of title rather it is
for a further relief for recovery of possession. It is to be noted that when in a suit for
declaration of title, a further relief is claimed in addition to mere declaration, the
relief of declaration would only be an ancillary one and for the purposes of
limitation, it would be governed by the relief that has been additionally claimed. The
further relief claimed in the suit is for recovery of possession based upon title and
as such its limitation would be 12 years in terms of Article 65 of the the Schedule
to the Limitation Act.
27. In C.Mohammad Yunus v. Unnissa {1961 SCC OnLine SC 135} it has been
laid down that in a suit for declaration with a further relief, the limitation would be
governed by the Article governing the suit for such further relief. In fact, a suit for a
declaration of title to immovable property would not be barred so long as the right
to such a property continues and AIR 1961 SC 808 subsists. When such right
continues to subsist, the relief for declaration would be a continuing right and there
would be no limitation for such a suit. The principle is that the suit for a declaration
for a right cannot be held to be barred so long as Right to Property subsist.
28. Even otherwise, though the limitation for filing a suit for declaration of title is
three years as per Article 58 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act but for recovery
of possession based upon title, the limitation is 12 years from the date the
possession of the defendant becomes adverse in terms of Article 65 of the
Schedule to the Limitation Act. Therefore, suit for the relief of possession was not
actually barred and as such the court of first instance could not have dismissed the
entire suit as barred by time.”
50. So, this Court makes it clear that, if the limitation of the suit is governed
by Article 58 or some other Article that would be an open question for
determination in accordance with law in the suit, if such a question is raised or
arises before the learned Trial Court.
51. The Civil Revision Petition is devoid of merits and is dismissed at the
admission stage.
No order as to costs.
29
As a sequel thereto, miscellaneous petitions, if any pending, shall also
stand closed.
_____________________
RAVI NATH TILHARI,J
Dated: 27.02.2026
Note: LR copy be marked
B/o.
AG
30
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE RAVI NATH TILHARI
CIVIL REVISION PETITION NO: 331/2026
Dated: 27.02.2026
Note: LR copy be marked
B/o.
AG