Karnataka High Court
Mareppa vs The State Of Karnataka on 11 February, 2026
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA
KALABURAGI BENCH
DATED THIS THE 11TH DAY OF FEBRUARY, 2026
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH RAI K
CRIMINAL PETITION NO. 201824 OF 2025
(482(Cr.PC)/528(BNSS))
BETWEEN:
MAREPPA S/O CHANDRASHYA DANDIN
AGE: 35 YEARS,
OCC: PRIVATE WORK,
R/O KALAGURTHI, TQ. KALAGI
KALABURAGI - 585312
...PETITIONER
(BY MS. NILUFARHANAZ, ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
THROUGH MADBOOL POLICE STATION,
Digitally signed by KALAGI CIRCLE, KALAGI
SHIVALEELA
DATTATRAYA DIST. KALABURAGI-585317
UDAGI
REPRESENTED BY ADDL. SPP
Location: HIGH
COURT OF HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA
KARNATAKA
KALABURAGI-585103
2. SMT MANDAKINI W/O NARASAPPA DANDINKAR
AGE: 30 YEARS, OCC: LABOUR,
R/O PALA VILLAGE,
AP KORAWAR VILLAGE,
TQ KALAGI, DIST: KALABURAGI-585107
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI GOPAL KRISHNA B YADAV, HCGP FOR R1;
R2 SERVED)
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THIS CRIMINAL PETITION IS FILED U/S.482 OF CR.P.C.
(OLD), U/SEC. 528 OF BNSS (NEW), PRAYING TO ALLOW THIS
PETITION AND TO QUASH THE FIR, COMPLAINT, CHARGE
SHEET AND FURTHER PROCEEDINGS IN C.C.NO.904/2025
(ARISING OUT OF CRIME NO.74/2025 FROM THE MADBOOL
POLICE STATION, KALAGI CIRCLE) ON THE FILE OF CIVIL
JUDGE AND JMFC AT CHITTAPUR KALABURAGI FOR ALLEGED
OFFENCES PUNISHABLE UNDER SECTIONS 64(2)(M), 332(B),
351(2)(3) OF BNS-2023, THE CERTIFIED COPY OF THE FIR,
COMPLAINT AND CHARGE SHEET ARE AT ANNEXURE-B, A AND
C RESPECTIVELY AND TO PASS ANY OTHER APPROPRIATE
ORDERS.
THIS PETITION, COMING ON FOR ADMISSION, THIS DAY,
ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER:
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH RAI K
ORAL ORDER
This petition is filed under Section 528 of Bharatiya
Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 seeking to quash
proceedings against the petitioner/accused No.1 in C.C.
No.904/2025, arising out of Crime No.74/2025, registered
by Madbool Police Station, for the offences punishable
under Sections 64(2)(M), 332(B), 351(2)(3) of Bharatiya
Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 [for brevity, ‘the BNS, 2023’], ,
pending on the file Civil Judge and JMFC, Chittapur,
2. The abridged facts of the case are that,
respondent No.2 lodged the complaint before respondent
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No.1 – Police alleging that she is residing along with her
husband and two children at Pala village and doing coolie
work. The petitioner got acquainted to respondent No.2 in
the year 2018. After exchange of the mobile numbers, he
used to call her through mobile and expressed his love
towards her. Thereafter, he started visiting her house and
they both were sexually active from the year 2018 till
2025. Thereafter, the petitioner got engaged with some
other girl and the said aspect was came to the knowledge
of respondent No.2. As such, she insisted him not to
continue the relationship with her. Despite that, on
16.06.2025 petitioner met her and had sexual intercourse
with her.
3. Things stood thus, on 12.07.2025 at about 8.00
p.m. when respondent No.2 was in her house along with
her husband, the petitioner along with his brother been to
her house and scolded her. She lodged the complaint
before respondent No.1 – Police against the petitioner that
he had committed forcible sexual intercourse with her by
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promising to marry her. On the strength of the said
complaint, respondent No.1 – Police registered the case
against the petitioner and others in Crime No.74/2025 for
the aforementioned offences. Subsequently, respondent
No.1 – Police investigated the matter and laid charge
sheet against the petitioner and others for the said
offences and the learned Magistrate took cognizance of the
offences. Aggrieved by the same, the petitioner/accused
No.1 preferred this petition to quash the proceedings.
4. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and
learned High Court Government Pleader for respondent
No.1 – State. Though notice is served to respondent No.2,
she remained absent.
5. The primary contention of the learned counsel
for the petitioner is that on perusal of the entire complaint
and charge sheet materials, it is categorically forthcoming
that respondent No.2 being a married woman having two
children, had consensual sexual act with the petitioner.
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According to her, from the year 2018 till 2025 they both
were sexually active and this complaint is lodged against
the petitioner only for the reason that he had performed
his engagement with another girl. In such circumstance,
the offences charge sheeted against the petitioner do not
attract against him.
6. Per contra, learned High Court Government
Pleader appearing for respondent No.1-State opposed the
petition on the ground that now charge sheet has been
laid against the petitioner and there are prima facie
materials forthcoming against him, the proceedings cannot
be quashed. Hence, prays to dismiss the petition.
7. I have given my anxious consideration both on
the submissions made by the learned counsel for the
respective parties and the documents made available on
record.
8. As could be gathered from the complaint
averments, respondent No.2 is aged about 35 years and
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she is a married woman having two children. In the year
2018, she came in contact with the petitioner through
phone and they became intimate friends. She used to visit
the house of petitioner and in turn he also used to visit her
house. They both were sexually active for a period of
seven years. According to her, after his engagement with
another girl, she advised him not to continue the
relationship with her. Despite he continued the
relationship. The complaint averments further discloses
that this complaint is lodged by her for the reason that he
had committed forcible sexual intercourse with her on the
promise to marry her. Even the medical history produced
in the charge sheet clearly depicts that this complaint was
filed after the petitioner’s engagement with another girl.
9. In such circumstance, the Hon’ble Apex Court in
the case of Deepak Gulati vs. State of Haryana
reported in 2013 Crl. Law Journal 2990, held in para
Nos.18 and 21 as under:
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“18. Consent may be express or implied,
coerced or misguided, obtained willingly or through
deceit. Consent is an act of reason, accompanied by
deliberation, the mind weighing, as in a balance,
the good and evil on each side. There is a clear
distinction between rape and consensual sex and in
a case like this, the court must very carefully
examine whether the accused had actually wanted
to marry the victim, or had mala fide motives, and
had made a false promise to this effect only to
satisfy his lust, as the latter falls within the ambit of
cheating or deception. There is a distinction
between the mere breach of a promise, and not
fulfilling a false promise. Thus, the court must
examine whether there was made, at an early
stage a false promise of marriage by the accused;
and whether the consent involved was given after
wholly, understanding the nature and consequences
of sexual indulgence. There may be a case where
the prosecutrix agrees to have sexual intercourse
on account of her love and passion for the accused,
and not solely on account of mis-representation
made to her by the accused, or where an accused
on account of circumstances which he could not
have foreseen, or which were beyond his control,
was unable to marry her, despite having every
intention to do so. Such cases must be treated
differently. An accused can be convicted for rape
only if the court reaches a conclusion that the
intention of the accused was mala fide, and that he
had clandestine motives.
21. Hence, it is evident that there must be
adequate evidence to show that at the relevant
time, i.e. at initial stage itself, the accused had no
intention whatsoever, of keeping his promise to
marry the victim. There may, of course, be
circumstances, when a person having the best of
intentions is unable to marry the victim owing to
various unavoidable circumstances. The “failure to
keep a promise made with respect to a future
uncertain date, due to reasons that are not very
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clear from the evidence available, does not always
amount to misconception of fact. In order to come
within the meaning of the term misconception of
fact, the fact must have an immediate relevance.”
Section 90 IPC cannot be called into aid in such a
situation, to pardon the act of a girl in entirety, and
fasten criminal liability on the other, unless the
court is assured of the fact that from the very
beginning, the accused had never really intended to
marry her.”
10. Further, the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of
Rajneesh Singh v. State of U.P. reported in 2025 (4)
SCC 197 held that, when a women who willingly engages
in a long term sexual relationship with a man, fully aware
of its nature and without any cogent evidence to show that
such relationship was induced by misconception of facts or
false promise of marriage made in bad faith from the
inception, the man cannot be held guilty of rape under
Section 376 of IPC. Thus, it is clear that accused can be
convicted for rape only if the Court reaches a conclusion
that the intention of the accused was malafide, and that
he had clandestine motives.
11. Further, the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of
Pramod Suryabhan Pawar vs. State of Maharashtra
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and Another in Crl.A.No.1165/2019 arising out of Special
Leave Petition (Criminal) No.2712 of 2019, held in para
Nos.16, 17 and 18 as under:
“16. Where the promise to marry is false and
the intention of the maker at the time of making
the promise itself was not to abide by it but to
deceive the woman to convince her to engage in
sexual relations, there is a “misconception of fact”
that vitiates the woman’s “consent”. On the other
hand, a breach of a promise cannot be said to be a
false promise. To establish a false promise, the
maker of the promise should have had no intention
of upholding his word at the time of giving it. The
“consent” of a woman under Section 375 is vitiated
on the ground of a “misconception of fact” where
such misconception was the basis for her choosing
to engage in the said act. In Deepak Gulati this
Court observed:
“21. … There is a distinction between the
mere breach of a promise, and not fulfilling a false
promise. Thus, the court must examine whether
there was made, at an early stage a false promise
of marriage by the accused; and whether the
consent involved was given after wholly
understanding the nature and consequences of
sexual indulgence. There may be a case where the
prosecutrix agrees to have sexual intercourse on
account of her love and passion for the accused,
and not solely on account of misrepresentation
made to her by the accused, or where an accused
on account of circumstances which he could not
have foreseen, or which were beyond his control,
was unable to marry her, despite having every
intention to do so. Such cases must be treated
differently.
…
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24. Hence, it is evident that there must be
adequate evidence to show that at the relevant
time i.e. at the initial stage itself, the accused had
no intention whatsoever, of keeping his promise to
marry the victim. There may, of course, be
circumstances, when a person having the best of
intentions is unable to marry the victim owing to
various unavoidable circumstances. The “failure to
keep a promise made with respect to a future
uncertain date, due to reasons that are not very
clear from the evidence available, does not always
amount to misconception of fact. In order to come
within the meaning of the term “misconception of
fact”, the fact must have an immediate relevance”.
Section 90 IPC cannot be called into aid in such a
situation, to pardon the act of a girl in entirety, and
fasten criminal liability on the other, unless the
court is assured of the fact that from the very
beginning, the accused had never really intended to
marry her.”
(Emphasis supplied)
17. In Uday v State of Karnataka12 the
complainant was a college going student when the
accused promised to marry her. In the
complainant’s statement, she admitted that she
was aware that there would be significant
opposition from both the complainant’s and
accused’s families to the proposed marriage. She
engaged in sexual intercourse with the accused but
nonetheless kept the relationship secret from her
family. The court observed that in these
circumstances the accused’s promise to marry the
complainant was not of immediate relevance to the
complainant’s decision to engage in sexual
intercourse with the accused, which was motivated
by other factors:
“25. There is yet another difficulty which
faces the prosecution in this case. In a case of this
nature two conditions must be fulfilled for the
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application of Section 90 IPC. Firstly, it must be
shown that the consent was given under a
misconception of fact. Secondly, it must be proved
that the person who obtained the consent knew, or
had reason to believe that the consent was given in
consequence of such misconception. We have
serious doubts that the promise to marry induced
the prosecutrix to consent to having sexual
intercourse with the appellant. She knew, as we
have observed earlier, that her marriage with the
appellant was difficult on account of caste
considerations. The proposal was bound to meet
with stiff opposition from members of both families.
There was therefore a distinct possibility, of which
she was clearly conscious, that the marriage may
not take place at all despite the promise of the
appellant. The question still remains whether even
if it were so, the appellant knew, or had reason to
believe, that the prosecutrix had consented to
having sexual intercourse with him only as a
consequence of her belief, based on his promise,
that they will get married in due course. There is
hardly any evidence to prove this fact. On the
contrary, the circumstances of the case tend to
support the conclusion that the appellant had
reason to believe that the consent given by the
prosecutrix was the result of their deep love for
each other. It is not disputed that they were deeply
in love. They met often, and it does appear that the
prosecutrix permitted him liberties which, if at all,
are permitted only to a person with whom one is in
deep love. It is also not without significance that
the prosecutrix stealthily went out with the
appellant to a lonely place at 12 o’clock in the
night. It usually happens in such cases, when two
young persons are madly in love, that they promise
to each other several times that come what may,
they will get married…”
(Emphasis supplied)
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18. To summarise the legal position that
emerges from the above cases, the “consent” of a
woman with respect to Section 375 must involve an
active and reasoned deliberation towards the
proposed act. To establish whether the “consent”
was vitiated by a “misconception of fact” arising
out of a promise to marry, two propositions must
be established. The promise of marriage must
have been a false promise, given in bad faith and
with no intention of being adhered to at the time it
was given. The false promise itself must be of
immediate relevance, or bear a direct nexus to the
woman’s decision to engage in the sexual act.
12. Hence, on overall perusal of the entire charge
sheet materials, the same depicts that since the
relationship between the petitioner and respondent No.2 is
a consensual one and she was major at that time and the
said consent was not obtained by the petitioner with a
coercion or wanton undue influence, in such circumstance,
the offence punishable under Sections 376 or 417 does not
attract as held by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of
Shiva Prathap Singh Rana V/s State of Madhya
Pradesh and Another reported in (2024) 8 SCC 313 in
paragraphs No.26 to 33 as under:
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“26. We have carefully gone through the
definition of “rape” provided under Section
375IPC. We have also gone through the
provisions of Section 376(2)(n)IPC, which deals
with the offence of rape committed repeatedly on
the same woman. Section 375 IPC defines “rape”
by a man if he does any of the acts in terms of
clauses (a) to (d) under the seven descriptions
mentioned therein. As per the second description,
a man commits rape if he does any of the acts as
mentioned in clauses (a) to (d) without the
consent of the woman. Consent has been defined
in Explanation 2 to mean an unequivocal
voluntary agreement when the woman by words,
gestures or any form of verbal or nonverbal
communication, communicates willingness to
participate in the specific sexual act. However,
the proviso thereto clarifies that a woman who
does not physically resist to the act of
penetration shall not by the reason only of that
fact, be regarded as consenting to the sexual
activity.
27. Having regard to the above and in the
overall conspectus of the case, we are of the view
that the physical relationship between the
prosecutrix and the appellant cannot be said to
be against her will and without her consent. On
the basis of the available materials, no case of
rape or of criminal intimidation is made out.
28. The learned counsel for the respondents
had placed considerable reliance on the
provisions of Section 90IPC, particularly on the
expression “under a misconception of fact”.
Section 90IPC reads thus:
“90. Consent known to be given
under fear or misconception.–A
consent is not such a consent as it
intended by any section of this Code,
if the consent is given by a person
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under fear of injury, or under a
misconception of fact, and if the
person doing the act knows, or has
reason to believe, that the consent
was given in consequence of such
fear or misconception; or Consent of
insane person.–if the consent is
given by a person who, from
unsoundness of mind, or intoxication,
is unable to understand the nature
and consequence of that to which he
gives his consent; or Consent of
child.–unless the contrary appears
from the context, if the consent is
given by a person who is under
twelve years of age.”
29. Section 90 IPC says that a consent is not
such a consent as it is intended by any section of
IPC, if the consent is given by a person under the
fear of injury or under a misconception of fact.
30. In Dhruvaram Murlidhar Sonar v. State
of Maharashtra [Dhruvaram Murlidhar Sonar v.
State of Maharashtra, (2019) 18 SCC 191 :
(2020) 3 SCC (Cri) 672] , this Court after
examining Section 90IPC held as follows : (SCC
p. 198, para 17) “17. Thus, Section 90 though
does not define “consent”, but describes what is
not “consent”. Consent may be express or
implied, coerced or misguided, obtained willingly
or through deceit. If the consent is given by the
complainant under misconception of fact, it is
vitiated. Consent for the purpose of Section 375
requires voluntary participation not only after the
exercise of intelligence based on the knowledge
of the significance and moral quality of the act,
but also after having fully exercised the choice
between resistance and assent. Whether there
was any consent or not is to be ascertained only
on a careful study of all relevant circumstances.”
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31. This Court also examined the interplay
between Section 375IPC and Section 90IPC in the
context of consent in Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v.
State of Maharashtra [Pramod Suryabhan Pawar
v. State of Maharashtra, (2019) 9 SCC 608 :
(2019) 3 SCC (Cri) 903] , and held that consent
with respect to Section 375IPC involves an active
understanding of the circumstances, actions and
consequences of the proposed act. An individual
who makes a reasoned choice to act after
evaluating various alternative actions (or
inaction) as well as the various possible
consequences flowing from such action (or
inaction), consents to such action. After
deliberating upon the various case laws, this
Court summed up the legal position as under :
(SCC p. 620, para 18)
“18. To summarise the legal
position that emerges from the
above cases, the “consent” of a
woman with respect to Section 375
must involve an active and
reasoned deliberation towards the
proposed act. To establish whether
the “consent” was vitiated by a
“misconception of fact” arising out
of a promise to marry, two
propositions must be established.
The promise of marriage must have
been a false promise, given in bad
faith and with no intention of being
adhered to at the time it was given.
The false promise itself must be of
immediate relevance, or bear a
direct nexus to the woman’s
decision to engage in the sexual
act.”
32. The learned counsel for the respondents
had relied heavily on the expression
“misconception of fact”. However, according to
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us, there is no misconception of fact here. Right
from the inception, it is the case of the
prosecution that while the appellant was insisting
on having a relationship with the prosecutrix, the
later had turned down the same on the ground
that the appellant was the friend of her younger
brother and a distant relative of her jijaji. That
apart, according to the prosecutrix, the appellant
was younger to her. Nonetheless, the prosecutrix
had accompanied the appellant to a temple,
where she had voluntarily taken bath under a
waterfall. Her allegation that the appellant had
surreptitiously taken photographs of her while
she was bathing and later on changing clothes
and was blackmailing her with such photographs
remain unfounded in the absence of seizure of
such photographs or the mobile phone on which
such photographs were taken by the appellant.
If, indeed, she was under some kind of threat
from the appellant, it defies any logic, when the
prosecutrix accompanied the appellant to Gwalior
from Dabra, a journey which they had made
together by train. On reaching Gwalior, she
accompanied the appellant on a scooter to a
rented premises at Anupam Nagar, where she
alleged that the appellant had forced himself
upon her. But she did not raise any alarm or hue
and cry at any point of time. Rather, she
returned back to Dabra along with the appellant.
The relationship did not terminate there. It
continued even thereafter. It is the case of the
prosecutrix herself that at one point of time the
family members of the two had met to discuss
about their marriage but nothing final could be
reached regarding their marriage. It was only
thereafter that the FIR was lodged.
33. As already pointed out above, neither
the affidavit nor stamp papers have been
recovered or seized by the police; so also the
jewellery. The alleged cheque of the prosecutrix’s
mother given to the appellant or the bank
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statement to indicate transfer of such money
have not been gathered by the police. In the
absence of such materials, the entire substratum
of the prosecutrix’s case collapses. Thus, there is
hardly any possibility of conviction of the
appellant. As a matter of fact, it is not even a
case which can stand trial. It appears to be a
case of a consensual relationship which had gone
sour leading to lodging of FIR. In the
circumstances, the Court is of the view that
compelling the appellant to face the criminal trial
on these materials would be nothing but an
abuse of the process of the court, result of the
trial being a foregone conclusion.”
13. Hence, in my considered view, continuation of
the proceedings against the petitioner is nothing but abuse
of process of Court. Accordingly, I proceed to pass the
following:
ORDER
i. The petition is allowed.
ii. The proceedings against the petitioner/
accused No.1 in C.C. No.904/2025
(arising out of Crime No.74/2025 of
Madbool Police Station), pending on the
file Civil Judge and JMFC, Chittapur, for
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the offences punishable under Sections
64(2)(M), 332(B), 351(2)(3) of BNS,
2023 is hereby quashed.
Sd/-
(RAJESH RAI K)
JUDGESWK
List No.: 1 Sl No.: 14
CT-BH
