Jharkhand High Court
Mangra Champia vs The State Of Jharkhand on 12 February, 2026
Author: Sujit Narayan Prasad
Bench: Sujit Narayan Prasad
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
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Cr. Appeal (D.B) No. 1533 of 2017
with
Cr. Appeal (D.B) No. 1203 of 2017
(Against the judgement of conviction dated 10.04.2017 and the order of
sentence dated 12.04.2017 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, West
Singhbhum at Chaibasa in Sessions Trial No. 08 of 2015)
Mangra Champia, son of late Jongo Champia, resident of Village-
Hakagui, P.O & P.S.-Manoharpur, Chaibasa, District- West Singhbhum,
State-Jharkhand.
..... ... Appellant
[In Cr. Appeal (D.B) No. 1533 of 2017]
1. Lala Champia, S/o Pator Champia
2. Soma Champia, S/o Late Rendo Champiya
Both are R/o Village- Hakagui, P.S.-Manoharpur, District- Singhbhum
West. ..... ....... Appellants
[In Cr. Appeal (D.B) No. 1203 of 2017]
Versus
The State of Jharkhand ... ... Respondent
(in both the cases)
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CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ARUN KUMAR RAI
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For the Appellants : Mr. Chandrajit Mukherjee, Advocate
[in Cr. App (DB) No.1533 of 2017]
Mr. Sunil Singh, Advocate
[in Cr. App (DB) No.1203 of 2017]
For the State : Mr. Saket Kumar, APP
[in both the cases]
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C.A.V On 03.02.2026 Pronounced on 12/02/2026
Per Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.
1. Since both the appeals arise out of the common judgment of conviction
dated 10.04.2017 and the order of sentence dated 12.04.2017 passed by
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the learned Sessions Judge, West Singhbhum at Chaibasa in Sessions Trial
No. 08 of 2015, as such they have been tagged together and taken up
together for analogous hearing and are being disposed of by this common
order.
2. These appeals under section 374(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973 are directed against the judgment of conviction dated 10.04.2017 and
the order of sentence dated 12.04.2017 passed by the learned Sessions
Judge, West Singhbhum at Chaibasa in Sessions Trial No. 08 of 2015
whereby and whereunder the appellants, above-named, have been
convicted under sections 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced
to undergo RI for life under section 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code with
a fine of Rs.10,000/- each and in default to pay fine amount, they were
directed to go further RI for one year for each convicts.
3. The prosecution story, in brief, as per the fardbayan of Besangi Champia
(since dead) recorded by S.I. Surendra Ravidas officer-in-charge
Manoharpur Police Station on 12.03.2014 at about 12:30 hours at Tumsai,
Handiburu forest, wherein it is stated that on 11.03.2014 at about
09:00 A.M. informant’s son Laxman Champia (deceased) was taken by
one co-villager Mangra Champia (appellant herein) for digging
foundation of his house at Tumsai Handiburu forest. When the informant’s
son didn’t return to home in the night, then the informant started searching
her son hither and thither.
4. On 12.03.2014 at about 07:00 A.M., Mangra Champia himself came to
the house of the informant and told that Laxman Champia has been
murdered by Soma Champia (appellant) and his son Rendo Champia by
assaulting the deceased with stones.
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5. Then, informant informed to police about the occurrence and went to
Tumsai Handiburu forest along with officer-in-charge of Manoharpur P.S
and saw the dead body of her son Laxman Champia, who had sustained
crush injury on his head and face with stones and blood was oozing out
from his face and his face was crushed. Blood-stained stone was also lying
near the dead body. Informant alleged that the incident took place on
11.03.2014 at about 04:00 P.M. Informant claimed that her son was called
upon by accused Mangra Champia for laying foundation of his house at
Tumsai, Handiburu forest, where in association with Soma Champia and
Rendo Champia killed him by assaulting on head and face with stones.
6. On the basis of the fardbayan of the informant, Manoharpur P.S. Case No.
18 of 2014 dated 12.03.2014 was registered under sections 302/34 of the
IPC. After investigation, the police submitted the charge sheet against the
appellants for the offences under sections 302/34 IPC and cognizance of
the offence was taken and the case was committed to the Court of Sessions.
7. Charge was framed under section 302/34 of IPC against the appellants
and trial commenced and at the conclusion of trial appellants were
convicted and sentenced as aforesaid.
8. The aforesaid order of conviction and sentence is under challenge in these
appeals.
Submission of the learned counsel for the appellants:
9. Learned counsel appearing for the appellants have taken the following
grounds for interfering with the finding recorded by the learned trial Court
in the impugned judgment:
(i) The prosecution has miserably failed to establish the charge
said to be proved beyond all reasonable doubt.
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(ii) The further ground has been taken that the conviction is under
sections 302 /34 of the Indian Penal Code but no any evidence in
order to substantiate the common intention among the appellants
to the deceased has been laid by the prosecution, as such, there
cannot be any conviction against the appellants, in absence of any
specific overt act said to be committed by these appellants even if
the entire prosecution version will be taken into consideration in
entirety.
(iii) It has been stated that the learned trial Court has convicted the
appellants for the offence under section 302/34 of the Indian Penal
Code without considering the fact that there was no eye witness to
the occurrence and only on the basis of information given by co-
villager, namely, Mangra Champia (the appellant herein) to the
informant, these appellants have been falsely implicated by the
informant and as such, it falsifies the statement of the informant
about assault and murder of the deceased, hence, the conviction
under sections 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code is not sustainable.
(iv) It has been contended that the appellants are alleged to have
been convicted on the basis of the statement of the informant who
was not the eye witness.
(v) It has been contended that the informant of the case has not
been examined in this case as she died during pendency of the trial.
(vi) It has been contended that that the deposition of the witnesses
on the point of occurrence is doubtful for the reasons that none of
the witnesses had seen the occurrence and they are only the
hearsay witness and most of them have denied that they were
present at the place of occurrence or they had gone to the place of
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occurrence and, as such, the story being concocted with a purpose
to falsely implicate the appellants cannot be ruled out.
(vii) It has been contended that seizure list witnesses P.W.-4,
P.W.-5 and P.W.-9 to the recovery of blood-soaked earth and
blood stained shirts have either turned hostile or did not support
the prosecution case.
10. The learned counsel for the appellants, based upon the aforesaid grounds,
have submitted that the judgment of conviction passed by the learned trial
Court convicting the appellants under sections 302/34 of the Indian Penal
Code, therefore, is not sustainable and fit to be set aside.
Submission of the learned counsel for the State:
11.On the contrary, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing for
the State has defended the impugned judgment of conviction and order of
sentence by taking the following grounds:
(i) The conviction under section 302/34 of the Indian Penal
Code against these appellants does not suffer from an error, since,
ample evidence has been produced by the prosecution.
(ii) Informant herself has not been examined in the present
case as she died during the trial but PW2 have supported the
prosecution story and, therefore, appellants have been rightly
convicted under section 302 /34 of the Indian Penal Code, as such,
the impugned judgment does not require any interference.
(iii) The argument has been advanced that the ample material
has been produced by the prosecuting agency who established the
case under sections 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code so far as the
appellants are concerned since the fact has come in course of
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the deceased on the pretext of digging foundation of house at
Tumsai Handiburu forest and later on he was found dead.
(iv) The argument has also been advanced that PW2 has
supported the prosecution version supported by the medical
evidence.
12.The learned State counsel, based upon the aforesaid premise, has
submitted that the impugned judgment so far as these appellants are
concerned, does not suffer from any error and does not require any
interference under section 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code, hence, these
criminal appeals are fit to be dismissed.
Analysis
13.We have heard learned counsel for the parties, perused the documents
available on record as also the finding recorded by the trial Court in the
impugned judgment.
14. We have also gone through the testimonies of the witnesses as available
in the Trial Court Records as also the exhibits appended therewith.
15. Learned trial Court, based upon the testimonies of witnesses, has passed
the judgment of conviction and has convicted the appellants under
Sections 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced them to undergo
RI for life under section 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code with a fine of
Rs.10,000/- each and in default of payment of fine they are directed to
undergo RI of one year to each convict.
16.This Court, before considering the argument advanced on behalf of the
parties, is now proceeding to consider the testimonies of witnesses which
have been recorded by the learned trial Court.
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17. It is evident from the record that in order to substantiate the case, the
prosecution has altogether examined eleven witnesses out of whom P.W.-
1 Manohar Champia, P.W.-3 Sukhlal Champia, P.W.-7 Saluka Champia,
P.W.-8 Ladura Manki and P.W.-9 Maheshwar Melgandi, (seizure list
witness) had been declared hostile by the prosecution.
18.Remanning other witnesses are P.W.-2 Kedar Champia, who is the step-
son of the informant and step-brother of the deceased; P.W.-4 Sikur
Champia and P.W.-5 Lodro Champia; are seizure list witness, P.W.-6 Dr.
Prince Pingua had conducted Postmortem examination on the dead body
of the deceased; P.W.-10 S.I. Umesh Prasad, who is investigating officer
of the case and P.W.-11 Surendra Ravidas was the then officer-in-charge
of Manoharpur police station.
19. Apart from oral testimony of witnesses, following documentary evidences
have also been produced which have been marked as exhibits:
(i) Ext-1 – Signature of Sikur Champia (PW-4) on fardbeyan.
(ii) Ext-1/1 – Fardbeyan.
(iii) Ext-1/2 – Endorsement on fardbeyan for registration of case.
(iv) Ext-1/3 – Signature of PW-11 S. Ravidas on fardbeyan.
(v) Ext-2 – Signature of Sikur Champia (PW-4) on memo of arrest of
accused Mangra Champia.
(vi) Ext-3 – Signature of Sikur Champia (PW-4) on seizure list.
(vii) Ext-3/1 – Seizure list of blood-stained soil and blood-stained stones.
(viii) Ext-3/2 – Signature of PW-11 Surendra Ravidas on seizure list.
(ix) Ext-4 – Signature of Sikur Champia (PW-4) on seizure list.
(x) Ext.4/1 – Signature of Maheshwar Melgandi (PW-9) on seizure list.
(xi) Ext.4/2 – Seizure list of two blood-stained T-Shirts.
(xii) Ext.-4/3 – Signature of PW-11 Surendra Ravidas on seizure list.
(xiii) Ext.5 – P.M. Report of deceased Laxman Champia.
(xiv) Ext.6 – Inquest report (carbon copy).
(xv) Ext.6/1 – Signature of PW-11 Surendra Ravidas on inquest report.
(xvi) Ext.7 – S.F.S.L. Report No.461/14 dated 12.02.15.
(xvii) Ext.7/1 – S.F.S.L. Report No.461/14 dated 30.04.14.
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20. P.W2- Kedar Champia is the step brother of the deceased. He had
deposed in his evidence that deceased Laxman Champia was killed two
years ago in Chereburu forest, where Mangra (appellant) was constructing
his house. Laxman Champia had gone for digging foundation for
Mangra’s house, where he was killed. This witness further stated that his
house is 2 K.M., away from Laxman’s house and he had no information
about the incident and the informant Besangi (since dead) had told him
that Soma Champia, Rendo Champia and Lala Champia had killed
Laxman Champia. Besangi had also told that one day prior to the incident
accused Mangra Champia had taken Laxman for digging foundation, but,
when Laxman did not return to home then Besangi had searched her son.
P.W.-2 further stated that he had not seen dead body of
Laxman(deceased).
21. In his cross-examination, P.W.-2 stated that he had not seen the house
under construction of Mangra. He cannot say who had accompanied
Laxaman for digging the foundation of Mangra’s house. There was old
land dispute continuing between Mangra Champia and Besangi.
22.P.W.4-Sikur Champia had put his signature on the fardbeyan of the
informant which has been marked as Ext.-1. He had also put his signature
on the arrest memo of Mangra Champia and put his signature on the
seizure memo of blood stained stone and blood-soaked earth which has
been marked as Ext.-2 and Ext.-3 respectively. P.W.-4 had further stated
that after arrest of Mangra, the dead body of Laxman was found from the
Handiburu forest. After the arrest of Mangra Champia, police had called
him at the house of Soma Champia and police had prepared seizure list
(two blood stained shirt), on which he had signed and his signature on it
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was marked as Ext.-4. At para-7 he had stated that Besangi Champia (the
informant) had told him that Laxman Champia was murdered.
23.P.W-4 in his cross-examination stated that he did not go to Handiburu
forest and the place where the foundation was being dug. At paragraph-
11, P. W.-4 stated that neither police had seized blood-soaked earth and
blood stained stone nor seizure list of it was prepared in his presence and
police had called him at the police station where officer-in-charge had
taken his signature. Further, at paragraph-13, P.W-4 stated that in his
presence, police did not recover any article from the house of accused
Soma Champia. At para-14 he has stated that he had put his signature on
all the papers at the police station and police had neither shown him any
seized articles at police station nor he had read over to him what was
written on all these papers. At para-15, he has stated that when Mangra
Champia and Soma Champia were arrested, he was not present at that
time. At para-16 he stated that he did not go to police station along with
Besangi Champia (informant) and on the next day, the police had called
him at police station and he had put his signature on the fardbeyan. At
para-18 he has stated that daroga jee didn’t read over to him, what was
written in the fardbeyan and he had signed on the fardbeyan as daroga jee
had instructed him.
24. P.W5-Lodro Champia has stated in his evidence that blood-soaked earth
and blood stained stones were seized from Tumsai forest and he had put
his thumb impression over the seizure memo prepared by the police.
25.In his cross -examination, he has stated that he had not seen anyone killing
Laxman Champia. Mangra Champia, Soma Champia and Lala Champia
were not arrested in his presence. At para-5, he has stated that the police
did not seize blood-soaked earth and blood stained stone in his presence
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and at paragraph-6, he has stated that daroga jee had called him at police
station and instructed him to put his thumb impression on a paper.
26. P.W6- Dr. Prince Pingua, is the doctor who had conducted postmortem
over the dead body of Laxman Champia on 13.03.2014 and found the
following injuries:
External Findings:
(i) Rigor Mortis present in Lower Limbs only (Receding Stage).
(ii) Lacerated wound in left fronto-parietal region of Skull 6″ x
½” x deep to cranial cavity approximately in size with
crushed wound in face, blood & blood clot present in wound
bed.
(iii) Abrasion in both left and right knee.
(iv) Abrasion in both left and right wrist.
Internal Findings:
Head & Neck:
Head-
(i) Facture of left side frontal and fracture of parietal bone of same
side with laceration of brain matter, blood and blood clot present in
cranial cavity.
(ii) Fracture of Left maxillary bone and injury of neck muscles and
vessels, food pipe, wind pipe. Fracture of thyroid bone.
Thorax: Blood and blood clot present below the subcutaneous
tissue of front of the chest. Multiple fracture of Ribs of the both side
of chest, Lacerated both lungs with chest cavity present blood &
blood clot.
Heart- Left Chamber empty and right chamber scanty blood present.
Abdomen: Stomach empty, other visceral organs -Liver, spleen,
kidney, look pale and intact.
Time Since death-24 to 40 hours.
Cause of death-Above mentioned Head injury and hemorrhage is sufficient
to cause she death caused by hard and blunt substances.
In his cross-examination, the doctor stated that due to hard and
blunt substances the death was caused and the death of the time of the
deceased was early morning.
27. Although P.W.-9 Maheshwari Malegandi, has been declared hostile by
the prosecution but since he is the seizure list witness to the recovery of
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two shirts from the house of accused Soma Champia, therefore his
evidence is crucial for appreciation of the evidences. He has identified
his signature on the seizure list which was marked as Ext.-4/1. He has
deposed that daroga jee had called him at the police station and had taken
his signature.
28. In his cross-examination, he had stated that he did not tell before the
police that on 12.03.2014, officer-in -charge had recovered one blood
stained full check shirt white in colour and one blood stained full shirt
cream in colour from inside the house of accused Soma Champia.
29. P.W.-10 Umesh Prasad is the investigating officer of the case.
Investigating officer has stated in his evidence that on 12.03.2015, he was
posted at Manoharpur police station on the post of A.S.I., and on that day
informant Besangi had come to the police station and informed that her
son Laxman was killed. Investigating officer further stated that after
receiving the information from Besangi Champia (the informant) he along
with the Officer-in-charge-Surendra Ravidas and other police personnel
went to the place of occurrence at Tumsai Handiburu forest where they
found the dead body of Laxman Champia.
30. The Investigating officer further stated that at the place of occurrence, the
fardbeyan of Besangi Champia was recorded by the officer-in-charge
Surendra Ravidas which was in his handwriting and signature, which he
identified and the fardbeyan was marked as Ext.-1/1. He has also
identified and proved the carbon copy of inquest report which was
prepared by officer-in-charge-Surendra Ravidas and the inquest report
was marked as Ext.-6, seizure lists were marked as Ext-3/1 and 4/2
respectively. He further identified and proved endorsement on fardbeyan
which has been marked as Ext-1/2.
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31. He had arrested accused Mangra Champia from village-Hakagui
Lohratoli. At para-15, he has stated that on 14.03.2014 on information
from the villagers, namely, Dakua, Sikur Champia, that they kept hold
Soma Champia upon which he went there and arrested accused Soma
Champia and recorded his confessional statement and on the basis of
which he arrested Lala Champia (appellant in Cr. Appeal (D.B) No. 1203
of 2017). Further this witness described the place of occurrence stating
that the place of occurrence is at a distance of 5 K.M. from Manoharpur
P.S towards North-East at Village-Tumsai Handiburu forest, at a lonely
place surrounded with mountains and there were no houses nearby the
place of occurrence, near the mountain there was some plain lands, where
he found the foundation of house and he also found blood-stained earth in
the foundation. He prepared sketch map of the place of occurrence. He
raided the house of accused persons, but they were absconding from their
houses. He sent the blood-soaked earth and blood-stained two shirts to
S.F.S.L., Ranchi for chemical examination.
32. P.W.-11-Surendra Ravidas is the then officer-in-charge of Manoharpur
P.S., has stated in his evidence that on 12.03.2014, he was posted as
officer-in-charge of Manoharpur P.S. and on that day at about 11 AM,
Besangi Champia (informant) came at the police station and informed that
her son had been killed. On this information, he along with other police
personnel went to Handiburu forest, where they found the dead body of
Laxman Champia.
33.He recorded the fardbeyan of the informant over which Besangi Champia
had put her thumb impression. He has identified his handwriting and
signature over it and proved the fardbeyan which has been marked as Ext-
1/3. He had also identified his signature on the seizure list prepared by
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A.S.I-Mukesh Kumar, on his instruction which has been marked as Ext.-
3/2. He has also identified the seizure list of two blood-stained shirts
which were seized from the house of accused-Soma Champia, identified
and proved his signature over the inquest report which was prepared by
A.S.I-Mukesh Kumar on his instruction which has been marked as Ext.4/3
and Ext.6/1 respectively.
34.Now this Court is adverting to the contention of the learned counsel for
the parties wherein the learned counsel for the appellants has mainly taken
the ground that there is no eye witness to the occurrence and the seizure
list witnesses to the recovery of blood soaked earth, blood stained stone
and alleged blood stained shirts turned hostile and, hence, no chain of
circumstance is complete therefore, the conviction of these appellants
under Section 302/34 of IPC is not sustainable in the eye of law.
35.On the other hand, learned APP appearing for the State has stated that the
chain of circumstance is complete and the discrepancies so pointed out by
learned counsel for the appellants are not enough to disbelieve the
prosecution story.
36. This Court, on the basis of the aforesaid factual aspect vis-à-vis argument
advanced on behalf of parties, is now proceeding to examine the legality
and propriety of the impugned judgment of conviction and order of
sentence by formulating following questions to be answered by this Court:
(I) Whether on the basis of the testimony of the witnesses can
it be said to be a case based on circumstantial evidence or
if it based upon the circumstantial evidence the chain is
being completed or not?
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(II) Whether all the seizure list witnesses, either turning hostile
or not supporting the prosecution case, are enough to
disbelieve the case of the prosecution?
(III) Whether the alleged recovery of the blood stain shirts
which was said to be recovered from the house of
accused/appellant Soma Champia, can be treated as cogent
evidence in order to prove the culpability of the appellants
in the alleged commission of crime.
37. Since all the aforesaid issues are inextricably interlinked, the same are
being decided hereinbelow by taking them together.
38.This Court, after referring the impugned judgment and adverting to the
testimony as recorded in course of the trial of the witnesses produced on
behalf of the prosecution has found that none of the witnesses in their
examination -in-chief or in cross-examination have deposed that they have
seen alleged commission of crime particularly in terms of manner of
assault on the deceased Laxman Munda and also nothing has been said
about recovery of the incriminating material used in commission of crime.
39.Further this Court find from the impugned judgment that learned trial
Court, inter alia, has convicted the appellants observing that prosecution
has established the existence of blood stained T-shirt in the house of
accused/appellant Soma Champai and the same was within the knowledge
of accused persons/appellants Mangra Champia and Soma Champai.
40.It is further evident from impugned order that the learned trial Court while
convicting the appellants has taken into consideration the earlier statement
of P.W.-1 Manohar Champia, P.W.-3 Sukhlal Champia, P.W.-7 Saluka
Champia recorded before the police under Section 161/162 of Cr.P.C. It is
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pertinent to mention herein that all the aforesaid prosecution witnesses
have been declared hostile before the trial Court.
41. Since as per the evidence before the trail Court, it is evident that P.W.-1
Manohar Champia, P.W.-3 Sukhlal Champia, and P.W.-7 Saluka Champia
who have been claimed in their statement before police that they had seen
the alleged occurrence, have been declared hostile, therefore, this Court
is now adverting to analyse and appreciate the circumstances that whether
on the basis of the circumstantial evidence the culpability of the appellant
can be proved or not. Therefore, this Court think it apposite to refer to
certain authorities pertaining to delineation of cases that hinge on
circumstantial evidence.
42.There is no quarrel with the settled position of law that in the case of
circumstantial evidence, the chain should be complete, then only there will
be conviction of the concerned accused person, as has been laid down by
the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Hanumant son of Govind
Nargundlar vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1952 SC 343 wherein it
has been held that “It is well to remember that in cases where the evidence
is of a circumstantial nature, the circumstances from which the conclusion
of guilt is to be drawn should in the first instance be fully established, and
all the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of
the guilt of the accused. Again, the circumstances should be of a conclusive
nature and tendency and they should be such as to exclude every
hypothesis but the one proposed to be proved. In other words, there must
be a chain of evidence so far complete as not to leave any reasonable
ground for a conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and
it must be such as to show that within all human probability the act must
have been done by the accused.”
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43.The same view has been taken by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Bakhshish
Singh vs. State of Punjab, (1971) 3 SCC 182 wherein the Hon’ble Apex
Court has observed that the principle in a case resting on circumstantial
evidence is well settled that the circumstances put forward must be
satisfactorily proved and those circumstances should be consistent only
with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused. These circumstances should
be of a conclusive nature and tendency and they should be such as to
exclude every hypothesis but the one proposed to be proved. In other
words, there must be a chain of evidence so far complete as not to leave
any reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the innocence of
the accused and it must be such as to show that within all human
probability the act must have been done by the accused.
44.The Hon’ble Apex Court while laying down such proposition in the said
case has considered the factual aspect revolving around therein and while
considering the fact has only found the incriminating evidence against the
appellant was his pointing the place where the dead body of the deceased
had been thrown which the Hon’ble Apex Court has not considered to be
circumstantial evidence though undoubtedly it raises a strong suspicion
against the appellant. The Hon’ble Apex Court while coming to such
conclusion has observed that even if he was not a party to the murder, the
appellant could have come to know the place where the dead body of the
deceased had been thrown. Hence anyone who saw those parts could have
inferred that the dead body must have been thrown into the river near about
that place. In that pretext, the law has been laid down at paragraph-9
thereof, which reads as under:
“9. The law relating to circumstantial evidence has been stated by this Court
in numerous decisions. It is needless to refer to them as the law on the point
is well-settled. In a case resting on circumstantial evidence, the circumstances16
2026:JHHC:3906-DBput forward must be satisfactorily proved and those circumstances should be
consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused. Again, those
circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency and they should
be such as to exclude every hypothesis but the one proposed to be proved. In
other words, there must be a chain of evidence so far complete as not to leave
any reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the innocence of the
accused and it must be such as to show that within all human probability the
act must have been done by the accused.”
45.It is, thus, evident from the close analysis of the aforesaid judgments, the
following conditions must be fulfilled before a case against an accused can
be said to be fully established:
(i) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn
should be fully established.
(ii) the facts so established should be consistent only with the
hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be
explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty,
(iii) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency,
(iv) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be
proved, and
(v) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any
reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of
the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must
have been done by the accused.
46.The Hon’ble Apex Court has reiterated the said principle again in the case
of “Sharad Birdhichand Sarda vs. State of Maharashtra“, (1984) 4 SCC
116 holding all the above five principles to be the golden principles which
constitute the panch-sheel of the proof of a case based on circumstantial
evidence. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the said case as under paragraph-
155, 156, 157, 158 and 159 has been pleased to hold that if these conditions
are fulfilled only then a Court can use a false explanation or a false defence
as an additional link to lend an assurance to the court and not otherwise.
Paragraphs-155, 156, 157, 158 and 159 of the said judgment read as under:
“155. It may be interesting to note that as regards the mode of proof in
a criminal case depending on circumstantial evidence, in the absence17
2026:JHHC:3906-DBof a corpus delicti, the statement of law as to proof of the same was laid
down by Gresson, J. (and concurred by 3 more Judges) in King v. Horry
[1952 NZLR 111] thus: “Before he can be convicted, the fact of death
should be proved by such circumstances as render the commission of
the crime morally certain and leave no ground for reasonable doubt:
the circumstantial evidence should be so cogent
and 2025:JHHC:13669-DB compelling as to convince a jury that upon
no rational hypothesis other than murder can the facts be accounted
for.”
156. Lord Goddard slightly modified the expression “morally certain”
by “such circumstances as render the commission of the crime certain”.
157. This indicates the cardinal principle of criminal jurisprudence that
a case can be said to be proved only when there is certain and explicit
evidence and no person can be convicted on pure moral conviction.
Horry case [1952 NZLR 111] was approved by this Court in Anant
Chintaman Lagu v. State of Bombay [AIR 1960 SC 500] Lagu case
[AIR 1960 SC 500] as also the principles enunciated by this Court in
Hanumant case [(1952) 2 SCC 71] have been uniformly and
consistently followed in all later decisions of this Court without any
single exception. To quote a few cases — Tufail case [(1969) 3 SCC
198] , Ramgopal case [(1972) 4 SCC 625] , Chandrakant Nyalchand
Seth v. State of Bombay [ Criminal Appeal No 120 of
1957,], Dharambir Singh v. State of Punjab [ Criminal Appeal No 98
of 1958,]. There are a number of other cases where although Hanumant
case [(1952) 2 SCC] has not been expressly noticed but the same
principles have been expounded and reiterated, as in Naseem Ahmed v.
Delhi Administration [(1974) 3 SCC 668, 670] , Mohan Lal Pangasa v.
State of U.P. [(1974) 4 SCC 607,] , Shankarlal Gyarasilal Dixit v. State
of Maharashtra [(1981) 2 SCC 35, 39] and M.G. Agarwal v. State of
Maharashtra [AIR 1963 SC 200 : (1963) 2 SCR 405,] — a five-Judge
Bench decision.
158. It may be necessary here to notice a very forceful argument
submitted by the Additional Solicitor General relying on a decision of
this Court in Deonandan Mishra v. State of Bihar [AIR 1955 SC 801]
to supplement his argument that if the defence case is false it would
constitute an additional link so as to fortify the prosecution case. With
due respect to the learned Additional Solicitor-General we are unable
to agree with the interpretation given by him of the aforesaid case, the
relevant portion of which may be extracted thus: “But in a case like this
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where the various links as stated above have been satisfactorily made
out and the circumstances point to the appellant as the probable
assailant, with reasonable definiteness and in proximity to the deceased
as regards time and situation. such absence of explanation or false
explanation would itself be an additional link which completes the
chain.”
159. It will be seen that this Court while taking into account the absence
of explanation or a false explanation did hold that it will amount to be
an additional link to complete the chain but these observations must be
read in the light of what this Court said earlier viz. before a false
explanation can be used as additional link, the following essential
conditions must be satisfied: (1) various links in the chain of evidence
led by the prosecution have been satisfactorily proved, (2) the said
circumstance points to the guilt of the accused with reasonable
definiteness, and (3) the circumstance is in proximity to the time and
situation.”
47.The foremost requirement in the case of circumstantial evidence is that the
chain is to be completed. In Padala Veera Reddy v. State of A.P. [1989
Supp (2) SCC 706 the Hon’ble Apex Court held that when a case rests upon
circumstantial evidence, the following tests must be satisfied:
“10. … (1) the circumstances from which an inference of guilt is sought to be
drawn, must be cogently and firmly established; (2) those circumstances
should be of a definite tendency unerringly pointing towards guilt of the
accused; (3) the circumstances, taken cumulatively, should form a chain so
complete that there is no escape from the conclusion that within all human
probability the crime was committed by the accused and none else; and (4)
the circumstantial evidence in order to sustain conviction must be complete
and incapable of explanation of any other hypothesis than that of the guilt of
the accused and such evidence should not only be consistent with the guilt of
the accused but should be inconsistent with his innocence.”
48.In Ram Singh v. Sonia (2007) 3 SCC 1, while referring to the settled proof
pertaining to circumstantial evidence, the Hon’ble Apex Court reiterated
the principles about the caution to be kept in mind by court. It has been
stated therein as follows:
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“39. … in a case depending largely upon circumstantial evidence, there
is always a danger that conjecture or suspicion may take the place of
legal proof. The court must satisfy itself that various circumstances in
the chain of events have been established clearly and such completed
chain of events must be such as to rule out a reasonable likelihood of
the innocence of the accused. It has also been indicated that when the
important link goes, the chain of circumstances gets snapped and the
other circumstances cannot in any manner, establish the guilt of the
accused beyond all reasonable doubts.”
49.Thus, it is evident that for proving the charge on the basis of circumstantial
evidence, it would be necessary that evidence so available must induce a
reasonable man to come to a definite conclusion of proving of guilt;
meaning thereby there must be a chain of evidence so far it is complete as
not to leave any reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the
innocence of the accused and it must be such as to show that within all
human probability the act must have been done by the accused.
50.Now re-adverting to the factual aspect of the case. The informant of the
case namely Besangi Champia, who is the mother of the deceased Laxman
Champia, was not examined, as she died during the trial.
51.On going through the record, this court finds that in the present case there
are two sets of seizure list- one seizure list pertains to blood-soaked earth
recovered from village -Tumsai at Handiburu forest and the other seizure
list is related to seizure of two blood stained full shirts from inside the
house of accused/appellant Soma Champia.
52. This court finds that P.W.4-Sikur Champia and P.W5-Lodro Champia are
the seizure list witnesses to the seizure of blood-soaked earth and blood
stained stone, recovered from village Tumsai at Handiburu forest, but none
of these witnesses have fully supported the prosecution case in their
examination- in -chief in relation to recovery of blood-soaked earth and
blood stained stone, in their presence.
20
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53.On going to the deposition P.W.-4-Sikur Champia, this Court finds that
P.W.-4 has stated in his cross-examination at paragraph-11 that police had
neither seized blood-soaked earth and blood stained stone nor seizure list
of it was prepared in his presence and police had called him at the police
station where officer-in-charge had taken his signature, for ready reference
the relevant paragraph is being quoted as under:
“11. मेरे सामने पुलिस खून िगा लमट्टी और खून िगा पत्थर जप्त नहीीं लिया
था और जप्ती सूची भी नहीीं बना था। थाना में बुिािर दरोगाजी हस्ताक्षर
िराये थे।”
54.Likewise, P.W5-Lodro Champia at paragraph-5 and 6 of his cross-
examination has stated that police did not seize blood-soaked earth and
blood stained stone in his presence and daroga jee had called him at police
station and instructed him to put his thumb impression on a paper, for ready
reference the relevant paragraph is being quoted as under:
प्रलिपरीक्षणः –
4. पुलिस ने मींगरा चाम्पिया, सोमा चाम्पिया और िािा चाम्पिया िो िहाीं से
लगरप्तार लिया और क्ोीं लगरप्तार लिया था, मैं नहीीं जानिा। मैं इनिोगोीं िो
लगरप्तार िरिे भी नहीीं दे खा।
5:खून िगा पत्थर एवीं खून िगा लमट्टी पुलिस मेरे सामने जप्त नहीीं िी थी।
6. दरोगाजी मुझे थाना बुिािर िागज पर टीपा िगाने बोिे थे।
55.Hence, both the seizure list witnesses P.W.4-Sikur Champia and P.W5-
Lodro Champia, to the seizure of blood-soaked earth and blood stained
stone, have denied in their cross-examination that seizure of blood-soaked
earth and blood stained stone, were made in their presence. So, the
testimony of both the witnesses was not shaken in the cross-examination
and hence, raises suspicion/doubt about the veracity of the prosecution
case.
56.Now, coming to the seizure of two blood stained full shirts alleged to be
recovered from inside the house of accused/appellant Soma Champia. This
21
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Court finds that P.W.4-Sikur Champia and P.W.-9 Maheshwari Malegandi
are seizure list witnesses to the alleged seizure of two blood stained full
shirts alleged to be recovered from inside the house of the
accused/appellant Soma Champai.
57. In regard to alleged seizure of two blood stained full shirts, P.W.4-Sikur
Champia at paragraph-13 of his cross-examination had deposed that in his
presence, police did not recover any article from the house of
accused/appellant Soma Marandi. Further, at para-14 he has stated that he
had put his signature on all the papers at the police station and police had
neither shown him any seized articles at police station nor he had read over
to him what was written on all these papers, for ready reference the relevant
paragraphs of the testimony are being quoted as under:
13. मेरे सामने सोमा चम्पिया िे घर से पुलिस िोई सामान बरामद नहीीं लिया
था।
14, सभी िागजािोीं पर मैंने थाना पर हस्ताक्षर लिया था। जप्ती िा िोई भी
सामान मुझे थाना में नहीीं लदखिाया गया था। दरोगाजी इन सभी िागजोीं में क्ा
लिखा हुआ था, मुझे पढ़िर नहीीं सुनाये थे।
58.Further, another seizure list witness P.W.-9 Maheshwari Malegandi, to the
alleged seizure of two blood stained full shirts from inside the house of
accused/appellant Soma Marandi, turned hostile and in his cross-
examination he denied that he had stated before the police that on
12.03.2014, officer-in -charge had recovered one blood stained full check
shirt white in colour and one blood stained full shirt cream in colour from
inside the house of the accused/appellant Soma Champia, for ready
reference the relevant paragraph is being quoted as under:
लवरोधी घोलिि, अलभयोजन िो लजरह िी अनुमलि दी गयीः –
4. ऐसी बाि नहीीं है लि पुलिस मेरा बयान लिया था और अपने बयान में िहा था लि लदनाींि
12.3.14 िो थाना प्रभारी, मनोहरपुर ग्राम हािागुटु गोपटोिा म्पिि सोमा चम्पिया िे22
2026:JHHC:3906-DBमिान िे अींदर अिगनी पर टीं गा हुआ एि खून िगा उजिा चेिदार फुि शटट और एि
खून िगा िीम ििर िा फुि शटट जप्त लिया था।
59.Hence, both P.W.4-Sikur Champia and P.W.-9 Maheshwari Malegandi,
who are seizure list witnesses to the alleged seizure of two blood stained
full shirts alleged to be recovered from inside the house of appellant Soma
Champia, have not supported the case of prosecution on the point of
alleged seizure.
60.Further, ongoing through paragraph-15 of the impugned judgment, this
Court finds that the learned trial Court, had not accepted the specific
defence of the appellants that seized shirts were not stained with blood and
gave its finding on the basis of F.S.L. Report that seized shirts were stained
with blood of deceased of ‘B’ Group.
61.Hence, to analyse the specific defence of the appellants raised before the
learned trial court that seized shirts were not stained with blood, this court
is going through the statement of the accused/appellants Mangra Champia
and Soma Champia under section 313 of Cr.P.C. and also the report of
F.S.L. Laboratory, Ranchi.
62. Here, it is pertinent to note that two blood stained shirts were alleged to
be recovered from inside the house of accused/appellant Soma Champia
on the saying of accused/appellants Mangra Champia.
63. This Court finds that question was put to the accused/appellant Mangra
Champia that after his arrest and on his saying two blood stained shirts
were recovered from the house of the accused/appellant Soma Champia
and to this accused/appellant Mangra Champia had accepted about
recovery of shirts, but he stated that there was no blood stain on the
recovered shirt.
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64.Further, ongoing through the statement of the accused/appellant Soma
Champia under section 313 of Cr.P.C., this court finds that question was
put to him that on 12.02.2014, one blood stained full check shirt white in
colour and one blood stained full shirt cream in colour, were seized from
inside his house in presence of witnesses Maheshwar Malegandi (P.W.9)
and Sikur Champia (P.W.-4) and to this question accused/appellant Soma
Champia stated that police had come to his house and at that time he was
not at his house and on the instance of accused/appellant Mangra Champia
recovery of the shirt was made from his house.
65. Further, this Court finds from perusal of the F.S.L. Report, that F.S.L.
Laboratory, Ranchi, had received cartoon marked as ‘C’ containing one
full sleeve shirt and one-half shirt, which were marked C/1 and C/2
respectively in the laboratory.
66. In the result of examination, it was found that blood detected in Ext.-C/1
was too small for serological test and about Ext.-C/2 one-half shirt,
laboratory noted that blood was detected in Ext.-C/2 which was of human
origin with ‘B’ Group.
67.But, ongoing through the seizure list Ext.-4/2 of seized shirts alleged to be
recovered from inside the house of accused/appellant Soma Champia, this
Court finds that in the seizure list seizure of two full shirts – one full check
shirt white in colour and another full shirt cream in colour, are shown. But
it is evident from the F.S.L. report that F.S.L. Laboratory, Ranchi, had
received cartoon marked ‘C’ containing one full sleeve shirt and one-half
shirt, which is contradictory to alleged seizure wherein it has been stated
that two blood stained full shirts have been seized.
68.Hence, it appears that one full shirt alleged to be recovered from the house
of accused/appellant Soma Champi, was not sent to F.S.L. Laboratory,
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Ranchi, and instead of that one half shirt which was marked as Ext.-C/2 by
the F.S.L. Laboratory was sent to the laboratory which was not recovered
from the house of accused/appellant Soma Champia.
69.Hence, the facts remain that in the said half shirt blood was detected, but
no any recovery of half shirt is shown in the seizure list Ext.-4/2 said to be
recovered from the house of accused/appellant Soma Champia.
70.Hence, the learned trial Court ignoring the statement of the accused/
appellants Mangra Champia and Soma Champia under section 313 of
Cr.P.C and without properly appreciating the report of F.S.L. Laboratory,
Ranchi, gave the finding that shirts recovered from the house of
accused/appellant Soma Champia, were stained with blood which is not
sustainable in the eyes of law.
71.Thus, from the aforesaid discussion it is evident that seizure list witnesses
P.W.-4, P.W-5 and P.W-9 either turning hostile or not supporting the
prosecution case and further there is contradiction in the recovery of the
blood-stained shirt as discussed hereinabove, this Court is of the view that
in the present case, chain of the circumstances is not completed herein.
72.Further, from impugned order it is evident that the learned trial Court
while convicting the appellants has taken into consideration the earlier
statement of P.W.-1 Manohar Champia, P.W.-3 Sukhlal Champia and
P.W.-7 Saluka Champia recorded before the police under Section 161/162
of Cr.P.C but the said witnesses have been declared hostile before the trial
Court then question arises herein whether the statement recorded before
the police under Section 161/162 of Cr.P.C can be the sole basis of the
conviction of the appellants in absence of cogent evidence.
73. It needs to refer herein that in criminal trials, statements recorded by the
Police during the course of any investigation cannot be used for any
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purpose during the trial except to contradict the witness as provided under
Section 145 of the Evidence Act, 1872. The police officer has the power to
examine the witnesses who are acquainted with the facts and circumstances
of the case as provided under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973. The investigating officer will invariably reduce into
writing any statement made by the witness before him in accordance with
Section 161(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and the said
statements will be a part of the final report (charge-sheet) to be submitted
under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 to the
Magistrate concerned. Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973 provides that such statements made to the police officer by any
person is not required to be signed and it further imposes a bar for use of
such statements for any other purpose except as provided under the proviso
to the said section.
74. Further the statements recorded under Section 161(3) of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 are not substantive piece of evidence and the
Court cannot suo motu make use of such statements in case if the testimony
of the witness made during the trial is not consistent with the statement
made before the police during the course of investigation.
75. Further Section 145 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, provides that
before using the previous statement of a witness for contradiction the
attention of the witness be called upon to those parts of the statement
recorded by the police under Section 161 of the Criminal Procedure
Code which are to be used for the purpose of contradicting the witness to
give an opportunity to explain the inconsistency between the evidence in
Court in witness box and statement given before the police
under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
26
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76.Hence, previous statement, recorded by police during investigation, can
only be used for contradiction after attention of witness drawn to it to those
part of the statement recorded under Section 161 of the Criminal
Procedure Code which is intended to use for contradiction. This view to
find favour in decisions reported in A.I.R. 1959 S.C., 1012(Tahsildar
Singh & Anr. Vrs. State of U.P.) and 1989 Cr.L.J., 1876 (Md. Badruddin
Vrs. State of Assam) and A.I.R. 1926 Pat, 20 (Badri Chaudhary & Ors.
Vrs. King Emperor).
77.However, it is pertinent to mention that Section 172 of the Criminal
Procedure Code provides the use of the case diary by the Court,
but, Section 172(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code provided that any
criminal Court may use the case diary to aid it during enquiry and trial, but,
at the same time it has also prohibited that the case diary cannot be used as
an evidence in a case. Moreover, it is well settled that a Judge is in error in
making use of police diary, at all, in his judgment and seeking confirmation
of his opinion on question of appreciation of evidence from statement
contained in those diaries. However, only proper use he could make of this
diary is one allowed by Section 172(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code as
the words “if the Court use for the purpose of contradiction the provision
of Section 161 of the Criminal Procedure Code or Section 145 of
the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, as the case may be of
the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, shall apply and, hence, Section 172
provides to use it to aid and the Court cannot look into the case diary for
contradicting a witness, as Section 172 of the Criminal Procedure Code,
itself, provides for contradiction the provision of Section 145 has to be
complied and this view has been supported by the view rendered by the
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Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Habeeb Mohammad Vrs. State of
Hyderabad A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 51.
78.Recently, in Alauddin & Ors. vs State of Assam & Anr., (2024) SCC
OnLine SC 760, the Hon’ble Supreme Court again considered the manner
in which a prosecution witness may be cross-examined with the help of
their prior statement. Referring to Section 162 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 and Section 145 of the Indian Evidence Act, the Supreme
Court has observed as below:
“6. ….The basic principle incorporated in sub-Section (1)
of Section 162 is that any statement made by a person to a police officer
in the course of investigation, which is reduced in writing, cannot be
used for any purpose except as provided in Section 162. The first
exception incorporated in sub-Section (2) is of the statements covered
by clause (1) of Section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (for short,
‘Evidence Act‘). Thus, what is provided in sub-Section (1)
of Section 162 does not apply to a dying declaration. The second
exception to the general rule provided in sub-Section (1)
of Section 162 is that the accused can use the statement to contradict
the witness in the manner provided by Section 145 of the Evidence Act.
Even the prosecution can use the statement to contradict a witness in
the manner provided in Section 145 of the Evidence Act with the prior
permission of the Court. The prosecution normally takes recourse to
this provision when its witness does not support the prosecution case.
There is one important condition for using the prior statement for
contradiction. The condition is that the part of the statement used for
contradiction must be duly proved.”
79.Specifically, with respect to Section 145 of the Indian Evidence Act, the
Supreme Court observed as below:
“8. ….The Section operates in two parts. The first part provides that a
witness can be cross-examined as to his previous statements made in
writing without such writing being shown to him. Thus, for example, a
witness can be cross-examined by asking whether his prior statement
exists. The second part is regarding contradicting a witness. While
confronting the witness with his prior statement to prove
contradictions, the witness must be shown his prior statement. If there
is a contradiction between the statement made by the witness before the
Court and what is recorded in the statement recorded by the police, the28
2026:JHHC:3906-DBwitness’s attention must be drawn to specific parts of his prior
statement, which are to be used to contradict him. Section 145 provides
that the relevant part can be put to the witness without the writing being
proved. However, the previous statement used to contradict witnesses
must be proved subsequently. Only if the contradictory part of his
previous statement is proved the contradictions can be said to be
proved. The usual practice is to mark the portion or part shown to the
witness of his prior statement produced on record. Marking is done
differently in different States. In some States, practice is to mark the
beginning of the portion shown to the witness with an alphabet and the
end by marking with the same alphabet. While recording the cross-
examination, the Trial Court must record that a particular portion
marked, for example, as AA was shown to the witness. Which part of
the prior statement is shown to the witness for contradicting him has to
be recorded in the cross-examination. If the witness admits to having
made such a prior statement, that portion can be treated as proved. If
the witness does not admit the portion of his prior statement with which
he is confronted, it can be proved through the Investigating Officer by
asking whether the witness made a statement that was shown to the
witness. Therefore, if the witness is intended to be confronted with his
prior statement reduced into writing, that particular part of the
statement, even before it is proved, must be specifically shown to the
witness. After that, the part of the prior statement used to contradict the
witness has to be proved. As indicated earlier, it can be treated as
proved if the witness admits to having made such a statement, or it can
be proved in the cross-examination of the concerned police officer. The
object of this requirement in Section 145 of the Evidence Act of
confronting the witness by showing him the relevant part of his prior
statement is to give the witness a chance to explain the contradiction.
Therefore, this is a rule of fairness.”
80. Further, the impact of Section 162 (1) of the 1898 Code (S.162 (1) of
the 1973 Cr.P.C.) and its proviso on Section 145 of the Evidence Act in
relation to the “previous statement in writing” of a prosecution witness
recorded by an investigating Police Officer under Section 161 of the 1898
Code (S.161 (3) of the 1973 Cr.P.C.) was considered in the celebrated
verdict of a Constitutional Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India
in Tahsildar Singh v. State of U.P. AIR 1959 SC 1012 wherein the
Hon’ble Apex Court has observed that since the said “statement” under
Section 161 (3) Cr.P.C. can be looked into only for “contradicting” a
prosecution witness in view of the proviso to Section 162 (1) Cr.P.C., it is
the latter limb of Section 145 of the Evidence Act alone which can be
made use of by the cross-examining counsel.
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81. Admittedly, herein the P.W.-1 Manohar Champia, P.W.-3 Sukhlal
Champia and P.W.-7 Saluka Champia have been declared hostile by the
prosecution and during the cross-examination on behalf of the prosecution
their attention was drawn towards their previous statements recorded
under Section 161 Cr.P.C. before the investigating officer and they had
resiled from their previous statement recorded before the Investigating
Officer. Further from perusal of testimony of I.O. who had been
examined as P.W.10 it is evident that he had stated before the Court in his
evidence that P.W.-1 Manohar Champia, P.W.-3 Sukhlal Champia and
P.W.-7 Saluka Champia have supported the case of the prosecution during
their statement reordered by him, but the question arises herein can the
conviction of the appellants be based upon the testimony of the
investigating officer in absence of other corroborative evidence.
82.It needs to refer herein that this Court has already observed in the
preceding paragraphs that none of the seizure list witnesses have
supported the case of the prosecution and also there is vital contradiction
on the point of recovery of the blood-stained shirts from the house of
accused/appellant Soma Champia, therefore it is considered view of this
Court that in absence of corroborative piece of evidence the testimony of
Investigating Officer is not fit to be accepted in entirety and as such
conviction of the appellants in these circumstances cannot be only based
upon the testimony of investigating officer.
83.Accordingly, all the issues have been answered.
84. Further at this juncture it requires to refer herein the settled proposition
of law that the principle of ‘benefit of doubt’ belongs exclusively to
criminal jurisprudence. The pristine doctrine of ‘benefit of doubt’ can be
invoked when there is reasonable doubt regarding the guilt of the accused,
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reference in this regard may be made to the judgment rendered by the
Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of State of Haryana Vrs. Bhagirath &
Ors., reported in (1999) 5 SCC 96, wherein, it has been held at paragraph-
7 as under: –
“7. The High Court had failed to consider the implication of the evidence
of the two eyewitnesses on the complicity of Bhagirath particularly when
the High Court found their evidence reliable. The benefit of doubt was
given to Bhagirath “as a matter of abundant caution”. Unfortunately, the
High Court did not point out the area where there is such a doubt. Any
restraint by way of abundant caution need not be entangled with the
concept of the benefit of doubt. Abundant caution is always desirable in
all spheres of human activity. But the principle of benefit of doubt belongs
exclusively to criminal jurisprudence. The pristine doctrine of benefit of
doubt can be invoked when there is reasonable doubt regarding the guilt
of the accused. It is the reasonable doubt which a conscientious judicial
mind entertains on a conspectus of the entire evidence that the accused
might not have committed the offence, which affords the benefit to the
accused at the end of the criminal trial. Benefit of doubt is not a legal
dosage to be administered at every segment of the evidence, but an
advantage to be afforded to the accused at the final end after
consideration of the entire evidence, if the Judge conscientiously and
reasonably entertains doubt regarding the guilt of the accused.”
85. It needs to refer herein that the Hon’ble Apex Court, in the case of
Allarakha K. Mansuri v. State of Gujarat reported in (2002) 3 SCC 57
has laid down the principle that the golden thread which runs through the
web of administration of justice in criminal case is that if two views are
possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of
the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable
to the accused should be adopted, for ready reference, paragraph 6 thereof
requires to be referred herein which reads hereunder as :-
“6. ——The golden thread which runs through the web of administration of
justice in criminal case is that if two views are possible on the evidence
adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to31
2026:JHHC:3906-DBhis innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted.
–”
86.It needs to refer herein before laying down the aforesaid view, the Hon’ble
Apex Court in the case of “Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of
Maharashtra (Supra) has already laid down the same view at paragraph
163 which is required to be referred which read hereunder as-
“163. We then pass on to another important point which seems to have
been completely missed by the High Court. It is well settled that where
on the evidence two possibilities are available or open, one which goes
in favour of the prosecution and the other which benefits an accused,
the accused is undoubtedly entitled to the benefit of doubt.—”
87. Further, it is also settled connotation of law that the prosecution has to
prove the charge beyond all reasonable doubt in order to prove the charges
against the accused.
88.The Hon’ble Apex Court in catena of decision has propounded the
proposition that in the criminal trial, there cannot be any conviction if the
charge is not being proved beyond all reasonable doubts, as has been held
in the case of Rang Bahadur Singh & Ors. Vrs. State of U.P., reported
in (2000) 3 SCC 454, wherein, at paragraph-22, it has been held as under:-
“22. The amount of doubt which the Court would entertain regarding
the complicity of the appellants in this case is much more than the level
of reasonable doubt. We are aware that acquitting the accused in a case
of this nature is not a matter of satisfaction for all concerned. At the
same time we remind ourselves of the time-tested rule that acquittal of
a guilty person should be preferred to conviction of an innocent person.
Unless the prosecution establishes the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt a conviction cannot be passed on the accused. A
criminal court cannot afford to deprive liberty of the appellants,
lifelong liberty, without having at least a reasonable level of certainty
that the appellants were the real culprits. We really entertain doubt
about the involvement of the appellants in the crime.”
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2026:JHHC:3906-DB
89. Likewise, the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Krishnegowda & Ors.
Vrs. State of Karnataka, (Supra), has held at paragraph-26 as under: –
“26. Having gone through the evidence of the prosecution witnesses and
the findings recorded by the High Court we feel that the High Court has
failed to understand the fact that the guilt of the accused has to be
proved beyond reasonable doubt and this is a classic case where at
each and every stage of the trial, there were lapses on the part of the
investigating agency and the evidence of the witnesses is not
trustworthy which can never be a basis for conviction. The basic
principle of criminal jurisprudence is that the accused is presumed to
be innocent until his guilt is proved beyond reasonable doubt.”
90. This Court, after having discussed the factual aspect and legal position
as discussed hereinabove, is of the view that since the prosecution has
miserably failed to prove the charges against the appellants beyond all
reasonable doubt as such the impugned judgment of conviction and order
of sentence requires interference by this Court.
91. Accordingly, the impugned judgement of conviction dated 10.04.2017
and the order of sentence dated 12.04.2017 passed by the learned Sessions
Judge, West Singhbhum at Chaibasa in Sessions Trial No. 08 of 2015 is
hereby quashed and set aside so far, the present appellants are concerned.
92. Accordingly, both these criminal appeals stand allowed.
93. The appellant, namely, Mangra Champia [in Cr. Appeal (D.B) No.1533
of 2017] and the appellants, namely, Lala Champia and Soma Champia
[in Cr. Appeal (D.B) No.1203 of 2017] are acquitted of the charge under
section 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code.
94. Since the appellants, namely, Lala Champia and Soma Champia [in Cr.
Appeal (D.B) No.1203 of 2017] are on bail vide order dated 12.02.2018
passed by a co-ordinate Bench of this Court, as such, they are discharged
of the liability of the bail bonds furnished by them.
Mr. Saket Kumar, the learned APP submits that the appellant-Mangra
Champia [in Cr. Appeal (DB) No.1533 of 2017] is in custody.
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95. Since, the appellant, namely, Mangra Champia [in Cr. Appeal (D.B)
No.1533 of 2017] is in custody and, as such, he shall be set free forthwith,
if not wanted in connection to any other criminal case.
96. Pending Interlocutory Applications, if any, stand disposed of.
97. Let a copy of this Judgment be sent to the concerned Court/Jail
Superintendent through Fax/Special Messenger for release of the
appellant, Mangra Champia [in Cr. Appeal (D.B) No.1533 of 2017]
forthwith.
98. Let the Trial Court Records be sent back to the Court concerned
forthwith, along with the copy of this Judgment.
(Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.)
I Agree.
(Arun Kumar Rai, J.)
(Arun Kumar Rai, J.)
Sudhir
Jharkhand High Court,
Dated:12/02/2026
AFR
Uploaded on 12/02/2026
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