Rajasthan High Court – Jodhpur
Magan Singh Meena vs State Of Rajasthan (2026:Rj-Jd:11109) on 4 March, 2026
[2026:RJ-JD:11109]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT
JODHPUR
S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 2581/2026
Magan Singh Meena S/o Pratha, Aged About 45 Years, R/o
Village Rama Ki Bhagal, Tehsil Kanod, District Udaipur,
Rajasthan.
----Petitioner
Versus
1. State Of Rajasthan, Through District Collector, Udaipur
Raj.
2. Tehsildar, Kanod, District Udaipur, Rajasthan.
3. Patwari, Patwar Halka Laalpura, Kanod, Udaipur Raj.
4. Rama S/o Pratha, R/o Village Rama Ki Bhagal, Tehsil
Kanod, District Udaipur, Rajasthan.
5. Onkar S/o Pratha, (Died), Through Its Lrs-
6. Mangi Bai W/o Onkar, R/o Village Rama Ki Bhagal, Tehsil
Kanod, District Udaipur, Rajasthan.
7. Laxmi Bai D/o Onkar, R/o Village Rama Ki Bhagal, Tehsil
Kanod, District Udaipur, Rajasthan.
8. Dev Deewan Singh S/o Onkar, R/o Village Rama Ki
Bhagal, Tehsil Kanod, District Udaipur, Rajasthan.
9. Mohan S/o Pratha, Hr/o Village Rama Ki Bhagal, Tehsil
Kanod, District Udaipur, Rajasthan.
----Respondents
For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Gajendra Singh Rathore.
For Respondent(s) :
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJEET PUROHIT
Order
04/03/2026
1. The present writ petition is filed challenging the order dated
23.09.2019 (Annex. 5) passed by respondent no.2-Tehsildar,
Kanod, District Udaipur. By the said order, respondent no.2
invoking authority under Section 91 of the Rajasthan Land
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[2026:RJ-JD:11109] (2 of 6) [CW-2581/2026]
Revenue Act, 1956 (“Act of 1956”) declared petitioner as an
encroacher and therefore, passed an eviction order.
2. Challenging the said order, learned Counsel for the petitioner
argued that respondent-Tehsildar issued notice dated 28.08.2019
(Annex. 1) wherein it was stated that petitioner is in possession of
the said land for two consecutive years. However, the land in
question is in petitioner’s possession for the last 47 years,
thereby, rendering the said notice defective.
2.1 He further submits that proceedings initiated under Section
91 of the Act of 1956 are vitiated by malice and therefore, the
eviction order dated 23.09.2019 (Annex. 5) deserves to be
quashed and set aside.
3. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and perused the
material on record.
4. At the outset, this Court finds that order impugned is of 2019
whereas the present petition has been filed in 2026 and the writ
petition is bereft of any explanation regarding inordinate delay of
six years in approaching this Court. The law is well settled that
unexplained delay and laches constitutes a sufficient ground for
dismissal of the writ petition. Petitioner’s inability to explain the
delay of six long years disentitles him to any discretionary
equitable relief under Article 226.
4.1 Hon’ble Apex Court in Tridip Kumar Dingal v. State of
W.B., (2009) 1 SCC 768 held that delay in filing the writ petition
is reasonable ground for refusing to grant relief under Article 226.
The relevant paragraphs are reproduced herein below:
“56. We are unable to uphold the contention. It is no doubt
true that there can be no waiver of fundamental right. But
while exercising discretionary jurisdiction under Articles 32,(Uploaded on 09/03/2026 at 08:50:52 PM)
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[2026:RJ-JD:11109] (3 of 6) [CW-2581/2026]226, 227 or 136 of the Constitution, this Court takes into
account certain factors and one of such considerations is
delay and laches on the part of the applicant in approaching
a writ court. It is well settled that power to issue a writ is
discretionary. One of the grounds for refusing reliefs
under Article 32 or 226 of the Constitution is that the
petitioner is guilty of delay and laches.
57. If the petitioner wants to invoke jurisdiction of a writ
court, he should come to the Court at the earliest
reasonably possible opportunity. Inordinate delay in
making the motion for a writ will indeed be a good
ground for refusing to exercise such discretionary
jurisdiction. The underlying object of this principle is not to
encourage agitation of stale claims and exhume matters
which have already been disposed of or settled or where the
rights of third parties have accrued in the meantime (vide
State of M.P. v. Bhailal Bhai [AIR 1964 SC 1006 : (1964) 6
SCR 261] , Moon Mills Ltd. v. Industrial Court [AIR 1967 SC
1450] and Bhoop Singh v. Union of India [(1992) 3 SCC 136
: (1992) 21 ATC 675 : (1992) 2 SCR 969] ). This principle
applies even in case of an infringement of fundamental right
(vide Tilokchand Motichand v. H.B. Munshi [(1969) 1 SCC
110] , Durga Prashad v. Chief Controller of Imports &
Exports [(1969) 1 SCC 185] and Rabindranath Bose v.
Union of India [(1970) 1 SCC 84]).”
4.2 Also, Hon’ble Apex Court in Chennai Metropolitan Water
Supply & Sewerage Board v. T.T. Murali Babu, (2014) 4 SCC
108 held that inordinate delay in filing the writ petition defeats
equity. The relevant paragraph is reproduced herein below:
“16. Thus, the doctrine of delay and laches should not be
lightly brushed aside. A writ court is required to weigh the
explanation offered and the acceptability of the same. The
court should bear in mind that it is exercising an
extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction. As a constitutional
court it has a duty to protect the rights of the citizens but
simultaneously it is to keep itself alive to the primary
principle that when an aggrieved person, without adequate(Uploaded on 09/03/2026 at 08:50:52 PM)
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[2026:RJ-JD:11109] (4 of 6) [CW-2581/2026]reason, approaches the court at his own leisure or pleasure,
the court would be under legal obligation to scrutinise
whether the lis at a belated stage should be entertained or
not. Be it noted, delay comes in the way of equity. In
certain circumstances delay and laches may not be
fatal but in most circumstances inordinate delay
would only invite disaster for the litigant who knocks
at the doors of the court. Delay reflects inactivity and
inaction on the part of a litigant — a litigant who has
forgotten the basic norms, namely, “procrastination is
the greatest thief of time” and second, law does not
permit one to sleep and rise like a phoenix. Delay
does bring in hazard and causes injury to the lis.”
5. Thus, present writ petition being grossly delayed deserves
dismissal on that ground alone. This Court also finds that order
impugned (Annex. 5) is passed under Section 91 of the Act of
1956, for which statutory remedy is available. However, petitioner
directly approached this Court without exhausting alternative
remedy as provided under the statute.
6. The scheme of Act of 1956, establishes a comprehensive
appellate and revisional hierarchy under Sections 75, 76 and 84,
thereby mandating exhaustion of these forums before invoking
writ jurisdiction.
6.1 It is a well-settled principle of law that the rule of alternative
remedy operates as restraint on the exercise of extraordinary
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. Where a statute
provides specific, adequate, and efficacious remedy by way of
appeal, revision, or other statutory recourse, the High Court
should not ordinarily entertain a writ petition and must direct the
petitioner to pursue the statutory remedy first.
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[2026:RJ-JD:11109] (5 of 6) [CW-2581/2026]
6.2 This Hon’ble High Court in Revataram & Ors. Vs. State of
Rajasthan & Anr.; S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.13572/15 held
that order passed by Tehsildar under Section 91 is appealable
before the Collector according to Section 75 of the Act, therefore,
extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court cannot be invoked. The
relevant paragraph is reproduced herein below:
“3. Indisputably, land alleged to be in unauthorised
occupation of the petitioner is oran land. By virtue of
provisions of Section 16 (vi) of the Act, the gair mumkin
oran land being the land held for public purpose/work of
public utility, no khatedari rights could accrue in respect
thereof. Be that as it may, the order impugned passed
by the Tehsildar u/s 91 of the Act is appealable before
the Collector under the provisions of Section 75 of the
Act and therefore, in view of the effective and
efficacious alternative remedy available to the
petitioners under the relevant Statute, there is
absolutely no reason as to why the petitioners should
be permitted to invoke the extra ordinary jurisdiction
of this court under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India.”
6.3 This Hon’ble High Court in Nanagram v State of
Rajasthan & Ors; S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 20658/2018
dismissed the petition on the ground that alternative remedy
against an order passed under Section 91 was not availed. The
relevant paragraphs are reproduced herein below:
“2. Under Provisions of the Act of 1956, the petitioner has
alternative efficacious remedy of appeal before the Revenue
Appellate Authority against the order of eviction under
Section 91 of the Act of 1956.
3. In view of the availability of the alternative remedy
to the petitioner, the present writ petition is
dismissed.”
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[2026:RJ-JD:11109] (6 of 6) [CW-2581/2026]
7. Thus, this Court declines to entertain present writ petition,
thereby preserving the legislative intent and preventing premature
judicial intervention.
8. In view of the aforesaid discussion and settled principles of
law, the present writ petition, being barred by gross delay and
laches and also filed without exhausting alternative statutory
remedy, is hereby, dismissed.
9. Stay petition and all pending applications, if any, also stand
disposed of.
(SANJEET PUROHIT),J
56-sumer-vallabhi/-
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