Allahabad High Court
Madarsa Jamia Arabia Hayatul Uloom vs State Of U.P. And 2 Ors. on 27 April, 2026
Author: Mahesh Chandra Tripathi
Bench: Mahesh Chandra Tripathi
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD WRIT C No. - 24588 of 2016 Madarsa Jmaia Arabia Hayatul Uloom ..Petitioners(s) Versus State of U.P. And 2 Ors. ..Respondents(s) Counsel for Petitioners(s) : Jahangir Jamshed Munir, Pooja Agarwal Counsel for Respondent(s) : C.S.C., Dharmendra Singh Chauhan, Indra Jeet Singh Yadav, Krishna Mohan Asthana, Pradeep Kumar Singh, Satish Chaturvedi, Tejasvi Misra Court No. -21 Judgment reserved on 13.04.2026 Judgment delivered on 27.04.2026 HONBLE MAHESH CHANDRA TRIPATHI, J.
HONBLE VIVEK SARAN, J.
1. Heard Ms. Namrata Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner; Shri Fuzail Ahmad Ansari, learned Standing Counsel for State respondents and Shri Ajit Singh, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Shri Tejasvi Misra, learned counsel for Moradabad Development Authority1.
2. The supplementary counter affidavit dated 22.09.2025 is taken on record.
3. The instant writ petition has been preferred for the following reliefs:-
(i) a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari quashing the impugned order dated 11.5.2016 passed by respondent no.1 (Annexure-22);
(ii) a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari quashing the impugned notification no.1256/IX-A-3-99-28 L.A.-98 dated 7.9.1999 in so far as it relates to the land in dispute issued U/s 4 (1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 by respondent no.1 to the extent it relates to the petitioner (Annexure-8) and the impugned declaration no.229/IX-A-3-2000-28 L.A.-98 dated 31.1.2000 issued U/s 6 (1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 by respondent no.1 to the extent it relates to the petitioner (Annexure-10);
(iii) a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus declaring proceedings for acquisition of land in dispute under the impugned notification and the impugned declaration lapsed under Section 24 (2) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Settlement Act, 2013;
(iv) a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus restraining the respondents from interfering with the petitioners peaceful possession or causing to be demolished any of the standing buildings over the land in dispute in enforcement of the impugned notification and the impugned declaration in any manner whatsoever.
4. In the instant matter, pleadings have been exchanged between the parties and with the consent of learned counsel for the parties, we are proceeding to decide the matter finally.
5. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner is a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860. The petitioner society runs an educational institution (Madarsa) imparting education to students in Arabic and Persian besides government approved general curricula courses. Looking to the increasing strength of students in the educational institution, the petitioner purchased three adjacent plots of land2 comprising Khasra No.450 through registered sale deed dated 12.4.1978; Khasra No.451 through registered sale deed dated 8.5.1978 and Khasra No.448 through registered sale deed dated 6.10.1979 in Village Mangupura, Tehsil and District Moradabad. The Madarsa had been constructed over the said land in the year 1979-80 and since then it is being used as an educational institution.
6. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that at the time of purchase of land in dispute and subsequently when construction for Madarsa building was started, the nature of the land was agriculture and it laid beyond the limits of the then Nagar Palika Parishad, Moradabad. The respondent Authority had not by then come into existence. The Authority was established through a notification dated 30.03.1981 issued under the U.P. Urban Planning and Development Act, 19733.
7. She further submits that a notification under Section 4 (1) read with Section 17 (1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 18944 was issued by the State Government on 7.9.1999 and declaration under Section 6 (1) of the old Act was issued on 31.1.2000 seeking to acquire some land including the land in dispute for the construction of residential colony under planned development scheme. Aggrieved with the same, the petitioner preferred Writ Petition No.28709 of 2000 (Madarsa Jamia Arabia Hayetul U.P. Moradabad v. State of U.P. & Ors.) before this Court, which was disposed of on 20.07.2000 in terms of the judgment dated 5.2.2000 passed in Writ Petition No.7550 of 2000 (Iftikhar Khan v. State). For ready reference, the order dated 5.2.2000 is reproduced as under:-
“Heard Sri M.A. Qadeer, learned counsel for the petitioner as well as learned Standing Counsel.
Learned counsel for the petitioners stated that petitioner Plot No.197 measuring 0.813 hectares has been acquired. A notification u/s 4 read with Section 17 (2) of the Land Acquisition Act had been made. Thereafter Notification u/s 17 (4) had also been issued. The petitioner has filed an objection, which is still pending.
We dispose of the writ petition with the direction to one respondent no.3 Land Acquisition Officer, who shall himself look into the matter and decide the petitioner’s objection within period of two month from the date of production of a certified copy of this order before him.
In the meantime, status quo with regard to the possession, nature and condition of the property shall be maintained by the parties.”
8. In compliance of the aforesaid order, the petitioner submitted an objection before the Special Land Acquisition Officer, Moradabad but he refused to entertain the same on the ground that the notification under Section 17 (4) of the old Act had also been made and there is no such provision for filing the objections after the notification. It is contended that till the filing of Writ Petition No.28709 of 2000 the petitioner was unaware about the declaration issued on 31.1.2000. Consequently, the petitioner preferred Writ Petition No.20998 of 2001 (Madarsa Jamia Arabia Hayatul Uloom Moradabad v. State of U.P. & Ors., which was disposed of on 16.8.2001 with following observations:-
“Heard.
The submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that although notification dated 20.01.2001 has been issued under section 4/17 of the Land Acquisition Act but yet notification under section 5 has not been issued.
We dispose of this petition with the direction that petitioners shall not be dispossessed from the land in question until of issuing of the notification under section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act.
Petition is disposed of.”
9. She argued that, meanwhile, the award had also been made qua the land in dispute on 27.08.2004. Against the same the petitioner filed reference under Section 18 of the old Act before the Land Acquisition Officer, Moradabad under protest. She submits that under the coercion of dispossession and demolition by the Authority, the petitioner preferred Writ Petition No.54244 of 2004 (Madarsa Jamia Arabia Hayatul Uloom, Moradabad v. State of U.P. & Ors.). In the said writ petition, a detailed counter affidavit was filed appending therewith the possession memo dated 7.11.2000 indicating therein that the possession of the acquired land had been taken by the State and later on handed over to Authority. The said writ petition was dismissed on 23.02.2005 with following observations:-
“……..Having heard the learned counsel for the parties we are of the opinion that the present writ petition deserves to be dismissed for the following reasons.
The present writ petition, in our opinion, is a second writ petition challenging the same acquisition proceeding and on the same grounds that were taken in the earlier Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 20998 of 2000. Learned counsel for the petitioner has urged that the said writ petition has been filed along with the copy of wrong notification and, therefore, the decision in the said petition would not come in the way of the present writ petition. It is apparent that a wrong notification was appended along with the earlier writ petition for reasons best known to the petitioner himself. Further, the pleadings of the said writ petition clearly pray for quashing of the acquisition proceeding in respect of the very same land with regard to which claims have been made in the present writ petition. Thus, the petitioner cannot be permitted to take advantage of his own deliberate or inadvertent mistake committed by him by filing of the wrong notification in the earlier writ petition. In essence, the petitioner had challenged the very same acquisition proceedings, which are sought to be quashed in the present writ petition. In view of this, we are clearly of the opinion that the second writ petition for the same cause of action is clearly barred. The second writ petition is also not maintainable under Chapter XXII Rule 7 of the High Court Rules and also in view of the principle of Order II Rule 2 C.P.C.
Then comes the question of non disclosure of correct facts. The petitioner has admitted the knowledge of the notification under section 6 of the Act in paragraph 13 of this writ petition. There is no explanation as to why this fact, which was in the knowledge of the petitioner, was not disclosed in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 20998 of 2001. The petitioner having obtained an order of restraining the respondents from dispossessing the petitioner by concealment of these relevant and material facts, completely disentitles him from having any relief from this Court. Had this fact of notification under section 6 of the Act, been disclosed before this Court by the petitioner, the petitioner could not have succeeded in obtaining the order dated 16th August 2001. The retention of the unlawful possession by the petitioner cannot, therefore, extend any benefit to him for the purpose of computing the period of two years as envisaged under section 11-A of the Act. The facts indicated herein above clearly demonstrate that the possession was taken over by the respondent after the notifications under sections 4 and 6 of the Act. Thereafter, the petitioner succeeded in obtaining the orders from this Court of stay of dispossession which has to be excluded in view of the findings and observations made by us herein above. As a matter of fact, the possession of the petitioner was being continued unlawfully by obtaining orders from this Court by concealing the material and relevant fact. The petitioner, therefore, being in unlawful possession, cannot be treated to have possession of the land, in law. The possession having been taken over by the respondent on 7th November 2000, the land vests in the respondent free from all encumbrances.
The land of the petitioner having been acquired through valid notification cannot be said to be suffering from any infirmity. The challenge to the proceedings is barred by laches and, therefore, the plea of the petitioner deserves to be rejected in view of the law down, by the Apex Court in the case reported in (1996) 11 SCC 501 paragraphs 23 and 29. The present writ petition also being heavily barred by laches deserves to be dismissed on this very ground. The claim of the petitioner on the question of acquisition under section 11-A of the Act has been answered in the case of (1993) 4 SCC 369 (Satendra Prasad Jain and others Versus State of U.P. and others) paragraph 15, which is quoted herein below: –
“15. Ordinarily, the Government can take possession of the land proposed to be acquired only after an award of compensation in respect thereof has been made under section 1. Upon the taking of possession the land vests in the Government, that is to say, the owner of the land loses to the Government the title to it. This is what Section 16 states. The provisions of section 11-A are intended to benefit the landowner and ensure that the award is made within a period of two years from the date of the Section 6 declaration. In the ordinary case, therefore, when Government fails to make an award within two years of declaration under section 6, the land has still not vested in the Government and its title remains with the owner, the acquisition proceedings are still pending and, by virtue of the provisions of Section 11-A lapse. When Section 17(1) is applied by reason of urgency, Government takes possession of the land prior to the making of the award under section 11 and thereupon the owner is divested of the title to the land which is vested in the Government. Section 17(1) states so in unmistakable terms. Clearly, Section 11-A can have no application to cases of acquisitions under Section 17 because the lands have already vested in the Government and there is no provision in the said Act by which land statutorily vested in the Government can revert to the owner.”
The claim of the learned counsel for the petitioner that possession taken over by the respondent was symbolic, was not acceptable inasmuch as the petitioner himself was responsible in obtaining the order from this Court and has succeeded remaining in unlawful possession thereof.
The last submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the land deserves to be excluded under section 48 of the Act. This is not a matter to be considered by this Court in view of the law laid down in the case reported in (2003) 6 AWC 5499. Even otherwise the provisions of Section 48 of the Act can be pressed into service in case the possession has not been taken over by the respondent.
In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case, the writ petition lacks merits, and is accordingly dismissed. Parties shall bear their own costs.”
10. Learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that the aforesaid judgment dated 23.2.2005 having not been challenged any further has become final and decided against the petitioner under the old Act. However, upon enactment and enforcement of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Settlement Act, 20135 w.e.f. 1.1.2014, the petitioner preferred Writ-C No.234 of 2015 (Madarsa A Jamia Arabia Hayatul Uloom Thru Mohatamim (Manager) v. State of U.P. & Ors.), which was disposed of on 20.01.2016 with following observations:-
“The issue in this petition is whether the petitioner can be granted the benefit of Section 24(2) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013.
According to the petitioner the award was made more than 5 years back from the date of implementation of the Act i.e. 1 January 2014, and therefore, the acquisition would lapse.
Learned Standing Counsel appears for respondent no. 1. Sri P.K. Singh and Sri Indrajeet Yadav, learned counsel appear for the Development Authority.
This is a factual dispute and learned Standing Counsel appearing for the respondents has pointed out that all such matters are being examined by the State Government in the first instance.
We, therefore, consider it appropriate to direct the State Government to examine as to whether the petitioner is entitled to the benefit of the provisions of Section 24(2) of the Act. For this purpose, the petitioner may file an application with supporting documents before the State Government within two weeks from today. The State Government shall thereafter pass an order after providing adequate opportunity to the Moradabad Development Authority expeditiously and preferably within a period of three months from the date the representation is filed with a certified copy of this order.
However, as an interim order was granted by the Court on 21 January 2015, that status quo in respect to the nature and possession of the land in dispute shall be maintained it is directed that the order of status quo shall remain in operation for a period of four months from today or till the disposal of the application to be filed by the petitioner, whichever is earlier.
The petition is, accordingly, disposed of.”
11. In response to the aforesaid order, the petitioner preferred application to the authority concerned, which was rejected by the order impugned dated 11.5.2016. Hence the instant writ petition has been preferred with the aforequoted reliefs.
12. Learned counsel for the petitioner, in this backdrop, has contended that the order impugned, holding the petitioner disentitled to lapse of proceeding under Section 24 (2) of the Act, 2013, on the ground that the petitioner had filed reference under Section 18 of the old Act before the District Judge, Moradabad against the award made by Special Land Acquisition Officer, even though later on the same was withdrawn, the same is irrelevant consideration, inasmuch as there is no such disentitling feature expressed or implied under Section 24 (2) of the Act, 2013. The respondents have also failed to consider the effect of the physical possession not been actually taken before the date of commencement of Act, 2013. She has also relied upon joint report of Lekhpal and Amin dated 20.06.2019, which was submitted to the Special Land Acquisition Officer in response to the letter dated 28.03.2009. She submitted that the impugned order is also vitiated for non-consideration of material evidence qua the actual physical possession. The order impugned is patently illegal and the petitioner’s claim to lapse based on non-deposit of compensation payable under the award had also been negated by the respondents on a vague finding and the same has been deposited in the Court only on 25.2.2016. The order impugned is per se unsustainable and liable to be set aside.
13. Per contra, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Authority vehemently opposed the writ petition. He submitted that the instant writ petition is infact the fifth writ petition challenging the land acquisition proceeding initiated vide notifications dated 7.9.1999 and 31.1.2000 issued under Section 4 and 6 of the old Act relating to land including plots in question. In this regard, earlier four writ petitions i.e. Writ Petition Nos.28709 of 2000, 20998 of 2001, 54244 of 2004 and 234 of 2015 were filed, which were decided on 20.07.2000, 16.08.2001, 23.02.2005 and 20.01.2016 respectively.
14. Vide notifications dated 7.9.1999 and 31.1.2000 under Sections 4 & 6 of the old Act, total 175.44 hect. of land in Village Mangoopura was notified for acquisition on behalf of the Authority, which proposed to utilize the said land for developing a residential/ commercial colony in the name & style of Naya Moradabad. The aforesaid land notified for acquisition included the land in question of which the petitioner claims to be the land owner.
15. Pursuant to the aforesaid land acquisition notifications the possession of the acquired land (including the land in question) was obtained by the State Government and transferred to the Authority on 7.11.2000, whereafter the acquisition proceedings were concluded vide award dated 27.8.2004 passed by Special Land Acquisition Officer, Moradabad.
16. He submits that the first writ petition i.e. Writ Petition No.28709 of 2000 was filed by the petitioner challenging the land acquisition in question. The said writ petition was preferred concealing the issuance of declaratory notification dated 31.1.2000 issued under Section 6/17 (4) of the old Act and prayed that his objections under Section 5A of the old Act were not being considered. The said writ petition was disposed of on 20.07.2000 in terms of the judgment dated 5.2.2000 passed in Writ Petition No.7550 of 2000 by which the Land Acquisition Officer was directed to decide the petitioner’s objection within two months and in the meantime, status quo with regard to possession, nature and condition of the property was directed to be maintained by the parties.
17. The petitioner filed Second Writ Petition No.20998 of 2001 for the same relief and challenging the land acquisition notification dated 7.9.1999. The second writ petition was decided vide judgment and order dated 16.8.2001 holding that the petitioner shall not be dispossessed from the disputed land, until notification under Section 6 of the old Act was issued. It is apparent that in the aforesaid second writ petition, the petitioner again concealed the material fact about the issuance of the declaration notification dated 31.1.2000 under Section 6 of the old Act.
18. After passing of the award by SLAO dated 27.8.2004, the petitioner filed his third Writ Petition No.54244 of 2004, once again challenging the land acquisition proceeding on the ground that the said proceeding had lapsed under Section 11A of the old Act. In the third writ petition, after exchange of pleadings the Court passed judgment and order dated 23.2.2005 holding that the land acquisition proceedings already stood concluded and the petitioner stood dispossessed from the acquired land of disputed plots w.e.f. 7.11.2000, whereafter his alleged possession thereon was unlawful and by way of encroachment.
19. After filing of the third Writ Petition No.54244 of 2004, the petitioner also challenged determination of compensation vide award dated 27.8.2004 by filing Reference Application dated 10.12.2004 and claiming compensation at the rate of Rs.4000/- per sq. mtr. The said reference application remained pending adjudication before Special Judge, Moradabad vide L.A.R. No.34 of 2005 w.e.f. 10.12.2004 till 18.12.2015. Before final hearing of Writ Petition No.234 of 2015, the said reference was withdrawn by the petitioner.
20. Learned Senior Advocate vehemently argued that while challenging the validity of the acquisition proceedings qua the disputed land by means of aforementioned writ petitions, the petitioner was simultaneously filing repeated representations before different authorities claiming exemption of disputed plots of land from the acquisition. The repeated representations for exemption of the disputed land from acquisitions were ultimately placed before the Board of Authority in its meeting dated 11.7.2007, whereon vide Resolution No.86/9, it was resolved that the matter be referred to a Committee under the Chairmanship of A.D.M. (Admn.) for spot inspection and preparation of report. Ultimately, the Committee appointed on 10.7.2007 submitted its report dated 18.10.2007 mentioning therein that the acquired land of disputed plots was covered by a small boundary wall and contained old half constructed/ dilapidated building in an area of about 250 sq. mtrs. The report further provided that since the claim of the petitioner for challenging the acquisition proceedings had already been decided by the High Court vide judgment and order dated 23.3.2005 in Writ Petition No.54244 of 2004, hence, at best the petitioner could claim fresh allotment of the disputed acquired land from the Authority at determined cost for operating the educational institution. It was also provided that in case any such request for allotment is made, the Authority shall take decision thereon in accordance with law.
21. Learned Senior Advocate further submitted that aforesaid report of the Committee dated 18.10.2007 was approved in the meeting of the Board of the Authority dated 24.10.2007, whereafter vide letter dated 3.12.2007, the Authority informed the petitioner that if the petitioner was desirous of operating its educational institution over the disputed acquired land, it may apply for allotment of the same from the Authority. He submitted that the petitioner did not respond to the letter of the Authority dated 3.12.2007 and instead started approaching the State Government again for claiming exemption of the disputed land from acquisition. Eventually, the State Government had taken a decision on 23.6.2008 not to exempt the disputed land from acquisition in response to the petitioner’s repeated representations. The letter/ decision of the State Government on 23.6.2008 was also communicated to the petitioner through Vice Chairman of the Authority vide his letter dated 24.7.2008. The recorded land holder/ predecessor of the petitioners has also received compensation of plot no.449 on 24.5.2003 and 4.11.2004. However, for disputed plot nos.448, 450 and 451, the determined compensation already stands deposited in accordance with law before the competent authority by the Authority/ SLAO, Moradabad.
22. He also submitted that after the conclusion of the acquisition proceedings vide award of SLAO dated 27.8.2004, the acquired land of disputed plots has already been developed into a residential colony, wherein majority of developed plots/ houses have already been allotted in favour of number of persons with effect from the year 2004. If at this belated stage the said acquisition of land is declared lapsed, it shall adversely affect the interest of the Authority and shall jeopardize a fully developed residential colony, which is already operational since 2004.
23. He next submitted that on one hand by filing and pursuing Land Acquisition Reference No.34 of 2005 the petitioner was claiming the benefit of Section 24 (1) (b) of the Act, 2013 and was treating the land acquisition proceedings as being continued under the provisions of the old Act (as if the old Act has not been repealed), whereas on the other hand the petitioner has filed fourth Writ Petition No.234 of 2015 claiming that the acquisition proceedings should be treated/ declared as having lapsed under Section 24 (2) of the Act, 2013. When the aforesaid contradiction in the stand of the petitioner was displayed/ mentioned in the supplementary counter affidavit filed in Writ Petition No.234 of 2015, the petitioner got his L.A.R. No.34 of 2015 dismissed as withdrawn on 17.12.2015. The fourth Writ Petition No.234 of 2015 filed by the petitioner was disposed of by this Court vide order dated 20.01.2016 directing the State Government to decide the claim of the petitioner for the benefit of Section 24 (2) of the Act, 2013 after providing opportunity of hearing to all concerned parties. In compliance of the order dated 20.01.2016, the State Government has passed the detailed and well reasoned order impugned dated 11.5.2016 rejecting the claim of the petitioner to avail the benefit of Section 24 (2) of the Act, 2013.
24. It is contended that admittedly the petitioners were fully conscious and aware of the land acquisition award dated 27.08.2004, whereby the compensation of the acquired land was determined, and even initiated their statutory rights for enhancement of the quantum of compensation, yet the petitioner deliberately did not apply for obtaining payment of determined compensation which already stood deposited in the Government Treasury by the Authority. Thus, there was never a lapse on the part of the Authority in offering and making payment of land acquisition compensation to the petitioner, rather the petitioner having full knowledge about the determination of compensation did not apply for obtaining the payment thereof, nor filed proof of its entitlement to receive the compensation. Thus, it is not open for the petitioners to take advantage of their deliberate inaction and claim benefit of Section 24 (2) of the Act, 2013.
25. By way of supplementary counter affidavit dated 22.09.2025, learned counsel for the Authority tried to apprise the Court that in the instant matter the provisions of Section 17 (3-A) of the old Act has also been complied with. Section 17 (3-A) of the old Act provides that in case of invocation of urgency clause under Section 17, the mandatory direction in terms of sub-clause 3-A viz-a-viz the Collector shall pay 80% of the estimated compensation before taking over the possession, shall be followed. The Authority, in order to show compliance of Section 17 (3-A) has also brought on record the documents to establish that the Authority has deposited the entire estimated 80% compensation amount before the State Government/ SLAO. Vide communication dated 8.5.2004 the SLAO demanded the amount of 80% estimated compensation from the Authority. In pursuance thereof, the Authority has deposited the said amount, so demanded by the SLAO on 12.5.2000 though Cheque No.0907467, Canara Bank. The Authority has deposited 80% compensation in May 2000 and only thereafter had taken possession on 7.11.2000 showing the compliance of mandatory provisions on Section 17 (3-A) of the old Act. It is submitted that in the instant matter the acquisition proceeding has already concluded way back on 27.8.2004 by declaration of award, the possession whereof was taken on 7.11.2000. Hon’ble Supreme Court had already settled the issue that Section 24 of the Act, 2013 shall not be made applicable to the concluded proceedings of land acquisition under the old Act. The entire writ petition is an attempt to deceive this Court, without having regard to the fact that the Land Acquisition proceedings had already come to an end and the same was not pending on the date when the Act, 2013 come into force. In so far as possession is concerned, it has already been held by this Court in Writ Petition No.54244 of 2004 that the same was illegal and unlawful. Apparently, the twin condition in terms of the judgment of Supreme Court for grant of compensation and delivery of possession, has already been complied with. Accordingly, no lapsing in terms of Act, 2013 would take place. He also submitted that most of the tenure holders had already received compensation through mutual negotiation and as such any interference at this belated stage is not justified. Learned counsel for the respondents, in support of his submissions, has placed reliance on the judgment of Supreme Court in Indore Development Authority v. Manoharlal & Ors.6
26. Learned Standing Counsel has also vehemently opposed the writ petition and corroborated the submissions advanced by learned counsel for the Authority. He submits that in the instant matter the acquisition proceeding stood concluded, the petitioner stood dispossessed from the land in question, the award was declared and the Division Bench affirmed the acquisition proceeding by way of its judgment dated 23.2.2005. He submits that once the said judgment has not been assailed any further, it becomes final and the judicial propriety demands that no interference should be made qua the findings recorded in the judgment and order dated 23.2.2005. He further submits that the order impugned has been passed strictly in accordance with law and there is no infirmity in it.
27. Heard rival submissions; perused the record and respectfully considered the judgment cited at Bar.
28. We find that vide notifications dated 7.9.1999 and 31.1.2000 under Sections 4 & 6 of the old Act, total 175.44 hect. of land in Village Mangoopura was notified for acquisition on behalf of the Authority, which proposed to utilize the said land for developing a residential/ commercial colony in the name of Naya Moradabad. The aforesaid land notified for acquisition included the land in question also. We find that petitioner has repeatedly challenged the said acquisition by way of successive writ petitions and the instant writ petition is infact the fifth writ petition in this regard.
29. Pursuant to the aforesaid land acquisition notifications the possession of the acquired land (including the land in question) was obtained by the State Government and transferred to the Authority on 7.11.2000, and the acquisition proceedings were concluded vide award dated 27.8.2004 passed by Special Land Acquisition Officer, Moradabad.
30. We find that in the instant matter the acquisition proceeding stood concluded, the petitioner stood dispossessed from the land in question, the award was declared and the Division Bench affirmed the acquisition proceeding by way of its judgment dated 23.2.2005. Once the said judgment has not been assailed any further, it attained finality and the judicial propriety demands no interference qua the findings recorded in the judgment and order dated 23.2.2005.
31. In the instant matter since the provisions of Section 17 (1) of the old Act were invoked, therefore, 80% of the proposed compensation was distributed to the tenure holders. Thereafter, the possession of the land was taken over by the competent authority and then the land was handed over to the Authority. Thereafter, the award was made. After the award, the rest of the compensation was also deposited with the Special Land Acquisition Officer.
32. In the instant matter, in pursuance of the aforementioned notification, the possession had been taken way back and as such the vesting is absolute, free from all encumbrances and as such the same cannot be divested. The old Act does not permit the State Government to release or exempt any land once the land stand vested with the State Government free from all encumbrances.
33. So far as applicability of Section 24 (2) of the Act, 2013 in the instant matter is concerned, the same stands crystal clear in view of the pronouncement of Supreme Court in Indore Development Authority (Supra). In the said judgment, the Supreme Court had observed in para 345 as under:-
Section 24 (2) is sought to be used as an umbrella so as to question the concluded proceedings in which possession has been taken, development has been made, and compensation has been deposited, but may be due to refusal, it has not been collected. The challenge to the acquisition proceedings cannot be made within the parameters of Section 24(2) once panchnama had been drawn of taking possession, thereafter re-entry or retaining the possession is that of the trespasser. The legality of the proceedings cannot be challenged belatedly, and the right to challenge cannot be revived by virtue of the provisions of Section 24(2). Section 24(2) only contemplates lethargy/inaction of the authorities to act for five years or more. It is very easy to lay a claim that physical possession was not taken, with respect to open land. Yet, once vesting takes place, possession is presumed to be that of the owner, i.e., the State Government and land has been transferred to the beneficiaries, Corporations, Authorities, etc., for developmental purposes and third-party interests have intervened. Such challenges cannot be entertained at all under the purview of Section 24(2) as it is not what is remotely contemplated in Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013.
34. In the instant matter also the acquisition proceeding stood concluded and the land vested in the State free from all encumbrances. The compensation was deposited and third party rights have been created after developing the land. As such merely on the ground that the petitioner has not collected the compensation, the acquisition proceeding cannot be treated to have lapsed.
35. Honble Supreme Court in Indore Development Authority (Supra) further observed in para 361 & 362 as under:-
361. So far as the propositionlaid down inRam Chand and Ors. v. Union of India(supra) is concerned, inaction and delay on the part of acquiring authorities have been taken care of underSection 24.The mischief rule (or Heydon’s Mischief Rule) was pressed into service on behalf of landowners relying upon the decision inBengal Immunity Co v. the State of Bihar(supra), it was submitted that Act of 1894 did not provide for lapse in the case of inordinate delay on the part of acquiring Authorities to complete the acquisition proceedings. Mischief has been sought to be cured by the legislature by introducing the Act of 2013 by making provisions inSection 24of the lapse of proceedings. The submission is untenable. The provisions made undersection 24have provided a window of 5 years to complete the acquisition proceedings, and if there is a delay of 5 years or more, there is a lapse and not otherwise. The provision cannot be stretched any further, otherwise, the entire infrastructure, which has come up, would have to go and only the litigants would reap the undeserving fruits of frivolous litigation,having lost in several rounds of litigation earlier, which can never be the intendment of the law.
362. We are of the considered opinion thatSection 24cannot be used to revive dead and stale claims and concluded cases. They cannot be inquired into within the purview ofSection 24of the Act of 2013. The provisions ofSection 24do not invalidate the judgments and orders of the Court, where rights and claims have been lost and negatived. There is no revival of the barred claims by operation of law. Thus, stale and dead claims cannot be permitted to be canvassed on the pretext of enactment ofSection 24. In exceptional cases, when in fact, the payment has not been made, but possession has been taken, the remedy lies elsewhere if the case is not covered by the proviso. It is the Court to consider it independently not undersection 24(2)of the Act of 2013.
36. The Supreme Court further observed in para 279 as under:-
279. The court is alive to the fact that are a large number of cases where, after acquisition land has been handed over to various corporations, local authorities, acquiring bodies, etc. After depositing compensation (for the acquisition) those bodies and authorities have been handed possession of lands. They, in turn, after development of such acquired lands have handed over properties; third party interests have intervened and now declaration is sought under the cover ofsection 24(2)to invalidate all such actions. As held by us,section 24does not intend to cover such cases at all and such gross misuse of the provisions of law must stop. Title once vested, cannot be obliterated, without an express legal provision; in any case, even if the landowners argument that after possession too, in case of non-payment of compensation, the acquisition would lapse, were for arguments sake, be accepted, these third party owners would be deprived of their lands, lawfully acquired by them, without compensation of any sort. Thus, wehave no hesitation to overrule the decisions inVelaxan Kumar(supra) andNarmada Bachao Andolan(supra), with regard to mode of taking possession. We hold that drawing of Panchnama of taking possession is the mode of taking possession in land acquisition cases, thereupon land vests in the State and any re-entry or retaining the possession thereafter is unlawful and does not inure for conferring benefits undersection 24(2)of the Act of 2013.
37. The Supreme Court further observed that in case there is delay in deposit of compensation, the acquisition proceeding would not lapse and the incumbent would only be entitled for interest.
38. It is apt to refer to the judgment rendered by the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Aflatoon & ors v. Lt. Governor of Delhi and ors.7. The Supreme Court while examining whether a planned development which included development of residential accommodation, housing society, falls within the scope of Public Purpose, the Court observed as under:
“3. The main arguments addressed before us on behalf of the appellants and the writ petitioners were that the public purpose specified in the notification issued under Section 4, namely, the ‘planned development of Delhi’ was vague as neither a Master Plan nor a Zonal Plan was in existence on the date of the notification and as the purpose specified in the notification was vague, the appellants were unable to exercise effectively their right under Section 5A of the Act and that as the notification under Section 4 was published in 1959, the compensation awarded was wholly inadequate with reference to the market value of the property on the date when the appellants are to be deprived of their possession of the property. In other words the contention was that as there was inordinate delay in finalizing the acquisition proceedings, the appellants were deprived of the benefit of the appreciation in the value of the property between the date of the notification under Section 4 and the date of taking possession of the property. Linked with this contention was the submission that the provisions of Section 23 of the Act which lay down that compensation should be determined with reference to the market value of the land as on the date of the notification under Section 4 was an unreasonable restriction on the fundamental right of the appellants to hold and dispose of property under Article 19(1)(f). It was further contended that as the acquisition of the property was for the purpose of planned development of Delhi, the only authority competent to issue the notification under Section 4 was the Central Government under Section 15 of the Delhi Development. Act and since the proceedings were initiated by the Chief Commissioner of Delhi, the proceedings were ab initio invalid. The argument was that, as the acquisition was made for the planned development of Delhi, it could be carried out only in accordance with the provisions of the Delhi Development Act, and that, under Section 15 of that Act, it was only the Central Government which could have issued the notification under Section 4, after having formed the opinion that the acquisition of the land was necessary for the planned development of Delhi and, since the notification was issued by the Chief Commissioner of Delhi, the notification was void ab initio. The last contention was that the acquisition was not for any public purpose, but for companies, as the major portion of the land acquired was allotted without any development to cooperative housing societies which were companies within the definition of the word ‘Company’ in the Act and as the provisions of Part VII of the Act were not complied with, the proceedings for acquisition were bad.
4. The influx of displaced persons in 1947 from West Pakistan into Delhi aggravated the problem of housing accommodation in Delhi. With the extension of industrial and commercial activities and the setting up of the foreign embassies, Delhi acquired enormous potential as an employment center. The consequent increase in the population was not accompanied by an adequate expansion of housing facilities. There was haphazard and unplanned growth of houses in different areas; land also was not available at reasonable price as substantial portion of the available land, suitable for development, had passed into the hands of private enterprisers. The Government found it necessary to take effective steps to check the haphazard growth of houses and to prevent substandard construction. Therefore, the Government framed a scheme for “planned development of Delhi”. It was in order to implement the scheme of planned development of Delhi that the Government decided to acquire 34,070 acres of land in 1959 and published the notification under Section 4 specifying the public purpose as “the planned development of Delhi”.
5. Section 4 of the Act says that whenever it appears to the appropriate Government that land in any locality is needed or is likely to be needed for any public purpose, a notification to that effect shall be published in the official Gazette and the Collector shall cause public notice of the substance of such notification to be given at convenient places in the said locality. According to the section, therefore, it is only necessary to state in the notification that the land is needed for a public purpose. The wording of Section 5A would make it further clear that all that is necessary to be specified in a notification under Section 4 is that the land is needed for a public purpose. One reason for specification of the particular public purpose in the notification is to enable the person whose land is sought to be acquired to file objection under Section 5A. Unless a person is told about the specific purpose of the acquisition, it may not be possible for him to file a meaningful objection against the acquisition under Section 5A.
This Court has laid down that it is necessary to specify the particular public purpose in the notification for which the land is needed or likely to be needed as, otherwise, the matters specified in Sub- Section (2) of Section 4 cannot be carried put. In Munshi Singh and Ors. v. Union of India, etc. MANU/SC/0517/1972 : [1973]1SCR973 the Court said:
It is apparent from Sub-section (2) of Section 4 that the public purpose which has to be stated in Sub-section (1) of Section 4 has to be particularised because, unless that is done, the various matters which were mentioned in Sub-section (2) cannot be carried out and if the public purpose stated in Section 4(1) is planned development, without anything more, it is extremely difficult to comprehend how all the matters set out in Sub-section (2) can be carried out by the officer concerned.
6. We think that the question whether the purpose specified in a notification under Section 4 is sufficient to enable an objection to be filed under Section 5A would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case.
7. In Arnold Rodricks and Anr. v. State of Maharashtra and Ors. MANU/SC/0272/1966 : [1966]3SCR885 , this Court held that a notification under Section 4 of the Act which stated that the land was needed for “Development and utilisation of the said lands as an industrial and residential area” was sufficient specification of public purpose.”
39. Recently, the Supreme Court in the authoritative pronouncement rendered in Delhi Development Authority Vs. Surender Singh and Ors.8, while examining in detail the legality and sustainability of acquisition proceedings, particularly in the context of taking over possession, has unequivocally reiterated the settled position of law as crystallized by the Constitution Bench in Indore Development Authority Vs. Manoharlal and Ors. (Supra). The Supreme Court has categorically held that once either of the twin conditions, as delineated in the aforesaid Constitution Bench judgment, stands satisfied, there remains no scope or necessity for entering into an evaluation of the other condition or ancillary factors. The Court, thus, affirmed that fulfillment of even a single condition is sufficient to sustain the acquisition proceedings and negate any claim of lapse under Section 24(2) of the Act, 2013. The Court has held:
17. The Constitution Bench of this Court in Indore Development Authority‘s case had opined that satisfaction of either of the conditions namely either taking possession of the acquired land or payment of compensation to the landowners would be sufficient to save the acquisition from being lapsed in terms of Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act. Various questions posed before the Constitution Bench of this Court were also answered.
18. It is the undisputed fact on the record, as has been noticed in the impugned orders passed by the High Court in the aforesaid Civil Appeals, the possession of the land was taken over by the Land Acquisition Collector and handed over to Delhi Development Authority. Hence, one of the conditions being satisfied, we need not examine any other argument.
40. In a similar vein, in yet another authoritative pronouncement in Delhi Development Authority versus Rajender Singh & Ors.9, the Supreme Court has further elaborated the doctrine of deemed lapse under Section 24(2) of the Act, 2013, making it abundantly clear that such deemed lapse can be invoked only in a situation where both the essential conditions, as propounded by the Constitution Bench in the case of Indore Development Authority (supra), remain unfulfilled. The Court has emphasized that the twin conditions, namely: (i) non-taking of possession of the acquired land, and (ii) non-payment or non-tendering of compensation, must cumulatively exist for a claim of lapse to succeed. It has been further clarified that the existence of even one satisfied condition is sufficient to uphold the acquisition and render it legally valid and operative. For ready reference, the relevant extract is reproduced herein below:
3.1 The view taken by the High Court is just contrary to the law laid down by this Court in the case of Indore Development Authority Vs. Manoharlal and Ors., (2020) 8 SCC 129. In 2 paragraph 366, the Constitution Bench of this Court ..
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4. Thus, as per the law laid down by this Court in the case of Indore Development Authority (supra) for deemed lapse under Section 24(2) of the Act, 2013, twin conditions, namely, (i) the possession is not taken and (ii) the compensation is not tendered/paid are to be satisfied and if one of the conditions is not satisfied there shall not be any lapse or deemed lapse under the Act, 2013.
5.Applying the law laid down by this Court in the case of Indore Development Authority (supra), the impugned judgment and 5 order passed by the High Court is unsustainable and the same deserves to be quashed and set aside and is accordingly quashed and set aside. There shall be no deemed lapse of the acquisition with respect to the lands in question. Present appeal is accordingly allowed. No costs.
41. Further, in yet another significant judgment rendered in Civil Appeal No. 2994/2023, titled Delhi Development Authority vs Anita Singh10, the Supreme Court, while strongly deprecating the conduct of landowners who deliberately or voluntarily refrain from accepting the awarded compensation with an ulterior intent to subsequently claim lapse of acquisition, has laid down an important legal principle. The Court has held that where compensation has been duly tendered in accordance with law, the statutory obligation cast upon the acquiring authority stands fulfilled, and a landowner cannot be permitted to take advantage of his own deliberate refusal or inaction. It has been clarified that in such circumstances, the non-receipt of compensation attributable to the conduct of the landowner cannot be a ground to invoke the doctrine of deemed lapse under Section 24(2) of the Act, 2013. The relevant portion of the judgment is extracted herein below:
10. Further, with reference to Section 24 (2) of the 2013 Act, the position is summed up in para 208 of Indore Development Authoritys case (supra), which is extracted below:
208. In our opinion, when amount has been tendered, the obligation has been fulfilled by the Collector. Landowners cannot be forced to receive it. In case a person has not accepted the amount wants to take the advantage of non-payment, though the amount has remained (sic unpaid) due to his own act. It is not open to him to contend that the amount has not been paid to him, as such, there should be lapse of the proceedings. Even in a case when offer for payment has been made but not deposited, liability to pay amount along with interest subsist and if not deposited for majority of holding, for that adequate provisions have been given in the proviso also to Section 24 (2). The scheme of the 2013 Act in Sections 77 and 80 is also the same as that provided in Sections 31 and 34 of the 1894 Act. (emphasis supplied)
11. The issue as to what is meant by “possession of the land by the State after its acquisition” has also been consideredin Indore Development Authoritys case (supra). It is opined therein that after the acquisition of land and passing of award, the land vests in the State free from all encumbrances. The vesting of land with the State is with possession. Any person retaining the possession thereafter has to be treated trespasser. When large chunk of land is acquired, the State is not supposed to put some person or police force to retain the possession and start cultivating on the land till it is utilized. The Government is also not supposed to start residing or physically occupying the same once process of the acquisition is complete. If after the process of acquisition is complete and land vest in the State free from all encumbrances with possession, any person retaining the land or any re-entry made by any person is nothing else but trespass on the State land.
42. Thus, in the light of the aforesaid authoritative pronouncements of the Supreme Court, the legal position stands firmly settled that the doctrine of deemed lapse under Section 24(2) of the Act, 2013 is to be applied in a strict and limited manner, and cannot be invoked in a casual or mechanical fashion. The law clearly mandates that unless both the essential statutory conditions co-exist simultaneously, the acquisition proceedings cannot be declared lapsed and any attempt to do so, contrary to the binding precedents of the Supreme Court, would be wholly untenable in the eyes of law.
43. So far as the claim of the petitioners for certain constructions over the acquired land is concerned, nothing is brought on record to substantiate that the petitioners had ever moved any application for sanction of map under Sections 14/15 of the Act, 1973. In absence of any material to that effect, the said claim is also unsustainable and no relief can be accorded in this regard over the acquired land.
44. It is well settled legal proposition that scope of judicial review is limited to the decision making process and not against the decision of the authority. The Court may review to correct errors of law or fundamental procedure requirements, which may lead to manifest injustice and can interfere with the impugned order in exceptional circumstances. The power of judicial review of the writ court is limited, but it has competence to examine as to whether there was material to form such opinion as required by law or the finding recorded by the authority concerned are perverse. The non consideration of relevant material renders an order perverse. A finding is said to be perverse when the same is not supported by evidence brought on record or they are against the law where they suffer from vice of procedural irregularities. In view of the settled legal proposition, it emerges that land can be acquired for public purpose, the expression “public purpose” cannot be defined by giving a special definition as the same cannot be fitted in a straight jacket formula. The facts and circumstances of each case have to be examined on its own merit and to find whether the acquisition is for public purpose or not.
45. It is also relevant to quote the observation made by the Supreme Court in the case of Ramniklal N. Bhutta vs. State of Maharashtra11 in paragraph No.10, which is given as under:-
“10.Before parting with this case, we think it necessary to make a few observations relevant to land acquisition proceedings. Our country is now launched upon an ambitious programme of all-round economic advancement to make our economy competitive in the world market. We are anxious to attract foreign direct investment to the maximum extent. We propose to compete with china economically. We wish to attain the pace of progress achieved by some of the Asian countries, referred to as “Asian tigers”, e.g., South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore. It is, however, recognised on all hands that the infrastructure necessary for sustaining such a pace of progress is woefully lacking in our country. The means of transportation, power and communications are in dire need of substantial improvement, expansion and modernisation. These things very often call for acquisition of land and that too without any delay. It is, however, natural that in most of these cases, the persons affected challenge the acquisition proceedings in courts. These challenge the acquisition proceedings in courts. These challenges are generally in shape of writ petitions filed on High Courts. Invariably, stay of acquisition is asked for and in some cases, orders by way of stay or injunction are also made. Whatever may have been the practices in the past, a time has come where the courts should keep the larger public interest in mind while exercising their power or grant in stay/injunction. The power under Article 226 is discretionary. It will be exercised only in furtherance of interests of justice and not merely on the making out of a legal point. And in the matter of land acquisition for public purposes, the interests of justice and the public purposes, the interests of justice and the public interest coalesce. They are very often one and the same. Even in civil suit, granting of injunction or other similar orders, more particularly of an interlocutory nature, is equally discretionary. The courts have to weigh the public interest vis-a-vis the private interest while exercising the power under Article 226 – indeed any of their discretionary powers. It may even be open to the High Court to direct, in case it finds finally that the acquisition was vitiated on account of non-compliance with some legal requirement that the persons interested shall also be entitled to a particular amount of damages to be awarded as a lumpsum or calculated at a certain percentage of compensation payable. There are many ways of affording appropriate relief and redressing a wrong; quashing the acquisition proceedings is not the only mode of redress. To wit, it is ultimately a matter of balancing the competing interests. Beyond this, it is neither possible nor advisable to say. We hope and trust that these considerations will be duly borne in mind by the courts while dealing with challenges to acquisition proceedings.”
46. The question of divesting of acquired land is no longer res-integra. In the case of V. Chandrasekaran and Anr. Vs. The Administrative Officer and Ors.12, the Supreme Court has made following observation in paragraph nos. 16, 17, 18, 21, 22, which is quoted below:-
“16. It is a settled legal proposition, that once the land is vested in the State, free from all encumbrances, it cannot be divested and proceedings under the Act would not lapse, even if an award is not made within the statutorily stipulated period. (Vide: Avadh Behari Yadav v. State of Bihar and. Ors. MANU/SC/002/1996: (1995) 6 SCC 31; U.P. Jal Nigam v. Kalra Properties (P) Ltd. (Supra); Allahabad Development Authority v. Nasiruzzaman and Ors. MANU/SC/1269/1996: (1996) 6 SCC 424, M. Ramalinga Thevar v. State of Tamil Nadu and Ors. MANU/SC/0291/2000: (2000) 4 SCC 322; and Government of Andhra Pradesh v. Syed Akbar and Ors. MANU/SC/0987/2004: AIR 2005 SC 492).
17. The said land, once acquired, cannot be restored to the tenure holders/persons-interested, even if it is not used for the purpose for which it was so acquired, or for any other purpose either. The proceedings cannot be withdrawn/abandoned under the provisions of Section 48 of the Act, or Under Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, once the possession of the land has been taken and the land vests in the State, free from all encumbrances. (Vide: State of Madhya Pradesh v. V.P. Sharma MANU/SC/0200/1966: AIR 1966 SC 1593; Lt. Governor of Himachal Pradesh and Anr. v. Shri Avinash Sharma MANU/SC/0417/1970: AIR 1970 SC 1576; Satendra Prasad Jain v. State of U.P. and Ors. MANU/SC/0392/1993 AIR 1993 SC 2517; Rajasthan Housing Board and Ors. v. Shri Kishan and Ors. MANU/SC/0466/1993: (1993) 2 SCC 84 and Dedicated Freight Corridor Corporation of India v. Subodh Singh and Ors. MANU/SC/0268/2011: (2011) 11 SCC 100).
18. The meaning of the word ‘vesting’, has been considered by this Court time and again. In Fruit and Vegetable Merchants Union v. The Delhi Improvement Trust MANU/SC/0082/1956: AIR 1957 SC 344, this Court held that the meaning of word ‘vesting’ varies as per the context of the Statute, under which the property vests. So far as the vesting Under Sections 16 and 17 of the Act is concerned, the Court held as under.-
In the cases contemplated by Sections 16 and 17, the property acquired becomes the property of Government without any condition or; limitations either as to title or possession. The legislature has made it clear that vesting of the property is not for any limited purpose or limited duration.
21. In Government of Andhra Pradesh and Anr. v. Syed Akbar (Supra), this Court considered this very issue and held that, once the land has vested in the State, it can neither be divested, by virtue of Section 48 of the Act, nor can it be reconveyed to the persons-interested/tenure holders, and that therefore, the question of restitution of possession to the tenure holder, does not arise. (See also: Pratap v. State of Rajasthan MANU/SC/1101/1996: AIR 1996 SC 1296; Chandragaudaj Ramgonda Patil v. State of Maharashtra MANU/SC/1264/1996: (1996) 6 SCC 405; State of Kerala and Ors. v. M. Bhaskaran Pillai and Anr. MANU/SC/0731/1997: AIR 1997 SC 2703; Printers (Mysore). Ltd. v. M.A. Rasheed and Ors. MANU/SC/0307/2004: (2004) 4 SCC 460; Bangalore Development Authority v. R. Hanumaiah MANU/SC/0988/2005: (2005) 12 SCC 508; and Delhi Airtech Services (P) Ltd. and Anr. v. State of U.P. and Anr. MANU/SC/0956/2011: (2011) 9 SCC 354).
22.In view of the above, the law can be crystallized to mean, that once the land is acquired and it vests in the State, free from all encumbrances, it is not the concern of the land owner, whether the land is being used for the purpose for which it was acquired or for any other purpose. He becomes persona non-grata once the land vests in the State. He has a right to only receive compensation for the same, unless the acquisition proceeding is itself challenged. The State neither has the requisite power to reconvey the land to the person-interested, nor can such person claim any right of restitution on any ground, whatsoever, unless there is some statutory amendment to this effect.” [Emphasis Supplied]
47. In the present matter, admittedly the acquisition proceedings, were taken under the old Act, possession was taken and the acquisition was subjected to challenge in the writ petition before this Court, which was dismissed. Therefore, at this stage, scope for interference is very limited, wherein, it is not in dispute that the acquisition has attained finality.
48. The Division Bench of this Court in Amar Singh & Ors. v. State of U.P. & Ors.13 has held that in case the acquisition is made for public purpose, the same lies within the domain and upon subjective satisfaction of the acquiring body, the Court cannot examine the correctness or proprietary of such subjective satisfaction. Even the land, which is recorded under abadi, may also be acquired. In Amar Singh (Supra) the Court has also considered the power to exempt the land from acquisition, wherein the Court can not direct the State Government to exempt any land from acquisition as that part is sole domain of the State Government and Court should not usurp the domain of the State Government.
49. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case as well as respectfully considering the judgments cited at bar, we find that the acquisition proceeding in the instant matter, having been concluded and affirmed by the Division Bench, vide order dated 23.2.2005 in Writ Petition No.54244 of 2004 cannot be treated to have lapsed at this belated stage. At the most, if the petitioner has not taken the compensation, the petitioner may apply before the Special Land Acquisition Officer for the same.
50. In view of above, no interfere is required in the instant matter. The writ petition, accordingly, stands dismissed. No order as to costs.
(Vivek Saran, J.) (Mahesh Chandra Tripathi, J.)
April 27, 2026
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