Delhi High Court
M/S Mrt Music vs Paramvah Studios Private Limited & Ors on 28 March, 2026
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Judgment delivered on: 28.03.2026
+ CS(COMM) 680/2024
M/S MRT MUSIC .....Plaintiff
Versus
PARAMVAH STUDIOS PRIVATE LIMITED
& ORS. .....Defendants
Advocates who appeared in this case
For the Plaintiff : Ms. Swathi Sukumar, Senior Advocate with
Ms. Asavari Jain, Ms. Geetanjali
Visvanathan, Mr. Shivansh Tiwari, Mr.
Ritik Raghuvanshi, Ms. Shrudula Murthy,
Ms. Rishika Aggarwal and Ms. Prathibha,
Advocates.
For the Defendants : Mr. J. Sai Deepak, Senior Advocate with
Ms. Meenakshi Ogra, Mr. Samrat S. Kang
and Mr. Vishnu Gambhir, Advocates for D-
1 and D-2.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE TEJAS KARIA
JUDGMENT
TEJAS KARIA, J
I.A. 36229/2024, I.A. 40421/2024, I.A. 40876/2024 & I.A. 22870/2025
1. By way of this common Judgment the following Applications are
decided:
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Signed By:SWATI
MAYEE SAHU
Signing Date:31.03.2026
14:54:49
i. IA No. 36229/2024 under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 read
with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (“CPC“)
seeking interim injunction against the Defendants;
ii. IA No. 40421/2024 filed on behalf of Defendant Nos.1 and 2
under Order VII Rule 10 read with Section 151 of the CPC for return
of Plaint;
iii. IA No. 40876/2024 filed on behalf of Plaintiff under Order
XXXIX Rule 2A read with Section 151 of the CPC read with Section
12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 with respect to wilful
disobedience of the Order dated 12.08.2024 and
iv. IA No. 22870/2025 filed on behalf of Defendant Nos.1 and 2
under Order XXXIX Rule 4 of the CPC for vacation of ex parte ad-
interim injunction granted vide Order dated 12.08.2024.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND:
2. The Plaintiff has filed the present Suit, inter alia, seeking the relief of
permanent injunction against the Defendants restraining from infringement
of copyright and seeking damages and rendition of accounts of profits. The
Plaintiff has alleged that Defendants are illegally and unauthorizedly
exploiting the audio-visual recordings, sound recordings and underlying
literary and musical works of two songs namely “Nyaya Ellide” and “Omme
Ninnanu” (“Original Works”) in the Defendant Nos. 1 and 2’s film,
“Bachelor Party” (“Impugned Film”).
3. The Plaintiff is a partnership firm duly constituted under the
provisions of the Partnership Act, 1932 and is engaged in the business of
acquisition and / or production, marketing, distribution and sale of sound
recordings and cinematograph films including audio visual recording of
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Signed By:SWATI
MAYEE SAHU
Signing Date:31.03.2026
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songs and underlying literary works and musical works embodied therein
via various means such as sale of recorded audio CDs, VCDs, DVDs and
sub-licensing / distribution of digital rights, audio rights, broadcasting rights
via satellite video and television etc. and also publishing, mechanical and
synchronization rights in the copyright in works therein.
4. The Plaintiff has a repertoire of more than 15000 sound recordings
and 2000 music videos over which it has all rights including the copyright
(“Copyrighted Works”) under Section 13 of the Copyright Act, 1957
(“Copyright Act“). The Plaintiff claims to have acquired the ownership of
Copyrighted Works by paying valuable consideration to acquire the
ownership from the producers or the owners thereof and / or directly from
the authors, i.e., lyricists and composers through written Assignment Deeds.
The Plaintiff also takes the initiative and responsibility to commission the
making of audio-visual recordings, cinematograph films, sound recordings
and underlying literary works, musical works and dramatic works and the
performances embodied therein for valuable consideration thereby being the
producer and the first owner of copyright therein.
5. The Plaintiff claims that being the owner of the Copyrighted Works,
the Plaintiff has the exclusive rights under Section 14 of the Copyright Act
to, inter alia, reproduce, store, post, issue copies, digitally transmit,
communicate to the public, publicly perform, synchronize, make any sound
recording or cinematograph film in respect of the Copyrighted Works. The
Plaintiff also has the exclusive right to adapt, modify, sell or give on hire or
otherwise exploit the Copyrighted Works. The Plaintiff further claims that
no third party, entity or person can utilize any of the Copyrighted Works
without obtaining a valid license or permission from the Plaintiff and any
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Signed By:SWATI
MAYEE SAHU
Signing Date:31.03.2026
14:54:49
unlicensed use or exploitation of the Plaintiff’s Copyrighted Works would be
a violation of the Plaintiff’s statutory rights under the Copyright Act.
6. The Plaintiff has also submitted that the Plaintiff is able to run its
business and recoup its investments made with respect to the acquisition and
production of the Copyrighted Works by exploiting the same through
licensing and the license fee received by the Plaintiff supports the creative
activities of the Plaintiff and gives opportunities to many talented writers,
composers, artists and performers to reach the wider audience, sustain their
livelihood and nurture their talents.
7. The Plaintiff claims that the Plaintiff has acquired the Original Works
for valuable consideration from its previous owners being the Master
Recording Company, “Sangeetha” by way of a written Assignment Deed
dated 31.08.2020 (“Assignment Deed”). The Plaintiff has relied upon the
Assignment Deed by which the sound recording, audio-visual songs as well
as literary, dramatic and musical works forming part of the original works
have been assigned in perpetuity to the Plaintiff throughout the entire world.
8. The Plaintiff has submitted that the use of Original Works without the
permission of the Plaintiff in any manner whatsoever is deemed to be
infringement of the Plaintiff’s copyright under Section 51 of the Copyright
Act and the Plaintiff is entitled to the relief of injunction against the
Defendants as the Original Works have been used in the Impugned Film.
9. According to the Plaintiff, in last week of January 2024, Defendant
Nos. 1 and 2 approached the Plaintiff expressing their willingness to obtain
license for use of the Original Works in the Impugned Film. The Plaintiff
communicated the License Fee for its synchronization and adaptation license
for the usage of the Original Works in the Impugned Film. However,
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Signed By:SWATI
MAYEE SAHU
Signing Date:31.03.2026
14:54:49
Defendant No. 1 did not respond to the Plaintiff despite regular follow-ups
over calls and messages. The Impugned Film was theatrically released on
26.01.2024 and, subsequently, made available on OTT Platforms in the first
week of March 2024. Defendant Nos. 1 and 2 used the Original Works in the
Impugned Film without obtaining the requisite license or permission from
the Plaintiff.
10. Being aggrieved by the use of the Original Works in the Impugned
Film, in which a character watching television plays the audio-visual
recording of the song “Nyaya Ellide” and the song “Omme Ninnanu” is
adapted in a scene depicting a young girl singing the song in school, the
Plaintiff has filed the present Suit in August, 2024 seeking the permanent
injunction, damages and rendition of account etc. along with IA
No.36229/2024 for interim relief.
11. Vide Order dated 12.08.2024 passed in IA No.36229/2024, an ad-
interim ex-parte injunction was granted in favour of the Plaintiff directing
Defendant Nos. 1 and 2 to deposit an amount of ₹20,00,000/- before this
Court within a period of four weeks and also to take down the infringing
posts on Instagram. Despite the expiry of four weeks on 09.09.2024,
Defendant Nos. 1 and 2 did not deposit the said amount within such period.
12. On 23.09.2024, Defendant Nos. 1 and 2 filed IA No.40422/2024 and
IA No.40421/2024 for modification of the Order dated 12.08.2024 and
return of the Plaint respectively.
13. On 26.09.2024, the Plaintiff filed IA No.40876/2024 for contempt of
the Order dated 12.08.2024.
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Signed By:SWATI
MAYEE SAHU
Signing Date:31.03.2026
14:54:49
14. On 01.08.2025, Defendant Nos. 1 and 2 filed IA No.22870/2025 for
vacating and / or setting aside the Order dated 12.08.2024 granting ex-parte
ad-interim injunction.
15. Vide Order dated 15.10.2025, IA No.40422/2024 was disposed of in
view of filing of IA No.22870/2025 seeking the same relief of vacating the
Order dated 12.08.2024.
16. Accordingly, submissions on IA Nos. 36229/2024, 40421/2024,
40876/2024 and 22870/2025 were heard on 15.10.2025, 03.11.2025 and
02.12.2025. During the course of the hearing, the learned Senior Counsel
for the Defendants, on instructions, submitted that without prejudice to the
rights and contentions of the Defendants, the Defendants would like to
deposit the amount of ₹20,00,000 as per the Order dated 12.08.2024, which
statement was recorded in the Order dated 15.10.2025. On 03.11.2025, it
was submitted on behalf of Defendant Nos. 1 and 2 that they had filed an
affidavit dated 31.10.2025 and have deposited ₹20,00,000 as directed vide
Order dated 12.08.2024, which was taken on record and it was observed that
the effect of the same shall be considered at the time of final disposal of
Application being IA No. 40876/2024 for contempt of the Order dated
12.08.2024.
17. After conclusion of the submissions in IA Nos. 36229/2024,
40421/2024, 40876/2024 and 22870/2025, Parties were directed to file their
respective Written Submissions, which were filed, and accordingly, the
Judgment in these Applications was reserved on 11.12.2025.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PLAINTIFF:
18. The learned Senior Counsel for the Plaintiff submitted that the
Plaintiff is the owner of the copyright in the audio-visual recording, sound
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Signed By:SWATI
MAYEE SAHU
Signing Date:31.03.2026
14:54:49
recording and underlying musical and literary works in the Original Works
by virtue of the Assignment Deed from the Master Recording company
called “Sangeetha”. The Plaintiff has relied upon the Assignment Deed as
well as the Agreement between the producers of the films “Gaali Matthu”
and “Nyaya Ellide” showing that the rights were transferred to Sangeetha,
which are produced on record.
19. It was further submitted that admittedly, the Defendants are not the
copyright owners of the Original Works, and they have not taken any license
from another third party for exploiting the Original Works in the Impugned
Film. The Defendants have also not been able to challenge the assignment of
the Original Works by Sangeetha in favour of the Plaintiff. Accordingly, the
Plaintiff has discharged the prima facie burden of proving ownership in the
Original Works.
20. The learned Senior Counsel for the Plaintiff submitted that in
accordance with Section 55(2) of the Copyright Act, there is a presumption
in favour of the Plaintiff as being the author of the Original Works unless
contrary is proved. In the absence of any proof of ownership in the Original
Works by any person or entity other than the Plaintiff, the Plaintiff is
presumed to be the owner of the Original Works.
21. In Super Cassettes Industries Limited v. Malayalam
Communications Limited, (Order dated 24.10.2013 in CS(OS) 1915/2012),
it is held by this Court that:
“6. I have heard the submissions of the learned counsel for the
parties. A question was posed to the learned counsel for the
defendant as to whether the defendant claims copyright in any of the
songs which have been referred to in the cue sheet. The learned
counsel for the defendant has denied that defendant is having any
copyright of the same. The counsel is also unable to state as to
whether the defendant has taken permission from owner of theSignature Not Verified CS(COMM) 680/2024 Page 7 of 72
Signed By:SWATI
MAYEE SAHU
Signing Date:31.03.2026
14:54:49
copyright before broadcasting the same. Counsel, however, submits
that for the said purpose he will have to take instructions.
***** ***** *****
8. The plaintiff has placed on record sample assignment deeds to
show assignment of rights of various songs in its favour. The
defendant has not been able to show that there exists any dispute
about the ownership of the plaintiff to the Copyright. Admittedly, the
defendant is not claiming ownership or copyright. The defendant has
admittedly not taken permission to broadcast these songs from any
other third party claiming ownership of copyright. Clearly the
plaintiff has been able to prima facie establish right to the copyright
in question.”
22. In Saregama India Limited v. Balaji Motion Pictures, 2019 SCC
OnLine 10036, this Court has held that:
“34. I even otherwise enquired from the counsel for the defendants,
whether not once it is found that the defendants are infringing
copyright in a song, which they themselves in their advertising
describe as iconic, whether copyright in the song be of the plaintiff
or anyone else, the defendants are liable to be restrained. It appears
that the purport of the laws relating to copyright and trade mark is
to prevent theft of intellectual property and a public element is also
involved in preventing such thefts.
***** ****** *****
36. The defendants, though have not denied infringement of
copyright, have not even whispered in their arguments, that they
have any right or title to the song copyright wherein is infringed. In
my view, on this ground alone the defendants are liable to be
restrained.”
23. In view of the above, as the Defendants have not claimed any right
over the Copyrighted Works, the use of the same in the Impugned Film
amounts to an infringement of the copyright of the Plaintiff and,
accordingly, the Defendants are liable to be restrained.
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Signed By:SWATI
MAYEE SAHU
Signing Date:31.03.2026
14:54:49
24. It was further submitted that the Defendants are estopped from
challenging the ownership of the Plaintiff in the Original Works since the
Defendants had themselves approached the Plaintiff for a license of the
Original Works. The issue of ownership been raised by the Defendants in the
Written Statement belatedly, which is an afterthought as the same was not
raised at the time of filing IA No.40422/2024 for modification of the Order
dated 12.08.2024. The defense of the Defendants in the Written Statement
regarding the ownership of the Original Works by the Plaintiff on the ground
of concealment of material facts and documents is untenable as there was no
occasion for the Plaintiff to have filed the documents since the ownership of
the Plaintiff was not in question prior to the filing of the Written Statement.
Accordingly, the Plaintiff has filed all the relevant documents along with its
Rejoinder as the same is permissible under Order XI Rules 1(1)(c)(ii) and
(5) of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 (“CC Act“). Hence, it is a non-
issue.
25. The learned Senior Counsel for the Plaintiff submitted that the
contention of the Defendants that the Plaintiff’s copyright had lapsed as on
the date of filing of the Suit by virtue of Section 19(4) of the Copyright Act
is incorrect. The Plaintiff has filed extracts from YouTube to show
exploitation of the Original Works on 15.05.2021 and 16.06.2021 in the
documents filed along with the Replication.
26. It was submitted that the Defendants’ argument that the Plaintiff’s
primary claim is over the film and sound recordings and not over the literary
and musical works, which are claimed as secondary works, is misconceived
as it is clear from the Plaint that the Plaintiff has asserted its copyright in all
works including sound recordings, audio-visual recording and underlying
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Signed By:SWATI
MAYEE SAHU
Signing Date:31.03.2026
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literary and musical works in both songs of the Original Works and has not
made any distinction between primary and secondary works. The Plaintiff
has been exploiting the Original Works openly and the reliance placed by the
Defendants upon Section 14 of the Copyright Act is misplaced.
27. The learned Senior Counsel for the Plaintiff submitted that the
contention of the Defendants that the Plaintiff is not a registered copyright
society or a member of a copyright society under Section 33 of the
Copyright Act and is not entitled to issue a license for the use of Original
Works is misconceived. It was submitted that the Plaintiff is a musical
record label, which is engaged in the business of acquisition and production
of sound recordings and films and is thus, an individual copyright owner.
The Plaintiff is not a copyright society or an association of persons, who is
solely into the business of issuing or granting licenses for work of others.
The Plaintiff is the copyright owner of the Original Works and, therefore,
Section 33 of the Copyright Act is not applicable to the Plaintiff.
28. The learned Senior Counsel for the Plaintiff submitted that Section 33
of the Copyright Act was introduced by virtue of Copyright (Amendment)
Act, 1994 to regulate the management of copyright societies and not to
curtail the power of copyright owners to be able to license their works.
Chapter VII of the Copyright Act deals with copyright societies while
Chapter VI deals with the grant of licenses. The first proviso to Section
33(1) of the Copyright Act clearly states that an owner of a copyright shall
in his individual capacity continue to have the right to grant licenses in
respect of his own works consistent with his obligations as a member of a
copyright society. Section 33 of the Copyright Act only gives a choice to the
author / owner to exploit its works on its own or through a copyright society.
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Signed By:SWATI
MAYEE SAHU
Signing Date:31.03.2026
14:54:49
The idea behind the copyright society is to assist the owner in exploiting his
rights and not to take away the rights of an owner to grant license in the
individual capacity. In any event, the proviso to Section 33 of the Copyright
Act shall come into play only if the owner of the copyright is a member of a
copyright society. As the Plaintiff is neither running the business of a
copyright society nor a member of a copyright society, the provisions of
Section 33 of the Copyright Act are not applicable to the Plaintiff.
29. It was further submitted that the mandate of Section 33 of the
Copyright Act does not compel the copyright owner to become a member of
a copyright society to be able to exploit his own works as the owner has
individual control over the exploitation of his own works. Section 34(1)(b)
of the Copyright Act provides that the owner has a right to withdraw the
authorization given to a copyright society and once an owner withdraws
such authorization, the owner can independently exercise their rights under
Section 30 of the Copyright Act to grant licenses as they deem appropriate.
The right to grant licenses under Section 30 of the Copyright Act can be
done by the copyright owner even when the owner is a part of a copyright
society. Therefore, the right to grant licenses under Section 30 of the
Copyright Act by the owner of the copyright is separate from Section 33 of
the Copyright Act relating to a copyright society as held in Novex
Communications Private Limited v. Trade Wings Hotesl Limited, 2024
SCC OnLine Bom 252, wherein the High Court of Bombay has observed
that:
“141. In my view, by its very nature, a copyright society may wear
two hats i.e. (1) as an authorized agent and (ii) as an assignee. It
administers the rights of “owners” by operating as an agent. It is
necessary to note that under section 34 of the Act and in particular
Section 34 (1) (b) it is provided that an owner will have the right toSignature Not Verified CS(COMM) 680/2024 Page 11 of 72
Signed By:SWATI
MAYEE SAHU
Signing Date:31.03.2026
14:54:49
withdraw authorization given to the copyright society. This also
shows that an author or other owner/assignee does not have to carry
on the business of licensing his works only through a copyright
society. Since, once an owner withdraws its authorization from a
copyright society, the owner can independently exercise his rights
under Section 30 of the Act to grant licenses as he deems
appropriate. It could never have been the intention of the legislature
that once an author/owner withdraws the authorization from a
copyright society then that work cannot be licensed by anyone
especially an owner. Such an Interpretation would undermine the
public interest in making available the copyrighted work to members
of the public. In any event the provisions of Section 31, 31A-D would
continue to operate to bind all owners to grant compulsory and
statutory licenses even after withdrawal of authorization under
Section 34(1)(b).
142. Thus it is clear that the 1994 Amendment which Introduced
these provisions was brought in to protect and facilitate the exercise
of “owner’s” rights, not to restrict or diminish them in any way.
143. The other relevant provision namely Section 34(3) of the Act
clarifies that a copyright society is licensing the works of an
“owner” under section 30. This means that a copyright society is
licensing the works of the “owner” as a duly authorized agent under
Section 30. Therefore, this is not a new right created in favour of a
copyright society independent of the owner or independent of it
being a duly authorized agent. Section 35(1) of the Act provides that
“Every copyright society shall be subject to the collective control of
the owners of rights under this Act whose rights it administers…”.
Thus, both Sections 34 and 35 draw a clear distinction between the
author/owner of the right on the one hand and the administrator of
that right on the other (i.e. the copyright society).”
30. The learned Senior Counsel for the Plaintiff submitted that there is no
copyright society in India which grants synchronization and adaptation
licenses with respect to audio-visual songs and underlying sound recording,
literary works and musical works and such rights are exercised only by the
copyright owners thereof. The fact that the Defendants approached the
Plaintiff and not any copyright society for the license, clearly shows that the
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Signed By:SWATI
MAYEE SAHU
Signing Date:31.03.2026
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Defendants are aware that it is the Plaintiff alone that has authority to grant
license in the Original Works.
31. The learned Senior Counsel for the Plaintiff submitted that the song
“Nyaya Ellide” is an original and independent work distinct from the Tamil
song “Sattam Oru Iruttarai”. Accordingly, the submission of the Defendants
that the film “Nyaya Ellide” being a remake of the Tamil movie “Sattam Oru
Iruttarai” and, therefore, the song “Nyaya Ellide” is not an original and
independent work is misplaced as the audio-visual elements, musical
composition and the underlying literary works of both the songs are
different.
32. The learned Senior Counsel for the Plaintiff submitted that the
graphical representation for musical works is not a requirement under
copyright law as the definition of “musical work” in the Copyright Act was
amended in 1994 to ensure that the musical work was not restricted to works
recorded in graphical notations or even those reduced to material form in
any manner in order to align with the Berne Convention. Accordingly, the
submission of the Defendants that since the Plaintiff has not filed the
graphical representation of the melody and harmony of the two songs, the
composition of the song would be disqualified from being considered as a
“musical work” under the Copyright Act is misconceived.
33. It was further argued on behalf of the Plaintiff that the Defendants’
reliance on the principle of “de minimis” is misplaced. As per the
Defendants, the song “Nyaya Ellide” is used only for 7 seconds in a scene in
the background in the Impugned Film and the depiction of song is
incidental, irrelevant and does not constitute substantial copying. The
Defendants have further contended that the song is not significant to plot,
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Signed By:SWATI
MAYEE SAHU
Signing Date:31.03.2026
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theme or central elements of the Impugned Film. The Defendants have also
contended that song “Omme Ninnanu” is used for a limited duration of 31
seconds in the Impugned Film. However, these submissions of the
Defendants are erroneous and misleading as:
i. The Defendants have specifically pleaded that the song “Nyaya
Ellide” was used with an intent to create a scene wherein the
song is played on the television where the housemaid is
watching the television with tears in her eyes and the
protagonist Santosh is seen standing in the balcony.
Accordingly, the song in the background was used to show the
suffering of the protagonist of the Impugned Film and his
plight. Given this intention, the Defendants specifically chose
the song “Nyaya Ellide” which means “where is the justice?”.
ii. Similarly, the song “Omme Ninnanu” was used to create a
scene where a small girl is singing this song in classroom where
Maddy recalls a childhood memory of his friend Santosh and
himself with an idea to give a reference by playing a song
which matches the script of the Impugned Film.
iii. This clearly shows that the use of Original Works was not
merely incidental or irrelevant but was actually a conscious
creative call taken to further the plot of the Impugned Film.
iv. The Defendants have taken a license from Saregama India
Limited, another copyright owner, for use of Saregama’s song
for 12 seconds and 30 seconds each. The Defendants have also
taken a license from French Gramm for another song to be used
in the Impugned Film. Therefore, the Defendants are aware andSignature Not Verified CS(COMM) 680/2024 Page 14 of 72
Signed By:SWATI
MAYEE SAHU
Signing Date:31.03.2026
14:54:49
recognize that the use for even a few seconds requires a
copyright license and is not covered by the principle of “de
minimis”.
v. The Defendants cannot have selective licensing where on one
hand for a similar usage they have taken license from
Saregama, but on the other hand, they have taken a defense of
“de minimis” for using the Original Works without taking
license from the Plaintiff.
vi. In any event, the use of the Original Works in the Impugned
Film was not minimal as the song “Omme Ninnanu” was
incorporated for substantial 31 seconds whereas the song
“Nyaya Ellide” was used for 7 seconds. As per Section
14(d)(i)(A) of the Copyright Act, even a single photograph of
any image forming part of the film is an exclusive right given
to the copyright owner and, therefore, the Defendants could not
have used even a single frame for even a second from the
audio-visual of the song “Nyaya Ellide” without permission of
the Plaintiff.
vii. The reliance placed by the Defendants on the case of India TV
Independent News Service v. Yashraj Films, 2012 SCC
OnLine Del 4298, is misplaced as only a half line of popular
Bollywood song which was incidental to the advertisement.
Further, the advertisement was for consumer awareness and not
for personal financial gain to the advertiser and there was no
evidence that the advertisement was paid. The second instance
of the usage of the songs was when a singer was discussing theSignature Not Verified CS(COMM) 680/2024 Page 15 of 72
Signed By:SWATI
MAYEE SAHU
Signing Date:31.03.2026
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life and achievement of his songs in a chat show, and it was
held that singer could not have been denied from using excerpts
from her own performance. Accordingly, the Defendants have
not satisfied the “de minimis” test as the use of the Original
Works is substantial.
viii. In Ramsampath v. Rajesh Roshan & Ors., 2008 SCC OnLine
Bom 370, the High Court of Bombay injuncted the use of 6
seconds of the works of the plaintiff therein and the defendants
were permitted to release the film by removing the infringing
part in the sound track of the film. Therefore, it is important to
examine the size and type of harm and not merely the duration
of the infringement.
ix. Further, the test is not quantitative but qualitative as admittedly,
the Original Works were selected to further the plot of the
Impugned Film and were not incidental thereto. It is settled law
that it is not only the duration of exploitation which matters but
there is a qualitative element as well in deciding the aspects of
fair dealing and “de minimis” as held in Shemaroo
Entertainment Limited v. News Nations Network Private
Limited, 2022 SCC OnLine Bom 930, wherein it is observed
that the length and extent of the copyrighted work,
infringement of which is complained of, is undoubtedly of vital
importance, however, it could not be reduced to just a
quantitative test of minutes and seconds de hors the qualitative
aspect. It was also held that the purpose for which the content
was used without license assumes critical significance.
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MAYEE SAHU
Signing Date:31.03.2026
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x. Further, the refusal by the Defendants to take a valid license
encourages others to do the same, which causes substantial
monetary and reputational harm to the Plaintiff’s business
revolving around licensing. As the Defendants have used the
Original Works for a commercial purpose and admittedly to
match the script, such use cannot be said to be covered within
the ambit of fair use and principle of “de minimis”.
34. The learned Senior Counsel for the Plaintiff submitted that the
Defendants have falsely stated that they had made telephonic enquiries
around December 2023 seeking a license from the Plaintiff. There is no
proof produced by the Defendants that they had contacted the Plaintiff
around that time. On the other hand, the Plaintiff has produced a WhatsApp
chat demonstrating that the Defendants contacted the Plaintiff only on
25.01.2024 for a license one day before the theatrical release of the
Impugned Film. As the scenes using the Original Works are in the middle of
the Impugned Film, which goes through the post-production process which
usually takes months, it is inconceivable that the Defendants would have
taken the creative call to include the Original Works and synchronized them
just one month prior to the release of the Impugned Film. It is clear that the
Defendants never intended to negotiate with the Plaintiff from the Instagram
and Facebook posts dated 15.07.2024, wherein Defendant No. 2 specifically
stated that the price quoted by the Plaintiff was beyond their budget and not
open for negotiation. As such, no counteroffer was ever given by the
Defendants to the Plaintiff at any point of time. Further, the Defendants
released the Impugned Film on OTT only in March 2024 and thus, the
Defendants had sufficient time to omit the usage of the Original Works from
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MAYEE SAHU
Signing Date:31.03.2026
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the OTT version of the Impugned Film, if they were not agreeable to the
license fee quoted by the Plaintiff.
35. In any event, the license fee quoted by the Plaintiff was not excessive
or unreasonable. The Plaintiff being the copyright owner was entitled to
quote license fees for the Original Works as per its market rates. The
Plaintiff has sought an injunction against the Defendants from using the
Original Works in the Impugned Film and does not seek that a rate of the
license fee be fixed by the Court as the same is not within the domain of this
Court.
36. The Plaintiff had quoted ₹10,00,000/- for each of the songs of the
Original Works as the same are classic evergreen songs having extensive
popularity across various platforms. Hence, the argument of the Defendants
that the license fee quoted by the Plaintiff was excessive and unreasonable is
misconceived.
37. The learned Senior Counsel for the Plaintiff submitted that this Court
has a territorial jurisdiction to hear and decide the present Suit as the
Impugned Film is accessible for viewing and downloading for the viewers
within the jurisdiction of this Court as the Impugned Film is available with
English subtitles on Amazon Prime. Further, the social media posts wherein
the clips of the impugned scenes of the Impugned Film were circulated are
also accessible for viewing within the jurisdiction of this Court. It is settled
law that as much as the Impugned Film is accessible within the jurisdiction
of this Court, infringement of copyright would take place within such
jurisdiction. In Nilesh Girkar v. Zee Entertainment Enterprises Limited &
Ors., 2025 SCC OnLine Del 6040, this Court held that based on the
averment that the film was being communicated to the public on OTT
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platforms throughout the territories of India including within the territory
limits of the Court in New Delhi, under Section 20(c) of the CPC, the Court
had the territorial jurisdiction to entertain the suit. Similarly, in Sholay
Media and Entertainment Private Limited & Anr. v. Law and Kenneth &
Ors., (Order dated 04.05.2018 in CS Comm 708/2018), this Court held that
whenever the copyright claim is infringed, the cause of action would arise
and howsoever minimal cause of action may be, the Court where the cause
of action has accrued will have jurisdiction under Section 20 of the CPC and
merely by saying that the impugned commercial advertisement could be
viewed everywhere through the internet would not be a defense to the cause
of action so accruing. In GE Power India Limited v. NHPC Limited, 2020
SCC OnLine Del 667, this Court held that by issuing the copies of the
plaintiff’s purported work by putting the same on the portal and circulating
the same to public including the public in Delhi would give rise to the cause
of action at Delhi.
38. It was further submitted that the cause of action under Section 20 of
the CPC is in addition to Section 62 of the Copyright Act and not in
exclusion thereof as held in Burger King Corporation v. Techchand
Shewarkramni & Ors., 2018 SCC OnLine Del 10881, and M/s Elite
Blenders and Distilleries Private Limited v. R.K. Distilleries Private
Limited, 2017 SCC OnLine Del 7224.
39. The learned Senior Counsel for the Plaintiff has submitted that the
principle of forum convenience does not apply to civil suit in India which
are governed by the CPC and there being no provision under the CPC for the
same, recourse to Section 151 of the CPC is not permissible for application
of the principle of forum non convenience to domestic forums especially
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keeping in mind that it is the other side of the coin of the doctrine of anti-
suit injunction as held in Horlicks Limited & Anr. v. Heinz India (Pvt.)
Limited, 2009 SCC OnLine Del 3342.
40. The learned Senior Counsel for the Plaintiff has submitted that on the
issue of pecuniary jurisdiction of this Court, the Plaintiff is entitled to value
its reliefs as per the Court Fees Act and Suit Valuation Act. It was submitted
that in intellectual property disputes, it is difficult to estimate damages.
License fee quoted is the minimum amount of damage that the Plaintiff is
entitled to recover from the Defendants however, given the public spectacle
caused by the Defendants the harm to the Plaintiff has only amplified both
monetarily and reputationally. Reliance is placed on Sandip Kumar Roy
Choudhary & Ors. v. Indian Plumbing Association through its precedent
Gurmeet Singh Arora, 2022 SCC OnLine Del 3272, and Bharat Bhushan
Gupta v. Pratap Narayan Verma & Anr., (2022) 8 SCC 333. Further, since
the license fee quoted was ₹20,00,000/-, the same is above the specified
value of ₹3,00,000/- and, accordingly, the present Suit is a commercial
matter as per the CC Act and there is no requirement to specifically mention
that the specified value is above ₹3,00,000/- when the pleadings in the Plaint
have to be read as a whole as held in M/s Kranti Shop Private Limited &
Ors. v. Deep Chand Arya Industries, Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:2908.
41. In view of the above, the learned Senior Counsel for the Plaintiff
submitted that there is a prima facie case in favour of the Plaintiff being a
copyright owner of the Original Works and the Defendants having
admittedly used the Original Works without taking a license despite having
approached the Plaintiff for the same. Irreparable loss is being caused to the
Plaintiff as the Defendants continue to illegally reap the benefit and earn
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revenues from the Impugned Film, which incorporates the Plaintiff’s
Original Works without requisite permission. The Plaintiff being the
copyright owner continues to suffer losses both monetarily and
reputationally as the conduct of the Defendants has a cascading effect and
also encourages others to use the Plaintiff’s Copyrighted Works without
taking license from the Plaintiff. The Defendants are continuing to infringe
the Original Works of the Plaintiff on a daily basis and also presently refuse
to comply with the directions of this Court. The balance of convenience is
also in favour of the Plaintiff and not the Defendants as the Defendants can
easily omit the impugned scenes from the Impugned Film. In any case,
without prejudice and without admitting the Defendants’ case that the use of
Original Works is “de minimis”, no prejudice would be caused to the
Defendants if the injunction as sought by the Plaintiff is granted as the
changes to be implemented by the Defendants would be miniscule.
42. Accordingly, it is settled law that in the cases of infringement of
copyright, an injunction must follow and mere delay is not sufficient to deny
the injunction as held in Midas Hygiene v. Sudhir Bhatia, (2004) 3 SCC 90.
43. The learned Senior Counsel for the Plaintiff submitted that IA No.
22870/2025 filed on behalf of Defendant Nos. 1 and 2 under Order XXXIX
Rule 4 of the CPC for vacation of ex-parte ad-interim injunction granted
vide Order dated 12.08.2024 is liable to be dismissed in view of the above
submissions.
44. As regards IA No. 40876/2024 filed by the Plaintiff under Order
XXXIX Rule 2A of the CPC for willful disobedience of the Order dated
12.08.2024, the learned Senior Counsel for the Plaintiff submitted that the
Defendants have actively committed contempt of the directions passed by
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this Court despite being aware about the same. The filing of the modification
application cannot be an excuse for not complying with the ad-interim
injunction granted as it is settled law that even if the injunction order was
subsequently set aside, the disobedience does not get erased as held in
Samee Khan v. Bindu Khan, (1998) 7 SCC 59. Further, challenging the
jurisdiction of this Court is also no excuse for not complying with the order
passed by this Court as categorically held by the Supreme Court in
Tayabbhai M. Bagasarwalla & Anr. v. Hind Rubber Industries Private
Limited & Anr., (1997) 3 SCC 443 that while in force, the orders of the
court have to be obeyed and their violation can be punished even after the
question of jurisdiction is decided against the plaintiff provided the violation
is committed before the decision of the Court on the question of jurisdiction.
45. Further, it is settled that the contemnor should not be allowed to enjoy
or retain the fruits of its contempt and it is the duty of the Court as a policy
to set the wrong right and not allow the perpetuation of the wrongdoing as
held in Delhi Development Authority v. Skipper Construction Co. (P) Ltd.
& Anr., (1996) 4 SCC 622.
46. In view of the above, it was submitted on behalf of the Plaintiff that
there is a clear contempt of the Order dated 12.08.2024 and Defendant Nos.
1 and 2 should be punished by way of attachment of property, detention of
Defendant No. 2 in civil prison and heavy costs being imposed on Defendant
Nos. 1 and 2 as held in Kashmiri Gate Charitable Trust v. M.G. Shahani
and Co. (Delhi) Pvt. Ltd. & Anr., 1980 SCC OnLine Del 116, and Louis
Vuitton Malletier v. Capital General Store & Ors., 2023 SCC OnLine Del
613.
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47. Accordingly, the learned Senior Counsel for the Plaintiff submitted
that this Court be pleased to grant interim injunction in favour of the
Plaintiff and against the Defendants and the Defendants be punished for the
contempt of the Order dated 12.08.2024, while dismissing the Application
for return of Plaint as well as the Application for vacation of the Order dated
12.08.2024 filed by Defendant Nos. 1 and 2.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE DEFENDANTS:
48. The learned Senior Counsel for the Defendants submitted that the
Plaintiff is not entitled to interim injunction restraining the Defendants from
streaming, exhibiting, broadcasting, reproducing, downloading,
communicating to the public, publicly performing the Impugned Film. The
Original Works used in the Impugned Film are only incidental to the scene
wherein the protagonist has bought a new TV in the house, followed by an
argument with his wife over such an expense and subsequently, the scene
transitions to the next day, showing the housemaid of the protagonist
watching the said TV while eating popcorn and crying while watching the
TV and it is only at that instant, in that TV, the song “Nyaya Ellide” is
played for merely 7 seconds. Again, the song “Omme Ninnanu” is an
incidental scene wherein the protagonist is shown to be going in a flashback
memory during his school days, wherein a school girl / classmate of the
protagonist whom the protagonist likes is seen reciting a version of the song
in her classroom, wherein the child form of the protagonist is shown
standing outside the class, and his friend makes a joke owing to the lyrics of
the song, making it a parody scene.
49. It was further submitted that the Plaintiff has failed to show any chain
of ownership as there is only assignment of rights from Sangeetha to theSignature Not Verified CS(COMM) 680/2024 Page 23 of 72
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Plaintiff, however, no assignment of rights was shown from the authors of
the Original Works. The Plaintiff has by way of additional documents sought
to rectify this defect by placing on record the Assignment Deed from the
producer of the movies to Sangeetha. However, as per the Copyright Act, the
ownership of a cinematograph film and sound recordings vest in their
respective authors at the time of completion, while literary and musical
works belong to their respective authors and composers, therefore, the
documents show that M/s Anupam Movies is merely a producer of the film
and does not establish as to how M/s Anupam Movies became the owner of
the Original Works either under Section 17 of the Copyright Act or by any
valid assignment. Further, the veracity of the assignment deeds are
questionable since the same are neither stamped nor notarized. Further, the
assignment deeds for “Gaali Maathu” is dated 04.09.1980, whereas the song
“Omme Ninnanu” was released along with the movie on 24.01.1981 and
03.09.1982.
50. It was further submitted on behalf of the Defendants that the
Plaintiff’s copyright had lapsed as on the date of the Suit as per Section
19(4) of the Copyright Act. Although the Plaintiff had filed YouTube
screenshots to demonstrate the usage, where the Original Works were posted
in the year 2022 and 2023, the same would only show the usage as merely
“sound recording” without the visual / cinematographic work and, therefore,
the rights qua the visual aspect of the Original Works are deemed to be
lapsed.
51. It was submitted on behalf of the Defendants that the film “Nyaya
Ellide” is not an original work as it is merely a remake of Tamil film
“Sattam Oru Irrutarai”, wherein the title of the song has an identical musicalSignature Not Verified CS(COMM) 680/2024 Page 24 of 72
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composition as that of the Original Works and the cinematographic work is
also identical wherein a person is seen playing a metal plate. Further, the
Original Works, having been conceived and released prior to the Copyright
(Amendment) Act, 1994, the same cannot be considered as valid “musical
works” as the definition of musical work as it stood under Section 2(p) of
the Copyright Act prior to its amendment would govern the Original Works.
Prior to the amendment, it was mandatory that a musical work be “printed,
reduced to writing or otherwise graphically produced or reproduced”.
Accordingly, graphical representation was an essential pre-condition for a
musical work to qualify as a copyrightable subject matter under the pre-
amendment regime. Therefore, any musical composition conceived in 1981,
without being reduced into writing, notation, or any other form of graphical
fixation, could not have acquired copyright protection as a “musical work”
within the meaning of the Copyright Act as it then existed. The subsequent
amendment in 1994, which broadened the definition to include the graphical
notation is merely illustrative rather than mandatory and cannot operate
retrospectively to vest copyright in works that were not protected at the time
of their creation. Hence, the Original Works having been conceived and
released prior to the 1994 amendment of the Copyright Act and not
represented graphically, cannot now be deemed to possess copyright
protection as “musical works” within the provisions of the Copyright Act.
52. The learned Senior Counsel for the Defendants submitted that the
Plaintiff cannot claim ownership over both the underlying literary and
musical works as well as the derivative sound recordings and cinematograph
films as the Original Works cannot be considered as valid “literary works”.
Section 16 of the Copyright Act unequivocally establishes that no copyright
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can be acquired except in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright
Act and only the rights which the Copyright Act creates and subject to the
limitations it imposes, vest in the owner. Similarly, Section 13(4) of the
Copyright Act reserves the copyright in primary works such as literary or
musical compositions even when incorporated into derivative works like
cinematograph films or sound recordings. This statutory framework creates
a clear hierarchy i.e., primary works (literary, musical, dramatic) exists
independently, and their copyright continues notwithstanding derivation,
whereas derivative works (sound recordings, films) do not retroactively
confer primary rights on embedded elements.
53. It was submitted on behalf of the Defendants that the Plaintiff in the
present case has not demonstrated the independent creation, fixation, or
exploitation of the literary or musical works prior to their embodiment in the
sound recording or film. The pleadings suggest that the underlying works of
the Original Works exist only as part of the derivative works. Consequently,
in the absence of any distinct subsistence or delineation of the alleged
literary and musical works as primary works, the Plaintiff’s attempt to assert
independent copyright over the embedded elements through the ownership
of derivative works stands contrary to the statutory scheme and renders its
claim legally unsustainable.
54. The learned Senior Counsel for the Defendants submitted that the
licensing business can only be carried out by a copyright society as per
Section 33 of the Copyright Act. Admittedly, the Plaintiff is not a copyright
society and, therefore, the Plaintiff cannot be in the business of such
licensing of copyrightable works. Reliance was placed on Azure Hospitality
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v. Phonographic Performance, 2025 SCC OnLine Del 2407, wherein the
Division Bench of this Court has held that:
“19.10 One reaches, now, Section 33, which is the cornerstone of
controversy.
19.11 Section 33 figures in Chapter VII, which deals with Copyright
Societies, and was entirely substituted by Section 11 of the Copyright
(Amendment) Act, 199431 .
19.12 Section 33(1) is worded in proscriptive terms. It unequivocally
proscribes any person, or association of persons, from “carrying on
the business of issuing or granting licences in respect of any work in
which copyright subsists or in respect of any other rights conferred
by (the Copyright) Act“, except to, or in accordance with,
registration granted under Section 33(3). Section 33(3) deals with
registration of copyright societies.
19.13 The word “business” is a word of wide import. The expression
“carrying on business” has been defined by the Supreme Court in
Director of Supplies and Disposals v Member, Board of Revenue32 ,
thus:
“To regard an activity as business there must be a course
of dealings, either actually continued or contemplated to
be continued with a profit-motive; there must be some
real and systematic or organised course of activity or
conduct with a set purpose of making profit. To infer from
a course of transactions that it is intended thereby to
carry on business, ordinarily there must exist the
characteristics of volume, frequency, continuity and
system indicating an intention to continue the activity of
carrying on the transactions for a profit.”
***** ***** *****
19.17 Thus, it is clear that word “business” is a word of very wide
import. Any person who grants licenses to others to exploit sound
recordings in which such person holds a copyright can be said to be
carrying on the business of issuing and grating such license.
19.18 In any event, there can be no doubt whatsoever that PPL is
most certainly engaged in the business of issuing or grantingSignature Not Verified CS(COMM) 680/2024 Page 27 of 72
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licenses in respect of copyrighted sound recordings. This position
stands recognized in para 2.1 of the impugned judgment itself, in the
following words:
“The plaintiff, Phonographic Performance Limited,
(PPL) is a company limited by guarantee, registered
under the provisions of the Companies Act, 2013, which
is engaged in the business of issuing licences for public
performance of sound recordings on the basis of the
assignments granted to it by its various member record
labels.”
***** ***** *****
19.23 Reverting back, now, to Section 33(1), the main body of the
sub-section prohibits the carrying on of business of issuing or
granting licences in respect of (i) any copyrighted work or (ii) any
other rights conferred by the Copyright Act, except under or in
accordance with the registration granted under Section 33(3) to a
copyright society.
19.24 It is important to understand this provision, and the best way
to do so would, perhaps, be to apply it to the facts before us. PPL is
an association of persons. It is, admittedly, carrying on the business
of granting licences in respect of the copyrighted works assigned to
it under Section 18(1) and forming its repertoire. The sub-section,
therefore, clearly applies to it. PPL is, therefore, proscribed from
granting any licence in respect of the said assigned work, or in
respect of the right to communicate it to the public, except under or
in accordance with the registration granted under Section 33(3).
PPL cannot possibly grant any licence under the registration
granted under Section 33(3), since it is not a registered copyright
society under the said provision. It has, nonetheless, to carry on the
business in accordance with the registration granted under Section
33(3). This can only be done if PPL is itself a member of the
registered copyright society, i.e. RMPL. Viewed in isolation,
however, this requirement, as envisaged by Section 33(1), is absolute
and non-negotiable.
19.25 What, then, is the effect of the proviso to Section 33(1)?
19.26 PPL’s contention is that the proviso to Section 33(1)
preserves, intact, its right to grant licences in respect of its own
works. PPL is the owner of the copyrighted sound recordings
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assigned to it under Section 18(1), by operation of Section 18(2);
ergo, the proviso to Section 33(1) allows it to grant licences in
respect of the said assigned recordings, which are “its own works”
under the proviso, as it is the owner thereof.
19.27 PPL, thereby, seeks to interpret the proviso to Section 33(1) as
crafting out an exception from the rigour of Section 33(1).
19.28 With this, we come to the nub of the controversy, and may,
therefore, discontinue our journey through the statutory provisions.
***** ***** *****
20.5 The Copyright Act does not envisage grant of license in respect
of copyrighted sound recordings by any person other than the first
owner of such copyrighted recordings, or the assignee thereof under
Section 18. PPL is, unquestionably, the owner of the sound
recordings in its repertoire, of which copyright stands assigned to it
under Section 18(1). To that extent, PPL’s stand is unassailable. The
two Novex decisions would, therefore, grant him an absolute right to
issue licenses in respect of such recordings, on its own terms.
20.6 Such an interpretation would, however, undisputedly render the
words “except under or in accordance with the registration granted
under sub-section (3)”, in Section 33(1), completely otiose. Indeed,
Section 33(1) would be rendered completely redundant, as it is
intended only to introduce this restriction, on persons who desire to
carry on the business of issuing or granting licenses in respect of
copyrighted work
***** ***** *****
The sequitur
21. The position that ultimately obtains is, therefore, the following:
21.1. The obligation under Section 33(1) is absolute. Section 33(1)
requires any person, who carries on the business of granting
licensees in respect of copyrighted works, to do so in accordance
with the registration granted under Section 33(3).
21.2. Be it noted, this sub-section does not specifically state that the
person issuing or granting licensees must itself be registered as
copyright society under Section 33(3). The issuance of granting ofSignature Not Verified CS(COMM) 680/2024 Page 29 of 72
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licensees has only to be in accordance with the registration granted
under Section 33(3).
21.3. This is also apparent from the proviso to Section 33(3), which
ordinarily permits the Central Government to register only one
copyright society in respect of one class of works. Sound recordings
constitute a distinct and individual class of works under Section
2(y)(iii). Thus, ordinarily there would be only one registered
copyright society in respect of sound recordings. Such a registered
copyright society, we are informed, is already in existence in the
form of RMPL.
21.4. The word “carrying on the business of issuing or granting
licensees” in Section 33(1) would envisage every commercial
activity in which licensees in respect of copyrighted works are issued
or granted. There is no legitimate basis to read down the ambit of
the expression “carry on the business”, particularly the word
“business”.
21.5. In any event, it is an admitted position that PPL is engaged in
carrying on the business of issuing or granting of licensees in
respect of the sound recordings assigned to it by the original
copyright owners.
21.6. PPL can, therefore, issue or grant licensees in respect of the
sound recordings assigned to it, of which it can claim ownership
under Section 18(2), only in accordance with the registration
granted under Section 33(3).
21.7. The use of the words “consistent with his obligations as a
member of the registered copyright society”, contained in the
proviso to Section 33(1) are of great significance. They clearly
indicate that the legislature envisages any person who is granting
licensees in respect of copyrighted works as being a member of a
registered copyright society. It would be unrealistic and strained to
read the words “consistent with his obligations as a member of the
registered copyright society” as contained in the proviso to Section
33(1) as applying only to a situation in which the copyright owner
happens to be such a member. Clearly, at the cost of repetition, it is
clear that Section 33(1) envisages that the copyright owner, who is
issuing or granting licensees in respect of the copyrighted works of
which he is the owner, is a member of a registered copyright society.
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21.8. This interpretation would also harmonise with the well-settled
principle that a proviso to a section cannot derogate or detract from
the ambit of the section itself. It has to be read harmoniously with
the main section and cannot dilute its efficacy. [ Refer CST v. B.G.
Patal, 1995 Supp (1) SCC 429 : 1995 SCC (L&S) 504] The
requirement of any person engaged in the business of issuing or
granting licensees in respect of copyrighted works, contained in
Section 33(1) cannot, therefore, be diluted, much less eviscerated, by
the proviso thereto.
21.9. Thus, what the proviso permits is that such a member of a
registered copyright society, who may also be holding copyright in
respect of his own works which expression has necessarily to be
contradistinguished with the works of which he claims ownership
merely as an assignee under Section 18(2) has the right to grant
licensees in respect of such works. Even so, such grant of licensees
has to be consistent with the obligations of such a person as a
member of the registered copyright society.
21.10. Viewed any which way, therefore, there can be no escaping
the position that issuance or grant of licensees for exploiting of
works in respect of which a person claims copyright can only be
done if such person is a registered copyright society or a member of
a registered copyright society.
***** ***** *****
24.The corollary
24.1. We, therefore, are unable to accept the principle that PPL was
entitled, without either registering itself as a copyright society or
becoming a member of any registered copyright society, to issue
licensees in respect of the sound recordings assigned to it under
Section 18(1) of the Copyright Act.
24.2. One of the contentions advanced in the written submissions
filed by Azure is that, not being a registered copyright society or a
member of a registered copyright society, PPL has no enforceable
legal right in respect of the sound recordings assigned to it, insofar
as their communication to the public by third parties is concerned,
as PPL cannot grant any licensee for the said purpose in view of the
proscription contained in Section 33(1) of the Copyright Act. WeSignature Not Verified CS(COMM) 680/2024 Page 31 of 72
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have found prima facie merit in this contention. The further issue
that would arise would be whether, in such a situation, PPL can
maintain the suit at all. We refrain from returning any finding on this
contention, as it was not orally argued at the Bar. We, therefore,
leave this issue open.”
55. The learned Senior Counsel for the Defendants submitted that an ex-
parte Order dated 12.08.2024 for pro-tem security cannot be passed without
hearing the Defendants. Therefore, the direction to deposit the license fee of
₹20,00,000/- ought to be vacated.
56. Further, the Suit was filed only in the second week of August 2024,
i.e., after 7 months of theatrical release on 26.01.2024 and after five months
of OTT release in the first week of March 2024, hence, there is no need for
any urgent interim relief. In addition, the Plaintiff quoted an exorbitant fee
of ₹20,00,000/- a day before the theatrical release, when the Defendant had
actually approached the Plaintiff in December 2023. Therefore, the
Defendants could not have taken the steps to curb the already included
Original Works in the Impugned Film just a day before its release. Since the
relief sought in IA No. 36229/2024 for grant of interim relief includes an
alternative prayer of deposit of money equaling the license fee quoted by the
Plaintiff, there cannot be any irreparable harm / injury when the Plaintiff can
be compensated with the damages.
57. The learned Senior Counsel for the Defendants submitted that this
Court does not have territorial jurisdiction based upon Section 20(c) of the
CPC on the ground that the platform of Defendant No. 3 – Amazon Prime
can be accessed, viewed, and downloadable in Delhi, which hosts the
Impugned Film containing the Original Works and Section 20(b) of the CPC
on the ground that Defendant No. 3 is carrying on business in Delhi and
Section 62 of the Copyright Act on the ground that the Plaintiff has a
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subordinate office in Delhi. It was submitted that this is a classic case of
forum shopping as the registered place of business of both Defendant Nos. 1
and 2 is in Bengaluru, Karnataka. The theatrical release of the Impugned
Film in January 2024 was only in Karnataka and the Plaintiff waited for its
OTT release, FIR against Defendant Nos. 1 and 2 was filed by the Plaintiff
in Bengaluru, Karnataka and OTT release of the Impugned Film was in
Kannada language only with English closed captions, which is a mandatory
requirement under the Prime Video Digital License Agreement. Therefore,
the Plaintiff has avoided the jurisdiction of Courts in Karnataka by wrongly
filing the Suit before this Court.
58. In absence of the Plaintiff being in Delhi, it is required to specifically
plead that the act of the Defendants resulted in an injury or harm to the
Plaintiff within the forum state, i.e., the effects test and it is also mandatory
to show that the injurious effect has been felt by the Plaintiff by showing
that the viewers in the forum state were specifically targeted, i.e., the sliding
scale as held in Banayan Tree Holding (P) Limited v. A. Murli Krishna
Reddy & Anr., 2009 SCC OnLine Del 3780.
59. In view of the above, the Plaintiff is required to show that the
Defendants engaged in some commercial activity in the forum state by
targeting its website specifically at customers within Delhi and also plead
that the website was specifically targeted at the viewers in the forum state.
In the present case, the only basis for the Plaintiff to maintain the Suit within
the jurisdiction of this Court is availability of the Impugned Film on the
OTT Platform of Defendant No. 3. It was submitted by the learned Senior
Counsel for the Defendants that unlike the traditional push-based models
such as linear television or early server-side streaming, OTT platforms rely
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on client-driven protocols such as HTTP Live Streaming (HLS) and
Dynamic Adaptive Streaming over HTTP (DASH). These protocols segment
media into small chunks, which are requested by the user’s device just in
time for playback. Accordingly, the availability of content on OTT platforms
is based on subscription, search, payment, request and delivery. Accordingly,
the Defendants do not push content to any specific location or user. Instead,
the user initiates the transaction by subscribing, searching and streaming
without any solicitation or targeting by the Defendants. It is the user who
‘travels’ with his request to the place of origin. Reliance is placed on the
book ‘Digital Peripheries’ published in Springer Series in Media Industries,
wherein Chapter 4 deals with territoriality of copyright law. The extract
relied upon by the Defendants is reproduced as under:
“4.5 Place of Communicating Works to the Public
One problem with the chain of arguments above is that,
despite being normatively valid, they are pragmatically very
problematic for a number of reasons that have been forcefully
articulated not only by AG Bobek, but also in European and US
copyright doctrine (Trimble 2019; Torremans 2016). It might, then,
simply be a matter of time before the jurisdictional uncertainty,
generated by the possibility of cause of action for damages in every
EU Member State (not to mention the other approximately 150
Member States of the Berne Convention), is limited legislatively or
judicially and the whole chain of arguments leading to the
conclusion above regarding the link between copyrights and
geoblocking is broken.
Even more problematic is the fact that many online
distribution platforms for copyrighted content do not operate on the
basis of distributing copies (files) but instead use various streaming
technologies. In that case, there are no copies being de fure
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according to the aforementioned Interpretation of the existing case
law of the CJEUCopyrighted works, in this instance, are without doubt made
available to the public in terms of Art. 3 of Directive 2001/29/EC,
but the question is whether “the act of communication to the public
of their works, by wire or wireless means, including the making
available to the public of their works in such a way that members of
the public may access them from a place and at a time individually
chosen by them” physically takes place simultaneously in all
Member States (and ultimately in all states where the Internet is
accessible), or only in the country of origin (i.e., in the Member
State from which the work is being made available).
The answer to that question is relatively simple to find in the
wording of Art. 3 of Directive 2001/29/EC. This question is also
answered by the definition of the term “information society service”
as provided in Directive (EU) 2015/1535.12
It is a definitional element of “communication to the public”
that “the public” decides the place and time that copyrighted works
are accessed and viewed or in any other way used for personal
purposes (i.e., “non-used” in terms of the Berne treaty). The fact
that place and time of access is by definition out of the control of the
provider directly implies that the provider cannot be seen as using
the work within a territory which is arbitrarily chosen by the
consumer as a matter of legally irrelevant “non-using” of that work,Recently, the CJEU considered multiple cases in which
“communication to the public” was at stake, namely with regard to
indirect forms of communication of copyrighted works such as
linking (Savola 2017). Although these cases do not give an explicit
answer as to possible fora where such a use of copyrighted work can
be claimed, the actions were always determined to be in the country
of origin of the provider (i.e., never in any other jurisdiction where
such “communication to the public” was merely available).
The only remaining possibility for arguing that the
copyrighted work, when it is available through the Internet, is
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jurisdictions at the same time. This would mean that by making the
work available on the Internet, the provider legally broadcasts that
work in every jurisdiction where the work is accessible.
Besides the problem in such circumstances of finding the
particular places of broadcasting within every single jurisdiction
(e.g.. for the purpose of determining which particular court in that
jurisdiction would be entitled to hear the case), it is not even
possible to consider the communication to the public in this way as a
form of broadcasting. The reason is that copyrighted works are
made available on the Internet through services that are provided, in
legal terms, upon the individual request of a user.
Broadcasting typically consists of coverage of a certain
target group with a signal that can be refined by specific
technologies (receivers) into particular casts. In con-trast,
transmitting content over the Internet always technically requires an
individual request from a user. The ECJ (CJEU) acknowledged this
in case C-607/11, which considered the webcast of TV programs, by
noting that “[t]he software on the edge server creates a separate
stream for each user who requests a channel through it. An
individual packet of data leaving the edge server is thus addressed
to an individual user, not to a class of users.”
The key element of a webcast, i.e., the provision of the service
in response to an individual request by a user, means that any
distribution of content via the Internet is not a broadcast service but
rather an information society service, according to the meaning of
Art. 1(b) of Directive (EU) 2015/1535.
While the user of a broadcasting service only waits for the
signal to arrive at her doorstep, the user of an information society
service always individually requests service at the place from which
it is provided. Upon such a request, an individual connection is
always established. This individually established connection
normally involves not only transmitting the requested content, but
also mutual communication with the client device such as the
processing of cookies. But in broadcasting, all communication goes
only one way from the broadcaster to the (deemed) user.
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The nature of the communication, unidirectional versus
bidirectional, makes an important distinction between broadcasting
and information society service. It is not only a technicality that
information society service is based on direct communication
between the provider and a user. Besides the provider knowing about
each request and eventually even knowing in detail about the
individual behavior of each user (which might have massive
economic meaning), it is also significant that an information society
service must be dimensioned in order to individually cater to its
users. In broadcasting, there is no concern about too many viewers,
for example, while too many requests for an information society
service leads to a technical denial of that service.
Thus, in broadcasting, the signal is transmitted solely at the
will of the provider, while in information society service, the user
“travels” with her request to the place of origin. This, then, clearly
implies that an information society service that consists of making
content available for viewing is both technically and legally
provided from the country of origin. This has been the conclusion of
the ECJ (CJEU) in similar cases outside the copyright domain, such
as sui generis rights and personal data protection.”
60. In Padmanabh Shankar v. Union of India, Neutral Citation:
2019:KHC:28061-DB, it has been observed that:
“10. In this petition, we are dealing with what is available on the
internet. Broadly speaking, internet can be an said to be an
interconnected network which connects the computers across the
globe. It can be said to be an interconnected network of all the web-
servers worldwide. When we come to web-server, it is essentially a
program that uses Hyper Text Transfer of Protocol [http] to serve
the files that form web pages to the users which are provided in
response to their requests which are forwarded by http client on
their computers. There may be various films or serials transmitted
via internet. If we take into consideration the concept of internet and
how the internet operates, it is impossible to accept the submission
that the films or serials which are transmitted or exhibited through
internet will constitute films within the meaning of Clause (dd) of
Section 2 of the said Act of 1952. In fact, if we consider the concept
of internet, it is very difficult to accept the contention that through
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contemplates transfer of files in response to the requests made by the
users.”
61. In view of the above, it was submitted on behalf of the Defendants
that this Court does not have territorial jurisdiction to entertain the present
Suit. In addition, it was submitted that this Court lacks pecuniary
jurisdiction as the Plaintiff has failed to declare the specified value.
Admittedly, the Plaintiff has quoted license fee of ₹20,00,000/- and not
justified the damages sought of ₹2,00,00,000. The Suit is not maintainable
due to failure by the Plaintiff to fulfill the twin conditions under the CC Act,
which requires that the suit being commercial in nature as per Section
2(1)(c) of the CC Act and the dispute must be of a specified value, which is
the market value of the concerned intellectual property. Reliance was placed
on Fine Footwear Private Limited v. Sketchers U.S.A. Inc. & Ors., Neutral
Citation: 2019:KHC:24569, and K.D. Gold and Diamonds Private Limited
v. Khimji & Sons, 2022(III) ILR-CUT 734. Accordingly, it was prayed that
IA No.40421/2024 under Order VII Rule 10 of the CPC be allowed and the
Plaint be returned for lack of territorial and pecuniary jurisdiction.
62. As regards IA No.40876/2024 under Order XXXIX Rule 2A read with
Section 151 of the CPC for willful disobedience of the Order dated
12.08.2024, the learned Senior Counsel for Defendant Nos. 1 and 2 relied
upon the affidavit dated 31.10.2025 filed by Defendant No. 2 for himself
and in his capacity as the authorized representative of Defendant No. 1
stating that the Defendants have never intended to disobey or disregard any
direction passed by this Court and they believed that since an Application
for modification of the Order dated 12.08.2024 was filed seeking an order to
keep in abeyance the direction to deposit ₹20,00,000/- till the disposal of the
interim injunction Application, the amount of ₹20,00,000/- was not
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deposited within a stipulated period as per the Order dated 12.08.2024. It is
further stated in the said affidavit that the Defendants deeply regret any
inconvenience or misunderstanding caused to this Court on account of the
said delay in submitting the security amount. It is stated in the said affidavit
that the Defendants hold this Court and its orders in the highest regard and
have always endeavored to act in complete consonance with its directions
and they are committed to ensuring their scrupulous compliance at all times,
both in letter and spirit. The said affidavit further states that to rectify any
inadvertent lapse, Defendant Nos. 1 and 2 have deposited the ordered
amount of ₹20,00,000/- by way of a demand draft dated 20.10.2025 before
the Registrar General of this Court.
63. In view of the above, it was submitted on behalf of the Defendants
that IA No.36229/2024 seeking interim relief and IA No.40876/2024 seeking
punishment for Defendant Nos. 1 and 2 for committing contempt of the
Order dated 12.08.2024 filed by the Plaintiff be dismissed and the Plaint be
returned as prayed in IA No. 40421/2024 and the Order dated 12.08.2024 be
vacated as prayed for in IA No. 22870/2025 filed by Defendant Nos. 1
and 2.
REJOINDER SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PLAINTIFF:
64. The learned Senior Counsel for the Plaintiff submitted that the
Defendants are estopped from challenging the ownership of the Plaintiff in
the Original Works as the Defendants admittedly approached the Plaintiff for
a license for the use of the Original Works in the Impugned Film. The
Plaintiff quoted a license fee for such usage, and the Defendants did not
revert with any counteroffer but went ahead and used the Plaintiff’s Original
Works with no intimation to the Plaintiff. Having approached the Plaintiff
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for a license and brazenly used the Plaintiff’s Original Works, the
Defendants are estopped from questioning the copyright ownership of the
Plaintiff.
65. The learned Senior Counsel for the Plaintiff submitted that the
reliance placed on Azure Hospitality (supra) by the Defendants to contend
that only copyright societies have the right to licensed work is misconceived
and contrary to the scheme of the Copyright Act.
66. It was submitted that a copyright society or internationally known as
‘collective society’ is a system of collective administration of the rights of
the owners whereby the right owners authorize one or more collective
societies to grant license on behalf of the right owners. Such societies
generally grant blanket licenses for a society’s entire repertoire on a take-it-
or-leave-it basis and, thereafter, distribute the royalties to its members as it is
difficult for the right owners to exercise their rights individually.
67. It was submitted that in Azure Hospitality (supra), the Phonographic
Performance Limited (“PPL”) was solely engaged in the business of issuing
licenses for public performance of sound recordings on the basis of
assignments granted to it by its various member record labels. Although PPL
was not registered as a copyright society under the Copyright Act, it was
carrying on the business of collective licensing akin to a copyright society
and thus, in that context, it was held that it could not issue licenses without
being registered as copyright society or being a member of the copyright
society.
68. It was submitted on behalf of the Plaintiff that in stark contrast to
PPL, the Plaintiff’s business is not of a copyright society or an association of
persons, who is solely in the business of issuing or granting licenses for
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works of others. The Plaintiff is a music record label, which is engaged in
the business of acquisition and production of sound recordings and films,
and, therefore, the Plaintiff is an individual copyright owner. The Plaintiff
does not have any members on whose behalf the Plaintiff issues licenses for
the Copyrighted Works. The Plaintiff grants licenses for its own Copyrighted
Works in its individual capacity and not on behalf of anyone else. Therefore,
the decision in the case of Azure Hospitality (supra) is not applicable to the
facts of the present case as the same apply to entities like PPL and not to the
owners of the copyright.
69. The learned Senior Counsel for the Plaintiff submitted that Section 33
of the Copyright Act is only restricted to copyright societies and their
management. As Section 33 of the Copyright Act was introduced by virtue
of the Copyright (Amendment) Act, 1994 to regulate the management of
copyright societies, it did not curtail the power of the copyright owners to be
able to grant licenses of their works in their individual capacity as per
Section 30 of the Copyright Act. Reliance was placed on Novex
Communication (supra), which further held that the carrying on business of
granting licenses cannot be excluded from Section 30 of the Copyright Act,
particularly when such granting of licenses is by the owner of the copyright.
70. It was submitted on behalf of the Plaintiff that the mandate of the
Copyright Act was never to preclude owners like the Plaintiff from
exercising their rights in their own copyrighted works. Further, Section
34(1)(b) of the Copyright Act permits the owner of the copyright to
withdraw the authorization given to a copyright society, which means that
the owner can independently exercise their rights under Section 30 of the
Copyright Act to grant licenses as they deem appropriate. This provision
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was not considered by the Court in Azure Hospitality (supra) as the issue
therein was regarding PPL’s ability to issue licenses without being a
registered copyright society and not regarding the individual licenses that
can be granted by the owners of the copyright.
71. The learned Senior Counsel for the Plaintiff submitted that admittedly,
the Impugned Film and the social media post, which reshares the clips
containing the Original Works are accessible and downloadable within the
jurisdiction of this Court amounting to communication of the Plaintiff’s
Copyrighted Works within this Court’s jurisdiction. Therefore, the Act of
infringement of Plaintiff’s copyright is taking place within the jurisdiction of
this Court. Further, Defendant No. 3 has provided New Delhi as the address
for service provider and contact information. Therefore, the cause of action
has arisen within the jurisdiction of this Court. Reliance was placed on Zee
Entertainment Enterprises Limited v. Mohalla Tech Private Limited,
Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:11002 and Sun Pharmaceutical Industries
Limited v. Artura Pharmaceuticals P. Ltd., Neutral Citation:
2025:DHC:10348.
72. It was submitted on behalf of the Plaintiff that the decision in
Banayan Tree Holding (supra) is not applicable in the facts of the present
case as it is a case of infringement of copyright and not a trade mark
infringement. Unlike a trade mark case where an imminent threat of a
commercial transaction gives rise to a cause of action in the forum state, in
the suit for infringement of copyright the cause of action arises in the forum
state where the infringement of the copyright takes place. In copyright cases,
streaming of copyrighted work constitutes communication to the public and
inasmuch as the Impugned Film is accessible within the jurisdiction of this
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Court, it will give jurisdiction to this Court as held in Nilesh Girkar (supra).
“Targeting” as founded in Banayan Tree Holding (supra) need not be an
aggressive act of marketing aimed at set of customers a mere looming
presence in a geography and the ability to access website is sufficient as held
in Tata Sons (P) Ltd. v. Hakunamatata Tata Founders & Ors., 2022 SCC
OnLine Del 2968.
73. Further, the decision in Padmanabh Shankar (supra) is
distinguishable as the same was in context of a writ petition in relation to
interpretation of the provisions of Cinematograph Act, 1952 and no issue of
territorial jurisdiction was involved qua copyright infringement. Further, the
Chapter in the book Digital Peripheries relied upon by the Defendants is not
authoritative as it does not consider or apply Indian law and mostly focus on
EU law which does not have equivalent provision of Section 20(c) of the
CPC.
74. It was further submitted on behalf of the Plaintiff that the Plaint has to
be read as a whole on demurrer and the Plaintiff being master of the Suit is
entitled to value its reliefs and it is the nature of the relief claimed in the
Plaint that is decisive of the question of Suit valuation and not the market
value of the property. Reliance was placed on Bharat Bhushan Gupta v.
Pratap Narain Verma & Anr., (2022) 8 SCC 333. It was also submitted that
when there exists no objective standards the Plaintiff has right to value the
relief claimed according to its own estimation and such valuation has to be
ordinarily accepted by the Court when no objective standard exists to
determine the precise amount of damages and, accordingly, the bona fide
and provisional valuation made by the Plaintiff must be ordinarily accepted
as held in Envitech Consultants India Private Limited v. Rudrabhishek
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Enterprises Limited & Ors., Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:10351. It was
submitted that given the intangible nature of intellectual property, it is
difficult to estimate the value of the relief to be claimed based on the
damages incurred from its infringement as calculating the damages require
judicial consideration and whether a party is entitled to damages cannot be
decided at a preliminary stage even before the trial has commenced as held
in Nandita Bose v. Ratanlal Nahata, (1987) 3 SCC 705.
75. The learned Senior Counsel for the Plaintiff relied upon Rule 20 of
the Delhi High Court Intellectual Property Rights Division Rules, 2022
(“IPD Rules”) that provides a list of factors to be considered while
determining the quantum of damages which include loss of profits suffered
by the injured party, profits earned by the infringing party, quantum of
income which the injured party may have earned through royalties / license
fees had the use of the subject IPR been duly authorized, duration of the
infringement, degree of intention / neglect underlying the infringement and
conduct of the infringing party to mitigate the damages being incurred by
the injured party. In view of the complex nature of this exercise, the said
Rule provides that the Court may take the assistance of an expert to compute
damages. Accordingly, in the present case, the Plaintiff has stated that the
losses both in business and reputation of the Plaintiff are incapable of being
assessed in monetary terms and tentatively valued at ₹2,00,01,000 as the
Plaintiff does not have access to the accounts of the Defendants to estimate
the profits earned by them through the Impugned Film and the Defendants
have been exploiting the Plaintiff’s Original Works till date through different
mediums.
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76. It was further submitted on behalf of the Plaintiff that the Defendants
reshared the clips of the scenes containing the Original Works on the social
media platforms and also made provocative statements against the Plaintiff
by calling the license fee requirement as being harassment by the Plaintiff.
Given the popularity and fan following of Defendant No. 2, the harm caused
to the Plaintiff has been amplified both economically and reputationally. It
was submitted that the Defendants’ conduct has a cascading effect which
actively encourages others not to take a license. Therefore, the infringement
by the Defendants is willful.
77. It was submitted that the Plaintiff has met the twin requirements of the
Suit being commercial and declaration of specified value under the
provisions of the CC Act and, therefore, the decision of Fine Footwear
(supra) and K.D. Gold (supra) are distinguishable.
78. It was also submitted that the license fee quoted at the initial pre-
infringement stage cannot be equated to damages post-infringement. The
willful infringement by the Defendants of the Plaintiff’s Original Works
coupled with the willful disobedience of the Order dated 12.08.2024, makes
it a fit case for enhanced, aggravated and punitive damages. Reliance was
placed on Adobe v. Namase Patel & Ors., 2022 SCC OnLine Del 4190,
wherein looking at the conduct of the Defendants, this Court had granted
damages of ₹2,00,00,000, which were intended to be deterrent in nature. It
was submitted that at this stage, the Court cannot decide the quantum of
damages and the Plaintiff will be entitled to prove the same at the stage of
trial of the Suit.
79. The learned Senior Counsel for the Plaintiff submitted that the
Defendants have wrongly argued that the Plaintiff’s copyright in Original
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Works lapsed as on the date of filing of the Suit by virtue of Section 19(4) of
the Copyright Act as the Defendants have no locus to make this argument
not being assigners of such right. It was submitted that the assignment does
not automatically get revoked unless the assigner exercises its right under
Section 19(A)(1) of the Copyright Act for revocation of the assignment. The
Defendants being a third party cannot invoke Section 19(4) of the Copyright
Act as it is only the assigner’s prerogative to have the assignment revoked. It
is settled law that a stranger to a contract cannot alter the legal obligations of
the parties to the contract as held in Suraj Mal Ram Niwas Oil Mills Private
Limited v. United India Insurance Company Limited & Anr., (2010) 10
SCC 567.
80. It was further submitted that Clause 9 of Assignment Deed between
the Plaintiff and the Master Recording Company, Sangeetha, provides that
all rights transferred therein will be in perpetuity and, therefore, Section
19(4) of the Copyright Act is not applicable as the parties have expressly
agreed that the Plaintiff can exercise its right in agreement at any time.
81. The learned Senior Counsel for the Plaintiff submitted that the
Defendants’ contention that the definition of “musical works” as it existed
prior to 1994 would apply to Plaintiff’s musical works as the work was
created in 1980s is misconceived as the cause of action of the Suit and the
enforcement of the Plaintiff’s rights in its musical works has arisen in 2024
and, therefore, the definition under the current Copyright Act would be
applicable. Further, the definition of “musical works” in the Copyright Act
was specifically amended in 1994 to ensure that the musical work was not
restricted to works recorded in graphical notation or even those reduced to
material form in any manner in order to extend the copyright protection
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effectively to Indian musical works. In A.R. Rahman v. Ustad Faiyaz
Wasifuddin Dagar and Ors., 2025 SCC OnLine Del 6159, the Division
Bench of this Court has examined the 1994 amendments to the definition of
“musical work” and specifically noted that fixation in writing was not a
requirement under the copyright law and would be contrary to the legislative
intent if its requirement was introduced indirectly.
82. It was submitted on behalf of the Plaintiff that merely because the
Plaintiff sought the alternative relief of deposit of money, the Plaintiff is not
disentitled from its primary relief of injunction as the said prayer for deposit
was made without prejudice. The Defendants’ act of infringement will
embolden third parties to freely infringe copyright of the Plaintiff. It is a
settled law that an alternative prayer cannot be construed as a waiver or
abandonment of the main relief in the suit as the alternative prayer is the
relief which is claimed by the party if the party is found to be not entitled to
the principle relief claimed in the Suit as held in M.K. Sehgal v. Mohinder
Kaur, 2006 SCC OnLine Del 579. It was also submitted that the belated
payment of ₹20,00,000/- deposited in the Court may be appropriately
purposed as this Court may deem fit.
REBUTTAL SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANTS:
83. The learned Senior Counsel for the Defendants submitted that the
presence of Defendant No. 3 in Delhi does not automatically attract the
jurisdiction of this Court under Section 20(c) of the CPC. The present Suit
involves a joinder of three Defendants, of whom only Defendant No. 3 is
alleged to have a subordinate office in Delhi and, accordingly, the present
case falls within the ambit of Section 20(b) of the CPC, which mandates that
where one of several defendants resides or carries on business within the
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jurisdiction of the Court, the plaintiff is required to obtain leave of the Court
before instituting a suit. As no leave has been sought or granted in the
present case, this Court does not have territorial jurisdiction. Further,
Defendant Nos. 1 and 2 have not acquiesced or consented to the institution
of this Suit in Delhi and consequently, the Plaintiff cannot rely on Defendant
No. 2’s limited presence to circumvent jurisdictional requirements or to
arrogate jurisdiction to this Court.
84. It was further submitted that the reliance by the Plaintiff on Nilesh
Girkar (supra) was misplaced as the factual matrix of the present case is
wholly different. The facts of the present case show that the theatrical
release of the Impugned Film was done solely in the State of Karnataka and
it was released on OTT in Kannada language, the FIR filed by the Plaintiff’s
representative in Bengaluru mentioning the place of occurrence of offence
as Bengaluru, Karnataka. This shows that the Defendants never purposefully
availed itself of the jurisdiction of this Court. Reliance was placed on Indian
Performing Rights Society Limited v. Sanjay Dalia and Another, (2015) 10
SCC 161, to submit that merely on the basis of OTT streaming the Plaintiff
can sue at far flunk places irrespective of the majority of the cause of action
happening at its principal place of business in the State of Karnataka, which
is the principal place of business of the Defendants as well as the Plaintiff.
Further, reliance was placed on Escorts Limited v. Tejpal Singh Sisodia,
2019 SCC OnLine Del 7607. Further, the Division Bench of this Court in
Nilesh Girkar (supra) was not considering the test of online infringement
via OTT platforms, which is different than the test of online infringement
via open-sourced websites as laid down in Banayan Tree Holding (supra).
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85. The learned Senior Counsel for the Defendants submitted that the
assertion of the Plaintiff that it is not in the business of licensing is contrary
to the pleadings of the Plaintiff. Hence, the argument of the Plaintiff lies in
the teeth of its own categorical averments, and the Plaintiff cannot be
allowed to resile from or contradict its own pleadings. Therefore, the
judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in Azure Hospitality (supra) is
totally applicable to the present facts and circumstances. Accordingly, once
the statutory framework under Sections 33, 34, 54 and 55 of the Copyright
Act is correctly appreciated, it becomes evident that the Plaintiff is not
competent in law to maintain a copyright infringement action in respect of
the Original Works as the Plaintiff’s entire case is based on the premise that
it exploits the Original Works through licensing, however, Section 33
mandates that the business of issuing or granting licenses can be carried out
only through a registered copyright society, which alone is vested with
exclusive authorization under Section 34 of the Copyright Act and is deemed
to be the owner of copyright under Section 54 of the Copyright Act for the
purpose of enforcement of Section 55 of the Copyright Act. As the Plaintiff
is not a copyright society, it lacks the statutory capacity to issue licenses,
administer rights, or claim infringement of rights as the same can be
exercised exclusively through a copyright society.
86. It was further submitted that without prejudice to the foregoing, the
Plaintiff has been insisting that the sum of ₹20,00,000/- be deposited before
this Court being the license fee chargeable by the Plaintiff, which has duly
been deposited by Defendant Nos. 1 and 2. In view of the same and
considering the alternative prayer contained in its Application, wherein the
Plaintiff explicitly sought a direction for deposit of ₹20,00,000/-, Defendant
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MAYEE SAHU
Signing Date:31.03.2026
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Nos. 1 and 2 may not be injuncted from displaying the Original Works in the
Impugned Film on the OTT platform of Defendant No. 3 as the Plaintiff is
not entitled to alter its stand and submit that it no longer presses for such
deposit and instead an injunction against the use of the Original Works be
granted.
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS:
87. Having considered the submissions made on behalf of the Parties, the
following Issues arise for determination in these Applications:
i. Whether the Plaintiff is the owner of copyright in the Original
Works?
ii. Whether the Defendants usage of the Original Works falls
under the category of fair use and de minimis?
iii. Whether the Plaintiff, not being a registered copyright society
or a member of a copyright society, entitled to issue a license
for usage of the Original Works as per Section 33 of the
Copyright Act?
iv. Whether the Original Works is an original and an independent
work?
v. Whether the Plaintiff’s copyright in Original Works had lapsed
on the date of the Suit as per Section 19(4) of the Copyright
Act?
vi. Whether graphical representation of musical works is a
requirement under the Copyright Act?
vii. Whether the license fee demanded by the Plaintiff was
excessive, unreasonable or exorbitant and if there was any
delay in communicating the same?
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viii. Whether this Court has territorial jurisdiction to entertain the
present Suit?
ix. Whether this Court has pecuniary jurisdiction to entertain the
present Suit?
x. Whether the Plaintiff is entitled to the relief of injunction as
prayed?
xi. Whether the Defendants have committed willful disobedience
of order dated 12.08.2024 and if so, the consequences?
Ownership of the Plaintiff in copyright of the Original Works
88. The Plaintiff has submitted that the Plaintiff is the exclusive owner of
the copyright in the Original Works pursuant to the Assignment Deed from
the Master Recording Company, Sangeetha, and the agreements between the
producers of the film “Gaali Maathu” and “Nyaya Ellide” showing that the
rights were transferred to Sangeetha. Additionally, the Plaintiff has also
produced documents to show that Sangeetha was the original owner of the
music rights in the songs of the films “Gaali Maathu” and “Nyaya Ellide”
before the transfer and assignment to the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff has also
produced documents showing Sangeetha as a publisher of the music in both
the said films.
89. Admittedly, the Defendant Nos. 1 and 2 approached the Plaintiff for
obtaining a license for the Original Works. This indicates that, prior to the
theatrical release of the Impugned Film, the Defendants were aware that the
Plaintiff held copyright ownership in the Original Works. Nonetheless, the
Defendants chose not to secure a license from the Plaintiff and proceeded to
utilize the Original Works in the Impugned Film, which is now accessible to
the public.
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MAYEE SAHU
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90. The Defendants have used the Original Works without taking the
license from the Plaintiff or any other third party as part of the Impugned
Film. Further, the Defendants have not claimed any ownership of the
copyright of the Original Works. On the contrary, the Plaintiff has the prior
assignment from Sangeetha, which is shown to be the original owner of the
Original Works since the 1980s. Accordingly, the presumption under Section
55(2) of the Copyright Act would apply in the present case. Section 55(2) of
the Copyright Act is reproduced as under:
“55. Civil remedies for infringement of copyright.–
(1) …
(2) Where, in the case of a literary, dramatic, musical or artistic
work, [or, subject to the provisions of sub-section (3) of section 13, a
cinematograph film or sound recording, a name purporting to be
that of the author, or the publisher, as the case may be, of that work,
appears] on copies of the work as published, or, in the case of an
artistic work, appeared on the work when it was made, the person
whose name so appears or appeared shall, in any proceeding in
respect of infringement of copyright in such work, be presumed,
unless the contrary is proved, to be the author or the publisher of the
work, as the case may be.”
91. In the absence of any contrary evidence led by the Defendants, it is
presumed that Sangeetha is the original owner of the Original Works and the
Plaintiff, being assignee of Sangeetha, is clearly has the copyright in the
Original Works as held in Super Cassettes (supra) and Saregama India
(supra).
92. The contention of the Defendants that the Plaintiff has not been able
to show the chain of ownership as the documents produced by the Plaintiff
only show assignment from Sangeetha to the Plaintiff, however, no
assignment of rights was shown from the authors of the Original Works to
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MAYEE SAHU
Signing Date:31.03.2026
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Sangeetha as the said documents only show the transfer of the rights from
the producer of the films and not from the owner of the literary and musical
works in the Original Works as the same belong to the respective authors
and composers. However, perusal of the Assignment Deed shows that the
Plaintiff is the assignee of all rights in the sound recordings, audio-visual
songs, underlying literary, dramatic and musical works in the entire
catalogue mentioned therein. Further, the assignment agreements in favour
of Sangeetha clearly mention that Sangeetha is assignee of the copyright in
the cinematograph films, original recording of any music or musical,
literary, dramatic and / or artistic works as incorporated in the
cinematograph films. Therefore, the argument of the Defendants that
Sangeetha did not have right in the literary and musical works in the
Original Works is prima facie not tenable.
93. From the documents produced by the Plaintiff on record, it is
established prima facie that the Plaintiff is the copyright owner of the
Original Works.
Fair / de minimis use of the Original Works
94. The Defendants have claimed that the use of the Original Works in the
Impugned Film falls within the category of fair and “de minimis” use. As per
the Defendants, the song “Nyaya Ellide” is used only for 7 seconds in a
scene in the background, whereas the song “Omme Ninnanu” is used for 31
seconds in another scene in the Impugned Film.
95. The Defendants have explained the intent for using the Original
Works in the Impugned Film to create a scene wherein the song “Nyaya
Ellide” is played on the TV when the housemaid of the protagonist was
eating popcorn and crying while watching the TV and the protagonist is seen
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MAYEE SAHU
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standing in the balcony. It was contended that the idea was to give a
reference by playing a song in the background and as a part of creativity to
show the suffering of the protagonist of the Impugned Film and his plight.
96. It is stated that the meaning of “Nyaya Ellide” is “where is the
justice?” and it appears that the Defendants have carefully chosen this well-
known song to further the script of the Impugned Film.
97. Similarly, the song “Omme Ninnanu” is used for 31 seconds in a
scene of the Impugned Film to show that the protagonist is going in a
flashback memory during his school days, wherein his classmate is shown
reciting a version of this song in her classroom. It is stated by the
Defendants that the idea of the Defendants was to give a reference by
playing a song which matches the script of the Impugned Film.
98. The foregoing justifications demonstrate that the Defendants made an
informed decision when selecting these two songs, which are neither
incidental nor irrelevant to the script or plot of the Impugned Film. Their
selections were purposeful and intentional, as reflected in their stated
position.
99. The Defendants’ reliance on fair use and the principle of “de minimis”
must be evaluated with regard not only to the duration of use, but also to the
intent and way the material was utilized. The application of the “de minimis”
or fair use standard is determined primarily by qualitative aspects rather than
quantitative measures. In Shemaroo Entertainment (supra), it was
concluded that, considering the nature of the activity–which constituted the
defendant’s primary revenue source–the burden rests with the defendant to
demonstrate that the use of copyrighted material occurred within their
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MAYEE SAHU
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ordinary and regular course of business in order for such use to be condoned
under the “de minimis” principle.
100. In Ramsampath (supra), the Court injuncted the use of six seconds of
the work, which demonstrates that the mere duration of the infringement is
not relevant and the Court has to examine the size and type of the harm
likely to be caused to the Plaintiff for considering whether the use of the
Original Works was “de minimis”.
101. As the use of the Original Works was not incidental or irrelevant to
the script of the Impugned Film, it is evident that the Defendants have
consciously selected the Original Works and, therefore, it was necessary for
the Defendants to take a license from the Plaintiff similar to the license
taken by the Defendants from Saregama India Limited for Saregama’s song
for 12 seconds and 30 seconds each.
102. The reliance placed by the Defendants on India TV (supra) is not
relevant to the facts of the present case as the song in question in the said
case was only incidental to the advertisement, which was for consumer
awareness and not for the financial gain of the advertiser.
103. The Plaintiff has relied upon Section 14(d)(i)(A) of the Copyright Act,
which provides that even a photograph of any image forming part thereof
would be covered within the meaning of copyright in case of a
cinematographic film. Hence, the Defendants were not entitled to use even a
single frame of the Original Works without the permission of the Plaintiff.
104. In view of the above, the use of the Original Works by the Defendants
does not fall in the exception of fair use and the principle of “de minimis”.
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MAYEE SAHU
Signing Date:31.03.2026
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Necessity to be a registered copyright society or member thereof by the
Plaintiff
105. The Defendants have submitted that the Plaintiff has no right to issue
a license for the Original Works as the Plaintiff is not a registered copyright
society as per Section 33 of the Copyright Act.
106. Section 33 of the Copyright Act provides as under:
“33. Registration of Copyright society.–
(1) No person or association of persons shall, after coming into
force of the Copyright (Amendment) Act, 1994 (38 of 1994)
commence or, carry on the business of issuing or granting licences
in respect of any work in which copyright subsists or in respect of
any other rights conferred by this Act except under or in accordance
with the registration granted under sub-section (3):
Provided that an owner of copyright shall, in his individual capacity,
continue to have the right to grant licences in respect of his own
works consistent with his obligations as a member of the registered
copyright society:
[Provided further that the business of issuing or granting licence in
respect of literary, dramatic, musical and artistic works
incorporated in a cinematograph films or sound recordings shall be
carried out only through a copyright society duly registered under
this Act:
Provided also] that a performing rights society functioning in
accordance with the provisions of section 33 on the date
immediately before the coming into force of the Copyright
(Amendment) Act, 1994 (38 of 1994) shall be deemed to be a
copyright society for the purposes of this Chapter and every such
society shall get itself registered within a period of one year from the
date of commencement of the Copyright (Amendment) Act, 1994.
(2) Any association of persons who fulfils such conditions as may be
prescribed may apply for permission to do the business specified in
sub-section (1) to the Registrar of Copyrights who shall submit the
application to the Central Government.
(3) The Central Government may, having regard to the interests of
the authors and other owners of rights under this Act, the interest
and convenience of the public and in particular of the groups of
persons who are most likely to seek licences in respect of theSignature Not Verified CS(COMM) 680/2024 Page 56 of 72
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MAYEE SAHU
Signing Date:31.03.2026
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relevant rights and the ability and professional competence of the
applicants, register such association of persons as a copyright
society subject to such conditions as may be prescribed:
Provided that the Central Government shall not ordinarily register
more than one copyright society to do business in respect of the
same class of works.
[(3A) The registration granted to a copyright society under sub-
section (3) shall be for a period of five years and may be renewed
from time to time before the end of every five years on a request in
the prescribed form and the Central Government may renew the
registration after considering the report of Registrar of Copyrights
on the working of the copyright society under section 36:
Provided that the renewal of the registration of a copyright society
shall be subject to the continued collective control of the copyright
society being shared with the authors of works in their capacity as
owners of copyright or of the right to receive royalty:
Provided further that every copyright society already registered
before the coming into force of the Copyright (Amendment) Act,
2012 (27 of 2012) shall get itself registered under this Chapter
within a period of one year from the date of commencement of the
Copyright (Amendment) Act, 2012.](4) The Central Government may, if it is satisfied that a copyright
society is being managed in a manner detrimental to the interests of
the [authors and other owners of right] concerned, cancel the
registration of such society after such inquiry as may be prescribed.
(5) If the Central Government is of the opinion that in the interest of
the [authors and other owners of right] concerned [or for non-
compliance of sections 33A, sub-section (3) of section 35 and
section 36 or any change carried out in the instrument by which the
copyright society is established or incorporated and registered by
the Central Government without prior notice to it], it is necessary so
to do, it may, by order, suspend the registration of such society
pending inquiry for such period not exceeding one year as may be
specified in such order under sub-section (4) and that Government
shall appoint an administrator to discharge the functions of the
copyright society”
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Signed By:SWATI
MAYEE SAHU
Signing Date:31.03.2026
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107. It is the case of the Defendants that the Plaintiff not being a registered
copyright society under Section 33 of the Copyright Act, it cannot carry on
the business of licensing the copyrightable works. It is only the registered
copyright society that can carry on the business of issuing or granting
licenses in respect of any work in which copyright subsists or in respect of
any other rights conferred by the Copyright Act. For carrying on the
business of issuing or granting license, the person or association of persons
have to register as a copyright society in terms of Section 33(3) of the
Copyright Act.
108. It is submitted on behalf of the Defendants that the Plaintiff is
primarily in the business of issuing license of the copyright in the repertoire
of the Plaintiff as admitted by the Plaintiff in the Plaint itself. The
Defendants have relied upon the decision in Azure Hospitality (supra) to
submit that any person who grants licenses to others to exploit sound
recordings in which such person holds a copyright can be said to be carrying
on business of issuing and granting such license and, therefore, the Plaintiff
is required to register itself before being able to issue license for the Original
Works.
109. The Plaintiff has contended that Section 33 of the Copyright Act only
regulates the management of copyright societies and reserves the right of the
owner of the copyright to grant licenses in his individual capacity.
Accordingly, the owner of copyright is not excluded from issuing license in
respect of the copyrighted works owned by the owner himself. It was
submitted on behalf of the Plaintiff that Azure Hospitality (supra) deals with
the issue of right to license the work by copyright societies on behalf of the
copyright owners and thereafter distribute the royalties to its members. In
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MAYEE SAHU
Signing Date:31.03.2026
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the said case PPL was carrying the business of collective licensing without
being registered as a copyright society under Section 33 of the Copyright
Act, whereas the Plaintiff is the assignee of the Original Works in terms of
the Assignment Deed and is, therefore, entitled to issue license in its
individual capacity without registering itself as a copyright society under
Section 33 of the Copyright Act.
110. In view of the above, it is clear that Section 33 of the Copyright Act
does not prohibit the individual copyright owners or assignees to issue
licenses of the copyrighted works owned by or assigned to them. As the
Plaintiff is not in the business of issuing or granting licenses in respect of the
works in which the copyright subsists, the Plaintiff is not required to register
itself as a copyright society as the Plaintiff is entitled to issue the license in
its individual capacity being the owner of the copyright in the Original
Works.
111. Hence, the objection of the Defendants with regard to the necessity of
the Plaintiff being a registered copyright society for being able to issue
licenses in respect of the copyright in the Original Works is rejected being
misplaced. Furthermore, the fact that Defendant Nos. 1 and 2 had
approached the Plaintiff for grant of license of the Original Works shows
that their objection that it is necessary for the Plaintiff to be a registered
copyright society is entirely an afterthought.
Original Works not being original and independent work
112. The Defendants have submitted that the film, “Nyaya Ellide” is not an
original work as it is merely a remake of Tamil Film “Sattam Oru Irrutarai”,
wherein the title of the song has an identical musical composition as that of
the Original Works and the cinematographic work is also identical.
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MAYEE SAHU
Signing Date:31.03.2026
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113. Per contra, the Plaintiff has submitted that the song “Nyaya Ellide” is
an original and independent work distinct from the Tamil Song “Sattam Oru
Irrutarai” as the audio-visual elements, musical composition and the
underlying literary works of both the songs are different.
114. The issue with regard to whether the Original Works are original and
independent works distinct from the previous Tamil Film requires
examination of evidence and at this prima facie stage, it is not possible for
this Court to determine the same. Further, the Defendants have only made
bald averments without producing any supporting material to appreciate the
objection raised by the Defendants. Hence, this objection of the Defendants
is rejected at this stage.
Lapse of copyright in the Original Works as per Section 19(4) of the
Copyright Act
115. The Defendants have submitted that the Plaintiff’s copyright in the
Original Works had lapsed as on the date of the Suit as per Section 19(4) of
the Copyright Act. Section 19(4) reads as under:
“19. Mode of assignment.–
(1) …
(2) …
(3) …
(4) Where the assignee does not exercise the rights assigned to him
under any of the other sub-sections of this section within a period of
one year from the date of assignment, the assignment in respect of
such rights shall be deemed to have lapsed after the expiry of the
said period unless otherwise specified in the assignment.”
116. As per Section 19(4) of the Copyright Act, the assignee has to
exercise the right assigned to him within a period of one year from the date
of assignment and failure to do so would result in deemed lapse of the
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Signed By:SWATI
MAYEE SAHU
Signing Date:31.03.2026
14:54:49
assignment after the expiry of one year unless it is specified in the
assignment otherwise.
117. The Plaintiff has submitted documentary evidence demonstrating their
use of the Original Works, which, prima facie, indicates continued usage
following assignment to the Plaintiff. Additionally, extracts from YouTube
dated 15.05.2021 and 16.06.2021 have been filed, evidencing exploitation of
the Original Works. This documentation establishes that Section 19(4) of the
Copyright Act is not applicable under the current circumstances.
Consequently, the Defendants’ objection regarding lapse of copyright due to
alleged non-use by the Plaintiff is deemed unfounded and is accordingly
rejected.
Requirement of graphical representation
118. The objection taken by the Defendants that as the Original Works
were conceived and released prior to the Copyright (Amendment) Act, 1994,
the same cannot be considered as a valid “musical work” in absence of the
Original Works being graphically produced or reduced to writing. The
Defendants have submitted that the definition of “musical work” in Section
2(p) of the Copyright Act as it stood prior to the amendment in 1994 will be
applicable to the Original Works and, therefore, the Original Works are not
“musical works” as the same are not printed, reduced to writing or otherwise
graphically produced or reproduced.
119. The Plaintiff has submitted that since the cause of action for the
present Suit arose subsequent to the 1994 amendment, the Copyright Act as
on the date of the cause of action would be applicable and, therefore, the
requirement of graphical representation is not essential for the Original
Works to acquire copyright protection as a “musical work”.
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MAYEE SAHU
Signing Date:31.03.2026
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120. In view of the above, the objection of the Defendants with regard to
the applicability of the definition of “musical work” as it stood prior to the
amendment of 1994 of the Copyright Act is rejected as the law on the date of
institution of this Suit would be applicable for granting protection to the
copyrighted work and not as on the date when such work was conceived or
released.
121. Accordingly, it is held that there is no requirement for graphical
representation of the Original Works under the Copyright Act in view of the
definition of “musical work” post amendment of 1994.
Reasonableness and timing of the license fee demanded by the Plaintiff
122. The Defendants have claimed that the license fee demanded by the
Plaintiff was unreasonable, excessive and exorbitant. Further, it is stated by
the Defendants that the license fee was communicated only one day prior to
the theatrical release of the Impugned Film and, therefore, there was no time
available to Defendant Nos. 1 and 2 to negotiate the license fee with the
Plaintiff.
123. The Plaintiff has submitted that the license fee of ₹10,00,000/- per
song of the Original Works was reasonable as the same are classic evergreen
songs having extensive popularity across platforms. Further, the Plaintiff
being the copyright owner was entitled to quote the license fee as per the
market rates. As regards the timing, the Plaintiff has contended that it is
incorrect that the Defendants had made any telephonic enquiries around
December 2023 and the Plaintiff communicated the amount of license fee
only a day prior to the theatrical release of the Impugned Film as there is no
documentary evidence to show that the Defendants had approached the
Plaintiff in the month of December 2023.
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Signed By:SWATI
MAYEE SAHU
Signing Date:31.03.2026
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124. As regards the quantum of the license fee and the reasonableness
thereof, the Defendants have not given any justification for calling the
quoted license fee as unreasonable and exorbitant. The Defendants have also
not given any counteroffer to the Plaintiff if the Defendants found the offer
of the Plaintiff excessive. The fact that the Defendants themselves claim to
have approached the Plaintiff for grant of license for the Original Works
shows that the Defendants were aware that they are liable to take license
prior to using the Original Works in the Impugned Film. The conduct of the
Defendants demonstrates mala fide intent on behalf of the Defendants to not
pay anything to the Plaintiff for using the copyrighted Original Works
belonging to the Plaintiff by raising the objection with regard to
excessiveness of the license fee quoted by the Plaintiff.
125. As regards the timing of the offer by the Plaintiff, there is no evidence
produced by the Defendants to ascertain at this prima facie stage as to
whether the Defendants had approached the Plaintiff in December 2023. On
the contrary, the Plaintiff has produced screenshots of the communications
exchanged between the Plaintiff and Defendant Nos. 1 and 2 a day prior to
the theatrical release of the Impugned Film. In any event, it is inconceivable
that Defendant Nos. 1 and 2 would have incorporated the Original Works in
the Impugned Film only a month prior to its release. Therefore, the objection
of Defendant Nos. 1 and 2 that there was a delay in communicating the
license fee by the Plaintiff cannot be accepted. Furthermore, there was
sufficient time between the theatrical release and the release on the OTT
platforms of the Impugned Film, however, there was no communication
from Defendant Nos. 1 and 2 or any response to the messages sent by the
Plaintiff. This clearly shows that the objection with regard to the excessive
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MAYEE SAHU
Signing Date:31.03.2026
14:54:49
license fee and delayed communication thereof, is nothing but an
afterthought.
126. As vide Order dated 12.08.2024 this Court has directed deposit of
₹20,00,000/- towards the license fee quoted by the Plaintiff, which amount
has been belatedly deposited by Defendant Nos. 1 and 2, the issue with
regard to the reasonableness of the license fee can be determined at the final
stage of the Suit after the evidence is led by the Parties.
Pecuniary and territorial jurisdiction of this Court to entertain the
present Suit
127. The Defendants have contended that this Court does not have
territorial jurisdiction in accordance with Section 20(c) of the CPC solely on
the basis that the office of Defendant No. 3 is located in Delhi and the
Impugned Film can be accessed, viewed and downloaded within the
jurisdiction of this Court. It is further submitted on behalf of the Defendants
that the Plaintiff has indulged in forum shopping as the cause of action has
arisen in Bengaluru, Karnataka and the place of business of Defendant Nos.
1 and 2 is also in Bengaluru, Karnataka. In any event, the Defendants have
relied upon the nature of the OTT platforms to contend that the same is
based on subscription, search, payment, request and delivery and, therefore,
the availability of content on OTT platforms does not amount to specifically
targeting the viewers in Delhi. Accordingly, if the test of sliding scale laid
down in Banayan Tree Holding (supra) is applied to the facts of the present
case, there is no injury suffered by the Plaintiff as there was no specific
targeting of the viewers in the forum State. Accordingly, the Defendants
have sought return of the Plaint under Order VII Rule 10 of the CPC.
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MAYEE SAHU
Signing Date:31.03.2026
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128. The Plaintiff has submitted that this Court has jurisdiction as the
Impugned Film is accessible on the platform of Defendant No. 3. The
Plaintiff has relied upon Nilesh Girkar (supra) to submit that the Impugned
Film being available on the OTT platform of Defendant No. 3 is sufficient to
confer the jurisdiction under Section 20(c) of the CPC. The Plaintiff has also
relied upon Sholay Media (supra) and GE Power India (supra) to submit
that whenever there is an infringement of copyright, the cause of action
would arise and the Court where such cause of action has accrued,
howsoever minimal it may be, will have the jurisdiction irrespective of the
same content being available throughout the internet. The Plaintiff has also
relied upon Section 62 of the Copyright Act as the subordinate office of the
Plaintiff is also located within the jurisdiction of this Court as held in
Burger King (supra) and Elite Blenders (supra). Further, the Plaintiff has
submitted that the principles of forum convenience are not applicable in the
domestic civil suits governed by the CPC as held in Horlicks Limited
(supra). The Plaintiff has submitted that the decision in Banayan Tree
Holding (supra) is not applicable as the same was for infringement of trade
mark and not copyright. In addition, it was submitted on behalf of the
Plaintiff that “targeting” as found in Banayan Tree Holding (supra) is not
required to be an aggressive act of marketing and mere looming presence
and availability of the copyrighted works for access is sufficient as held in
Tata Sons (supra) and Sun Pharmaceutical (supra).
129. Upon consideration of the Parties’ submissions, it is pertinent to
review the arguments presented by the Defendants regarding the nature of
OTT platforms and whether content accessibility on these platforms
establishes jurisdiction for the Court where such access occurs. The
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MAYEE SAHU
Signing Date:31.03.2026
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Defendants assert that OTT platforms utilise client-driven protocols, such as
HLS and DASH, which segment media into smaller units delivered upon
user request during playback. As a result, the Defendants maintain that users
access content on OTT platforms through subscription, searches, and
explicit requests, rather than by any form of solicitation or targeting by the
Defendants. Furthermore, the Defendants referenced a chapter in the book
“Digital Peripheries,” which addresses the territoriality of copyright law and
differentiates between unidirectional and bidirectional communication.
130. The above arguments do not help the Defendants to contend that this
Court does not possess territorial jurisdiction as the availability of the
content on the OTT platforms is sufficient to confer jurisdiction on this
Court. This Court in Tata Sons (supra) and Sun Pharmaceutical (supra) has
held that the mere looming presence in a geography and ability of the
customers to access the content is sufficient.
131. Although OTT platforms provide content to subscribers without
specifically targeting individual viewers, the location where the content is
accessed determines where copyright infringement occurs. There is no
distinction between content availability on OTT platforms and other
websites concerning copyright violations. The mere accessibility of content
on OTT platforms by individuals within a Court’s territorial jurisdiction
establishes the jurisdiction of that Court over matters related to copyright
infringement.
132. In addition, the Plaintiff has relied upon Section 62 of the Copyright
Act as the Plaintiff’s subordinate office is located in Delhi as well as
Defendant No. 3 has its office in Delhi. Hence, this Court would have the
jurisdiction to hear and determine the present Suit.
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Signed By:SWATI
MAYEE SAHU
Signing Date:31.03.2026
14:54:49
133. The Defendants have also raised the issue with regard to lack of
pecuniary jurisdiction as there is no declaration of the specified value by the
Plaintiff. It was submitted by the Defendants that the Plaintiff has quoted
license fee of ₹20,00,000/- and not provided any justification for the
damages sought.
134. The Plaintiff has submitted that the Plaintiff is entitled to value its
relief and given the harm caused by the Defendants, the Plaintiff is entitled
to recover the losses suffered by the Plaintiff. In any event, the license fee is
above the specified value under the CC Act and there is no requirement to
specifically mention the same as the Plaint has to be read as a whole as held
in M/s Kranti Shop (supra).
135. Given that the present suit is commercial in nature and the amount in
dispute exceeds the prescribed minimum threshold, the objection regarding
this Court’s lack of pecuniary jurisdiction is not sustainable. Pursuant to the
IPD Rules, multiple factors are specified for determining the quantum of
damages, and the Court is authorised to seek expert assistance due to the
complexity involved in such assessments. Consequently, it cannot be
determined at this preliminary stage that the Plaintiff is not entitled to the
damages claimed, as this will be adjudicated after both Parties have had the
opportunity to present evidence. Provided the Suit is valued above the
mandatory minimum required to confer jurisdiction, the Plaint cannot be
returned on grounds of insufficient pecuniary jurisdiction at the outset.
Accordingly, the Defendants have not established any valid case for lack of
pecuniary jurisdiction before this Court in relation to the current
proceedings.
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Signed By:SWATI
MAYEE SAHU
Signing Date:31.03.2026
14:54:49
136. Accordingly, IA No. 40421/2024 under Order VII Rule 10 read with
Section 151 of the CPC is dismissed.
Plaintiff’s entitlement to the relief of injunction
137. The Plaintiff is recognised as the exclusive copyright owner of the
Original Works under the Assignment Deed executed by Sangeetha in
perpetuity. The Defendants have acknowledged their use of the Original
Works in the Impugned Film without obtaining a licence from the Plaintiff,
thereby constituting prima facie copyright infringement. Given that the
Defendants have not satisfactorily established any applicable defences as
discussed above, the result of this infringement is that they must be
restrained from using the Original Works in the Impugned Film.
138. The Defendants have not provided adequate justification for their
unauthorised use of the Original Works and failed to demonstrate the
absence of a requirement for a licence from the Plaintiff. Notably, the
Defendants initially approached the Plaintiff to obtain a licence for the
copyright in the Original Works. However, their actions following the
Plaintiff’s quotation of the licence fee indicate deliberate infringement,
citing the fee’s alleged excessiveness and delayed communication as
justifications. Furthermore, the Defendants’ assertion regarding the
Plaintiff’s entitlement to grant a licence appears to be an afterthought and
lack merit.
139. Accordingly, the Defendants are liable to be restrained from using the
Original Works in the Impugned Film. However, since the alternative prayer
of the Plaintiff for grant of license was payment of ₹20,00,000/- as the
license fee, and the same having been deposited by Defendant Nos. 1 and 2
albeit belatedly, it would be sufficient if the same amount is directed to be
Signature Not Verified CS(COMM) 680/2024 Page 68 of 72
Signed By:SWATI
MAYEE SAHU
Signing Date:31.03.2026
14:54:49
disbursed to the Plaintiff in lieu of granting injunction against the
Defendants.
140. Therefore, to balance the equities, it would be expedient in the interest
of justice to direct the Registry to release the amount of ₹20,00,000/- to the
Plaintiff subject to the outcome of the present Suit in view of the alternative
prayer of the Plaintiff and the submission of Defendant Nos. 1 and 2 during
the course of the arguments that the Defendants may not be injuncted from
displaying the Original Works in the Impugned Film in view of the deposit
of ₹20,00,000/- by Defendant Nos. 1 and 2.
Willful disobedience by the Defendants
141. The Plaintiff has filed IA No. 40876/2024 under Order XXXIX Rule
2A read with Section 151 of the CPC and Section 12 of Contempt of Courts
Act, 1971 alleging that the Defendants have committed willful disobedience
of the Order dated 12.08.2024 as the Defendants actively committed the
contempt of the direction passed by this Court despite being fully aware
about the same.
142. It was submitted by the Plaintiff that merely filing an Application for
modification of Order dated 12.08.2024 does not justify non-compliance of
the direction contained in the said Order. As held in Samee Khan (supra)
and Tayyabbhai (supra), the contempt once committed will be punishable
even though the order which is not complied is subsequently set aside.
143. The sole explanation provided by the Defendants for their non-
compliance with the Order dated 12.08.2024 is their assertion of a bona fide
belief that compliance was unnecessary while the Application for
modification of the said Order remained pending. In their affidavit dated
31.10.2025, Defendant Nos. 1 and 2 asserted that there was no intention to
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Signed By:SWATI
MAYEE SAHU
Signing Date:31.03.2026
14:54:49
disregard the Court’s direction and expressed regret for any
misunderstanding resulting from the delay in depositing the amount as
directed vide Order dated 12.08.2024.
144. It is well-established law that filing an application for modification or
vacation of an order neither excuses nor dispenses with compliance with its
directions. The rationale advanced by the Defendants for their failure to
deposit ₹20,00,000/- pursuant to this Court’s Order is entirely misplaced.
The Defendants were fully cognizant of the requirement but elected not to
comply. Their position that they are not obliged to make the deposit in
compliance with the Order dated 12.08.2024 is untenable, as the claimed
bona fide belief regarding non-compliance during the pendency of the
modification application cannot be accepted.
145. The position adopted by Defendant No. 2 in the social media post, as
cited by the Plaintiff, indicates clear knowledge of the Order dated
12.08.2024. Nonetheless, the Defendants elected not to comply with the said
Order. This constitutes intentional and deliberate non-compliance, for which
the Defendants are accountable for contempt.
146. However, upon consideration of the Affidavit dated 31.10.2025
submitted by Defendant Nos. 1 and 2 expressing regret for their actions, the
Court is inclined to exercise leniency. Rather than imposing simple
imprisonment on Defendant No. 2 for contempt of the Order dated
12.08.2024, Defendant Nos. 1 and 2 are directed to remit an exemplary cost
of ₹5,00,000/- to the Plaintiff within two weeks to purge the contempt
committed.
147. Consequently, IA No. 40876/2024 is allowed in accordance with
these directions.
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Signed By:SWATI
MAYEE SAHU
Signing Date:31.03.2026
14:54:49
CONCLUSION:
148. In view of the above analysis, it is held that this Court has territorial
and pecuniary jurisdiction to entertain the present Suit. IA No. 40421/2024
filed on behalf of Defendant Nos. 1 and 2 under Order VII Rule 10 read with
Section 151 of the CPC for return of the Plaint is hereby dismissed.
149. It is held that the Plaintiff has the exclusive copyright in the Original
Works being the audio-visual recording, sound recording and underlying
literary and musical works of two songs namely “Nyaya Ellide” and “Omme
Ninnanu” being original and independent works and the Plaintiff’s copyright
had not lapsed on the date of filing of the Suit as per Section 19(4) of the
Copyright Act. It is also held that the Defendants’ usage of the Original
Works did not fall under the category of fair use and de minimis. It is further
concluded that the Plaintiff was not prohibited from issuing license although
not being a registered copyright society or a member of a copyright society
as per Section 33 of the Copyright Act and the license fee demanded by the
Plaintiff was not excessive, unreasonable or exorbitant and there was no
delay in communicating the same. Accordingly, IA No. 36229/2024 filled by
the Plaintiff under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 read with Section 151 of the
CPC is allowed and as the Plaintiff is held entitled to the relief of injunction
as prayed. Consequently, IA No. 22870/2025 filed on behalf of Defendant
Nos. 1 and 2 under Order XXXIX Rule 4 of the CPC for vacation of ex
parte ad-interim injunction granted vide Order dated 12.08.2024 is
dismissed. However, since Defendant Nos. 1 and 2 have already deposited
the amount of ₹20,00,000/- pursuant to the Order dated 12.08.2024, the
Registry is directed to release the said amount to the Plaintiff subject to
outcome of the present Suit within a period of one week in lieu of the
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Signed By:SWATI
MAYEE SAHU
Signing Date:31.03.2026
14:54:49
injunction against the Defendants from using the Original Works in the
Impugned Film given the alternative prayer of the Plaintiff and submissions
of Defendant Nos. 1 and 2.
150. It is held that Defendant Nos. 1 and 2 have committed willful
disobedience of Order dated 12.08.2024 and, therefore, they are liable to pay
exemplary costs of ₹5,00,000/- to the Plaintiff within a period of two weeks.
IA No. 40876/2024 filed on behalf of Plaintiff under Order XXXIX Rule 2A
read with Section 151 CPC read with Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts
Act, 1971 is allowed with the aforesaid directions.
151. Accordingly, I.A. 36229/2024, I.A. 40421/2024, I.A. 40876/2024 &
I.A. 22870/2025 stand disposed of.
TEJAS KARIA, J
MARCH 28, 2026
ap
Signature Not Verified CS(COMM) 680/2024 Page 72 of 72
Signed By:SWATI
MAYEE SAHU
Signing Date:31.03.2026
14:54:49